Lebanon

The Politics of a Penetrated Society

Tom Najem

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781134479115
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

In a time of great political change and unrest in the Middle East, this highly topical text offers a succinct account of the contemporary political environment in Lebanon. Tom Najem provides both a developed understanding of the pre-civil war system and an analysis of how circumstances resulting from the civil war combined with essential pre-war elements to define politics in Lebanon.

Systematically exploring Lebanon's history, society and politics, the author stresses the importance of the crucial role of external actors in the Lebanese system. The analysis encompasses:

• 
  
  

• the formation of the state
• weaknesses and dynamics of the Lebanese state
• the civil war
• post-war government and change
• the Lebanese economy
• foreign policy.

Written in a clear and accessible manner, this book fills a conspicuous gap in the existing academic literature on Lebanon. It will be of interest not only to students of international politics and Middle East studies, but also to anyone travelling in or wanting to learn more about the region.

1

The Formation of the Modern Lebanese State

Many of the state institutions that continue to characterise the Lebanese political system to this day actually date back to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, most scholars would agree that the key event in the formation of the modern system took place in 1943, when leaders from two of Lebanon’s major sectarian communities, the Maronite Christians and the Sunni Muslims, agreed to a political arrangement that became known as the National Pact. This agreement essentially established a framework for power-sharing and cooperation that would make it possible for the country’s many and deeply divided sectarian groups to govern collectively. From the end of the First World War, the country had effectively been governed by the French, but developments during the Second World War set the stage for Lebanese independence and prompted the major sectarian leaders to prepare for self-government. As events developed, the framework established by the National Pact would become the fundamental blueprint for the independent Lebanese state, and would continue to function until 1975. By that time, a combination of internal and external pressures had made the system unsustainable, and a long and disastrous civil war ensued.

This chapter serves two basic functions. First, it provides necessary historical background on important developments prior to the civil war period. Second, and more importantly, it explains the nature and workings of the pre-war political system and considers the reasons for its ultimate failure. The chapter is organised along chronological and thematic lines, and is divided into three main sections.

In the first section, I examine the origins of the Lebanese nation state, beginning with the Ottoman period (prior to 1860), proceeding through the establishment of an autonomous Lebanese entity, the mutasarrifiyya (1860–1918), and concluding with the French mandate period (1919–46). I then look at the National Pact in some detail, focusing on the underlying issues and divisions it was intended to address.

In the second section, I examine the function of the Lebanese political system from 1943 to 1975. First, I look at the main features of the political order, particularly its unique blend of confessionalism and neo-patrimonialism and the workings of its “consociational democracy”. I then provide a chronological overview of the major political and economic developments during this period.

Finally, in the third section, I consider the factors that brought about the collapse of the Lebanese system and led to the civil war. I begin by presenting an overview of the different schools of thought concerning this issue, and then present my own analysis concerning the key causal factors.

1.1 The birth of the Lebanese state

The Seeds of Modern Lebanon (up to 1860)

Prior to the First World War, the territories that make up present-day Lebanon had long been part of the once-mighty Ottoman Empire (1288–1923), which, at the height of its power, stretched across the Middle East, Asia and parts of Southern and Eastern Europe. The empire was ethnically and religiously diverse, and used a range of methods to govern the territories under its control. In Lebanon, the Ottomans relied, for the most part, on local feudal leaders and powerful families to rule the area. In return for providing both allegiance and taxes to the Ottomans, these elements were permitted some autonomy in local matters. This was particularly the case in remote mountainous regions. These were of limited strategic interest in any case, and the Ottomans would have found it difficult to control them otherwise. Tensions between the central authorities and local leaders occurred often, as each would use opportunities to increase their own power at the expense of the other. For example, local leaders were often able to exercise considerable autonomy during periods of Ottoman weakness.

Another feature of Ottoman administration that was particularly significant with respect to Lebanon was the so-called “millet system”, which governed legal relations between the majority (Sunni Muslim) and minority religious groups. Effectively, the millet system accorded the religious minorities a relatively autonomous legal and cultural status. For example, Christians and other minority sects were entitled to make their own arrangements with respect to religious practice, marriage and family law, inheritance, education, and so on. Lebanon, due to the Crusades and other historical and geographical circumstances, had a much higher concentration of minority sects than most parts of the empire. There were large numbers of Christians, including Maronite Catholics, Greek Catholics and Greek Orthodox, as well as other non-Muslim and Muslim minorities such as Druze, Jews and Shiites. Thus, over time, some sectarian communities gradually developed their own sense of cultural, and ultimately political, identity within the broader Ottoman framework.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, and throughout the nineteenth century, the influence of the Ottoman Empire declined significantly in comparison with the emerging European colonial powers. Due largely to the growing importance of international trade, the decentralised nature of Ottoman administration, and the growing aspirations of ethnic and religious minority groups, the empire’s relative weakness in the international sphere had grave internal implications.

