Human Ethology

Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351514446
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psicología
• Subtopic: Historia y teoría en psicología

With the discovery of conditioned reflexes by I. P. Pavlov, the possibilities for experimenting, following the example set by the classical, exact sciences, were made available to the behavioral sciences. Many psychologists hoped that the component parts of behavior had also been found from which the entire, multifaceted cosmos of behavior could then be constructed. An experimentally oriented psychology subsequently developed including the influential school of behaviorism.This first text on human ethology presents itself as a unified work, even though not every area could be treated with equal depth. For example, a branch of ethology has developed in the past decade which places particular emphasis on ecology and population genetics. This field, known as sociobiology, has enriched discussion beyond the boundaries of behavioral biology through its stimulating, and often provocative, theses.After vigorous debates between behaviorists, anthropologists, and sociologists, we have entered a period of exchange of thoughts and a mutual approach, which in many instances has led to cooperative projects of researchers from different disciplines. This work offers a biological point of view for discussion and includes data from the author's cross-cultural work and research from the staff of his institute. It confirms, above all else, the astonishing unity of mankind and paints a basically positive picture of how we are moved by the same passions, jealousies, friendliness, and active curiosity.The need to understand ourselves has never been as great as it is today. An ideologically torn humanity struggles for its survival. Our species, does not know how it should compensate its workers, and it experiments with various economic systems, constitutions, and forms of government. It struggles for freedom and stumbles into newer conflicts. Population growth is apparently completely out of hand, and at the same time many resources are being depleted. We must consider our existence rati

1
Objectives and Theoretical Bases of Human Ethology

The animal is taught by its organs; man teaches his and controls them.

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

Whether mankind considers himself the son of God or a successful ape will make a clear difference in his behavior towards actual facts; in both cases he will also hear very different commands from within himself.

Arnold Gehlen (1970, p. 1)

1.1 Inquiry Formulation and Definition

There has never been a shortage of attempts to define man and, by interpretation, attribute meaning to his life. For millennia, priests, artists, and philosophers have considered these questions. Religious revelation has often been contrasted with the efforts to gain insight into human nature through observation and introspection, that is, through experience and with the aid of reason. To this empirical-rational approach, biology gave new impetus with the theory of evolution, a theory that shook our anthropocentric perception of the world. Through evolutionary theory, man became aware not only of his animal heritage, but also of the reality of his incompleteness—man could no longer consider himself as the final “crowning achievement” of creation, but rather, at best, as an intermediate link on the path toward a higher level of humanity.

Of course, this new insight led to a new perspective of man, one of a progressively developing creature, setting ever higher goals and striving toward these objectives. But, at the same time, man became painfully aware that he travels on a narrow ridge, risks toppling off, and is burdened with responsibility, in as much as he accepts his further development as his mission.

If, for some, man was simply one animal species among others, a “naked ape” as Desmond Morris provocatively expressed it, others, in contrast, felt that man had progressed so far above animals in his evolution that he no longer had anything in common with them; that he had gone beyond the biological process of evolution by virtue of his culture. Man, therefore, was considered free to arrange his life in accordance with reason, without any limitations on constraints. These alternate viewpoints became unnecessarily polarized, for both approaches have validity. Biological inheritance determines human behavior, as we will show, in precisely definable parameters. But it is equally true that only man possesses a language, with which he can creatively formulate new statements and thus pass on his cultural heritage by tradition. Only Man can be defined as a cultural being even though some primates show some modest cultural beginnings. Art, reason, and responsible morality, as well as open-mindedness and adaptability, are further distinctive human traits, and no reasonable biologist doubts their special role.¹

It is important, however, that we are also aware of the more primitive action and reaction patterns that determine our behavior, and to not pretend as if they did not exist. It is especially in the area of social behavior that we are less free to act than we generally assume. This is poignantly demonstrated by the astonishing discrepancy between our ability to control the external environment and our inability to shape our social life satisfactorily. At the same time that we enthusiastically view the space photographs of Jupiter from the Voyager space probe, we read in our newspapers about executions in Iran, terrorist acts in Ireland, and mass murder in Kampuchea. Of course we should be hopeful for our future based on our potential for responsible morality, but this is possible only when we also recognize the inherited basis of our actions and take them into consideration. In this sense biology can contribute to our enlightenment and emancipation.

