Sport and Leisure in Social Thought

Grant Jarvie, Joseph Maguire

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2002
• ISBN:
  9781134901074
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

This much needed book examines all of the major traditions of social thought to clearly show their influence in our understanding of sport and leisure.

Chapter 1

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Functionalism, solidarity and social stratification

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The literature on functionalist thought stretching from Durkheim to Parsons is vast. As a tradition of social thought, functionalist concerns and methodological assumptions have influenced a substantial body of research into sport and leisure. During the late 1960s and early 1970s it played a key part in the early development of the sociology of sport in North America and on both sides of what was then the European ‘iron curtain’. The work of both Durkheim and Parsons has been subject to recent critical re-evaluation.¹ Yet in many ways it has been a traditional reading of their works that has been the hallmark of functionalist thinking about sport and leisure.

A consistent theme of functionalist thought, and one derived from Durkheim, is that sociology is concerned with the impact that large scale structures of society have on the thoughts and actions of individuals. The key to tracing this impact lies in grasping the existence of what Durkheim termed social facts. Social facts are both cultural norms and social structures that are external to and constrain and regulate social actors. Examples of social structures and cultural norms would include the bureaucracy of an organisation such as the Arts Council, and the emphasis in sport on achievement-striving, effort and competition. As social facts are things they can be studied empirically-sociology entails an attempt to establish the pattern that lies behind all observable phenomena. This is what Durkheim argued in this connection:

…Social facts are to be treated as things…. Things include all objects of knowledge that cannot be conceived by purely mental activity, those that require their conception of data from outside the mind, from observations and experiments, those which are built up from the more external and immediately accessible characteristics to the less visible and more profound.²

For Durkheim, social facts were external to the individual and were invested with coercive power. This power enables them to ‘impose’ their influence on individuals. In language development, such social facts are internalised. They rule individuals from within, becoming an integral part of the self. Society ‘enters’ the individual as a moral force. The task thus facing sociologists is to study the ways in which social facts are impregnated with moral elements. Some dominant themes of functionalist thought have concerned social cohesion, social order and the ways in which individuals are integrated into society.

Several crucial questions arise with regard to Durkheim's account of social facts. How do social facts control human actions? What role does an individual's subjective state play in social life? If social cohesion rests on the autonomy of moral action, how can ‘society’ be external to the individual? On these questions Durkheim was ambivalent. Though he argued that individuals act in conformity to constraining influences, he also suggested that the individual interprets external facts in specific ways. Durkheim concluded:

…nothing collective can be produced if individual consciousnesses are not assumed; but this necessary condition is by itself insufficient. These consciousnesses must be combined in a certain way; social life results from this combination and is, consequently, explained by it.³

Generally, however, functionalist work is portrayed as stressing that society is less the product of collective human action and more a constraining abstraction. The social milieu is the determining factor, while an individual's subjective state plays a more passive role. Durkheim, and other writers working within functionalist traditions, have been accused of adopting a ‘mechanistic’ and ‘deterministic’ approach. It is possible, however, to see Durkheim's early writings as an over-reaction to the then pervasive methodological individualism and atomism. That is, Durkheim was critial of voluntaristic, subjective and psychological approaches and, to counter their influence, sought to emphasise that the primary unit of sociological analysis must be the social milieu. The social was irreducible. Hence, sociology must be concerned with social facts: objective datums that exist independent of individuals, of their psychology and their interaction with others. Despite this forthright emphasis, Durkheim's later work is seen to revolve around the unresolved problem of human action and a constraining social milieu. As Durkheim argued more than once, the unity of society develops only through moral action.

Social facts then are viewed as objective entities but they also contain a significant subjective element. These social facts, combining within the individual's consciousness, form what Durkheim termed ‘collective representations’ of the social world. That is, collective symbols through which society becomes conscious of itself. They are not reducible to individual consciousness. Durkheim argued that the states which constitute collective consciousness ‘differ specifically from those which constitute the individual consciousness’ and that this ‘specificity comes from the fact that they are not formed from the same elements’. While individual consciousness resulted from the ‘nature of the organico-psychological being taken in isolation’ collective consciousness emerged out of ‘the combination of a plurality of beings of this kind’.⁴ Collective life is thus reflected in collective representations. In turn these representations become autonomous realities independent of individuals.

The functionalist perspective that emerged out of Durkheim's shadow was further developed in Parsons' later work.⁵ Drawing on Parsons' general theoretical model, it is possible to establish the basic assumptions on which functionalism rests. Societies are viewed as wholes, that is as a system of interrelated parts. These parts perform a specific function within the system and contribute to the integration and adaptation of the system as a whole. Reference to ‘system’ is not surprising given that it is a concept central to all forms of functionalism. Examining the functional relation of parts to whole, society is understood as a structure of elements possessing a patterned form. The task for functionalists is to discern those parts that are essential for the survival, evolution and adequate functioning of the system.