For one thing, beginning in 1569, successive Ottoman governments negotiated a series of treaties with European powers known as “capitulations”. These treaties gave European merchants, traders and diplomats ever-increasing freedom to operate within Ottoman borders, to the extent that, by the eighteenth century, such elements were able to operate almost completely outside the bounds of normal Ottoman laws. This, along with the growing volume and importance of trade, provided an important lever that the European states were able to use to undermine Ottoman central authority to their own advantage.

The decentralised nature of Ottoman administration also contributed to growing European influence within the empire, as autonomous local leaders in the Ottoman provinces were largely free to negotiate their own trade and diplomatic agreements with foreign governments. For their part, the Europeans were able to use such agreements to advance their own political, strategic and economic objectives in Ottoman regions. In addition, the local leaders and the ethnic, cultural and religious interests they represented were able to use the agreements to increase their autonomy from central government control.

The Ottoman central authorities made a number of attempts to reform the empire as it became more and more susceptible to the external and internal pressures that these developments were generating. However, for various reasons, they were unable to prevent European penetration and halt their own, ultimately terminal, decline. Thus, during the course of the 1800s and 1900s, the Ottomans lost de facto and/or de jure control of many of their provinces in North Africa and Eastern Europe. Significant occurrences in Lebanon at this time were part of a general and intensifying trend.¹

Throughout the early and mid-nineteenth century, internal tensions were on the increase in the Ottoman provinces that make up present-day Lebanon and Syria, particularly in the region of Mount Lebanon. What may have started as class-related disputes between peasants and landowners ultimately took on a sectarian character, with the result that the Druze and Maronite communities became increasingly hostile to each other. By 1860, the situation became a fully fledged war that spread throughout the surrounding provinces and involved the local sects in a wider Christian–Muslim conflict. This naturally prompted action from the Ottoman central authorities and also attracted significant attention and concern in Europe, particularly in France, which had by this time cultivated close relations with the Maronite community. Indeed, the French dispatched an expeditionary military force to the region to protect the Christian element. After the conclusion of the conflict, the European powers, essentially at the behest of the Maronites, induced the Ottomans to allow for the creation of an autonomous political entity in Mount Lebanon. This entity, known as the mutasarrifiyya, was overwhelmingly Christian, and its security was guaranteed by the five great European powers (France, Britain, Prussia, Russia and Austria-Hungary).²

The Mutasarrifiyya (1860–1918)

From 1860 until the end of the First World War, the mutasarrifiyya began to lay the foundations of a Lebanese national consciousness, albeit one strongly influenced by European penetration and dominated by the Christian worldview and Christian political, economic and cultural priorities. Although the mutasarrifiyya continued to contain a diverse mix of sects, the Christians, and particularly the Maronites, made up a considerable majority of the population during this period.

From a political perspective, Mount Lebanon ostensibly continued to function as part of the broader Ottoman Empire. In practice, however, the influence of the central Ottoman authorities was very limited. The region was administered by a Christian governor (mutasarrif ) from outside the entity, with a sort of consultative council including representatives from all of the sectarian groups. It maintained a strong European orientation with particularly visible economic, cultural and diplomatic ties to France. At the same time, largely as a consequence of this orientation, the Ottoman and Muslim character of the region became somewhat muted.

Economically, the mutasarrifiyya forged increasing links with the emerging capitalist economies of the West throughout this period. Naturally, the Christians were able to use their strong European and New World ties to begin to exercise a decisive advantage over the other sects. This advantage was intensified by the ability and willingness of the Christians to establish emigrant communities throughout the Western world.

From the cultural standpoint, the education system was heavily influenced by the French model, and by French language and culture more generally. The emerging Lebanese press and publishing houses were also heavily influenced by European models and standards. Religious links with the Catholic European states, especially France and Italy, also increased. It is also worth noting that the political influence of the Maronite Church began to increase significantly after 1860.³

The French Mandate Period (1919–46)

The conclusion of the First World War saw the final dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. While what remained of the Ottoman central government formed the basis of the modern Turkish state, the vast majority of Ottoman territory was divided into regions with different types of official political standing. Some parts of the empire, such as the Arabian peninsula, were granted independence immediately. Other parts were classified as European colonies. However, most of the territory was placed under the control of the victorious European states through legal “mandates” initially issued at the San Remo Conference in 1920 and formally ratified by the new League of Nations organisation in 1922. Ostensibly, the function of the mandatory authorities was to prepare the territories for full independence. However, the duration of the mandates was never specified, and, in practice, they were granted to the European powers that already exercised military control on the ground in the respective territories. There was no mechanism to establish when a territory would be deemed ready for independence, and for the most part, the European powers continued to rule until the Second World War redefined geo-political realities to make the mandate system unsustainable.

