Africa's Big Men

Predatory State-Society Relations in Africa

Kenneth Kalu, Olajumoke Yacob-Haliso, Toyin Falola, Kenneth Kalu, Olajumoke Yacob-Haliso, Toyin Falola

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781351363716
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica comparata

This book spotlights, analyzes and explains varying forms and patterns of state-society relations on the African continent, taking as point of departure the complexities created by the emergence, proliferation and complicated interactions of so-called 'big men' across Africa's fifty-four states. The contributors interrogate the evolution of Africa's big men; the role of the big men in Africa's political and economic development; and the relationship between the state, the big men and the citizens.

Throughout the chapters the contributors engage with a number of questions from different disciplinary and methodological orientations. How did these states evolve to exhibit various deformities in their composition, functioning and in their relations with the societies that they govern? What roles did Atlantic and other slavery and European colonialism play in creating states that are unable to display the right and good relationships with citizens in civil society? Why did these forms of predatory state-society relations continue to thrive in Africa after the end of Atlantic slave trade and subsequent colonialism? Why did the emerging African leaders at independence fail to effectively dismantle the structures of exploitation and expropriation that were the defining features of slavery and colonialism? Who are Africa's 'big men', and what are their trajectories?

This book is essential reading for all students and scholars of African politics, public policy and administration, political economy, and democratisation.

Part I

Citizens, citizenship and state-society relations

1 The postcolonial African state and its citizens

Kenneth Kalu

Introduction

This chapter explores the relationship between the African state and its citizens, from the prisms of the postcolonial governance institutions that evolved in the continent following the attainment of political independence. After several centuries of Atlantic slave trade and subsequent colonial rule, African states began to gain political independence beginning in the late 1950s. At independence, African states inherited economic and political structures that were set up during colonial rule. Expectedly, these structures were the platforms for the take-off and subsequent administration of the newly independent states. Given that the political and economic systems that existed during colonial administration were not designed for the benefit of Africans at that time, but mainly for the interests of colonial Europe,¹ the structure and governance arrangements that formed the basis of independent African states were likewise not designed to promote the wellbeing of the masses, but to serve the African elites who took over power from European colonial masters.

The effects of Africa’s colonial experience in terms of exploitation and expropriation of Africa’s resources, and the foisting of extractive institutions that have continued to impede long-term growth and development are well documented in the literature,² and no attempt is made to rehearse these experiences here, except to the extent that they help to explain the nature of the institutions that evolved in postcolonial Africa. What became of African states after the attainment of political independence would suggest that Africa’s nationalists who championed the agitation for political independence wanted political independence for its own sake, without giving full thought to what to do with political power. The general mantra during the independence struggles was the need for Africa to govern itself, irrespective of how the desired self-government turns out for the states and their peoples. For example, the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana noted that “what we want is the right to govern ourselves, or even to misgovern ourselves”.³ In effect, self-government was seen as an end in itself, and not necessarily as a means to an end.

Although there is nothing to suggest that African nationalists did not mean well for the continent, the aftermath of Africa’s political independence suggests that the first set of African leaders who took over from European colonial administrators did not give serious thoughts to how the newly won political power would be used to advance society’s welfare. Specifically, there has been no documented evidence to suggest any rigorous process or even casual attempts by the first set of leaders of independent Africa to comprehensively dismantle the exploitative institutions that colonial Europe set up in the continent for the primary purpose of transferring Africa’s commodities to Europe. Again, and even more critical is the point that there were no conscious efforts to redefine the relationship between the state and its citizens after independence. It would be recalled that one of the defining characteristics of colonial government was a near complete detachment of the colonial authorities from African citizens. Colonialism represented a rule by force, with militarization and violence extensively used to generate submission from African subjects.⁴

The European colonial administration in the African colonies was not accountable to African citizens. The colonial officers reported to the home government and the native Africans appointed to assist European colonial officials under indirect rule were accountable to the colonial officers who appointed them. From all fronts, Africans were at the receiving end and the citizens were not a focus of government programs. Colonialism in all its ramifications was not concerned with developing institutions that would guarantee economic freedom or rights and privileges of the average African. The educational system in the colonies was not designed to develop a people that could stand and pursue developmental programs on their own. Rather, the system of education was designed to equip a few Africans with the rudimentary skills necessary to provide junior clerical support to the colonial administration. Similarly, the colonial administration instituted a unique economic system that was based solely on the extraction of primary produce for use by European manufacturing firms. Any associated developments such as the construction of roads and railways and the development of seaports were all provided as accessories to facilitate exploitation and transfer of Africa’s commodities for the development of Europe.⁵ The African farmers who were the primary producers had no control over what was produced or how the produce was sold. African producers were mere hands working primarily for the benefits of colonial Europe.

Following from this unique economic structure driven by primary commodities was a dual society made up of the “village” and the “city”. The commodities were mostly produced by peasants in the villages, collated by local commodity boards and transported to the nearest railway post for onward transfer to the nearest seaport. In Ghana, as in a number of other colonies, rural farmers felt cheated and exploited by the colonial economic system that paid the farmers much less than the worth of their produce.⁶ Conditions in the villages were and are still miserable with no modern facilities for decent living. On the other hand, the colonial masters built some infrastructure in the city, where the seat of government also resided. Government officials lived in the city and Africans who were fortunate to work for the colonial government had the opportunity to live in the city and enjoyed the lifestyle of Europeans, at least, to a certain degree. The city was also the center for trading in European goods that were being brought into the colonies. The creation of this dual society in the same country is part of the original foundations of institutionalized inequality that continue to define African societies to the present.

