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QUEER BELONGINGS
The politics of departure
Elspeth Probyn
When we are sitting on the bank of a river, the flowing of water, the gliding of a boat or the flight of a bird, the uninterrupted murmur of our deep life, are for us three different things or a single one, at will.
(Henri Bergson; cited in Deleuze 1991: 80)
UP ON THE ROOF
It is the winter of 1994 when all of the east of North America froze and here I am in San Diego with strains of T.S. Eliot going through my brain: āA cold coming we had of it.ā¦ The very dead of winterā (1963: 109).1 The very dead of winter and Iām up on the roof with the harbour in front of me and the airport to the side. Still not totally sure where I am, I sit on the roof and watch the planes slope by. They angle by the two weird trees on the close horizon, then from mere specks they emerge in all their awesome materiality over me; bellies swaggering, lights flashing, they descend and are gone. This happens over and over and over again; the frisson of slight excitement each time smoothed away. From where I am, all is descending, arriving, returning. The only hints of leaving are the invisible roars from the space-off.
This seems like a very apt place in which to think about belonging. This most southern of Californian cities is a strange place of movements. Across the flight path lies the port, dotted with yachts, criss-crossed with ocean cruisers, the site of cargo ships coming and going. I navigate San Diego on bike, my trips constantly interrupted by canyons, by signs declaring āDangerā, āPeligroā, āNaval Propertyā. I ride along paths enjoying the feeling of self-locomotion, ignoring the refrains of friends who said āyouāre crazy, you canāt exist in southern California without a driverās licenceā. Frequently I am stopped, caught in a net of highways, halted before concrete channels of movement, fascinated and appalled by a place that constructs highways as lethal barriers to aliens crossing borders. In short, this is an appropriately strange place in which to consider belonging, a space that cackles with movement as people continually arrive, depart, are thrown out; some try to belong, some take their belonging for granted.
In turn, this reminds me that in common usages, the term belonging moves from ābeing the property of someone, somethingā to the sense of āfitting in sociallyā, ābeing a memberā, and that ābelongingsā designates āpossessionsā and ābaggageā. Belonging for me conjures up a deep insecurity about the possibility of really belonging, truly fitting in. But then, the term ābelongingsā also forefronts the ways in which these yearnings to fit in will always be diverse: at times joyous, at times painful, at times destined to fail. Perhaps more immediately, belonging brings forth images of leaving, carting oneās possessions and baggage from place to place. Thus, while belonging may make one think of arriving, it also always carries the scent of departure ā it marks the interstices of being and going.
On another level, but bound up in belongings, as a term it causes me to consider points of departure, of where we say weāre leaving from, and why. Depending on your tastes, it is either a lyrical or a maudlin way of saying that as theorists, we all have epistemological allegiances and baggages that we cart through our writing and thinking. And while much theory seems to be hell-bent on arriving somewhere, belonging to one clique or another, fitting in, being in, travelling under the sign of the latest buzz-words, there is some merit in a mode of theorizing that is careful of where it is leaving from.
Departing, getting going, going on, getting (it) on, getting by ā these are necessary terms. They are also terms that I need to make rhyme with desire, a desire to keep on going, a desire to keep desire moving. I sit and watch the planes float in. I shut my eyes and feel the brightness burn holes in my memories. I wonder if I can ever fit in here. I sit and feel nebulously touched by belonging; a vague shifting of desire for a woman, a woman past and a woman present. These images of desire are not merely whimsical; rather, as concrete memories they queer me again and again as they embed themselves in the possibility of desire now. Images and fragments: meeting in a doorway, a handshake, a kiss, seeing my features rearranged as I smile back at her. Desire for me is not a metaphor, it is a method of doing things, of getting places. I want to think desire as singular, I want to make the singularities of desire the modus operandi of my queer theorizing.