Such parts perform special functions and are called ‘functional prerequisites’. They cater for the generalised conditions necessary for the maintenance of the system. Several have been identified. These include the provision for an adequate relationship of the individual to the environment, role differentiation and role assignment, communication, shared cognitive orientations, goals and suitable means of achieving these. The regulation of affective expression, socialisation and social control of deviant behaviour are also crucial to the maintenance of social order.⁶

It is important to grasp that the integration of parts of the system, termed the sub-system, is never perfect. Durkheim's work highlighted the fragile and unstable nature of social solidarity within advanced societies. Though the basic tendency of social systems veers towards equilibrium, elements of mal-integration will always be present. In functionalist thinking therefore, particular consideration is paid to the role of social control mechanisms.

Functionalists thus argue that deviance, tension and strains are dysfunctional elements that tend to become institutionalised or resolved in the direction of social integration. This is reached through value consensus. The principles underlying this consensus legitimise the existing social, economic and political structure. Change is possible, and, as noted earlier, Durkheim was not primarily concerned with ‘the problem or order’, but with the problem of ‘the changing nature of order’. Social change is viewed as adaptive and gradual, and where more rapid change does occur, it tends to do so in cultural institutions. The basic institutional framework remains intact.

Parsons identified four ‘functional imperatives’ which are characteristic of systems. For Parsons, a system, if it is to survive, must be able to cope with external change (adaptation). Further, a system must be able to define and secure its primary goals (goal attainment). In addition, a system must regulate the interrelationship both between its component parts and among the other three functional imperatives (integration). Finally, a system must nurture, sustain and regenerate both the motivation of individuals and the cultural patterns that create and enhance the motivation (pattern maintenance).⁷

Building on these assumptions, Parsons argued that these four functional imperatives are linked to four action systems. For Parsons, these action systems were conceptual tools with which to understand the ‘ordered structure of systems’. They do not exist in the real world. The biological organism is the action system that handles the adaptation function. It does so by adjusting to and transforming the external world. The goal attainment function is performed by the personality system. This is achieved by defining system goals and mobilising resources to attain them. The integration function is undertaken by the social system that ensures that its component parts are suitably controlled. The cultural system performs the pattern maintenance function by providing actors with the appropriate norms and values that motivate them for action.

The problem of order dominates both the functional imperatives and the action systems identified. For Parsons systems have the property of and tend toward self-maintaining order or equilibrium. His theoretical analysis was thus focused on outlining the ordered structure of systems. Consequently, his work has been viewed as too static, mechanical and structured. Gone is the insight that Durkheim concerned himself with, namely, the changing nature of order.⁸ Functionalist thinking about sport and leisure has tended to follow several familiar themes.

The social functions of sport and leisure practices

Several key features of functionalist accounts of sport and leisure can be identified. The role that sport and leisure play in socialisation and the learning of culturally ‘appropriate’ values is examined. In addition, the ‘functional’ relationship between sport, leisure and work is explored. Further, the contribution that sport and leisure make to the ‘functional’ requirements of social systems is considered.⁹ For functionalists, sport is a social institution that transmits values to participants. It functions to maintain the larger society. Sport is not unique in this respect. As with other leisure activities, sports contribution is inter-related with other aspects of society. These include the family, education and religion. In each of these areas sport and leisure activities find regular expression.

Closer inspection of functionalist research reveals that several questions about sport and leisure repeatedly surface. How is sport and leisure inter-related with other social institutions? How does sport and leisure promote social values, norms, statutes and roles? How does sport and leisure function as an integrative mechanism within society? Underpinning each of these questions is a functionalist objective that seeks to establish how social phenomenon contribute to the ‘functional prerequisites’ or ‘imperatives’ of society.

Sport and leisure is seen as a cultural subsystem of society. They serve specific functions. The rules of sports are, for example, widely agreed and this is perceived to both reinforce and reflect the notion of consensus in society. Sport refl...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Full Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: Sport and leisure in social thought
• 1 Functionalism, solidarity and social stratification
• 2 Interpretative sociology: Rationalisation, cultural pessimism and the search for meaning
• 3 Beyond conventional pluralism
• 4 Classical Marxism, political economy and beyond
• 5 Culture as a war of position and a way of life
• 6 Figurations, power and civilising processes
• 7 Feminist thought and the boundaries of sisterhood
• 8 Fields of power, habitus and distinction
• 9 Beyond modernity and the problems of postmodernism
• 10 Dependency and globalisation: Sport, leisure and global processes
• Index