Human ethology can be defined as the biology of human behavior. Like its parent discipline ethology, it too is divided into specialties, since the question as to why humans behave one way rather than another can be defined and answered in different ways. If one’s interest lies in the function of the underlying physiological mechanisms, then human ethology becomes allied with traditional behavioral physiology. Here we are dealing with an explanation of the proximate cause of a behavior pattern. Inquiry is directed, for example, toward the stimuli that trigger specific responses, how the coordination for muscle action is achieved, what motivates and terminates behavior, as well as other questions. One can also ask how and why specific behavioral patterns evolved. In order to answer these questions, which aim at the ultimate causes, one must first understand in which way the behavior in question contributes to fitness, as measured by the number of surviving offspring. In short, one must establish its function, or in this sense its task. Experimental and ecological designs, including the study of the ontogeny, are used to answer this question.

The observation of behavior in the natural context is an important starting point for such an investigation. Whenever we encounter a structure or a behavioral pattern on a regular basis it is common sense to ask what that pattern’s function is, in other words to begin with the presumption that the behavior fulfills some task. It can, of course, be the case that the particular behavior under observation from a selectionistic point of view is either neutral or even a disadvantageous heritage, dragged along as a burden of history, or as a by-product of other adaptations. This is, however, only rarely the case. The various cost-benefit calculations used by sociobiologists constitute a promising new way to study adaptiveness; we shall explore this topic in a special section later in this volume.

Some functions are immediately obvious. If a paleontologist finds a petrified wing impression he needs no experimental procedure to state that this is a flight organ. Should one find the fossil imprint of a structure looking like a camera eye, i.e., with lens, glass body, accommodation structures, and a projection surface like the retina, the investigator can state that he found an eye, an organ used for visual perception. This statement can be made even if the organ was found in a meteorite and it was thus impossible to make any experimental verification of the structure’s function.

Questions about function and development can be asked for cultural behavior patterns just as they can for phylogenetically evolved characteristics. We emphasize this because one occasionally comes across the point of view that human ethologists deal only with the basic “animal” heritage in human behavior. This is false. We also investigate man’s cultural behavior. Thus questions as to specific adaptiveness can be posed both for phylogenetically and culturally evolved patterns and achievements from the biological point of view mentioned above. O. Koenig (1970) even coined the term “cultural ethology.” Excellent examples of the ethological approach to the study of cultural behavior include Koenig’s investigations on the biology of uniforms and the ethological analysis of soccer by D. Morris (1981). We must also correct the frequent equating of phylogenetic adaptation with animal heritage. This is unwarranted because there are many phylogenetic adaptations that are specific to Homo sapiens alone. Consider, for example, our innate propensity for speech or the expression of crying.

Human ethologists investigate complex behavioral sequences of individuals and of interactions among people and groups of people. They thus work on higher integration levels than physiologists, who are concerned with the elemental life processes such as stimulus perception, muscle contraction, and the conduction of nerve impulses. Although these processes are an important prerequisite to the understanding of behavioral events, one cannot deduce all the laws underlying any given social interaction from these elemental processes. Each higher level of integration has its own laws that cannot be derived from those of the levels below. Special emphasis must therefore be placed on the necessity of formulating questions appropriate to each level of behavioral organization.

Human ethology makes use of experimental and analytical methods of behavioral research developed in related disciplines, including techniques of data sampling developed in anthropology and psychology, such as, the interviewing of informants. From animal ethology we take the methods of nonparticipant observation, techniques of recording and documenting, and the comparative approach. Human ethology also places value in studying behavioral patterns in their natural context (Section 3.3) and thereafter proceeding to experimental analysis.

The theoretical basis of human ethology is critical realism (K. R. Popper, 1973; K. Lorenz, 1973, 1983). Hence, the basic assumption is that every “adaptation” reflects features of a reality outside the subject (p. 8).

In order to make objective statements about the real world, our perception must be capable of reconstructing this world from the sensory data perceived. In order to reconstruct the real world we must be able to recognize constancy, even under changing conditions. Special mechanisms of constancy perception as well as our ability to recognize configurations (Gestalt perception, Section 2.2.2) enable us to do this. Since these are phylogenetic adaptations, we can say that the constancy hypothesis is innate.

