The Louisiana Purchase

A Global Context

Robert D. Bush

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781135077716
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Early American History
• Index: History

In 1803, the United States purchased 828, 000 square miles of land from France at a price of approximately three cents per acre, dramatically altering the young nation's geography and its political future. President Thomas Jefferson had struggled for three years over the purchase, which many believed to be unconstitutional, during which time the land changed hands between the French and the Spanish. In perhaps the nation's most formative development since the Revolutionary War, the deal secured the U.S. territory that would become fifteen new states, sparked intense public argument about the American Frontier, and ensured Jefferson a complicated legacy in American history.

With special attention to the diplomatic and constitutional background of the purchase, The Louisiana Purchase examines the event in the context of the Atlantic world, including the impact of the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars in Europe, colonial revolutions in the Caribbean, and the westward expansion of the U.S. population. In five concise chapters bolstered by primary documents including treaties, letters, and first-hand observations, Robert D. Bush introduces students to the political history of this momentous land acquisition.

CHAPTER 1

The Louisiana Purchase

A Global Context, Background

Prepared as a supplement to accompany any general textbook on a History of the United States undergraduate course, the focus of this volume is on the people and events that made it happen, and it provides in the narrative both an introduction to primary documents and historical analysis. It incorporates a brief overview of the historiography of the Louisiana Purchase in American history. Spain and France's positions regarding the future of Louisiana are contrasted with their European and global priorities. But, what exactly was this colony of Louisiana?

Louisiana was of little importance as a European colonial possession on its own. This was due to the fact that so little was known about it. Maps of Louisiana were mainly drawn based upon geographical, historical and topographical speculations. French cartographers, with information from explorers in the southern areas of the colony, missionaries or fur traders from Canada, and friendly Indians provided little in the way of exact details of the area; oftentimes these details were, however, conflicting. This was particularly the case for the boundaries between Canada and New France, then Spanish, Louisiana. The sheer physical size of the colony inhibited travel and exploration. The first major breakthrough in knowledge regarding the history of New France, or Louisiana, came in 1744 with the publication of Father Pierre François Xavier de Charlevoix's (1682–1758) Journal of a Voyage to North America.⁴ Translated into English in 1746, and 1776, the latter edition was a common reference on book shelves in Britain and the American colonies. Thomas Jefferson owned a copy of Charlevoix's Journal in his personal library at his home in Monticello. The Journal included descriptions of outposts, relations with the Indian tribes, limited travel routes—both overland and by water—and a history of France's explorations from Canada inland, and up and down the Mississippi River from New Orleans. Because he traveled both in Canada and Louisiana, Father Charlevoix's descriptions were widely considered the most authoritative. Based on such travel accounts, Jacques Nicholas Bellin, an engineer for the French Navy and to the King of France, drew his map: “Carte de la Louisiane cours du Mississippi et Pais voisins” in 1744, and his “Carte Reduite des costes de la Louisiane et de la Floride,” in 1764. Bellin's maps were designed to show French possessions that included the Great Lakes and the Ohio Valley and all the land drained by waters flowing into the Mississippi River and therefore the entire valley.

A second French source of information about Louisiana was that by Antoine Simon Le Page du Pratz (c.1695–1775), The History of Louisiana, three volumes, published in 1758 in French as a travel account from his personal observations (1718–1734), and translated into English in 1774.⁵ Prophetically, Le Page du Pratz described the Mississippi River and New Orleans:

It is without reason then, that we say, whoever are possessed of this river, and the vast tracts of fertile lands upon it, must in time command that continent, and the trade of it, as well as all the natives in it, by the supplies which this navigation will enable them to furnish those people.⁶

Le Page du Pratz's work provided descriptions of the topography, fauna and flora, settlements, and Indian tribes—especially the customs, lifestyle, and politics among Natchez Indians, with whom he lived for eight years. After the Natchez massacred several French settlers in 1729, he returned to France in 1731. But despite these travel accounts and others from the eighteenth century, no one really knew what existed beyond the immediate areas along and west of the Mississippi; and, more importantly, no one cared when these lands passed from France into the Spanish global empire in 1762. Being uncharted and unexplored, the colony of Louisiana was regarded as a vast wasteland of no value; the only exception was New Orleans as a commercial entrepôt for trade on the Mississippi River.

The events of the French and Indian War (1756–1763) altered western land claims. France's defeat at the Battle of Quebec (1759) ended French control, which now passed to Britain. However, prior to the Treaty of Paris, which ended the war in 1763, France had secretly ceded her colony of Louisiana to her wartime ally Spain. By the terms of the 1763 Treaty Britain retained Canada, plus former claims by France to any of the lands east of the Mississippi River. But, per the secret Treaty of Fontainebleu (1762), Spain received from France possession of all lands west of the Mississippi River, including the “Isle of Orleans.” This division of lands, based on the Mississippi River as the dividing line, in 1763 created the geographical and political de-marcations for the future as well. The Mississippi River therefore became the focus of European colonial empires between Britain and Spain, both of whom retained navigation rights on the river.

Per the Treaty of Paris of 1763, Britain originally divided Spanish Florida into East Florida and West Florida in 1764 at the Apalachicola River from which East Florida extended to the Atlantic. West Florida extended from the Apalachicola and Chattahoochee Rivers to the Mississippi, which included Baton Rouge, Mobile, Natchez and Pensacola.

However, British navigation rights were hindered by Spanish control of New Orleans as the only port with an outlet to the sea. In the Treaty of Paris (1783), which granted independence to the American colonies, the United States received from Britain this same right of navigation on the Mississippi, and inherited the same problem—no access to the sea because of Spanish control at the Isle of Orleans. The stage was therefore set for future disagreement between Spain and the United States.

The British had not seen fit to challenge the transfer of New France to Spain at the Paris treaty negotiations; she was content to establish a Proclamation Line in 1763 between the Alleghenies and Mississippi that in theory was to restrict colonists from further intrusions into Indian lands, and reserve them for Indians as one way to maintain peace on the frontier. Further west, beyond the Mississippi River, Spanish Louisiana was seen as a vast wasteland, destitute of settlements, occupied by warring Indians, and for Spain, this was ideal in that no one would want it and therefore not initiate actions to take it. Don Manuel de Godoy (1767–1851), Prime Minister, 1801–1807, to King Carlos IV (1748–1919) of Spain, later concluded regarding Louisiana: “Almost all is yet to be done, just a sprout of life on those unpopulated regions.”⁷ Such a view of Louisiana dominated official Spanish thinking and planning, and therefore it was an ideal pawn to be traded for something somewhere else.

Spain's global empire stretched from the Viceroyalty of New Spain (Mexico, Texas to California, Cuba as well as the Caribbean and Central America) in the Western Hemisphere and to the Philippines and her other islands in the Pacific. But, Spain's empire was in decline due to the global challenges from Britain, the Netherlands, and for a while, France. For the province of Louisiana, however, it is necessary to examine the forty years (1762–1803) of Spain's possession, and concurrently her continued decline as a global power. In contrast to Spain, France—dominant on the Continent of Europe after 1795—administered Louisiana for only twenty days, November 30–December 20, 1803! And yet, the last two years (1802–1803) of this Franco-Spanish dealing prior to Louisiana's acquisition by the United States were the most dangerous and global in the potential for hostilities. France, on her part, was caught up in revolution at home after 1789, and in her West Indies colonies after 1791. She faced a coalition of nations against her, including Austria, Britain, and Spain, engaged in a European war in 1793. By 1795, however, France's military power had grown to the point that it forced Spain to switch her alliance from Britain to France, and so too was France's new appetite for global expansion in Syria, Egypt, and the West Indies.⁸

In the United States, President Washington proclaimed America's neutrality from the hostilities in Europe on April 23, 1793. It is therefore on this stage of global interests and events that the fate of Louisiana must be considered within the interrelationships between European and Western Hemisphere affairs.

Once again, events in Europe entered American politics. The catalyst for global events from 1791–1803 was the French Revolution with its national repercussions in Europe, the West Indies and America, and resulting international conflicts spawned by it. The French Revolution in 1789 and European wars after 1793 might have easily led the United States into war with Great Britain. Ultimately American neutrality did lead to a period of quasi-war (1797–1800) between the United States and France on the high seas over the American claim of the rights of neutrals. Within the United States, the impacts of the French Revolution included pro-French clubs, political debates on the events in France as reported in local newspapers, agitation and intrigue by a French emissary in Kentucky, and an increasing political hostility from those conservatives in the United States who saw only chaos in the beheading of the French king in 1793, and its resulting civil and international war attributed to the rule of the mob.

A history of the Louisiana Purchase constitutes an excellent study laboratory for the interrelationships in American domestic politics and global affairs during the critical years between 1800–1803.

In American political circles, factions who either opposed it, or supported it, became part of the nucleus for two definable political parties by 1796 elections—the old guard conservative (Presidents Washington and then Adams) Federalists, and the new (Jeffersonian) Democratic Repub licans. Emerging out of the intense national debate over the new Constitution, and the government it created, two political ideologies emerged and vied for public support. In the first national elections of 1788, those who had supported the Constitution, the original Federalists, as opposed to their opponents—the Anti-Federalists, dominated not only the executive in the persons of President George Washington and Vice-President John Adams, but also the House of Representatives and the Senate. Their political agenda was predicated upon their clearly perceived need for a new strong national government, which included the idea of the natural right of the county to enlarge its borders, and in the process under the new Constitution to replace the weaknesses of the old Articles of Confederation. The Constitution said nothing about territorial expansion of the nation. In one of their first legislative actions, the Federalists passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, creating a district court in each state along with circuit courts and the Supreme Court of the United States. The Federalist party manager was not, however, President Washington, but his secretary of the treasury, Alexander Hamilton. No one personified the conservative outlook, which would be built into the Federalist camp, better than Hamilton did. His fiscal policies emerged in his reports to Congress on the public credit, the national bank and manu facturing between 1790–1791. Such initiatives outlined his mechanisms for establishing a national program. Hamilton's political and fiscal conservatism looked to English models, especially with his Bank of the United States patterned after that of the Bank of England. The need for credit in order to stimulate trade required confidence on the part of those with wealth to invest, and therefore through implementation of Hamiltonian policies, the Federalists became identified as the political party of the wealthy, bankers, merchants from the east coast cities, and those with international ties to Great Britain. By early 1791, some of those in government, who had originally feared the powers entrusted to a strong national government under the new Constitution, and to those persons with personal interests in government, became more vocal. Among them, was Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, and, in the House, James Madison. The chartering of Hamilton's National Bank was the test case. Jefferson opposed it on the grounds that it was unconstitutional; Hamilton brilliantly argued that the power to tax and raise revenue, which were stipulated in the Constitution, necessitated a means to manage federal revenues. Therefore, he cited Article 1, Section 8, or the “implied powers” provision, which permitted Congress to make “all laws which shall be necessary and proper” to implement the Constitution. A Bank of the United States was “necessary and proper” in Hamilton's view, and President Washington agreed with him and signed the bill. Slowly, but inevitably, two political factions emerged on the American political scene with divergent views on the role of government under the Constitution, fiscal policy that included taxes along with the national debt, and international affairs. Two events turned these factions into American political parties: (1) the French Revolution after 1793; and (2) Jay's Treaty in 1795.

“All revolutions since 1800, in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa, have learned from the eighteenth-century [1760–1800] Revolution of Western Civilization. They have been inspired by its successes, echoed its ideals, used its methods.”

R.R. Palmer, The Age of the
Democratic Revolution

The French Revolution began in 1789, and news of the events there were generally seen in the United States as a positive step toward human progress by ending the old corrupt regime built upon privilege. But, by 1790–1791, views changed; and, on April 20, 1792, France declared war on Austria, in August King Louis XVI was placed under house arrest, and in September France abolished the monarchy and declared itself a “republic.” In December the King was tried for treason, and executed on January 21, 1793. Shortly thereafter, came French declarations of war against England (February 1), and Spain (March 7). In the United States, these events, along with revolutionary activities among the slaves in the French colony of Haiti after 1791, combined to divide Americans into pro-French or anti-French factions. President Washington, Vice President Adams, and Alexander Hamilton as conservative Federalists could not support the social, political and international chaos that suddenly arrived on American shores due to events in Europe. President Washington responded with the declaration of American neutrality on April 23. The problem with neutrality, however, is you have to have the means with which to enforce it against the combatants. In this regard, the United States was woefully short, since the British navy ruled the seas. As the greatest maritime power in the world, Britain began to stop American vessels at sea in order to search them for cargoes destined for French ports, or coming back to the United States from the French West Indies. Given the choices, President Washington and his Federalist government had no alternative but to seek some sort of accommodation with Britain; and, Secretary Hamilton was already known for his pro-British position. It was amidst this climate, Secretary of State Jefferson resigned from Washington's administration in 1793.⁹ President Washington's dilemma was how to remain “neutral” while seeking relief from the Royal Navy, which by 1795 had already impounded over 200 American vessels. From the Federalist point of view, such events were the result of radical French actions. Once again, Secretary Hamilton had a solution. Washington appointed John Jay, Federalist Chief Justice, to go to London with instructions, drawn up by Hamilton, to negotiate a maritime treaty for the relief of American shipping interests.

John Jay was successful. The result of his negotiations with his English counterpart William Grenville was signed as a “Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation” on November 19, 1794. In its provisions, England agreed to withdraw its remaining troops from the Northwest Territory, which it had originally agreed to do in 1783, and to arbitrate the lingering issue of U.S. Canadian boundaries and war debts owed to British citizens since the American Revolution. The British agreed to compensate American ship owners for their losses, and in return, the United States recognized Britain with “most favored nation” status for trade con-cessions and the right of its naval vessels to enter U.S. ports. On its part, Britain obtained substantial trade concessions, and, most importantly, the continued neutrality of the United States, which would insure that any pro-French activities would be avoided for the duration of the European war. Jay's Treaty, as it became known in the United States, was submitted to the United States Senate in June, 1795. It immediately encountered opposition from Jefferson, Madison, and their supporters. Quite simply, anything that supported trade concessions to Great Britain was seen as another example of the pro-British foreign policy of the Federalists. By now, the Jeffersonian “republicans” had seen enough of Federalist policies, which they labeled as “aristocratic” and even “monarchical” based upon an overindulgence to moneyed American and British interests. In the American west, the treaty with Britain was seen as coming too late because of English traders and army officers from Canada and their alleged support to Indians in the Northwest Territory. In the southern states, while Jay had secured compensation for shippers in the northeast, he had not gotten similar compensation for those slaves that had been taken away by the British during the American Revolution. For the Jeffersonians, now becoming a distinct political party, Jay's Treaty was the centerpiece of everything they detested among the Federalists' control of government. The treaty was ratifi...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Critical Moments in American History
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Series Introduction
• List of Figures
• Acknowledgments
• Timeline
• Preface
• 1 The Louisiana Purchase: A Global Context, Background
• 2 Louisiana in Spanish Global Policy, 1762–1802
• 3 Louisiana in French Global Policy, 1800–1803
• 4 Louisiana in American Domestic and Global Policy, 1800–1803
• 5 The Louisiana Purchase: A Global Context, Summary
• Documents
• Notes
• Suggestions for Further Reading
• Bibliography
• Index