The Creation of Le Grand Liban

The mandate for Syria and Lebanon was granted to France. As part of this arrangement, the autonomous Lebanese entity was significantly expanded to Le Grand Liban, a territory that basically included the whole of present-day Lebanon. In short, the mandate established the borders of the modern state.

The creation of Le Grand Liban was extremely controversial. It was primarily a Maronite initiative, but it was ultimately supported by the French in the League of Nations and thereby gained international sanction. The Maronite community had been gaining increasing political influence since the creation of the mutasarrifiyya in 1860. As the most natural and reliable allies of the French within the mandated territories, they were in a good position to advance their long-term interests. By this point in time, these had come to include greater territorial, economic and political aspirations.

The underlying logic of the territorial expansion plan was that, if there were to be an independent state of Lebanon at all, it must be constructed as an economically viable entity with a port, an agricultural base and established territorial and infrastructural links to surrounding states. While this was undeniably a valid argument, it did not take account of some very significant potential obstacles. The first of these was that the majority of the people in the territory who were directly affected, Sunni Muslims in particular, had no desire to be incorporated into an entity with a strong European and Christian orientation.

Naturally, this fact would inevitably generate a number of critical issues with respect to the legitimacy and function of the country. Would it be possible to create a national identity that could be embraced by all citizens of the new state irrespective of sectarian allegiances and cultural affinities? Furthermore, how would the political system account for the demographic balance of sharply divided confessional communities in the society? For example, while many Christians would presumably be happy to embrace an independent Lebanon closely allied with the West, the aspirations of many Arab Muslims were oriented towards the creation of a large Arab state incorporating Arabia, Iraq, Palestine and Syria, as well as the proposed Lebanese state. While the Christian elements wanted to secure an indefinite political predominance, the other sects clearly would prefer a system designed to take advantage of long-term demographic shifts that might favour them.⁴

A second problem was that the Arab world as a whole, and especially Syria, were opposed to the scheme. Arab opposition was based for the most part in broader Arab nationalist aspirations. Syrian opposition drew on pan-Arab issues, but also had a more specific and self-interested character. In effect, of course, the creation of Le Grand Liban would significantly reduce Syrian territory, especially coastal territory, and would rob it of its major Mediterranean ports.

It should be noted that there were some leaders, both in France and in the Maronite community, who foresaw these problems, and had serious reservations about the proposed territorial expansion as a result. However, those in favour of the plan exercised the decisive influence. It was implemented in 1920 and formally recognised by the League of Nations two years later.

The Institutional Foundations of the Modern State

During the course of the mandate period, the French authorities did take significant steps to meet their mandatory obligations by fostering the development of indigenous political institutions. Indeed, the institutional foundations of the modern Lebanese state were established by the 1926 Constitution. Although it was amended several times, this document essentially remained in force until the late 1980s. For the most part, the institutions were modelled on the democratic system of the French Third Republic, with a Chamber of Deputies, a Council of Ministers headed by a Prime Minister, and a President elected by the Chamber of Deputies. However, the Constitution also specified that the French High Commissioner, and not the elected representatives, would exercise final authority.

Another significant feature of the 1926 Constitution was that it formally reflected the reality of confessional divisions in Lebanese society by establishing a distinction between criminal and civil law. While criminal matters were to be handled according to a secular juridical model based on the French system, civil matters, and particularly personal status and family laws, were governed by the respective religious codes of law and judicial practice. This mirrored a similar legal distinction which dated back to the mutasarrifiyya, and even, to a great extent, the Ottoman millet system.

On the subject of confessionalism, however, the Constitution was probably even more significant for what it did not specify than for what it did. In short, no formal system was elaborated to account for the interaction of the different confessional groups in the political sphere. Therefore it is of paramount importance to recognise the fact that, even at this early stage, the Lebanese political system was characterised by critically important informal rules governing the balance of power among the major confessional groups. Although there was no formal written requirement, in practice, the office of the Presidency was reserved for a Christian, just as the mutasarrifiyya had always had a Christian governor. All of the sects were informally guaranteed some level of representation in the Chamber of Deputies, and so on. After the 1932 census, it became standard practice for fixed numbers of seats to be allocated in proportion to the relative sizes of the respective sects. For various reasons, the Lebanese state never conducted another census, and consequently the 1932 population figures continued to be used to determine confessional representation until the Constitution was reformed in 1990.⁵

It is important, at this point, to emphasise the crucial significance that these informal sectarian power arrangements would ultimately have on the shape of the mode...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Chronology of Lebanon
• Map of Lebanon
• Introduction
• 1. The formation of the modern Lebanese state
• 2. The civil war: 1975–90
• 3. The post-war political system
• 4. Post-war reconstruction and the economy
• 5. Post-war foreign policy: Syrian penetration and Lebanese interests
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index