Nietzsche and Jung

The Whole Self in the Union of Opposites

Lucy Huskinson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• ISBN:
  9781135447106
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Mental Health in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Was Jung's interpretation and assessment of Nietzsche accurate? Nietzsche and Jung considers the thought and personalities of two icons of twentieth century philosophical and psychological thought, and reveals the extraordinary connections between them. Through a thorough examination of their work, Nietzsche and Jung succeeds in illuminating complex areas of Nietzsche's thought and resolving ambiguities in Jung's reception of these theories. The location and analysis of the role played by opposites in the whole self according to Jung is considered, revealing the full extent of Nietzsche's influence. This rigorous and original analysis of Jungian theory and its philosophical roots, supported by Jung's seminars on Nietzsche's Zarathustra, leads to the development of a fresh interpretation of the theories of both. The shared model of selfhood is put into practice as the personalities of Nietzsche and Jung are evaluated according to the other's criteria for mental health, attempting to determine whether Nietzsche and Jung were themselves whole. Nietzsche and Jung demonstrates how our understanding of analytical psychology can be enriched by investigating its philosophical roots, and considers whether the whole self is a realistic possibility for each of us. This book will prove fascinating reading for students in psychology, philosophy and religion as well as practicing Jungian analysts.

Chapter 1
Introduction

This book concerns C. G. Jung’s peculiar relation to the work and personality of Friedrich Nietzsche. Although the ambiguity that surrounds Sigmund Freud’s reception of Nietzschean thought has been widely reported and to some degree explained,¹ the sense that one cannot but have of the even greater confusion and contradiction that envelops Jung’s reception of Nietzsche has barely been investigated. Indeed, while Nietzsche’s anticipation of central themes of Freudian psychoanalytic theory – including psychological drives, the unconscious, guilt, repression, dreaming, wishing, projection and sublimation – has been extensively reported, and is generally agreed to be beyond doubt, Nietzsche’s influence on Jungian analytical psychology has received little attention, and even less by way of thorough evaluation.² This is surprising, almost embarrassing, as the similarities between the thought of Nietzsche and Jung are obvious. Indeed, Jung’s affinity with the German philosopher, and his acceptance of philosophical speculation in general, is used by him to criticize and dissociate his theory from that of Freud.³ For example, although Freud borrowed the Nietzschean term ‘das Es’ (translated in the English editions of Freud’s works as the ‘Id’) to refer to an unconscious source of energy, the nature of this energy is significantly different for the two thinkers. Jung, on the other hand, endorses Nietzsche’s conception, and for Jung this constitutes a fundamental difference between his theory and that of Freud.

Freud maintains that the unconscious consists of nothing but residues of the conscious mind that have become repressed. Simply put, this means that the value of the psyche is identified with consciousness or the ego. Nietzsche disagrees with this claim. Unlike Freud, Nietzsche recognizes that the unconscious exhibits contents that are wholly unlike those of consciousness and are ungraspable by the ego. A significant implication of this difference is that in Freud’s model the unconscious has no autonomy, for it is simply a product of consciousness, or a container of its remnants. In Nietzsche’s model, on the other hand, the unconscious is an autonomous entity that can function in opposition to consciousness. The Freudian understanding of the unconscious reveals a rigid framework of rationalism that gives primacy to the ego, which is in contrast to Nietzsche’s richer framework that recognizes other sources of knowledge considered irrational, such as emotion, imagination and intuition.

The difference between Nietzschean psychology and Freudian psychoanalysis is more profound than is often realized and, as we shall see in the course of this inquiry, it is unwise to regard Nietzsche simply as a forerunner to psychoanalysis. Nietzsche’s conception of the unconscious is not the ‘classical’ one adopted by Freud, among others, but is more like that particular notion of an autonomous and collective unconscious that marks the very separation of Jungian ‘analytical psychology’ from traditional ‘psychoanalysis’.⁴

By enlarging the boundaries of the ‘productive’ psyche to include non-rational sources of knowledge, Nietzsche and Jung have effectively enlarged the capacity for personal growth and creativity. Thus, while Freud’s understanding of the personality is essentially ‘reductive’, with its motivation being exclusively sexual, and with the communication of the unconscious having been filtered through signs, Nietzsche and Jung’s understanding of the personality is ‘constructive’, with the focus being on its potential – specifically, its potential for becoming whole – and so encourages unconscious communication through symbolic language. The difference between the sign and the symbol is significant in that the former is a conscious construct – a fixed reference that conceals something knowable – whereas the latter is in part conscious and in part unconscious – a dynamic living entity that expresses something that is not fully graspable. In the Freudian model, the interpretation of the sign simply leads to the unmasking of a repressed conflict or wish; by contrast, the symbol in the Nietzschean and Jungian model facilitates psychic growth by naturally uniting consciousness with the unconscious.