QUEER MEMORIES
A woman in a bar asks me what sign I am. Not a very original line, but a project of astral origins; I think that I give the wrong answer. (A past lover, a very rational type takes up astrology in her 50s, places me as an Aquarian and thus solves her problem of why I am what I am.) I should have been born under the sign of a plane: Delta, Southwestern, Air America. Wherever I am, people ask me where I come from and the answer is as evasive as my accent. I have a few stock answers: Iām an army brat; I grew up in Wales; I am from no one where. In fact, my family myth places us under the sign of the train, recounting, recanting the story of my Canadian mother meeting a slightly hung-over British army officer on the Canadian Pacific. The story goes that she was leaving the west to get a job in External Affairs; he was brought over to teach Canadian soldiers home from the war how to skydive out of silos ā a Cold War sort of thing. As the great train rolled on and on and on through the prairies, and remember this was the days of great trains, my motherās companion told her to offer that young man a drop of whisky. Wham, bam, thank you mam, her dreams rolled off the edge of that endless scape, and three months later she was an army wife.
So you see, I was born departing, watching from the sidelines the ways in which children seem to know as if by intuition who belongs and who doesnāt. The product of a childhood of moving, boxing up belongings, carting them along with my motherās injunction never to get married. Crossing seas, continents, innumerable borders which stop our movement with the fear of lost passports, of being turned back, of watching others who belong even less being stopped short at the frontiers of economic hope.
As I sit on the roof watching the planes descend, watching the lines of flight, I wonder if Iāve lost the knack of feigning belonging. Have I lost the desire to belong? Is that already a condition of the desire for belongings? I wonder where desire goes. This isnāt a new thing, I often ponder this, normally at the end but recently at the beginning (a disastrous move as we all know). I try to remember a moment when I felt ābelongedā, when I first felt desire, when I was first moved by it. The desire to remember familiar desiring bodies and bodies that desire. An image of horses and a girlfriend come to mind, inextricably wound up in each other, bound up with the motive of motion and emotions.
Horses, planes and trainsā¦ strange points of departure. As objects, they seem so impossibly phallic. I remember what Raymond Bellour said of the horse in Marnie: that āMarnieās fetishistic love for Forioā¦ typically takes the place of a man and childrenā (1977: 84). In turn, Bellour doubly takes away Marnieās pleasure with her horse (āāOh Forio, if you want to bite someone, bite meāā) when he posits that, on the one hand, it is merely the āpleasure of the signifiedā¦ the horse, animality, the phallic substituteā. And on the other, this image is āthe condition necessary to the constitution of [Hitchcockās] phantasyā (ibid.: 85ā6). In this scenario, the image of the horse impales desire as the desire for the phallus, for the family. It cannot be Marnieās desire; it always-already displaces hers as the condition of anotherās desire.
Not a very promising point of departure, I think you will agree. However, as stilted and dated as Bellourās reading may seem, it is hard to escape psychoanalytic interpretations of desire. Indeed, one could speculate that modern conceptions of desire were spawned with the birth of psychoanalysis. So it is not surprising that, with notable exceptions, psychoanalytic assumptions inform the basis from which to consider questions of queer desire. On this front and as a theoretical point of departure, psychoanalysis is implicitly and outrageously caught up in belonging. It may well be one of the theoretical āhomesā that demands the most investment, that has the steepest dues to be paid before you belong. As a āpossessionā it is hard won through the years that it takes to master its complex machinery. Although, for many reasons, I have not taken the time necessary to fit in with feminist psychoanalytic theory, I am impressed by those who have. To be truthful (in that my own point of departure is Foucault), I am more impressed by those who have possessed this machine, who made it belong to them and for them, only to depart from it. They also tend to be rare. However, a few years ago, after years of brilliant slogging through Lacan, Elizabeth Grosz departed from her point of departure and āleftā psychoanalysis. The reason seems to be simple, even if the logistics of leaving probably were not:
I donāt want to talk about lesbian psychologies, about the psychical genesis of lesbian desire.ā¦ I am much less interested in where lesbian desire comes from, how it emerges, and the ways in which it develops than where it is going to, its possibilities, its open-ended future.
(1994: 68ā9)2
In that essay, Grosz rigorously and elegantly moves on from psychoanalysis. But to stop for a moment, and to be crude, one can say that, in one form or another, desire still lurks as lack within much of contemporary cultural theory. Even in Judith Butlerās reworking of Lacan, the movement of desire is āimpelled, thwarted by the impossible fantasy of recovering a full pleasure before the advent of the lawā (Butler 1993: 99). Butler does, of course, reposition Lacanian and Freudian origins. Thus, like the judge who enacts the law by citing it but does not originate it, she argues that āthe law [of sex] is no longer given in a fixed form prior to its citationā (ibid.: 15). However, if Butler does an admirable job of dislodging sex as origin, she does not quite manage to shift desire from its Lacanian position as that which circles endlessly and compulsively around its constituted object. Here, desire āmissesā its object, as in the French, son objet lui manque; it misses and lacks its originary object.
Of course, desire as lack goes beyond the texts of Freud and Lacan, or, rather, Freud as cultural phenomenon has gone beyond himself. Thus, the OED first defines desire as āunsatisfied longing or wish; or an expression of thisā, only to finally remind us of the Latin root, ādesidero: to long forā. While it is, as I mentioned earlier, beyond my interest to engage in a rigorous critique of the role of desire within psychoanalysis, what I will do is suggest ways in which desire may be put to work as method within queer theory. To replay that, let me state that desire is my point of departure and my guide. This in turn involves reconceptualizing desire as well as the idea of departure in theory. In a nutshell, as a problematic, desire compels me to work along the lines set up between and among longing, leaving, being, bodies, images, movement; in short, it causes me to depart from any strict and stationary origin.
This problematic that I am calling queer belonging is essentially about the movement between bodies and points of departure in theory. It is fundamentally about milieux not origins (to take up Deleuze and Guattariās distinction). As Deleuze describes it,
a milieu is made of qualities, substances, forces and events: for example, the street with its matter like paving-stones, its noises like the cry of the merchants, its animals like the horses yoked, its dramas (a horse slips, a horse falls, a horse is beatenā¦).
(1993: 81)
Indeed, Deleuzeās essay about Freudās āLittle Hansā (āCe que disent les enfantsā) is a marvel of movement and a refutation of origins. In fact, Deleuze takes up āLittle Hansā and rescues him from his location as evidence for Freudās theory of Oedipal beginning. In other words, Deleuze frees āLittle Hansā from his position as belonging to Freud and to the history of psychoanalysis: this ārage of possessiveness and of the personal [in which psychoanalytic] interpretation consists in finding the person and his possessionsā (ibid.: 86). He looses āLittle Hansā from the grip of Freudian principles and lets him once again wander the streets, exploring his desire to get out of his familyās building, his desire to meet up with the rich little girl taking him by the horsesā stable. It is this meandering that Freud reduces āto the father-mother: bizarrely enough, the wish to explore the building strikes Freud as the desire to sleep with the motherā (ibid.: 81).
Thus instead of origins (bizarre or normalized), Deleuze proposes that we follow a cartographic logic whereby āmaps superimposeā¦ it is not a question of looking for an origin, but rather of evaluating displacementsā (ibid.: 83ā4, emphasis in original). This is movement that we can only catch and recreate through images; images, in turn, that with desire move through bodies. Each of these terms must take flight. Take, for instance, the body: the body as hallowed within feminist theory; the body as cairn. All those pages read and written about the body as location seem now to ring with a nostalgia of lost origins. Even Adrienne Richās (1986) birth scene, that most cited of citations about the body, grounds the body ā alright, her body ā in a place of origins: the hospital. And while I have been inspired by Richās use of her body, the strategy of naming the institutional markings (white, lesbian, Jewish) only takes us so far. It is a project of differentiating bodies on account of their locations; a project that speaks of where bodies belong but that canāt quite write out of the desire for other belongings. Important as it is, it tends to slow the body down.
So instead of the body as location, letās take the body as loca-motion (to borrow from Anzalduaās (1991) use of āloca porqueā). Belonging set in motion which skewers as it remembers the marks of difference; motion that queers those necessary moments and memories of originary belonging. This body, these bodies, can only be understood as images. In Bergsonās terms (1990: 168ā9), the body as image āis then the place of passage of the movements received and thrown back, a hyphen, a connecting link between things which act upon me and the things upon which I actā (cited in Massumi 1992: 185; emphasis in original).
TO QUEER THE OBJECT
The problematic of belonging that I propose thus foregrounds the body as a place of passage, moved through by desire and being moved in return. Images of past and present belongings, of necessity, pass through and on. But, of course, images of ābelongingā conjoin with...