Global Democracy

Key Debates

Barry Holden

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781134639205
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book presents the key debates about globalisation and links them with the growing, related discussion of the possible development of global democracy.
Global Democracy presents the literatures of globalisation and democracy to explore the major debates. The first part of the book brings together three major theorists and three critiques of their work - David Held on the potential advantages of globalisation for the furtherance of democracy; Paul Hirst questioning the idea of globalisation and Danilo Zolo on the need for some kind of international governance. The second part of the book looks at structures and processes, such as the UN, global civil society, state sovereignty, the EU and democratisation from major thinkers such as Boutros Boutros-Ghali.
This book provides exposition and critical examination of the latest thinking of leading authorities in the newly important fields of globalisation and global democracy. It will be a valuable textbook and resource for students of International Relations, Politics, Political Theory, and those taking courses in democratisation and globalisation.

Part I Theoretical issues

1 The changing contours of political community Rethinking democracy in the context of globalization

David Held

DOI: 10.4324/9780203022436-1

Political communities are in the process of being transformed. Of course, transformation can take many forms. But one type of transformation is of particular concern in this paper: the progressive enmeshment of human communities with each other. Over the last few centuries, human communities have come into increasing contact with each other; their collective fortunes have become intertwined. I want to dwell on this and its implications.

The focus will be on the changing nature of political community in the context of the growing interconnectedness of states and societies — in short, globalization. The paper has a number of parts.¹ In the first part, I explore some of the key assumptions and presuppositions of liberal democracy; above all, its conception of political community. In the second part, I explore changing forms of globalization. In my view, globalization has been with us for some time, but its extensity, intensity and impact have changed fundamentally. In the third and final part, the implications of changing forms of globalization are explored in relation to the prospects of democratic political community.

The presuppositions of liberal democracy

Until the eighteenth century, democracy was generally associated with the gathering of citizens in assemblies and public meeting places. From the late eighteenth century, it began to be thought of as the right of citizens to participate in the determination of the collective will, but now through the medium of elected representatives (Bobbio 1989). The theory of liberal or representative democracy fundamentally shifted the terms of reference of democratic thought: the practical limits that a sizeable citizenry imposes on democracy — which had been the focus of so much critical (anti-democratic) attention — were thought to be eradicable. Representative democracy could now be celebrated as both accountable and feasible government, potentially stable over great territories and time spans (see Dahl 1989: 28–30). As one of the best-known advocates of the representative system put it, ‘by ingrafting representation upon democracy’ a system of government is created that is capable of embracing ‘all the various interests and every extent of territory and population’ (Paine 1987: 281). Representative democracy could even be heralded, as James Mill wrote, ‘as the grand discovery of modern times’ in which ‘the solution of all difficulties, both speculative and practical, would be found’ (quoted in Sabine 1963: 695). Accordingly, the theory and practice of democratic government broke away from its traditional association with small states and cities, opening itself to become the legitimating creed of the emerging world of modern nation-states.

Built, as it was, against the background of the formation of the modern nation-state, the development of liberal democracy took place within a particular conceptual space (cf. Walker 1988; Connolly 1991; McGrew 1997b). Modern democratic theory and practice was constructed upon national, territorial foundations. National communities, and theories of national communities, were based on the presupposition that political communities could, in principle, control their destinies and citizens could come to identify sufficiently with each other such that they might think and act together with a view of what was best for all of them; that is, with a view of the common good (Sandel 1996: 202). It was taken for granted that, bar internal difficulties, the demos, the extent of the franchise, the form and scope of representation and the nature and meaning of consent — in fact all the key elements of self-determination — could be specified with respect to geography: systems of representation and democratic accountability could be neatly meshed with the spatial reach of sites of power in a circumscribed territory. Moreover, as a consequence of this, clear-cut distinctions could be elaborated — and national institutions built upon — the difference between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ policy, between domestic and foreign affairs.

Of course, the construction of a national democratic community was often deeply contested, as different social, economic and cultural groups fought with each other about the nature of this community and about their own status within it. None the less, the theory of democracy, particularly as it developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, could take for granted the link between the demos, citizenship, electoral mechanisms, the nature of consent, and the boundaries of the nation-state. The fates of different political communities may be intertwined, but the appropriate place for determining the foundation of ‘national fate’ is the national community itself. Accordingly, modern democratic theory and democratic politics assume a symmetry and congruence between citizen-voters and national decision-makers. Through the ballot box, citizen-voters are, in principle, able to hold decision-makers to account; and, as a result of electoral consent, decision-makers are able to make and pursue law and policy legitimately for their constituents, ultimately the people, in a fixed, territorially-based community.

Changing forms of regional and global order

At the centre of the dominant theoretical approaches to democratic politics is an uncritically appropriated concept of the territorial political community. And the difficulty with this is that political communities have rarely — if ever — existed in isolation as bounded geographical totalities; they are better thought of as overlapping networks of interaction. These networks crystallize around different sites and forms of power — economic, political, military, cultural, among others — producing diverse patterns of activity which do not correspond in any simple and straightforward way to territorial boundaries (see Mann 1986: ch. 1). Modern political communities are, and have always been, locked into a diversity of processes and structures which range in and through them. The theory and practice of the democratic sovereign state has always been in some tension with the actuality of state sovereignty and autonomy. How, then, should one understand these patterns of interconnections, and their changing form over time? And how should one understand their political implications, in particular for sovereignty, autonomy and the democratic political community?

The term‘globalization’ captures some of the changes which shape the nature of the political and the prospects of political community; unpacking this term helps create a framework for addressing some of the issues to be explored. Globalization can be understood in relation to a set of processes which shift the spatial form of human organization and activity to transcontinental or inter-regional patterns of activity, interaction and the exercise of power (see Held et al. 1999 ²). It involves a stretching and deepening of social relations and institutions across space and time such that, on the one hand, day-to-day activities are increasingly influenced by events happening on the other side of the globe and, on the other, the practices and decisions of local groups or communities can have significant global reverberations (see Giddens 1990). It is possible to distinguish different historical forms of globalization in terms of (1) the extensiveness of networks of relations and connections; (2) the intensity of flows and levels of activity within these networks; and (3) the impact of these phenomena on particular bounded communities. It is not a case of saying, as many do, that formerly there was no globalization, and there is now; rather, it is a case of recognizing that forms of globalization have changed over time and that these can be systematically understood by reference to points 1–3 above. Such an historical approach to globalization contrasts with the current fashion to suggest either that globalization is fundamentally new — the‘hyper-globalization school’, with its insistence that global markets are now fully established (see Ohmae 1990) — or that there is nothing unprecedented about contemporary levels of international economic and social interaction since they resemble those of the gold standard era, the‘sceptical school’ (see Hirst and Thompson 1996 and ch. 3 in this volume).

Globalization is neither a singular condition nor a linear process.

Rather, it is best thought of as a multi-dimensional phenomenon involving domains of activity and interaction that include the economic, political, technological, military, legal, cultural and environmental. Each of these spheres involves different patterns of relations and activities. A general account of globalization cannot simply predict from one domain what will occur in another. It is necessary to keep these distinctive domains separate and to build a theory of globalization and its impact on particular political communities from an understanding of what is happening in each and every one of them.

At least two tasks are necessary in order to pursue this objective, although, of course, not to complete it. First, it is important to illustrate some of the fundamental alterations in the patterns of interconnectedness among political communities. Second, it is important to set out some of the political implications of these changes. In what follows, I start by illustrating some of the transformations which have brought a change in the organization and meaning of political community.

1. Among the significant developments which are changing the nature of political community are global economic processes, especially growth in trade, production and financial transactions, organized in part by rapidly expanding multinational companies. Trade has grown substantially, reaching unprecedented levels, particularly in the period following the Second World War. Not only has there been an increase in intra-regional trade around the world, but there has also been sustained growth among regions as well (see Perraton et al. 1997). More countries are involved in global trading arrangements, for instance India and China, and more people and nations are affected by such arrangements. If there is a further lowering of tariff barriers across the world, along with a further reduction of transportation and communication costs, these trends are likely to continue and to further the extension, intensity and impact of trade relations on other domains of life. The expansion of global financial flows has, moreover, been particularly rapid in the last 10–15 years. Foreign exchange turnover has mushroomed and is now around 1.2 trillion US dollars a day. Much of this financial activity is speculative and generates fluctuations in prices (of stocks, shares, futures, etc.) in excess of those which can be accounted for by changes in the fundamentals of asset values. The enormous growth of global financial flows across borders, linked to the liberalization of capital markets from the late 1970s, has created a more integrated financial system than has ever been known.
   Underpinning this economic shift has been the growth of multinational corporations, both productive and financial. Approximately 20,000 multinational corporations now account for a quarter to a third of world output, 70 per cent of world trade and 80 per cent of foreign direct investment. They are essential to the diffusion of skills and technology, and they are key players in the international money markets. In addition, multinational corporations can have profound effects on macroeconomic policy. They can respond to variations in interest rates by raising finance in whichever capital market is most favourable. They can shift their demand for employment to countries with much lower employment costs. And in the area of industrial policy, especially technology policy, they can move activities to where the maximum benefits accrue.
   It is easy to misrepresent the political significance of the globalization of economic activity. There are those, earlier referred to as the‘hyper-globalizers’, who argue that we now live in a world in which social and economic processes operate predominantly at a global level (see Ohmae 1990; Reich 1991). According to these thinkers, national political communities are now immersed in a sea of global economic flows and are inevitably‘decision-takers’ in this context. For many neo-liberal thinkers, this is a welcome development; a world market order based on the principles of free trade and minimum regulation is the guarantee of liberty, efficiency and effective government (see Hayek 1960: 405–6). By contrast, however, there are those who are more reserved about the extent and benefits of the globalization of economic activity. They point out, for instance, that for all the expansion in global flows of trade and investment the majority of economic activity still occurs on a more restricted spatial scale — in national economies and in the OECD countries. They also point out that the historical evidence suggests that contemporary forms of international economic interaction are not without precedent — and they refer to the gold standard era for some substantial and interesting comparisons (see Hirst and Thompson 1996; cf. Perraton et al. 1997, and ch. 4 in this volume).
   But the claims of the hyper-globalizers and their critics mis-state much of what is significant about contemporary economic globalization for politics. Nation-states continue to be immensely powerful, and enjoy access to a formidable range of resources, bureaucratic infrastructural capacity and technologies of coordination and control. The continuing lobbying of states by multinational corporations confirms the enduring importance of states to the mediation and regulation of economic activity. Yet it is wrong to argue that globalization is a mere illusion, an ideological veil, that allows politicians simply to disguise the causes of poor performance and policy failure. Although the rhetoric of hyper-globalization has provided man...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Figures
• List of Contributors
• Preface
• Introduction
• Part I Theoretical issues
• Part II Structures and processes
• Index