Political systems and institutions

Following the pioneering work of Douglas North,⁷ there appears to be some consensus that institutions are important in shaping the development trajectory of every society. North made the distinction between formal and informal institutions. Whereas informal institutions include the customs and traditions of any given society, formal institutions are the humanly devised structures that shape the relationships between agents and that define incentives and punishments for acceptable and unacceptable actions, respectively. North argued that efficient institutions that provide the right incentives for agents to make welfare enhancing choices are necessary for sustained economic development. On the other hand, inefficient and extractive institutions that increase uncertainties and associated transaction costs deter growth and development.⁸ Formal institutions, which include the systems of law and order, the judiciary, the civil service and the Police Force, among others, guide the actions of individuals, firms and government in any society. These institutions shape the relationship between private agents (individuals and firms) on the one hand, and the relationships between the government and private agents on the other.

A number of studies⁹ on Africa’s institutions focus on the relationships between institutions and economic growth in the region. These studies review the role of institutions in facilitating economic growth and in advancing democratic culture. Efficient institutions, such as fair and transparent legal systems help to reduce transaction costs that sometimes arise from uncertainties in commercial contracts. Similarly, inclusive institutions that protect citizens and firms from exploitation and expropriation by the government enhance the confidence of individuals and firms, and in the process make it possible for agents to play active roles in the economy. In the same vein, credible electoral processes with inclusive rules guiding the conduct of elections engender citizens’ commitment to the democratic process; and political institutions that emphasize and enforce checks and balances and the enthronement of the rule of law help to strengthen democratic accountability.

The focus of this chapter is on state institutions that shape the relationship between the state and its citizens. Douglas North elaborated on the “contract theory” of the state versus the “predatory theory” of the state.¹⁰ Under the contract theory, the state provides efficient institutions in the form of an inclusive economic system, efficient laws and contract administration, protection of lives and properties and a generally safe environment that enables individuals and firms to have a fair chance of attaining their potentials. In return, individuals and firms obey duly enacted laws and pay taxes to the state. Under the predatory theory, the state and its institutions are generally in the business of transferring resources from one group to another. The predatory state uses state institutions, including its laws and regulations, processes and government establishments to foster exploitation and expropriation of resources against the majority and in favor of a tiny elite.

Acemoglu and Johnson¹¹ examine the effects of property rights institutions on economic performance. They show that laws and processes that protect the citizens from government exploitation, that provide effective checks and balances on government powers; and a political system that places some constraints on executive powers have significant effects on short- and long-run economic performance. In simple terms, efficient property rights institutions help to protect private property, as well as the common wealth of the citizens from usurpation by government forces. The contrary is a system where the institutions allow or condone exploitative behavior by the government, either through the conversion of private property to government use or the transfer of public assets and resources for the private use of government officials and their cronies. Expropriation of public resources also includes the granting of undue privileges, such as mining rights, direct and indirect subsidies only to preferred individuals or groups, at the expense of the citizens. Institutions that foster these forms of expropriation in favor of a few are by nature “extractive” in the sense that they extract from what would otherwise be used to advance society’s welfare.

To appreciate the nature of institutions that exist in most African states, it is appropriate to explore the evolution of the state in Africa, with emphasis on how governance institutions were created. Prior to colonial rule, Africans lived in smaller communities with kings, queens and chiefs overseeing each community.¹² There was no centralized authority or power over large geographical areas, as the domain of each traditional society was limited to the extent to which the king could maintain effective control.¹³ It was not until colonial conquests that large geographical areas made up of different communities were merged into single administrative units. Formal transition of African societies into states with the characteristics of modern statehood, such as a defined geography, population and government, occurred mainly after the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885.¹⁴ At the Berlin Conference, the contending European imperialists formally divided up Africa into administrative units that were shared among the colonial powers. Subsequently, each colonial power pursued a system of colonial administration that suited its interests.

While the systems of colonial administration differed across the colonies, a common denominator across the African colonies was colonial administration marked by crass exploitation of the colonies for the benefit of the colonial power. The extent and specifics of these forms of exploitation during colonial rule are well documented in the literature.¹⁵ The European colonial administration in Africa had the primary motive of extracting Africa’s commodities for export to Europe. Consequently, the institutions that were set up during colonial rule were those that facilitated this form of exploitation. In a seminal paper, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson¹⁶ show that the system of colonial administration and the governance institutions that evolved were dependent on the type of colony in question – whether they are “settler” or “non-settler” colonies. In the “settler colonies” European colonial officials and other European explorers and businessmen chose to settle in those colonies. In such colonies, the colonial administration set up effective and inclusive institutions that enabled the European settlers to enjoy at least similar quality of life as was the case in Europe. Some of the settler colonies included Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. On the other hand, in colonies that were not conducive to colonial settlement, the colonial administration set up “extractive” institutions that basically facilitated exploitation of the colonies. Acemoglu et al. show that the nature of the institutions prevalent in the former colonies have a significant impact on the economic performance of the former colonies even decades after the end of colonialism.¹⁷ The extractive institutions that were set up in the non-settler colonies persisted, ju...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• Preface
• List of contributors
• Introduction
• PART I: Citizens, citizenship and state-society relations
• PART II: Civil society, identities and big men
• PART III: Democratic impact of predatory state-society relations
• Index