Kuwait and Al-Sabah

Tribal Politics and Power in an Oil State

Rivka Azoulay

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781838605070
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Globalisation
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The Emirate of Kuwait hardly resembles the city-State it was at the start of the 20th century. The discovery of oil in 1938 rapidly transformed the tiny tribal sheikhdom of the Al-Sabah into a modern oil-producing state where, by the early 1980s, citizens were enjoying one of the highest standards of living in the world. While much has been written on the reasons why and how the Al-Sabah became a ruling dynasty, little is known about the nature of their authority and its relationship to Kuwait's social structure. Rivka Azoulay shows how despite the rapidity of change in the oil-rich, family-run emirate, it is the pre-oil dynamics of social and political life that dictate how society operates. The author shows that Kuwait's ambitious diversification plans to reduce oil-dependence by 2035 require a renegotiation of the regime's pact with society, which threatens the pre-oil alliances upon which the Al-Sabah's regime has been built.

Part One

Traditional politics and the pre-oil authority system of the Al-Sabah (1716–1938)

Introduction

With its air-conditioned malls, skyscrapers and high-speed roads leading to residential areas segregated by social status, the Emirate of Kuwait hardly resembles the city-state it was at the start of the twentieth century. The discovery of oil in the Burgan field in 1938, followed by other discoveries, rapidly transformed this tiny tribal shaykhdom of the Al-Sabah – once a haven for transnational merchants searching for better conditions for trade – into a modern oil-producing state with its citizens enjoying the highest standards of living in the world. In no less than a couple of decades, the shaykhdom subject to British colonial administration was transformed into a hyper-affluent welfare state and integrated into the global capitalist system.

Despite the magnitude and rapidity of change, induced by the transformation of the political economy in the Arabian Gulf, the pre-oil dynamics of social and political life laid the foundations of what would later develop into the complicated semi-democratic Sonderweg of this rentier state. The reasons why and how the Al-Sabah of the ‘Utub clan of the ‘Aneza turned from a tribal shaykhdom into a ruling dynasty have been sufficiently covered.¹ Rather than recounting this history, this chapter analyses the nature of the authority system of the Al-Sabah in its relation to the traditional social forces living both within (hadar) and outside (badu) the walls of the old city. Emphasis is placed upon the impact of socio-economic transformations and colonial rule in changing this authority system since the mid-nineteenth century until the discovery of oil. It hereby focuses on how the traditional social forces adapted to these changes in the authority system, both vis-á-vis each other and vis-á-vis the Al-Sabah. System here refers to the continuous interaction between a structure and its environment.²

With traditional social forces, I refer to three distinct status groups or socio-political categories that form the basis of Kuwait’s social structure: hadar (urban dwellers), Shi’a and badu (tribesmen). Until today, these concepts are lively present in Kuwait’s society and in popular parlance. They represent ‘invisible walls’, with borders between citizens being deepened as a consequence of state policies, through the segmented access to oil rents and state services, but also through divide-and-rule regime strategies. In terms of political socialization and matrimonial strategies, these groups represent the country’s main voting blocs that can further be split into smaller ascriptive sub-communities.

This chapter aims to grasp the nature of ‘traditional politics’ in pre-oil Kuwait, in terms of the components structuring the old political community and the ruling bargain. Understanding the idiosyncrasies of contemporary politics and citizen identities in Kuwait necessitates a deeper analysis of the founding bricks of this atypical political community in the Arabian Gulf. Literature on hybrid societies deals with understanding the reasons behind the persistence of premodern forms of politics in societies integrated into the globalized world, such as the resilience or reinvention of traditional identities and authority structures that do not coalesce into cross-cutting status-association along occupational lines. Oil monarchies have a particularly deep historical memory. With regimes not having experienced revolutions and with political legitimacy based upon the preservation of the old communal order in a semi-corporatist way, oil revenues allowed to perpetuate or reinvent old alliances and identities in a path-dependent process over time.³

In the following, I will focus on those dimensions of Kuwait’s political history that have been obliterated in both Western and Arabic sources or have only received attention in passing. My focus is on the role played by non-core elites in Kuwait’s pre-oil politics; referring hereby to those elites that were not part of the Sunni merchant aristocracy, but who nonetheless played an important role in politics. As will be demonstrated, their status as outsiders to the merchant–Al-Sabah nexus made them crucial allies to the rulers; as they could not challenge the central elite status. The high degree of stratification within the group of merchants as well as within the broader population of the town has often been overlooked in studies on Kuwait. Yet, this segmentation along identity and occupational lines has played a key role in consolidating an authoritarian shaykhdom, first in 1896 by Mubarak al-Sabah, and later with the discovery of oil. No work exists which systematically traces these pre-oil elite alliances that I argue are crucial for understanding contemporary politics in Kuwait.

Kuwait’s classic socio-political categories: hadar, Shi’a and badu

The hadar trace their origins back to pre-oil Kuwait and refer to those who settled in Kuwait before the discovery of oil (i.e. prior to 1938). Although many of the Shi’a families settled in Kuwait in the pre-oil era, the Shi’a are referred to as a separate category. In pre-oil Kuwait, the hadar were approximately 60 per cent of the population, the rest largely composed of Shi’a. An elite of Najdi merchants participated in the initial power-sharing with the Al-Sabah and were the advocates of parliamentarianism to secure their interests, mostly embracing pan-Arabism. Today they have largely devoted themselves to their privileged commercial life, dependent on the state’s rents. Apart from this Arab merchant aristocracy, the hadar Sunna are composed of a mix of diasporas from Iran, Iraq and Central Arabia, reflecting the melting pot nature of Kuwait’s social fabric. The hadar from the Sunni parts of Iran (the Balushs) were largely a lower class group of workers and constituted a different sub-community that lived together with the Shi’a ‘Ajam in the Al-Sharq neighbourhood. One can think of the Al-Kandari or the Al-Balushi, whose toilsome jobs – such as those of water carrier – were shunned by the tribal aristocracy.

The Al-Naqib and the Rifa’i were among the families who came from the north, as well as the Sa’dun. The latter trace their origin back to an elite lineage of the Muntafiq tribe many of whose tribesmen converted to Shi’ism.⁴ Among the various diasporas of Kuwait, micro-localism reigns, with place of origin figuring prominently as an identity marker; either directly in a family’s name (i.e. Al-Balush) or by denoting groups of families according to their place of origin (i.e. Basrawis).⁵ Another important subgroup here are the Qina’at (or Jena’at in Kuwaiti dialect). They form a clan of Sunni families who migrated from northern parts of Iraq to Kuwait in the nineteenth century, but claim descent from the Suhul tribe from an area in Najd. In Kuwait, the group presents one of the largest elite family groups (apart from the Sunni merchant aristocracy and the Shi’a merchants) and rose to prominence following the adoption by the Al-Sabah of the orphan Yusuf Bin Issa.⁶ The person of Yusuf Bin Issa would have allowed the group – that until today tends to marry exclusively from within the family – to make inroads in commerce, as nouveaux riches. As they share with the Shi’a merchants a position of non-core elites, the Qina’at tend to be the most anti-Shi’a Kuwaitis, competing with the latter for the Al-Sabah’s favour in commerce and access to management positions in the oil industry.

A related cleavage within the group of hadar is the distinction between asli and bayseri; between families that can trace back their roots to pure Arab descent and families that do not have such a pure Arab family tree, having mixed with non-pure or non-Arab lineages. Although a sensitive topic for the politically liberal-minded hadar Kuwaitis, these identity markers continue to have deep political, marital and economic implications. The aristocracy of merchant families tends to marry within each other’s subgroup of pure Arab notable families. Until today, micro-localism and tribalism play important roles in social, economic and political affairs.

The Shi’a, although mostly hadar, socialize in distinct community-based institutions and also represent a mosaic of diasporas from Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The Shi’a have been key allies of the Al-Sabah family in its confrontation with different opposition forces throughout Kuwait’s modern history, with only the tense interlude of the Iran–Iraq War marking an exception to this. Three main categories can be differentiated here: the ‘Ajam (from Iran), the Hasawiyyin (from Al-Hasa) and the Baharna (from Bahrain). The Shi’a from Iraq represent only a minority of families, such as the Al-Kadhemi (from Al-Kadhemiyya). The majority are the ‘Ajam, who represent around 70 per cent of the Kuwaiti Shi’a that today form between 25 and 35 per cent of Kuwait’s citizens (in the absence of a population census). An elite of ‘Ajam merchants traditionally dominated this diaspora; families that enjoyed historically close relations to the Al-Sabah, like the Qina’at, as they could not challenge the central elite status. By the end of the twentieth century, migration from Iran was diversified with the arrival of poor farmers severely hit by the Pahlavi regime’s administrative reforms. Most of them came from the region of Tarakma in southern Iran and are generally referred to as Tarakmas. In Kuwait, their diasporic identity was reinforced by the fact that they would constitute a subclass of workers, employed in the shipping industry and to a lesser extent in handicrafts. In general, the crafts were the domain of the Shi’a in Kuwait, shunned by the tribal aristocracy (and tribesmen in general) as activities of particularly low social status, contrary to maritime commerce, considered as necessitating tribal virtues of courage, wisdom, manhood and leadership.

As to the Shi’a from Al-Hasa (around 15 per cent), most of them came to the Emirate in the nineteenth century after the various Saudi conquests sweeping the Eastern Province. These Hasawiyyin have developed a particularly strong group identity in Kuwait coupled to their common belonging to a minority branch within Twelver Shi’ism: shaykhism that follows the teachings of Ahmad al-Ahsa’i (1753–1826).⁷ The group identity of the Kuwaiti shaykhis has also been strengthened by the fact that an important line of the shaykhi maraja’ itself settled in Kuwait by the end of the 1950s: the Mirza al-Ihqaqi family.⁸ This strong group identity has led to the development of specific communal relations and distinct processes of socialization. As far as the Baharna Shi’a are concerned (around 5 per cent), they also combine ethnic membership with belonging to a specific current in Twelver Shi’ism as they are descendants of the ‘Gharbi tribe in Western Arabia and belong to the Akhbari school of thought.⁹ Most of the Baharna came to the Emirate during the eighteenth century fleeing political instability after the settlement of the ‘Al-Khalifa in Bahrain.

Finally, there are the badu who were later incorporated into the citizenry, representing today around 60 per cent of Kuwait’s citizens. They were naturalized between 1965 and 1981 to form a loyal support base for the Al-Sabah in the face of hadar opposition, but are no longer a loyal constituency. Among the tribesmen that were present in Kuwait before the advent of oil, only the ‘Awazem and the Rashaida along with some members of the Bani Khaled were the tribes that are considered original (asli) in Kuwait, as most of its members were living in the close vicinities of the town, already since the arrival of the Bani ‘Utub. The ‘Awazem and Rashaida are two landless tribes, serf tribes of respectively the Mutran and the ‘Ajman.¹⁰ Most of them were semi-nomadic (arib dar) and settled in Kuwait during the dry season, in which they took part in pearl-fishing and diving activities, and followed the rains in search of grazing or cultivable land. While they were part of the original inhabitants of Kuwait and enjoy more social prestige than the naturalized tribes, members of the ‘Awazem and Rashaida are referred to as tribesmen in popular parlance and socialize in different networks than the Sunni hadar. This is a consequence of their lower social status in pre-oil Kuwait and lower tribal ranks. By the start of the twentieth century, up to 90 per cent of Kuwait’s pearling fleet consisted of Bedouin divers and sailors.¹¹ Another reason contributing to their historically stringent relation with the Sunni merchant aristocracy is the role played by these tribesmen in supporting the Al-Sabah militarily at various occasions, exemplified by their role in Mubarak al-Sabah’s killing of his siblings to usurp the throne (1896) and by the role of tribal recruits in the crackdown of the 1938 movement.

Between 1965 and 1981 the tribal population was expanded in a political move of the Al-Sabah, naturalizing en masse thousands of southern tribes, who they trusted and whose shaykhs were in Saudi Arabia; most of them were from the ‘Ajman, the Mutran and the ‘Aneza noble tribes. Life conditions in Kuwait were better than in neighbouring Saudi Arabia and Iraq which is why these tribesmen came to Kuwait for work, particularly in the nascent oil industry in Ahmadi where they came to work as watchmen of installations, guards of pipelines, etcetera.¹² While in the 1960s the door of naturalization was shut for a lot of northern tribesmen who later would constitute the majority of the stateless (Bidun), trusted tribes from Saudi Arabia were naturalized by thousands and were granted first-class citizenship. The precise number of these naturalizations remains unknown, but estimates converge on between 160,000 and 400,000 naturalized individuals, mostly from Saudi Arabia.¹³ What is known is that the northern tribes from Iraq were excluded from these naturalization policies although they represented a clear majority of the armed forces back then.¹⁴ The Iraqi threat and a hostile parliament were behind the Al-Sabah’s main motives here to naturalize the more trusted southern tribes, while shutting the door of naturalizations to the northern tribes. Until today this dichotomy between northern and southern tribes plays a role in Kuwait’s rulers’ perception vis-à-vis the Bidun and ruler’s reluctance to solve the issue. Many Kuwaitis across different social strata (apart from a few activists) remain wary of the Bidun’s claim to citizenship for similar reasons, adding to the obvious fear for competition with the group for access to the state’s largesse. The dimension of trust played a strong role in these political naturalizations and ruler’s personal ties with tribes and sometimes direct kinship ties were determinant here. It is well known among Kuwaitis that the powerful Minister of Interior - Jaber al-‘Ali – naturalized many members of the ‘Ajman who were living in Kuwait in 1967. Himself the son of an ‘Ajman mother and with ambitions to become Crown Prince, these naturalizations enhanced his support base.¹⁵

These naturalizations of southern tribesmen infuriated the nationalist and mercantile hadar opposition, but also the Shi’a who had strengthened their political role in parliament as a consequence of the political awakening of its youth in the 1970s. Adding fuel to the fire, the government changed the electoral district system to give more weight to the periphery where the naturalized tribesmen were living. The ten districts were changed to twenty-five, making it easier for the government to engage in vote-buying and co-optation practices. The naturalization of southern tribesmen shifted t...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle Page
• Title Page
• Dedication Page
• Contents 
• Acknowledgements
• Authoritarian regimes and the crucial role of the periphery
• Part 1 Traditional politics and the pre-oil authority system of the Al-Sabah(1716–1938)
• Part 2 Oil and the consolidation of a tribal authoritarian shaykhdom: ruler–ruled relations 1961–90
• Part 3 New forces of globalization and the rise of the tribal periphery in Kuwait (1990–2014)
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index
• Imprint