That education should be regulated by law and should be an affair of state is not to be denied, but what should be the character of this public education, and how young persons should be educated, are questions which remain to be considered. As things are, there is disagreement about the subjects. For mankind are by no means agreed about the things to be taught, whether we look to virtue or the best life. Neither is it clear whether education is more concerned with intellectual or with moral virtue. The existing practice is perplexing; no one knows on what principle we should proceed – should the useful in life, or should virtue, or should the higher knowledge, be the aim of our training; all three opinions have been entertained. Again, about the means there is no agreement; for different persons, starting with different ideas about the nature of virtue, naturally disagree about the practice of it.
(Politics, 8: II)
It seems that the issues dealt with in this quote have not changed much since Aristotle’s time. That education should be regulated by law and therefore is a question of state policy is almost common sense today. That it should also be carried out by the state is less self-evident but still strongly believed by educational thinkers and those fractions of the population who oppose the so-called neo-liberal “marketization” of schooling. However, the present author belongs to those who do not see this as self-evident (cf. Dahlin, 2010). Since this issue is highly relevant to the question of the aim of education, let us pursue it further.
State versus state-independent schooling
It is a commonly accepted historical fact that the rise of state funded and state run educational institutions did not happen only out of sheer altruism, but mainly because it was in the interest of the ruling classes to form loyal citizens and to develop the economy of the nation (Green, 1990). But the state did not always succeed in this; neither was it always open about its real intentions but concealed them under more idealistic discourses. Of course, particular individualities were probably completely honest in their engagement for educational rights, ideals and values. Considering these facts, it is no surprise to find that there are many conceptions of education and its aims, depending on the social, historical, political and cultural contexts in which they are conceived and the social/cultural/political interests behind them. An educational conception is unavoidably ethical in character; it is inseparable from values and ideas of “the good life” (Winch and Gingell, 2004). Apparently this was so already in ancient Greece, as indicated by Aristotle in the quote above. Naturally, the education that was implemented by the state in actual practice would also bear inevitable traits of a particular educational conception, constituted by cultural and political forces.
If this was so historically, is it any different today? One could expect it to be somewhat different in democratic states, where governments are forced to take more than one interest, ideology or conception into account when formulating its educational policies and national curriculum plans. However, even in democratic states there is the problem of “the tyranny of the majority”; that it may be more or less impossible for minorities (ethnical, cultural or religious) to institute their own educational ideals because of government decisions based on the will of the majority (Winch and Gingell, 2004, p. 6). There is also the strong tendency that the values of the elite or higher classes determine the educational conception of state run schools (Winch and Gingell, 2004). Hence, it would seem that in the name of justice people should be allowed to form their own schools and run them according to their own educational ideals. And this they have been allowed to do, as there are now so-called state-independent schools in all democratic countries. The question, however, is how much independent of the state these schools really are? Under the present almost global politics of “performativity” (cf. Ball, 2003) the margins of freedom for both the non-state schools and each individual state school are rapidly diminishing. National governments increasingly hold the idea that the aims and goals of education are for the state to decide, whereas how these aims are realized in practice is up to the schools. “Pedagogical freedom” is thus reduced to the freedom to choose the means for implementing the goals decided by the state. This would perhaps not be a complete mockery of pedagogical professionalism if goals and aims were explicated only for the last grade of obligatory schooling (15–16 years old in most countries). However, as a result of the growing importance of international comparisons like Trends in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), Progress in International Reading Literacy Studies (PIRLS) and OECD’s Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), aims are now often explicitly formulated already from grade 1 in order to make test results comparable across countries. What consequences does this have for the freedom and the possibility to choose a different educational conception than the one propagated by the state? If grade specific goals are made obligatory for all schools, public or “state-independent” – which is now the case in many countries – this freedom is severely restricted.
Arguments against a complete freedom in educational choices often include the following (cf. Winch and Gingell, 2004):
- the interests of the state or the society as a whole will not be taken account of
- many people are not “knowledgeable, committed and responsible enough to make the right decision” (Winch and Gingell, p. 14)
- there are problems which require co-operation directed by a central agency.
The “interests” referred to are presumably those of economy and social cohesion. But, concretely, in what way does an educational system based on freedom not take these interests into account? Winch and Gingell (2004) themselves point out that ideas about what is a good or “strong economy” differ. Thus, if the state is going to take economical interests into account it has to decide which model of a “strong economy” is the right one, against the interest of those who disagree. As for social cohesion, it might be argued that a school system consisting of many different ethnically, culturally or religiously based schools will increase difficulties of mutual understanding between sub-cultural sections of the population and hence potentially undermine social cohesion. However, the principle of freedom in education does not preclude the state from constituting a minimal set of laws to which all schools must abide (laws are different from aims and goals). One such law could forbid dogmatic and indoctrinating approaches in religious and political views – a law or regulation that is already in place in many countries.1 One could also prescribe the duty to teach other religious and political systems than that of one’s own cultural group. Here it is also worth noting that social-psychological studies of tolerance indicate that the more authentically one is grounded in one’s own culture, the more open and tolerant one can be towards people of other cultural beliefs and values (Hornsey and Hogg, 2000; Moghaddam and Solliday, 1991).
Thus, even in democratic states there is a problem that the values of the majority, the elite or the higher classes determine the educational conception of state run schools. Traditional liberalism has tried to solve this problem by maintaining that the liberal state stands only for the values of autonomy or personal liberty and political equality; regarding all other norms and values the state is/should be neutral (Winch and Gingell, 2004, p. 141). However, can the state be neutral regarding conceptions of “the good life”? Under present conditions the answer is definitely no, considering that there is a strong link between the state and the economic system. Historically the state has intervened in education for two reasons: to develop faithful citizens and to develop the economy of the nation (Green, 1990; Winch and Gingell, 2004, p. 11). Although government intolerance for non-patriotism has obviously decreased in most democratic states, the economic interests of the state have not. The growth of the GNP is now virtually the overriding goal of all politics. This, together with the idea of the so-called knowledge economy (Neef, 1998), is what makes PISA, PIRLS and TIMSS so important. Economic interests become educational interests and education becomes “an affair of the state”, an issue of power and politics, not of freedom and creativity.
The conclusion of my argument in this section is that from a social and political point of view, the question of the purpose of education is always already answered by the actual practice of educational institutions – and this practice is virtually determined by social, political and economic power relations. At present there is hardly any freedom in the educational sphere because of state dictates about what standards ought be reached and when. From this point of view, the question of the purpose of education is rather much like a so-called academic question: our answer to it has little practical meaning in the current climate.
The social function of education
There is another perspective from which we could have reached the same conclusion. By referring to the functionalistic school of sociology the question of the purpose of education would be transformed into the question of the function of education in society. Looking at a phenomenon like education, one has to ask what function it has in the social system as a whole. The answer to this question was formulated decades ago; the function of the educational system is twofold: to reproduce the social structure and to “sort” the future citizens so that each one finds their “right place” in an increasingly differentiated labour market (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). Hence, from this point of view also, the question of the purpose of education is too idealistic. We can debate over it as much as we want, the educational system will unaffectedly go on performing its functions – at least as long as our economical and working life is organised according to present principles. The early Marxist vision of a more humane society where we can be craftsmen in the morning, hunters in the afternoon and philosophers in the evening (or something of that sort) would require substantial changes of these principles.
Nevertheless, we continue to discuss aims and purposes of education and our ideas in this field are not without significance. The functionalistic view is only partially true and there are still some greater or smaller margins of freedom left. Even though educational thought has not affected the basic function of the educational system, it has in many places severely reduced the function’s inhumane consequences, for instance by counteracting the social predetermination of life trajectories that was so prevalent in the past. The idea that all children have the right to a common education that develops their inherent abilities, talents and interests for at least nine years is one example.2 With that in mind, it still seems worthwhile to reflect on the aims of education in a more philosophical way, in spite of the fact that the functions of education are not likely to change unless the whole social system in which education takes place is radically transformed.