Turkey

Challenges of Continuity and Change

Meliha Altunisik, Özlem Tür

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• ISBN:
  9781134446353
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Storia
• Subtopic: Storia moderna

The authors put issues relevant to Turkey today – such as consolidating democracy, dealing with economic development issues, improving its human rights record and its foreign policy – in an historical context, allowing comparisons with other late developers in the world and reflecting the complexity of Turkish political and socio-economic developments. Turkey also argues that the modernization process that started in the nineteenth century, with all its elements including secularization and Westernization, has taken root.

1 From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic

The origins of state formation in Turkey go back to the nineteenth century. During the last century of the Ottoman Empire the emergence of the reformist state in Istanbul and its reforms in the military, political, legal and economic fields amount to the beginnings of modern state formation. A parallel process of Western political and economic penetration into the region affected the implementation of these reforms during that period. These two contradictory processes shaped the political and socio-economic landscape within which the Turkish Republic was founded.

There was a significant degree of institutional, ideological and elite continuity between the Ottoman and the Republican periods.¹ Institutionally, the Turkish Republic inherited most of the ministries, high courts, public service institutions, civil and military educational institutions of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. Ideologically, the debates of the nineteenth-century, which mostly centred on modernisation, affected the debates in the Republican era and most of the main currents that emerged during the reformation period continued to prevail. Finally, the bulk of the elite who established the Turkish state had been part of the Ottoman civil and military bureaucracy. On the other hand, the transition from the Ottoman state to the Turkish Republic also signified a rupture in important ways, as the context had been dramatically altered. The Ottoman reformists wanted to save what was left from the empire and considered modernisation a tool with which to do this. For the Kemalist elite, however, there was nothing to be saved after years of war. Therefore, their task was to build a nation state out of the ashes of the empire in a much smaller territory, and for them modernisation was a goal in itself.

The emergence of the reformist state

At the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire, which had emerged in Anatolia around 1300 and, up until the seventeenth century, had held vast lands in West Asia, North Africa and South-east Europe, was facing serious problems. Shifting power relations between Western powers and the Ottoman Empire had led to military defeats and territorial contraction and a consequent increase in European economic and political influence. Important changes were taking place in the Ottoman economy as the world economy came to play an ever larger role. On the one hand, the empire was gradually losing its position as an intermediary in international trade; on the other hand, parts of the empire were becoming more integrated into the expanding world capitalist economy. The latter developments were slowly transforming the socio-economic landscape in those areas. In a parallel process, the central administration had lost most of its control over the periphery as a result of the increased assertiveness of local notables in the eighteenth century.² In the meantime the spread of revolutionary ideas from France gave rise to nationalism, first in the Balkan territories, then throughout the empire, and, thus challenged its political unity. All these developments in turn exacerbated the revenue crisis and created a sense of urgency in the central administration that unless improvements were made, the Ottoman state could not survive.

The reforms were therefore mainly designed to preserve the unity of the empire in the face of increasing internal and external challenges. Through a series of military, political and social measures the state tried to make itself more efficient. The first attempts to reform the state and state-society relations came from the sultans themselves. In the late eighteenth century Sultan Selim III (1789-1806) started the reform process, especially in the military field. The creation of a new standing army, Nizam-ı Cedid (the New Order), trained by Europeans, was mainly designed to quell the power of the local notables and to increase the military effectiveness of the Ottoman Empire vis-à-vis its external enemies. However, as a result of rebellious opposition from powerful groups, especially from the janissaries, the traditional standing army, the Sultan was deposed and his reforms were reversed. After a brief rule by Mustafa IV, the new Sultan, Mahmud II (1808-39) relaunched the reform programme. Faced with the challenge of powerful notables and nationalist uprisings in the Balkans, in addition to the challenge of his governor in Egypt, Muhammad Ali, the new Sultan had to start his reign by signing a Document of Agreement (Sened-i Ittifak) in 1808 with the powerful local notables to consolidate his rule, despite its being contrary to his centralisation efforts.³ Once firmly in control, however, Mahmud II went further than his predecessor and acted more forcefully in implementing several reform measures. His reforms mainly aimed to consolidate the power of the central government visà-vis significant social forces in society. During this period the iltizam (land tenure) system, which had opened the way for the rise of landlords in some provinces, was abolished. Second, the janissaries, the Ottoman army which served the state well for centuries until it became a source of power against the Palace, were disbanded in 1826, to be replaced by the new army. Finally, the administrative and financial independence of the ulema (clergy) was undermined by several measures, including the adoption of new civil and commercial codes structured like European ones and the increased control of vakıf (religious endowment) revenues.

