Sino-Japanese Relations After the Cold War

Two Tigers Sharing a Mountain

Michael Yahuda

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781135009083
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Since the end of the Cold War China and Japan have faced each other as powers of relatively equal strength for the first time in their long history. As the two great powers of East Asia the way they both compete and cooperate with each other and the way they conduct their relations in the new era will play a big part in the evolution of the region as a whole.

This textbook will explore in detail the ways in which politics has shaped the thinking about history and identity in both China and Japan and explain the role political leadership in each country has played in shaping their respective nationalisms. Michael Yahuda traces the evolution of the relationship over the two decades against the framework of a rising China gaining ground on a stagnant Japan and analyzes the politics of the economic interdependence between the two countries and their cooperation and competition in Southeast Asia and in its regional institutions.

Concluding with an examination of the complexities of their strategic relations and an evaluation of the potentialities for conflict and co-existence between the two countries, this is an essential text for students and scholars of Sino-Japanese and East Asian International Relations

Chapter 1

Politics of history and identity

From the Mao era to the early reform period of the 1980s

Most writers on contemporary Sino-Japanese relations pay much attention to the historical legacy of Japan’s brutal aggression in Asia in the first half of the twentieth century and to the failure of the Japanese adequately to come to terms with the history of those atrocities. It is further asserted that until Japan does address that history adequately it will remain a running sore in Japan’s relations with China and the two Koreas. I will argue that such a view is too simplistic. A careful account of when and how animosity towards Japan in China came to be based on these historical charges will show that these took place because of changes in the domestic politics of identity within China, rather than because of a continuing sense of grievance stemming from when Japanese atrocities actually took place. To be sure there are many Chinese families who share memories of the wartime depredations of the Japanese, but it was the Chinese leadership which determined whether or not to make these historical grievances into public issues in the conduct of relations with Japan. The role of the leaders in authoritarian China has clearly been crucial in determining the extent to which public demonstrations can take place against an important foreign country. Whatever the character of individual and collective memories and the emotionalism to which they give rise, governments take other factors into account in their interactions with each other. The Chinese government, for example, at different times has chosen to downplay the question of history in its dealings with Japan. In the Mao period comparatively little attention was given to past Japanese aggression, but beginning in the 1980s and culminating in the 1990s and the first fifteen years of the twenty-first century, hostility towards Japan because of the history question reached unprecedented heights. Between 2006 and 2009, as we shall see in chapter 3, China’s leaders took a more pragmatic course of cultivating relations with Japan and they stifled possible anti-Japanese demonstrations and the media reported more objectively about Japan. However, in 2010 and again in 2012 the Chinese authorities encouraged anti-Japanese demonstrations once again, this time in response to what were regarded as Japanese attempts to enhance their claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea also claimed by China.

By the latter stage a gap had begun to grow between the popular nationalistic attitudes of the younger generation and the more pragmatic views of the leaders.¹ The evolution of these viewpoints, as I shall show, was greatly influenced by changes in the international system (notably the end of the Cold War and its aftermath) and by changes in the way Chinese and Japanese debated their respective identities, as well as by political changes in their respective countries.

During Mao’s totalitarian rule there was no social space for such grievances to be aired unless specifically called for by the leadership. Although there is now more social space for the airing of grievances and the government is interested in paying heed to public opinion, that space is still heavily circumscribed, especially in the foreign policy arena, and the authorities have means at their disposal to curtail, or even prevent, demonstrations not to their liking.²

Approaches towards Japan during Mao’s rule

As noted in the Introduction, Mao did not greatly emphasize his country’s grievances against Japan. In part that was due to his domestic agenda and in part to the international context. Upon the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Mao Zedong famously declared that the Chinese people have stood up and that never again would they be humiliated. He also placed the “New China” within the Communist bloc and pledged to develop a socialist system within the country. He neatly integrated nationalism or patriotism with socialism or communism. One of the main themes of his program was the emphasis on class struggle. Chinese history was rewritten to reflect the significance of class struggle as the main driving force of the country’s development.³ Modern history was written with the aim of showing that it was only with the rise of the Communist Party that it became possible for the Chinese people to overcome their feudal past, imperialist oppression and the “bureaucratic-capitalism” of the KMT.⁴ Only by building socialism, according to Mao, would the Chinese people be able to embark on the nationalist road to wealth and power that would make the country great again. In contrast to his successors, Mao tended to put the blame for China’s earlier abject condition during the “century of shame and humiliation” on domestic failures which made the country vulnerable to foreign aggressors rather than on the foreigners.