Nietzsche and Jung place the symbol at the heart of their interpretation of psychic development. However, to leave Nietzsche and Jung coupled together in this way would be inadequate, for the very meaning of the symbol, and its subsequent implications for psychic development, are different for the two thinkers. And this is where our inquiry begins. For we shall see that the contradiction and confusion that penetrate Jung’s reception of Nietzsche are rooted in his misunderstanding of Nietzsche’s conception of the symbol. It is Jung’s misinterpretation of the Nietzschean symbol as a mere conscious construct – a sign – that confuses Jung’s subsequent reading of Nietzsche. Perhaps more significantly, this misinterpretation allows Jung, who was personally troubled by the prospect of his own mental illness, to distance himself from the insane personality of Nietzsche – for Jung regarded Nietzsche’s madness (diagnosed by Jung as ego-inflation) as an inevitable consequence of Nietzsche having denied the creativity of the symbol.

Jung’s reception of Nietzsche’s work and personality is peculiar because, on the one hand, Jung readily acknowledges his debt to Nietzsche’s influence and the similarity of their ideas, but, on the other hand, he wildly misinterprets Nietzsche’s ideas. Now, it is not simply the case that Jung is a bad philosopher and so makes excusable mistakes in reasoning or interpretation; rather Jung overlooks obvious passages in Nietzsche’s work that immediately overturn Jung’s criticism of it. One has an overwhelming sense that Jung is purposely selective in his reading of Nietzsche. It is true that Nietzsche’s aphoristic style of writing, together with his avoidance of presenting one systematic viewpoint, easily lead to misinterpretation. It is relatively simple to find passages in Nietzsche that support or reject most philosophical outlooks.⁵ Yet in Jung’s interpretation of Nietzsche (which depends principally on Thus Spoke Zarathustra, a work that is not aphoristic but a continuous text) one has a distinct sense of Jung ‘cutting and pasting’ according to his needs, and of his own personal unease with some of the material presented in Nietzsche – material that Jung often skates over at an alarming rate. Furthermore, Jung’s denigration of Nietzsche’s personality and of his personal life in general is laboured and unnecessary, and often diverts the reader from Jung’s own argument. There is thus an interesting taint and ambivalence in Jung’s reception of Nietzsche. Consciously he can be seen to endorse Nietzsche’s views; here there is a sense of affinity, of wanting to get close to Nietzsche. And yet there is also a sense of rejection at an unconscious level, which expresses itself as an enforced difference in his misrepresentation and misinterpretation of Nietzschean theory.

Our inquiry will analyse in detail Jung’s ambivalent relationship with Nietzsche’s work and personality, and it will attempt to explain the reasons that lie behind the ambivalence. It will do this through a close examination and evaluation of what I consider to be their similar models of psychological health and illness. By first identifying aspects of affinity in their models, we shall be in a better position to see where Jung’s favourable reception of Nietzsche begins to waver.

I shall argue that, for Nietzsche and Jung, the goal or height of human health and potential is the realization of the whole self, which they refer to as the ‘Übermensch’ and ‘Self’ respectively.⁶ This achievement is marked by creativity, which is achieved by the cultivation and balance of all antithetical psychological impulses – both rational and irrational – within the personality, and it is in this sense that I shall refer to the whole self as a union of opposites. Specifically, the whole self comprises the dynamic syntheses of Apollinian and Dionysian impulses in the Nietzschean Übermensch, and consciousness and the unconscious in the Jungian Self. When the opposites fail to synthesize, or when only one opposite in the pair is present, Nietzsche and Jung warn of impending psychological damage.

A few paragraphs earlier I noted that, for Nietzsche and Jung, the symbol is a source of creativity; as we shall see in the course of our inquiry, they also regard it as that which mediates between the opposites, thereby enabling their synthesis. The symbol is therefore integral to mental health. Earlier I also mentioned that the meaning of the symbol is different for either thinker; later our inquiry will evaluate the implications of this difference for their models of the whole self. In particular, we shall see that the conceptions of the Übermensch and the Self diverge most profoundly by virtue of the different conceptions that Nietzsche and Jung have of where the symbol stands in relation to the interplay of opposites, and thus, how the personality should attempt to harness the energy generated by the symbol. According to Jung, the symbol is ‘a third thing’ that lies outside of the opposites; creativity must come from outside the individual, so that the whole self is a matter of discovery. For Nietzsche, however, the symbol is inherent within the opposites themselves, so that creativity is found within the individual, and the whole self is a matter of creation.⁷ It is precisely because Jung could not find a symbol operating outside Nietzsche’s opposites that he believed the opposites were incapable of synthesis, and that Nietzsche’s psychological breakdown or stagnation was inevitable.

The structure of our inquiry

We shall begin our inquiry with the location and analysis of opposites in the whole self according to Nietzsche and Jung. Part I will engage with the controversial issue of the meaning and constitution of the Nietzschean Übermensch and the Jungian Self.⁸ In Chapters 2 and 3 I analyse the development in Nietzsche’s thought concerning the validity of the concept of opposites, and try to explain why Nietzsche first accepts opposites that are metaphysical, aesthetic and psychological, but eventually recognizes only psychological opposites. Chapter 4 argues that the Übermensch is a whole self that seeks to configure (psychological) opposites into a union. In Chapter 5 I turn to Jung’s model of the psyche, and analyse the compensatory function of opposites, with reference to the alchemical coniunctio oppositorum. Chapter 6 argues that the Self is a whole self that seeks a configuration of opposites into a balanced union.

