Political Change in Thailand

Democracy and Participation

Kevin Hewison

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2002
• ISBN:
  9781134681204
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Scienze sociali
• Subtopic: Studi sull'etnia

This book provides an assessment of approaches to studying Thai politics, the various forces reshaping the forms of political activity and their roles in the fluid contemporary political environment. This volume will be of particular interest to those who require an understanding of the complex and rapidly changing political realities of contemporary Thailand. Political Change in Thailand will be of particular interest to those who require an understanding of the complex and rapidly changing political realities of contemporary Thailand.

1 Introduction

Power, oppositions and democratisation

Kevin Hewison

At the end of the 1980s, the political and economic future was looking good for Thailand, despite the economic downturn of the mid-1980s and two failed military coups in 1981 and 1985. The economy had again surged, with double-digit growth, and, for the first time since 1976, the country had an elected government headed by a prime minister who was an elected member of parliament (MP). Corruption was discussed, as it had been with almost all governments since 1945, but, in the context of rapid growth, it was not perceived as a major issue.

Chatichai Choonhavan came to the prime ministership following the 1988 election and after the surprise retirement of General Prem Tinsulanonda, the unelected incumbent from 1980. Prem withdrew after enormous pressure from various groups and political parties demanding that the leader be drawn from the ranks of MPs. While this may appear an unremarkable event, at the time many saw it as a victory on the path to democracy. As events unfolded, it was to prove a precursor to a major turning-point in Thailand's political development.

Although he came from the rightist Chart Thai Party, Chatichai seemed to accept that he and his government had an historical role to play in enhancing democratic development, and he challenged continually Thailand's conservative state. In particular, he took steps to move decision-making away from the civil and military bureaucracy and into the hands of elected politicians. The politicians seemed to think that their time had arrived, and pushed the military conservatives to the brink. The military rattled their swords and manoeuvred against the government, and in 1991 could stand the perceived insults and moves against its perquisites no longer. Led by Class 5 graduates of the military academy, a coup threw out Chatichai's government, the constitution and the parliament.

At first, many were pleased to see the end of a corrupt civilian government. However, it soon became clear that the military was not simply cleaning up politics and then returning to the barracks. Despite the installation of a respected government of business people and technocrats, demonstrations demanding the reintroduction of constitutional rule began and grew in intensity, with the press generally supportive of these calls. Elections were brought on, but the result confirmed that the military was not about to relinquish its control, and was, in fact, further entrenching the conservative polity (see Hewison 1993a). It installed its own unelected prime minister, General Suchinda Kraprayoon, and set about establishing a constitution which gave the civil and military bureaucracy extensive powers.

The opposition movement, which had grown steadily, suddenly exploded. In May 1992 the streets of Bangkok witnessed the most extreme political violence since October 1976, as hundreds of thousands of Bangkokians—with people from all walks of life, and including business people and the middle classes—rose against the military. The world watched CNN and the BBC in horror as what had, initially, been a well-organised and non-violent confrontation coordinated by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) degenerated into chaos as the military perpetrated violent attacks on demonstrators they branded as communists. Over five days viewers saw indiscriminate shootings and brutalities committed against ordinary people and even against medical professionals who were treating the injured. They also witnessed remarkable bravery and resoluteness in the face of fully armed troops.

As the violence peaked and a complete breakdown of political order threatened, pictures were broadcast of then Prime Minister Suchinda and one of the leaders of the demonstrators, Major-General Chamlong Srimuang, prostrate before King Bhumibol Adulyadej as he chided them and demanded an end to the disorder.

The calling of new elections and the promise of a revised constitution offered a way forward in these circumstances. However, the issues which gave rise to the events of 1992 were not adequately addressed. This has been demonstrated by the fact that the period since September 1992 has seen three elected governments—those led by Chuan Leekpai (elected in September 1992), Banharn Silpa-archa (July 1995) and retired Army Commander General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (November 1996). Both Chuan's and Banharn's governments fell amid accusations of corruption. The three elections of the period have seen money politics dominate, with up to 17 billion baht being spent during the 1995 campaign and up to a massive 25–30 billion in 1996. Parliamentary politics, while apparently established, is in danger of leading to ‘revolving door’ government as parties vie for their place at the cabinet table, which itself looks increasingly like a cash dispensing machine as the government parties scramble to recoup their investments in election campaigning. In addition, a pattern has emerged whereby the voting patterns of Bangkok and rural electorates appear different. Bangkok voters blame rural voters for electing corrupt governments and are increasingly likely to view the electoral system as being loaded against the emergence of efficient and clean government.

While the tumultuous events of 1992 were an initial stimulus to the chapters presented in this collection, the questions which have exercised the authors are wider. The essential issue is whether the basic nature of Thailand's politics has been challenged and changed irrevocably. Has a new path been taken? Has the vicious cycle of politics—coup, handover to unstable parliamentary rule, ended by another coup—been broken? Has civil society developed to the stage where it acts as a counterweight to the state? What are the elements of this civil society which challenge the conservative polity? Have civilian politicians and the electoral process played a significant role in challenging the conservative polity led by the military—can they in the future? Is the elected legislature likely to become the centre of democratic politics or will it remain unrepresentative? Will it challenge the role of technocrats in policy-making? Will participatory institutions be located outside the system of electoral politics, in NGOs and social movements? Can the gap—in all senses of the word—between Bangkok and rural areas be bridged?

Questions like these have not been commonly asked by those who study Thailand's politics simply because they have not been on the theoretical agenda. Prior to examining the course of modern politics and providing the necessary backdrop for the chapters, it is appropriate to provide an overview of approaches to political studies of Thailand.

APPROACHES TO POLITICS

Until relatively recently, there has been a significant consensus in the study of Thailand's political system. Most analysts have agreed that the system could be considered a ‘bureaucratic polity’. Derived from a seminal work by Fred Riggs (1966), the bureaucratic polity model used by Riggs and by his followers—both Thai and Western—is fundamentally derived from Western theories of society and politics, specifically modernisation theory and its antecedents. A challenge to the modernisation approach emerged in the early 1980s. It drew on two sources: first, a developing ‘school’ of analysts interested in radical political economy; and second, the recognition that the modernisation approach and the bureaucratic polity model had become irrelevant to Thailand's political and economic realities.

In developing this collection, there has been no intention to include authors from any particular theoretical position, although all have clearly recognised the limitations of the modernisation approach which has been delineated in recent years. It is appropriate to provide a brief description and critique of modernisation-influenced approaches prior to a discussion of competing models.

Modernisation and consensus on politics

Prior to the publication of Riggs's book, the major work on post-war Thai politics was by David Wilson (1962). His work provided the essential background to the model of the bureaucratic polity. While Wilson had observed a fluid political situation in the late 1950s, he preferred to emphasise order and consensus in his analysis. He noted that there were few extra-bureaucratic inputs into the political system, and considered that the bureaucracy—civil and military—had become the totality of politics. The bureaucracy itself was dominated by competition between powerful cliques jockeying for the highest offices and their perquisites (Wilson 1962:278). The vast mass of the population was uninterested in politics; indeed, they were apolitical. Wilson explained this arrangement in cultural terms. He described Thais as individualistic and status-conscious, albeit within a loose social structure, driven by the Buddhist desire for the accumulation of personal merit and with the security of substantial natural resources (ibid.: 46–7). These factors worked against the development of community solidarity and gave little impetus to the development of political interest; hence, the politicised elite could dominate. In addition, the masses—mostly farmers—deferred to the ruling elite.

Wilson's work established a set of concerns which informed many future social and political studies: loose social structure, political passivity, military and bureaucratic domination of politics, the significance of culture and personality, the role of tradition, and weak extra-bureaucratic influences. The cement of society was to be found in traditional, powerful and pervasive patron-client relations. For example, Neher (1981:121) argues that patronclient relations play a major role in the integration of society.¹ Conflict was not a major defining characteristic of political activity, which was strongly influenced by passivity, individuality and deference.

In going beyond Wilson's approach, Riggs attempted to develop a complete structural-functional model, in line with developments within modernisation theory. Riggs establishes two ideal types of society: the traditional or ‘fused’ society at one end of the development spectrum and the modern or ‘diffracted’ society at the other. In traditional society, a single structure—a repetitive pattern of behaviour—may perform many functions, while in modern society structures are functionally specific (Riggs 1961:19). Thailand is identified as a ‘prismatic’ society, which lies somewhere between these two ideal types, where the bureaucratic polity is defined as a ‘system of government that is neither “traditional” nor “modern” in character’ (Riggs 1966:11).

Using this model, Riggs agrees with Wilson that political activity is limited to the bureaucracy, with no outside force capable of establishing the parameters of bureaucratic prerogative and action. One of the reasons for this was that while differentiation within the bureaucracy had been rapid, development outside had been much slower. Hence, there was no extrabureaucratic force capable of overseeing the political elite, so it dominated political activity (Riggs 1966:131, 197, 319). Further, because the political elite was well developed and politically predominant, opportunities for status and wealth were seen to be correlated with high bureaucratic position rather than with business and entrepreneurship.

While Riggs established a tight and complete theoretical model, it is apparent that most analysts have relied more on his description of politics than his theory. The use of ‘bureaucratic polity’ conjures an image of a powerful and unshakeable bureaucracy, and a politically involved and dominant military. Whenever there was a coup and each time parliamentary rule failed, this was confirmation of the existence of the bureaucratic polity.

That Wilson and Riggs are Western analysts has not prevented their work being adopted by Thailand's political and social analysts. As noted by Neher and Bidhya (1984:1), Western scholars dominated the study of politics until the early 1980s. Even with an expansion of Thai academic studies, they argue, Western frameworks have remained predominant. Additionally, many Thai political scientists were trained in the North American tradition (see, for example, Thinapan 1975; Kanok 1984; Pisan 1988). For many of these scholars, while consensus and order have been important elements of their analysis, there has also been a concern for reform. Because of the influence of the bureaucratic polity model, much of the emphasis in studies has been on administrative reform, the need for the development of extra-bureaucratic forces, and overcoming clientelist politics (Neher and Bidhya 1984:6–7).

Challenging the consensus on the bureaucratic polity

While there has been a tradition of radical scholarship (see Reynolds and Hong 1983), anti-communism and the resultant political repression from the 1950s meant that it was not until the 1973–76 democratic interregnum that there was a renewed academic interest in radical approaches to political studies (see Morell and Chai-Anan 1981: part II). While the political openness of the period was short-lived and repression strong, academic interest in radical approaches continued into the 1980s.

With notable exceptions, the critics of modernisation approaches have seldom provided a theoretical critique of the perspective. Some of the problems associated with the approach can be summarised here (for more details, see Hewison 1989:10–14).

A brief critique of modernisation approaches

One of the substantive criticisms of the modernisation approaches is that they prevent a full analysis of conflict, change and class struggle (Phillips 1979:438; Girling 1981b:10). The organic model of society developed by those influenced by modernisation theory stresses equilibrium within society and emphasises the delineation of structures which maintain the system. A further telling criticism has been that the approach tends to be neo-evolutionary. In particular, Riggs's work presents a neo-evolutionary typology of structural features of social and political development. There is an assumption that a universal path from traditional to industrial or modern society exists, with development being measured at points along this path.

There is also a tendency for this approach to produce arguments which rely on cultural determinism for their explanations. There is a heavy emphasis on Buddhism as an explanatory factor for social and political action. Such explanations—essentially impossible to test—suggest that culture exists independently of people in society. This is a false assumption for, as Moore (1969:486) has argued, ‘Cultural values do not descend from heaven to influence the course of history’. In fact, the reverse is true: cultural values are not unchanging and are themselves influenced by the course of history. To explain social or political action by simple recourse to assumed cultural values obscures the significance of the way such values change and the broader political and economic changes taking place in society.

A final significant challenge to the modernisation perspective relates to the instrumentalist position it takes on relations between state and society. Writers in this school generally consider that there should be extra-bureaucratic influences on the state, and see such influences in essentially instrumental terms—where interest groups gain control of policy-making—thereby giving limited attention to structural factors. The lack of such influences in Thailand is usually explained in cultural terms.

Beyond the bureaucratic polity

Interestingly, these criticisms have not necessarily been the factors which have led to a move away from the models. Indeed, many of those adopting alternative theoretical approaches have tended to accept the description of the bureaucratic polity. It has been the perception that this model is no longer an adequate description of politics in the 1990s that has led to a move to go beyond the bureaucratic polity (see, for example, Anek 1992:4). There are essentially two paths which seek to move beyond the bureaucratic polity—first, the neo-pluralist and institutionalist approaches; and second, the political economy approach. These will be briefly discussed. A third path, represented by postmodernist approaches, is not discussed here as it has not yet established a significant body of literature (see Callahan 1993; 1994).

(i) Neo-pluralist and institutionalist approaches

Neo-pluralist approaches are well represented in the recent literature on Thailand's politics, while institutionalist approaches are only beginning to be applied. Common features, drawing together what is a diverse range of analysts, include a focus on an expanding range of interest groups and a recognition that the bureaucratic polity was an adequate representation of the situation until the early 1970s (e.g., Anek 1992; Christensen 1993; Christensen and Ammar 1993; Doner and Ramsey 1993; King and LoGerfo 1996). While it is clear that this group owes much to the modernisation approach, they are seen to represent an important path away from the bureaucratic polity model.

Prolific author and commentator Anek Laothamatas (1992), has produced a comprehensive approach to the ways in which a neo-pluralist—he uses the term ‘corporatist’—model may be utilised to go beyond the bureaucratic polity. While not confronting the theoretical shortcomings associated with Riggs's model, Anek does provide a theoretically informed model of ‘liberal corporatism’ applied to Thailand (see Anek 1992: Chapter 7). While declaring his work a discussion of ‘political economy’, it has much in common with revised pluralist approaches (see Martin 1983). He argues that the bureaucratic polity has been replaced by a system of liberal corporatism which is ‘marked by a high degree of autonomy and spontaneity, and by the central role of private groups in the creation and operation of their representative associations, as well as systems of government-group interest mediation’ (Anek 1992:13–14). Anek contends that extra-bureaucratic influences, and especially organised business, now have greatly enhanced power over the state, even if in a ‘less statist’ manner than in South Korea and Taiwan (ibid.: 15). Such influence was not possible under the bureaucratic polity.

In essence, the approach is that bureaucracy and business have developed a new relationship—no longer is business dominated by bureaucracy; rather, the former is privileged (ibid.: 150). The outcome from this is that analysts must examine the organised interests and their relationship to the state and policy-making not that far from early pluralist models, but modified by a more ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Politics in Asia series
• Full Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Notes on Contributors
• Foreword
• Preface
• List of Abbreviations
• 1 Introduction: Power, oppositions and democratisation
• 2 Power in transition: Thailand in the 1990s
• 3 Old soldiers never die, they are just bypassed: The military, bureaucracy and globalisation
• 4 The monarchy and democratisation
• 5 Withering centre, flourishing margins: Buddhism's changing political roles
• 6 More of the same? Politics and business, 1987–96
• 7 Thailand's political parties: Real, authentic and actual
• 8 Electoral politics: Commercialisation and exclusion
• 9 Local bureaucrats, power and participation: A study of two village schools in the Northeast
• 10 Locating working-class power
• 11 The politics of environment: Opposition and legitimacy
• 12 Non-governmental development organisations: Empowerment and environment
• 13 Thailand's media: Whose watchdog?
• 14 The Thai medical profession and political activism
• 15 The changing role of provincial business in the Thai political economy
• Notes
• References
• Index