During this period there were also attempts to adopt European forms of organisation in the bureaucracy to increase its efficiency. Institutions for the training of higher officials were established. Together with the reopening of Ottoman embassies in Europe and the launching of the Translation Bureau, these institutions performed a significant role in the training of the next generation of civil servants. Early reform efforts for ‘saving the state’ were based on two elements. The first was the acceptance of Western superiority that, the reformists believed, required Turkey to ‘catch up’ with the West by borrowing Western institutions and training, and creating an economic system based on the sanctity of private property. The second was the perception that the increasing power of the periphery relative to the power of the centre that had occurred in the eighteenth century in particular was to be blamed for the decline of the Ottoman Empire’s power, and this perception led to efforts towards centralisation.

The most important contribution of the limited reforms of the sultans in the early nineteenth century was to help the establishment of what Serif Mardin has called ‘the respectability of change’.⁴ In addition, the opening of new schools contributed to the reform process in the long run, as their graduates became the main source of recruits to the reformist civil and military bureaucracy throughout that century.⁵ In fact, the first generation of reformers was mainly comprised of the elite central bureaucracy, who had received a higher education either abroad or in the newly established schools. They started a new era known in Ottoman history as the Tanzimat (literally, reorganisation) that extended from 1839 to 1876. Like the reformist sultans before them, these bureaucrats were of the opinion that the re-establishment of a uniform and centralised administration was the key to ‘saving the state’. This meant, first and foremost, the redefinition of centre–periphery relations in the empire. In addition to the recentralisation of government, the first phase of reforms consisted of the modernisation of the army, reorganisation of the bureaucracy, adoption of new laws, reformation of the education system and attempts to strengthen the economy. The primary purpose always remained the reform of the state in order to cope better with internal conflict and external pressure. Most of the reform measures were first proclaimed in royal decrees, the Tanzimat Fermanı, issued in 1839, and the Islahat Fermanı in 1856. These decrees contained the promises of the central administration as regards administrative reforms, the standardisation of conscription and the equality of all the Sultan’s subjects, regardless of their religion. This last aspect was further underlined by the nationality law of 1869, which defined citizenship ‘purely on a territorial basis, unconnected with religion’.⁶ These reforms were much more extensive than the earlier ones and were also significant in that they showed the increasing influence of the outside world on Ottoman affairs. The decision to open up the Ottoman economy, signified by the signing of the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838, and the decision to grant extraterritorial protection to Christian subjects of the empire by the European powers were two areas where this influence was easily seen.

The earlier reform efforts were implemented to some extent but they could not be carried out completely. As is often the case with such significant transformations they soon encountered obstacles. Those with vested interests in the old system resisted. The Ottoman state was trying to steer a smooth course between European external interests and interference, on the one hand, and the various sorts of domestic opposition, on the other. This complicated the task of reform. In addition there was the problem of increasingly scarce economic resources, which made the implementation of reforms even more difficult. The trade agreements with major European powers, known as the Capitulations, had turned the Ottoman economy into an open market and the central government’s control over its finances was being rapidly eroded. In order to meet the expenses, the central government resorted to more coercive means of taxation, which contributed to the disruption of the ideological unity of the empire. For the same reason the empire also resorted to foreign borrowing, which eventually led to Ottoman bankruptcy in 1876.⁷ The external threat of dismemberment of the empire was also creating a negative atmosphere for change and putting the daunting task of preserving the political unity at the forefront of all other aims.

Finally, a very important challenge to the reforms originated from a growing sense of duality in the empire. The new ruling elite and its inability to reconcile its interests with those of most of the other groups in the society, coupled with the withdrawal of several social groups (such as the ulema and the sipahi (cavalry)) and institutions as a result of reforms, created a cultural cleavage. In the meantime, increasing signs of foreign intervention brought forward the issues of legitimacy. Therefore the Ottoman reformation process soon faced a dilemma. On the one hand, particularly through the establishment of a modern army and achievement of technological and economic development, the reformists aimed to strengthen the state. On the other hand, the changes the reforms brought in from the West in administration, education and law had the potential to undermine the state by challenging its traditional foundations. This dilemma led to a fascinating debate among the elites and intelligentsia as to how to reconcile these two aspects of reforms.

The most important response came from a diverse group of mostly young bureaucrats, the so-called Young Ottomans (or New Ottomans), who basically put forward the conciliatory thesis to tackle the issue of duality that started to exist in the Ottoman Empire with the implementation of reforms. For them what the Ottoman state needed was the incorporation of selected European institutions without totally undermining the traditional basis of the Ottoman political and social system. Therefore, they were not against modernisation per se but to the way the Tanzimat reformers perceived it. According to the Young Ottomans Tanzimat reformers were too conciliatory towards the West, which led them to internalise the West’s perspective of themselves and eventually to adopt policies that discriminated against the Muslims. In particular, the Western powers’ increasing utilisation of Christian merchants in the Ottoman Empire as intermediaries and their success in obtaining certain privileges for them, such as tax exemptions and immunity from Ottoman law, had fuelled the grievances against the Tanzimat reforms. The Young Ottomans were thus quite critical of what they saw as superficial modernisation and bureaucratic absolutism of the Tanzimat reformers and excessive foreign intervention in domestic affairs of the empire. The remedy for them was the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, which was also legitimised through the Islamic notion of meşveret (consultation). They also hoped that the institution of popular sovereignty would overcome inter-communal divisions and problems within the empire. A closely related concept was ‘Ottoman patriotism’, expressed in the ideas of vatan (fatherland), which underlined the loyalty of Muslims and non-Muslims to a geographically defined concept of fatherland and its ruling dynasty, the Ottomans. Finally, controlled economic liberalism that would open the way for Ottoman bourgeoisie constituted the backbone of their thinking.⁸