Part II examines the Nietzschean Übermensch and Jungian Self according to their similarities and differences. Here I shall begin to expose the ambiguous relation between the two models and the potentiality of a Jungian critique of Nietzsche’s model. Chapter 7 identifies the differences between the two models by examining the respective processes through which the opposites are united. I shall try to account for these differences by relating them to the avowed philosophical influences on Nietzsche and Jung. We shall examine the theories of opposites proposed by Plato, Kant, Schopenhauer, Heraclitus and Aristotle and contrast them with those of Nietzsche and Jung. In Chapter 8 I identify seven similarities between the two models according to the end-product of the process, that is, what results from the union of opposites.⁹ We shall consider the quality of the relationship between opposites; the value of completion over perfection, and its moral implications; the privilege and exclusivity of the union, and its political implications; the dangerous implications of the union for the personality; the particular opposites that are united; and the notion of the Dionysian. Also, not explicit in Nietzsche’s model of opposites but beneath its surface is Nietzsche’s anticipation of the fundamental tenets of Jung’s ‘individuation process’ and analytical psychology in general. In this chapter I shall ask whether these similarities reflect Nietzsche’s influence on Jung.

In order to expose fully the similarities and differences in the Nietzschean and Jungian models of the whole self, it is profitable to evaluate them from each other’s perspective. Thus in Part III I assess Jung’s critique of Nietzsche’s model and offer a Nietzschean critique of Jung’s model. Chapter 9 examines Jung’s criticisms of Nietzsche’s model and his subsequent diagnosis of Nietzsche’s madness, through an examination of his seminars on Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In Chapter 10 I argue that Jung’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought and his diagnosis of Nietzsche’s personality is flawed and based upon wild misinterpretations. Chapter 11 tries to explain why Jung might want to deny Nietzsche’s influence upon his own model despite their significant affinities. In keeping with Jung’s and Nietzsche’s insistence that the author is identified with his work,¹⁰ I put forward an argument about Jung’s psychological disposition, which I derive from an examination of SNZ,¹¹ focusing on those passages of TSZ he analyses and, principally, those he chooses to omit. In Chapter 12 I continue to enlarge upon the differences between Nietzsche and Jung by criticizing the Jungian model from a Nietzschean perspective. Part III, as a whole, will put their models of selfhood to the test by actively evaluating or ‘diagnosing’ the personalities of Nietzsche and Jung according to each other’s criteria for mental health and illness. In other words, we shall determine whether or not Nietzsche and Jung are themselves whole – whether the former can aspire to Selfhood and the latter to Übermenschlichkeit. This will enable us to consider in the concluding Chapter 13 whether the whole self is a realistic possibility, for Nietzsche, for Jung and for us. In Chapter 13 we shall also look to the future of analytical psychology and ask how Nietzschean philosophy might enrich its further development.

Before we embark on our inquiry, however, I think it is worth turning to a problematic issue that is central to it, but that will find resolution in the pages that follow. This is the notion of a union of opposites.¹²

Opposites as incommensurable

To help us in our examination of the interplay of opposites in the models of Nietzsche and Jung, I here sketch a view embodying commonly held conceptions of opposites, which has, as one of its consequences, the view that opposites are incommensurable and incapable of uniting to form a whole – a view that I shall employ as a comparison in the discussion of the two models. I term the view in question the ‘proto-theory’.

For Nietzsche and Jung, a self becomes whole when it dynamically synthesizes its antithetical psychological material. But in abstract terms opposites cannot be reconciled or united to form a coherent whole. Opposites are defined as such because they are incommensurable.¹³ To say they can merge is to introduce compatibility between them and to deny their essential contrast and conflict.¹⁴ We can thus put forward a theory of opposites, contra Nietzsche and Jung, in which a union of opposites is a chimera.

Opposites are required in the definition and identification of all things. Something is determined as what it is in relation to what it is not.¹⁵ Opposing elements define one another. Opposites are inextricably linked and cannot be separated, because they entail one another. Although opposing forces must be intimately connected in this way, they remain, at all times, at an incommensurable distance from one another in a relationship defined by contradiction. Moreover, there is no primary member in a pair of opposites. Since opposition is a symmetrical relation, to regard one side as primary would remove the notion of ‘opposition’ itself. In other words, for one side to be accorded primacy over the other implies that the two sides are not equally balanced in opp...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Preface
• Abbreviations
• Chapter 1: Introduction
• Part I: Opposites In the Whole Self
• Part II: The Potential Influence of Nietzsche’s Model On That of Jung
• Part III: Jung’s Rejection of Nietzsche’s Model
• Part IV: Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography