The Structure of Psychological Common Sense
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The Structure of Psychological Common Sense

  1. 128 pages
  2. English
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eBook - ePub

The Structure of Psychological Common Sense

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About This Book

Psychologic is a formal system and relationship within which psychological processes are defined. The language people ordinarily use to formulate, think, and talk about psychological phenomena is organized by Jan Smedslund into a set of propositions aimed at identifying the generalities which underlie human behavior. In this way, psychologic illuminates the conceptual system of psychology embedded in ordinary language. This book continues Professor Smedslund's search for stable theoretical structures to explain the meanings that are part of all psychological investigation.

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Chapter 1

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Persons

Note 1.0.0 Persons are individuals of the species Homo sapiens and can be regarded as natural entities. Psychology is the study of persons.
Primitive term 1.0.1 Person
Note 1.0.2 Persons are highly distinct entities just as organisms are. Although, normally, one person corresponds to one human organism, the phenomena of multiple personalities highlight the fact that an organism and a person are quite different concepts. In rare cases, two or more persons can be clearly distinguished, even though they are manifested by the same organism.
Note 1.0.3 Because psychologists study persons, and because psychologists themselves are persons, personal encounter is involved in every instance of psychological research and practice. Major parts of the present work consist of analyses of the preconditions, concomitants, and outcomes of personal encounters.
Note 1.0.4 When we encounter a person, numerous conceptual schemes are engaged. This chapter presents five of these dichotomous schemes, namely subjective/objective, intentional/causal, normative/neutral, reflective/unreflective, and reversible/irreversible. Person processes are always subjective, intentional, and normative, and they may be either reflective or unreflective, and reversible or irreversible.

1.1 The Subjective

Primitive term 1.1.0 Aware
Note 1.1.1 In encountering a person, we take it for granted that the person is aware of what goes on, that is, that the world exists for the person. We also take it for granted that the person's awareness is limited, that is, refers to only some of the indefinitely numerous parts, aspects, and possibilities of the world. The limits are both internal (limited capacities) and external (limited availability of information, given previous history and current situation). Because different persons have different capacities, different histories, and different current situations, what exists for them (their subjective worlds) also differs. Getting to know a person entails getting to know what exists for that person.
Note 1.1.2 What exists for a person includes not only everything the person can report, but also everything the person automatically presupposes or takes for granted. These presuppositions exist for the person and are built into his or her experience and acting. However, although they are subjective, the person may not be aware of that he or she has them. Hence, what exists for a person at a given moment is much more than what the person is aware that he or she is aware of at that moment. In order to make it explicit that awareness, as used in psychologic, refers to the entire subjective world, the following axiom is proposed (P is a person, X is anything):
Axiom 1.1.3 P is aware of X, if, and only if, X exists FOR P.
Note 1.1.4 Axiom 1.1.3 explicates part of the meaning of “P is aware of X,” namely that it is equivalent to “X exists for P.” One can determine what exists for P even in cases where P is not aware that P is aware of something. Example: A person always began to smile when the social situation got tense, and ceased to smile when the situation became easier. This was regularly observed by friends of the person, and one of them said: “Why do you always smile when people are angry?” The person became very surprised, but had to admit that it was true. Her automatic smiling showed that she had been aware of changes in the social situation, even though she did not realize that she was aware of them and that she responded to them in the way she did.
Note 1.1.5 In the preceding example, and in psychology in general, one must acknowledge the existence of three kinds of reality, namely the subjective, the social, and the material realities. The situation as it existed for the smiling person was her subjective reality, the aspects of the situation shared by the participants was the social reality, and the physical objects and events involved made up the material reality.
Definition 1.1.6 “Subjective reality of a person” = df “What exists FOR that person.” “= df” means “is by definition equal to”.
Definition 1.1.7 “Social reality of a community” = df “What everyone in that community takes for granted, and everyone takes for granted that everyone takes for granted, and everyone takes for granted that everyone takes for granted that everyone takes for granted.”
Definition 1.1.8 “Material reality” = df “What exists independently of persons.”
Note 1.1.9 What exists for a person, may or may not correspond to anything in the social or the material reality. Also, what exists in the social reality may or may not correspond to anything in the material reality and vice versa. Finally, a person may or may not be correct in his or her judgments of another person's subjective reality or of given social and/or material realities.
Note 1.1.10 According to Definition 1.1.7, even if something is taken for granted by all members of a community it need not be a part of social reality. It becomes social reality only when, and to the extent that, everyone also takes it for granted that everyone else takes it for granted, and that everyone takes it for granted that everyone else takes it for granted that everyone else takes it for granted. Time and location of events are examples of social reality.
Note 1.1.11 The mode of existing for someone defines a domain clearly different from that of natural science, which involves events and objects taken to exist independently of persons. The dependence of awareness on someone is a logical relation. Something cannot be said to exist for, if there is no one for whom it exists. On the other hand, phenomena which exist independently of someone continue to exist even if that someone ceases to exist.
Note 1.1.12 The assumption that someone is a person, hence, entails that a world exists for that someone. It makes no sense to think of a person for whom nothing ever exists. But, although awareness, in the sense of existence for, is a necessary characteristic of a person, it is not a sufficient one. Animals are also aware, but are not persons. Important distinguishing features of persons are described under the headings of normativity and reflectivity.
Note 1.1.13 Although a person must be capable of becoming aware of something, it is not the case that the person is always capable of this. In deep sleep, and under sedation, a person is not aware of anything. The concept of consciousness is needed to differentiate between states of a person with respect to capacity for awareness.
Axiom 1.1.14 P is conscious if, and only if, P is in a state in which P is aware of something.
Corollary 1.1.15 If P is not aware of anything, then P is not conscious. Proof: This follows directly from Axiom 1.1.14.
Corollary 1.1.16 If P is aware of something, then P is conscious. Proof: This follows directly from Axiom 1.1.14.
Corollary 1.1.17 If P is conscious, then P is aware of something. Proof: This follows directly from Axiom 1.1.14.
Note 1.1.18 The fruitfulness of the dispositional concept of consciousness, as defined here, lies in that if P is aware of something, then P can usually become aware of other things normally accessible to P's awareness. Conversely, if P cannot become aware of something normally accessible to P's awareness, then P may be expected not to become aware of other things, also normally accessible to P's awareness. In other words, if P responds normally to an ordinary event, then P can be expected to respond normally to other ordinary events, and if P does not respond normally to an ordinary event, then P can be expected not to respond normally to other ordinary events.
Note 1.1.19 One may distinguish between degrees of being conscious, from being fully conscious to being fully unconscious.There are also the specific distinctions between being asleep and being awake, between different depths of sleep, different degrees of sleepiness, and between being asleep and being unconscious because of a physical trauma or chemical agent. The sleeper can be awakened and the person in coma cannot. In what follows, these distinctions are not being further considered, and all persons are simply taken to be fully conscious. This entails that they are continuously aware, that is, that a world continuously exists for them.
Note 1.1.20 The distinction emphasized in the preceding discussion of subjectivity is between what exists for a person and what does not exist for a person. This distinction leads to usage of the terms aware and conscious that on some occasions differs from ordinary usage. Awareness of something here means that something exists for a person, whereas consciousness here refers to a state in which a person can be aware of things. Hence, it does not make sense in the present terminology to talk about psychological processes of which a person is unaware, because awareness is precisely the defining criterion of a psychological process. Later, I introduce another relevant distinction, namely reflective versus unreflective awareness, the latter referring to what in many psychological theories are called “unconscious” processes.
Note 1.1.21 A person's subjectivity is not something that can be observed but is something encountered. There is an unavoidable mutuality in encounter. I see (hear) you, I see (hear) you seeing (hearing) me, I see (hear) you seeing (hearing) me seeing (hearing) you, and so on. Hence, persons encounter not only material and social reality, but also the other person's unique subjectivity. There is always commonality in an encounter. Unless two persons share a sufficient number of presuppositions about meaning, they cannot get to know each other's subjective worlds. In research, the participant must correctly understand the meaning of the instruction and the researcher must correctly understand how the participant has understood this meaning. Subjectivity requires a unique methodology.
Note 1.1.22 We cannot avoid the category of subjectivity. We cannot live our lives regarding ourselves and our fellow human beings as merely objective, material entities. Similarly, we cannot avoid the category of social reality....

Table of contents

  1. Cover
  2. Half Title
  3. Full Title
  4. Copyright
  5. Contents
  6. Introduction
  7. Acknowledgments
  8. 1. Persons
  9. 2. Acting
  10. 3. Wanting and Believing
  11. 4. Feeling
  12. 5. Interpersonal Processes
  13. 6. Intrapersonal Processes
  14. 7. Personal Change
  15. Appendix A: Primitive Terms
  16. Appendix B: Definitions
  17. Appendix C: Axioms
  18. Appendix D: Presentations, Critiques, and Replies Concerning or Related to Psychologic