Mao sought to build the Chinese nation anew. Although he claimed that the Communist Party of China had played the main role in the defeat of Japan in 1945, he put the main stress of his historical claim to legitimacy on the defeat of the KMT in the civil war that followed, which culminated in the foundation of the new state, the People’s Republic of China, in October 1949. The KMT had been supported and armed by the US (albeit not wholeheartedly). Hence Mao claimed to have repulsed the forces of feudalism and imperialism as well as to having defeated the KMT in the civil war as his primary achievement. This claim drew strength and immediacy from the continued presence of the defeated KMT on the island of Taiwan, especially once it enjoyed the protection of the American Seventh Fleet from June 1950 after the North Korean invasion of the South.

Japan did not get off altogether lightly in domestic Chinese propaganda. For example, popular histories such as school textbooks, films and children’s comics all portrayed scenes from the war, with graphic depictions of the cruelties of Japanese soldiers. But the key point is that in most of these presentations the main emphasis was directed towards the alleged shortcomings and even betrayals by KMT stereotypes. The war with Japan was not depicted as a war between the two nations, but rather between the Chinese people and “the small handful of Japanese militarists” assisted by counter-revolutionary Chinese traitors.⁵ In other words, the “lesson” was to be prepared for betrayal by class enemies, especially in wartime, who would tend to side with the external enemy.

Throughout the Mao era (1949–76) class struggle at home was linked with the issue of the “liberation of Taiwan.” The presence of class enemies who might support Chiang Kai-shek was a constant theme of Mao’s rule. More broadly, class struggle within China was integrated with resistance to imperialism outside China. Children’s comics, films, TV programs and even Jiang Qing’s revolutionary Peking operas that dealt with the War of Resistance Against Japan consistently stressed the dangers of domestic class enemies who would betray the heroic resisters to the Japanese. In a rural context they would be depicted as landlords and in the cities as capitalists (usually singled out by the wearing of scholarly gowns and fedora hats), but they were all associated with the KMT.⁶

The link between the betrayal of the revolution at home and a sell-out to imperialism abroad was evident in Mao’s treatment of the Soviet Union after Khrushchev became leader. Mao’s argument was that the betrayal of the Bolshevik revolution came about after Khrushchev succeeded Stalin, when he began what Mao regarded as a series of revisionist policies in opposition to the main tenets of Marxism–Leninism. Mao instigated the Cultural Revolution by arguing that there were similar revisionists who sought to betray the revolution in China, leaders who were close to him just as Khrushchev “nestled” beside Stalin only to go against him after his death.⁷

Although the defense treaty with the Soviet Union of February 14, 1950 was targeted at “Japan, or any country allied with it,” Mao encouraged his countrymen to distinguish between the governing elite and the people. This was a distinction he applied retroactively, arguing that it was the government at the time and not the Japanese people as a whole, who was responsible for the war. Mao tended to lend his support to the leftist forces within Japan who supported the peace constitution and opposed the defense treaty with the United States. His aim was to try and encourage the Japanese to renounce their security ties to the United States. He welcomed the development of economic ties proposed by Prime Minister Yoshida at the end of the American occupation in 1952, as this constituted an open break with the American imposed trade embargo with China. In talks with the Indian Prime Minister Nehru in 1954, Mao referred to Japan as being “bullied” and its people as being “oppressed” (by the US). A year later he said that it would be “good” if Japan were to become “strong and prosperous.”⁸ Later in 1955 Mao told a delegation of members of the Japanese Diet that they shared a common interest in pushing away “the hand [of the US] weighing over our heads.” Then, in sharp contrast to what Chinese leaders were to say after his death, Mao went on to say: “In the past, ordinary Chinese did not like the Japanese; now we like you very much … The debts of the past are not an obstacle, nor are the present difference in social systems. Let bygones be bygones.” Mao added:

As you have formally apologized for the debts you incurred in the past, it is not reasonable to ask you for payments of those debts. You cannot be asked to apologize everyday, can you? It is not good for a nation to constantly feel guilty, and we can understand this point.

He then returned to his main argument about their common need to “make the United States withdraw its hands.”⁹

Given the significance of KMT-ruled Taiwan in Mao’s entire political strategy this favorable view of Japan was challenged by the continued links between some leading conservatives of Japan’s ruling LDP and senior members of the KMT including Chiang Kai-shek. This was especially troubling for Beijing when first, Prime Minister Kishi visited Taiwan in 1957, to be followed by Prime Minister Sato in 1967. Both were seen in Beijing as right-wingers who sought to establish in effect “two Chinas,” undermining the sovereign claims of the PRC. They were criticized for allegedly seeking to revive Japan as a military power and to oppose the PRC in conjunction with the United States with whom Japan’s security treaty had been renewed in 1960. The agreement with the US on the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1971 was seen as confirming these right-wing aims. It was then that Chinese propaganda began to warn about the revival of Japanese militarism and indeed Cultural Revolution leftists made great play with the issue. Not only was that at a time of the Cultural Revolution, but it was also when Chinese foreign policy was in flux just prior to the rapprochement with the United States. And it also reflected Chinese concern about Sato’s attempt to link up South Korea and Taiwan with the Japan–US alliance.¹⁰

All of these concerns dropped away in 1971–72, when Kissinger and Nixon agreed in effect to help China in its confrontation with the Soviet Union and also to stop challenging China’s claim to Taiwan. After recovering from the “shock” of being given only three minutes’ advanced notice of the announcement of Kissinger’s visit in 1971, the Japanese government was keen to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, which the United States, on account of its formal recognition of Taiwan as the Republic of China, was still unable to do. But Mao continued to distinguish between the pro-KMT right-wingers and others in the governing LDP. Japan’s Prime Minister Sato was rebuffed when he attempted to open negotiations for normalizing relations in 1972. The position of the Chinese government was thought to have played a part in the LDP decision to replace Sato with the more moderate Tanaka, who then proceeded to normalize relations.¹¹ On meeting Mao Tanaka immediately began to apologize for Japan’s aggression in the past, when he was apparently stopped by Mao, who said that he was grateful to Japan, for without the war he would not have been able to seize power. Mao also refused to consider the issue of reparations.¹² But the Chinese side did insist that Japan accept the Potsdam Declaration on Taiwan. The precise text of the joint statement was that Japan “fully understands and respects” the reaffirmation by China that Taiwan is an “inalienable part” of its territory. Although the Japanese position fell short of formally recognizing the Chinese claim, it did in effect constitute a retreat from the assertion of Japan having a security interest in Taiwan, as was stipulated in the Nixon–Sato communiqué of November 1969. The agreement with Japan allowed it to maintain non-governmental economic and social links with Taiwan and its non-official institutional representation on the island was to serve as a model for all other countries. The Chinese side also accepted that the Japanese side need only “acknowledge” rather than “recognize” the Chinese claim that Taiwan was an inalienable part of the PRC. In any event, the main issue for Mao in 1972 was to try and recruit Japan into his united front against the Soviet Union.¹³ Hence Japan was not required to renounce any key aspect of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of September 1951, which the Chinese government had denounced at the time.

Mao regarded Japan as another potential major ally against the Soviet Union and at one point he chided Dr. Kissinger for not paying enough attention to Japan.¹⁴ Japan, which had been so used to deferring to the United States on questions of security strategy, seemed little bothered by the “anti-hegemony” (read anti-Soviet) clause that was included in the document of recognition. But under later Soviet pressure they did try to resist Chinese insistence upon such a clause in the build up to the signing of a peace and friendship agreement in 1978. The issue typified the difference between China’s leaders, who did think deeply about security matters, and the Japanese, who by and large did not.¹⁵

The opening to China also provided Japan with an opportunity to redress the wholly Western orientation of its general policies and outlook. Ever since it began modernizing at the time of the Meiji restoration in 1868 Japan had been torn between considering itself as belonging to the West or to Asia. After its defeat in 1945, Japan’s orientation was to the West. There was never a concerted attempt to reach out to the new Asian governments in a spirit of reconciliation by acknowledging its past aggression and its moral obligation to pay reparations. These, it was claimed, had been dealt with by law in the framework of the San Francisco Peace Treaty by which Japan extended relatively small amounts of official reparations due to its relatively poor conditions at the time. Moreover, because these were tied to Japanese companies, they contributed to Japan’s post-war recovery as much as they helped the states in Southeast Asia.¹⁶ The recognition of South Korea in 1965 and the payment of reparations resulted more from American pressure than from any Japanese initiative.¹⁷ Nevertheless some Japanese ha...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1 Politics of history and identity: from the Mao era to the early reform period of the 1980s
• 2 The post-Cold War transformation: the 1990s
• 3 China’s rise and Japan’s decline 2000–12
• 4 The politics of Sino-Japanese economic interdependence
• 5 Partnership and rivalry in regional institutions
• 6 Strategic rivalry
• Conclusion: looking ahead
• Select bibliography
• Index