The relationships between reality, perception, and knowledge can be demonstrated by using a graphic projection model (G. Vollmer, 1983). If a cube is optically projected onto a screen, we can reconstruct it if we know its structure, the type of the projection, and the characteristics of the screen. In this manner we can accurately reproduce three-dimensional objects from two-dimensional projections on our retina. Even when we look at pictures, we interpret the objects portrayed on them in three dimensions. In the reconstruction of three-dimensional objects, the information lost in the projection process must be recovered. This takes place relatively reliably during the course of the perception process, with the exception of special cases, such as optical illusions.

Cognition can be seen as an effort to reconstruct the real, “true” structures of reality outside the subject from the sensory impressions perceived as projections of these structures. Thus we interpret the cosmic signals perceived by our sensory organs as projections of astronomical objects. That the interpretation of these projections fits the outer world is proved by the success of interplanetary space travel.

The ability to reconstruct a real world from sensory data presupposes a knowledge about this world. This knowledge is based in part on individual experience and, in part, on the achievements of data processing mechanisms, which we inherited as phylogenetic adaptations. Knowledge about the world in the latter instance was acquired during the course of evolution. It is, so to speak, a priori knowledge—prior to all individual experience—but certainly not prior to any experience (Section 2.1).

The process of cognition consists of a step-by-step reconstruction of an hypothetically postulated reality, a stepwise liberation from the limitations of our sensory organs (the “screen” …). This reconstruction process works counter to the chain of projections. While each projection effectively reduces information, in the process of cognition we attempt a reconstruction. Naturally, such a reconstruction must remain partial and hypothetical” (G. Vollmer, 1983, p. 64, translation of the German original).

In recent years, promising relationships have developed with other disciplines of human behavior and human culture. In this book we will discuss the work of many researchers who would not regard themselves as ethologists, but whose findings are ethologically relevant. This holds true for psychologists as well as ethnologists, sociologists, political and legal scientists, and art historians.

A particularly close relationship exists with ethnologists and social anthropologists (E. Goffman, 1963, 1967; K. Jettmar, 1973; M. Godelier, 1978; H. Schindler, 1980). Common interests arise from comparative cultural work and from a mutual interest in the general, universal laws of human behavior, as demonstrated, for example, by the structuralism of C. Lévi-Strauss (p. 517). These relationships are so varied that they cannot all be cited here. Our common interests touch on questions of early childhood development and socialization, societal structure, hierarchical organization, aggression, ethical norms, and many more. Ties also exist with psychology and sociology. We will cite specific examples of this in the discussion of these themes. There are further common interests with linguistics, both at the level of concept formation and that of speech itself (p. 523). There have long been mutual relationships with medicine, especially psychiatry and psychoanalysis (D. Ploog, 1964, 1966, 1969; J. Bowlby, 1969, 1973). The growing interest in ethological findings by political scientists is noteworthy. In America, biopolitics has developed as a new discipline (R. D. Alexander, 1979; C. Barner-Bárry, 1983; P. A. Corning, 1981, 1983b; H. Flohr and W. Tönnesmann, 1983; R. D. Masters, 1976, 1981b, c; G. Schubert, 1973, 1975, 1983b; A. Somit, 1976; A. Somit and R. Slagter, 1983). Art history and archeology have also been inspired by findings from ethology (D. Fehling, 1974; G. C. Rump, 1978, 1980; M. Schuster and H. Beisl, 1978).

Summary 1.1

Human ethology can be defined as the biology of human behavior. The research objectives are the elucidation of the physiological mechanisms underlying behavior, the discovery of the functions fulfilled by behavioral patterns and thus the unveiling of the selective pressures to which the behavior in question owes its existence, and, finally, the investigation of behavioral development in ontogeny, phylogeny, and cultural history, with emphasis on the question as to how and to what extent Man became programmed to act through phylogenetically acquired adaptations or by learning during individual ontogeny. Human ethology makes use of the concepts and methods developed in animal ethology, but adapts them to the special requirements associated with the unique position of man within the Animal Kingdom. Methodological techniques are also utilized from the related disciplines of psychology, anthropology, and sociology. Through points of mutual interest human ethology thus endeavors to bridge the gap between the different human sciences. Human ethologists study not only the phylogenetically evolved behavior of man but also its individual and cultural modifiability. Critical realism is the epistemological basis of human ethology.

Oh, great star! What would you be, had you not those on which to shine?

Friedrich Nietzsche (from Zarathustra’s prologue)

1.2 Phylogenetic and Cultural Adaptation

Life is defined today as an energetic process during which organisms, bearers of this process, extract more potential energy from their environment than they must expend in the acquisition of this energy. In other words, organisms are energy-acquiring systems with a positive energy balance. H. Hass (1970), the first to clearly formulate this concept to my knowledge, originated the term “Energon” for such energy-acquiring systems. The life processes are maintained by the multiplicity of organisms and by those energy-acquiring systems developed by them. Although we can trace the development of the process throughout evolution, we have yet to understand its ultimate causes.

The energetic process presupposes structures at its disposal that are “adapted” to the appropriate energy transformations. Each organism must possess structures with which it can extract energy from the environment. These structures are adapted to the appropriate energy sources, that is, they are so constructed that they can tap the specific energy sources and thus aid in the maintenance of the energy-acquiring system.

The environment is not only the source of energy but also the source of a multitude of interfering and even harmful influences against which the organism must protect itself. Organisms must also repair damage and be able to transform their positive energy balance into the procreation of their species. In short, there are a multitude of adaptations that require energy investment, such as reproduction, growth, protection, and similar tasks, which enter the balance as costs (H. Hass, 1970).

Since organisms live in an ever-changing environment, they must be able to modify their adaptations in response to these changes. This may even require changes in their basic construction. Furthermore, there are a variety of changes to which an organism must continually adapt during its lifetime. Thus it must be able to institute short-term, reversible changes in response to temporary environmental changes. The musculature and circulatory systems must be able to adapt to new stresses, and calluses must be able to form on the skin in response to pressure. Finally, an animal must be able to learn from experience in such a way that it modifies its behavior adaptively. Adaptive here refers to fitness as measured by reproductive success or, ultimately, the propagation of the genes of the individual in question (see inclusive fitness, p. 92).

Adaptation is thus a central problem for all organisms. Since the entire nature-nurture controversy centers around the question of the source of adaptation, we will add a few basic remarks about this subject here.

Adaptations depict features of the environment relevant to survival. They reflect facets of the external reality, such as, characteristics of the energy source they tap or the environment in which they move. Thus, certain characteristics of water are reflected in the anatomy of fishes and dolphins, by adaptations that are functionally related to the movement of these organisms in this medium. This is what is meant when we say that an adaptation reflects features of the environment. The degree of detail and exactness in which an adaptation depicts the outer world varies from case to case since it is determined by function. The organism only reflects characteristics of the environment relative to fitness and not every detail of the environment. However, the match can be amazingly complete, as for example in the case of mimicry, in which a mimic imitates its model even down to the smallest details. The leaf insects, for example, mimic the leaves of the shrubs on which they live. Interesting examples of mimicry are reviewed in W. Wickler (1968).

K. Lorenz (1941, 1973) has made a significant contribution to the question of what constitutes reality in his biological epistemology. In our adaptations we do not depict the external world—pictorially (iconically), but our thought processes and our perceptual capabilities fit as adaptations in the same way as do our physical characteristics. “Our cognitive and perceptual categories, given to us prior to individual experience, are adapted to the environment for the same reasons that the horse’s hoof is suited for the plains before the horse is born, and the fin of a fish is adapted for water before the fish hatches from its egg” (K. Lorenz, 1941, p. 99, translation of the German original).

The adaptations of an organisms, w...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication Page
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Mirror-Image Illustrations
• 1 Objectives and Theoretical Bases of Human Ethology
• 2 Basic Concepts of Ethology
• 3 Methodology
• 4 Social Behavior
• 5 Intraspecific Aggression: Conflict and War
• 6 Communication
• 7 Behavior Development (Ontogeny)
• 8 Man and his Habitat: Ecological Considerations
• 9 The Beautiful and True: The Ethological Contribution to Aesthetics
• 10 Biology’s Contribution to Ethics
• Bibliography
• Film Publications
• Author Index
• Subject Index