The Young Ottoman ideas for a constitutional monarchy began to find more support within a group of high-level bureaucrats when they saw the increasing autocracy of the Palace. The reflection of the reforms in the political arena was the adoption of a constitution in 1876 and the opening of a first Parliament in 1877. The commission that drafted the constitution witnessed a struggle between the reformists and the conservatives, the latter staunchly trying to safeguard the powers of the Sultan. The result was a compromise. The constitution reflected many of the ideas of the Young Ottomans, while at the same time jealously guarded the ultimate power of the Sultan. Due to a certain wealth requirement for those running for office, provincial notables and nouveaux rich were overly represented in the Parliament, which consisted of an elected chamber of deputies and an appointed senate.⁹

Even this limited atmosphere of freedom contributed quite significantly to the advancement of freedom of expression in the empire, which was reflected particularly in the publication of a variety of newspapers. In addition the notions of legality, equality and individual rights became part of the political discourse and the concept of Ottoman citizenship emerged. Representatives from different parts of the empire with different ethnic and religious backgrounds coalesced around the notion of Ottomanism. Elite and upper-middle-class provincial representatives from diverse parts of the empire came together for the first time to discuss issues ‘varying from the appropriate official language of the Empire to provincial reorganization, freedom of the press, tax collection, and Westernisation’, and in the course of these discussions ‘blocs not tied to religious and ethnic lines emerged.’¹⁰

This era of relative freedom ended rather abruptly when in 1878 Sultan Abdül Hamid II (1876–1909), using the humiliating defeat suffered against Russia as a pretext, suspended the constitution and closed the Parliament. This was the beginning of his 33-year rule during which the power shifted from the Sublime Porte to the Palace and he ruled with an iron fist with the help of the conservative Palace bureaucracy. The new period clearly signalled a change of approach with the end of the constitutional monarchy. The relative freedoms ended and were replaced by a rule that was intolerant of opposition and obsessed with security. The Sultan and the Palace bureaucracy were also inclined to use Islam as a source of legitimacy both in domestic and foreign policy and approached the West in a more cynical manner than had the earlier reformists. This was a response both to the increasing duality in the Ottoman Empire and to the accelerated process of internal dislocation and external defeat. Sultan Abdül Hamid’s Islamism had two objectives. Internally Islam was used to foster unity among Ottoman Muslims so as to prevent further disintegration. Externally the Sultan’s emphasis on his position as Caliph was thought as a rallying force for the Muslims outside the empire to be used as a balance against European interventionism.¹¹

Despite the disruption of the constitutional period, during the Hamidian era reforms continued particularly in the technical and educational fields. This was a reflection of the understanding that Western superiority rested on these two areas. There was a significant rise in government revenues, especially during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The Ottoman economy in general and Ottoman agriculture in particular grew at more moderate rates during these years, owing mainly to the strengthening of the Ottoman state and the austere policies pursued by Istanbul. Finally, during the Abdül Hamid era the empire witnessed the development of the means of communication, through the use of telegraph, railways and steamships, all of which contributed to the expansion of central control. Sultan Abdül Hamid was able to prevent further fragmentation of the empire, and the relative peace that prevailed during most of his reign ‘permitted the various internal processes of change to mature.’¹²

The conventional historiography of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire has regarded the Hamidian era as an aberration in, if not a reaction to, the reform process. In recent years, however, studies on this era came to characterise the 33-year rule of Sultan Abdül Hamid II as a continuation of the adaptation and reform process. According to this new characterisation his rule was a response to the ‘legitimacy crisis’ in the Empire that, in tackling that crisis, contributed in a more significant way to the ‘recasting of Ottoman identity’.¹³ This crisis was due to both the internal dislocations that were referred to above and also intense imperialist rivalries targeting various territories of the empire. The Sultan, therefore, sought to maintain the integrity of the empire like the earlier reformers while at the same time trying to restore some of the social dimensions of the traditional order. His formula was i...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• The Contemporary Middle East
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Tables
• Abbreviations
• Chronology of Turkish modernisation and the Republic of Turkey
• Preface and acknowledgements
• 1: From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic
• 2: Politics in the Turkish Republic
• 3: The Turkish economy
• 4: Turkey in world affairs
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography