Russia's International Relations in the Twentieth Century

Alastair Kocho-Williams

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781136157479
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

Russia has long been a major player in the international relations arena, but only by examining the whole century can Russian foreign policy be properly understood, and the key questions as to the impact of war, of revolution, of collapse, the emergence of the Cold War and Russia's post-Soviet development be addressed.

Surveying the whole of the twentieth century in an accessible and clear manner Russia's International Relations in the Twentieth Century provides an overview and narrative, with analysis, that will serve as an introduction and resource for students of Russian foreign policy in the period, and those who seek to understand the development of modern Russia in an international context.

The volume includes:

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• an analysis of the major themes which surrounded Russia's position in world affairs as one of the European Great Powers before the First World War

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• the impact of Revolution and the emergence of Soviet foreign policy with its dual aims of normalization and world revolution

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• the changes wrought to the international order by the rise of Nazi Germany and by the Second World War

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• the origins and development of the Cold War

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• the end of the Cold War and the Soviet collapse

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• how Russia has rebuilt itself as an international power in the post-Soviet era.

An essential resource for students of Russian history and International policy.

1 Russian foreign policy under the last Tsar

As Russia entered the twentieth century, it was faced with foreign policy challenges on a number of fronts. Expansion towards the Far East, not least via the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway in the late nineteenth century, had brought it into competition with other great powers in vying for trade and influence, and into confrontation with Japan. At the same time, Russian interests in the Balkans were sustained, and unrest within the Empire was spreading.

The late Russian Empire was faced, therefore, with a diverse set of challenges. On the one hand there was a need to protect old interests and to remain strong in the interplay with the Great Powers. On the other hand there was a desire to expand its influence, and increasingly to maintain domestic stability as the tide of revolution built within Russia.

The situation of the Russian Empire in the early years of the twentieth century needs some contextualization. In the 1870s the Russian Empire had entered into an alliance system with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The brainchild of Count Otto von Bismarck, the alliance was designed to bring Russia and Austria-Hungary into an alliance system that would prevent their coming to blows as a result of a clash of interests in the Balkans, while at the same time reassuring Russia that Germany did not pose a threat to Russia and keeping Russia from forging an alliance with the French or British. Bismarck’s alliance system was complicated, ridden with contradictions, and proved ultimately unworkable with Russia as a partner.

In 1890 the alliance between Russia and Germany ceased. Isolated, the Russian Empire sought for a new partnership to counter a potential threat from Germany or Austria. It was as a result of this that the Russian Empire was to forge an alliance with France in 1893–94. The Franco-Russian Alliance was not only an important step in finding a new international partner, it led to an influx of capital which the Russian Empire was able to use to equip its army and develop its industrial and rail capacity.

Tsar Alexander III saw the Franco-Russian alliance as a basis for dealing with a German threat. Officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were concerned about this, not least as the Tsar appeared to have an intention to use the alliance as a basis for launching an assault on Germany. While he never took his plan to fruition, the fact that France could be counted on to support Russia in conflict with Germany and Austria nonetheless stood as a factor in late imperial Russian foreign policy considerations.

In 1893 construction on the Trans-Siberian Railway commenced. This brought Russia to a point where it was able to open up trade with the Far East, which brought the Russian Empire into a relatively strong position in the Far East and led to its having an increasing involvement in the region. Russia played an active role in the settlement of the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War. While Japan had been victorious, Russia stripped the Japanese of most of their gains, seizing territory for itself and gaining control of the Chinese and Korean economies as a result of extending Russian financing. Japan was snubbed, but sought to ensure that Russia did not encroach further on its interests.

The maintenance of Russian pressure on British interests in Central Asia and the Far East led to a somewhat fraught relationship with Great Britain. Russia challenged the security of British India by impinging on British influence in Persia, Afghanistan and the Far East, while also competing for trade. The opening of the Trans-Siberian Railway had given Russia an edge in the Chinese market, and Russian gains after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 made it a major player in the region. When the Great Powers joined to suppress the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1901, Russia became the steward of the settlement, thus gaining more sway in the Far East. As Russia gained dominance and began on a collision course with Japan, Britain took steps to forge alliances with the Japanese in 1902 and to send an expedition to Tibet in 1903. Conflict in Afghanistan remained, but had been largely settled by border agreements in the 1890s, but as Britain fought a war in South Africa at the turn of the century, the Tsar was keen to point out that Russian pressure on routes to India could well determine the outcome of the British military campaign against the Boers. The closest-fought area, though, was Persia, where in 1900 both Russia and Britain had opened embassies. While the British had given assurances to support the Shah, the Russian Empire secured dominance in road and rail building. The British were concerned that they were not only losing important ground to Russia in Persia, but also to keep Russia from gaining access to a warm-water port on the Persian Gulf, and to limit Russian agitation amongst indigenous tribes in Khorana that could lead to the Shah’s power being challenged. Many of the British concerns about the Russians centred on the security of India. While there was no outright conflict in the early twentieth century between Britain and Russia, the relationship was shaky and the British were clearly wary of the Russian Empire and what they saw as its expansionist tendencies.

All of these aspects of Russia’s situation in the world at the beginning of the twentieth century would come to bear on the challenges and events that faced the Russian Empire in its last years. While some would be resolved without resort to war, others saw Russia embroiled in conflict, not least in the First World War.

It is rather simplistic to see the Russian Empire as on a path to war in 1914. Nonetheless, it is difficult to escape 1914 as a product of Russian foreign policy in the early years of the twentieth century. Sustained Russian involvement in the Balkans, particularly the support for Serbia, led to Russian interests colliding with those of both the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Even so, it was not with Russia’s most likely imperial rivals that the Russian Empire first found itself at war in the early years of the twentieth century. It was with Japan that Russia was to fight its first conflict of the twentieth century.

The Russo-Japanese War, 1904–5

Russian aspirations in the Far East led to conflict with Japan. Having snubbed the Japanese in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War, Russia failed to respond adequately to repeated Japanese demands to respect spheres of influence, and Japan ultimately waged war on the Russian Empire. In part this line was pushed by the Minister of the Interior V. K. Pleve, who argued that matters in the Far East should be settled by force rather than diplomacy, and that a brief victorious war with Japan would serve to stem the tide of revolution in Russia. Officials in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs disagreed, as did Sergei Witte, who, believing that war with Japan had become inevitable, resigned as Minister of Finance in 1903.

With support for adventurism in the Far East, the tide of war with Japan was almost impossible to hold back. Following Russian rebuttal of a proposal over the recognition of a Russian sphere of influence in Manchuria and a Japanese sphere in Korea in 1901, Japan had turned to Britain and concluded a defensive alliance against Russia in 1902. In the summer of 1903 the Japanese again attempted to conclude an agreement with the Russians along the same lines as in 1901. Again, the Tsar refused to agree, as he did again in December 1903. General Kuropatkin suggested the restoration of Port Arthur, Kwantung Province to Japan and selling it the Chinese Eastern Railway in return for a guarantee on rights in Manchuria. The Japanese gave their final warning in January 1904 that if an agreement could not be reached, then war would break out. Tsar Nicholas II arrogantly refused to believe that Japan would start a war with Russia and gave no response to the Japanese demands. In doing so he was to find that his faith both in Japan’s willingness to go to war with Russia and in the superiority of Russian military and naval power was misplaced. Without warning or any formal declaration of war, Japan launched an attack on Port Arthur and Chemulpo in February 1904.

Just as indecision, arrogance and adventurism had led to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, they also led to an ineffectiveness and confusion in fighting it that was compounded by serious military and naval defeats. The surprise attacks that had begun the war at Port Arthur and Chemulpo had neutralized Russia’s far eastern naval squadron by sinking ships and blockading ports. Following this, the Japanese sent troops to Korea, who outnumbered and defeated Russian forces at the Yalu River, which served as the natural border between Manchuria and Korea, before moving to cut the South Manchuria Railway north of Port Arthur. By May 1904, both the port of Dalny and Port Arthur were besieged.

Russian forces did not receive significant reinforcement until August 1904, at which point a Russian campaign began in Manchuria. Russia continued to fare badly, being defeated at Liaoyang and the Shaho River, before being forced to retreat from the Battle of Mukden in February 1905. Kuropatkin was able to establish a front south of Harbin and the Chinese Eastern Railway, which he held until the end of the war.

The Russian navy also suffered serious defeat and humiliation. After being blockaded in Port Arthur, the Port Arthur Squadron attempted to break out and reach Vladivostok in August 1904. The Japanese Admiral Togo destroyed it in the attempt. In October the Baltic Fleet was sent from St Petersburg. While in the North Sea, crossing the Dogger Bank, the fleet fired upon British fishing vessels in the belief that they were Japanese torpedo boats. This caused an outcry from Britain, with British public opinion calling for war with Russia. The embarrassed fleet was escorted by the Royal Navy to Africa and continued on its journey to the Far East. On arriving, in May 1905 the fleet attempted to sail through the straits between Korea and Japan, where it was destroyed at the Battle of Tsushima. This embarrassing defeat was the catalyst for Nicholas II to admit that peace with Japan should be sought.

Despite the extent of Russian military and naval defeat, Japan was eager for peace too. Japan approached the United States President, Theodore Roosevelt, to act as mediator of the peace, and in August 1905, Russia and Japan met at Portsmouth, New Hampshire to discuss terms. The Russian delegate was Sergei Witte, who had been instructed by the Tsar not to concede any territory, agree to reparations or give up the Chinese Eastern Railway. Witte was unable to work entirely within these constraints, but nonetheless salvaged a reasonable settlement for Russia.

Under the Treaty of Portsmouth Russia ceded to Japan the Liaotung Peninsula, Port Arthur, the South Manchuria Railway and the southern half of Sakhalin Island. Both parties agreed to a withdrawal of troops from Manchuria, with the exception of those stationed as railway guards. Japan’s sphere of interest over Korea was enforced and Manchuria was divided into two spheres of interest – Russian in the north and Japanese in the south. Witte was able to ensure that Russia did not have to pay reparations to Japan.

On the face of it, the Russo-Japanese War appears to have been a disaster for Russia, and in many senses it was, particularly in the short term. The war had been very costly, both financially and with respect to loss of life, and Russia lost a significant amount of prestige as the first of the European Great Powers to be defeated by an Asian power. The Franco-Russian Alliance was weakened by the conflict and the defeat was viewed in a negative light by the Russian population, contributing significantly to the outbreak of revolution in 1905.

In the longer term, however, Russia was able to make some gains. The loss of the Russian fleet at the Battle of Tsushima brought an end to British concerns about the Russian navy and contributed to the easing of Anglo-Russian tension that led to the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907. Additionally, the Treaty of Portsmouth paved the way for Russo-Japanese cooperation and further agreements, which took on particular significance as the Chinese Manchu Empire declined. In July 1907 Japan and Russia drew up a convention which reaffirmed the Treaty of Portsmouth and gave Japan a free hand within its sphere of Korea, South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, and Russia the same in North Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. A further Russo-Japanese treaty was concluded along the same lines in July 1910, in part as a response to the United States’ desire to place the Manchurian railways under joint American and Japanese control. When Sun Yat-Sen was overthrown in 1911, leading to the collapse of the Chinese Manchu Empire, Russia and Japan worked together to mutually respect each other’s interests, while dismembering China and profiting from its demise. A secret treaty between Russia and Japan in July 1912 confirmed Russia’s and Japan’s dominance over their respective spheres. Russia, by 1912 had become entangled in dealing with its interests in the Balkans and the secure and stable relationship with Japan allowed for the concentration of efforts away from the Far East.

1905: revolution and reform

As mentioned above, one of the hopes of the Minister of the Interior, Pleve, was that a brief, victorious war with Japan would stem the tide of revolution in Russia. Defeat at the hands of the Japanese in a costly and disastrous war had quite the opposite effect. While not the root cause of the 1905 Revolution – the cause is generally viewed as being the result of Nicholas II’s unwillingness to respond to calls for liberal reform – the Russo-Japanese War certainly acted as something of a catalyst for it. It was shortly after the loss of Port Arthur at the end of 1904 that Bloody Sunday took place on 9 January 1905 in the Russian capital. Mutiny broke out in pockets across the Russian army and navy, most notoriously aboard the battleship Potemkin, which was unable to leave the Black Sea.

The 1905 Revolution took hold in the cities and countryside as strikes broke out and peasants took up the revolt against landlords. The Tsar was ultimately persuaded that some degree of reform should be agreed to, and issued the October Manifesto, which, while it safeguarded his autocratic rule over Russia, made provision for a parliament, or Duma and granted limited civil liberties. The Tsar then followed this by the issuing of the Fundamental Laws of 1906, which gave rise to limited reforms and consultative government. While reform was significant in bringing Russia back from the brink of revolution in 1905–6, it also had an impact on Russia’s position in international politics.

The defeat at the hands of the Japanese and its connection to the outbreak of revolution in Russia highlighted that Russian foreign policy needed to undergo change. While this was one of the things that Russian newspapers had called for in the years immediately preceding 1905, there had been no real reform. A new Foreign Minister was appointed, Alexander Izvolsky, who set about attempting to reform the Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del (MID) or Foreign Ministry. While his reforms were never fully carried through, they serve to highlight an adjustment in the conduct of foreign affairs that was deemed necessary by the failure of diplomacy to prevent war with Japan, and a sense that Russia could not continue to behave in such a manner on the world stage, not least because it was plain that Russia needed the maintenance of peace in order to be able to develop economically and to maintain of the regime’s political control.

While there was not so much a Russian ‘diplomatic revolution’ after 1905, Russian foreign affairs did change in the aftermath. The granting of constitutional concessions by the Tsar was viewed in a favourable light by other powers, and Russia’s ability to engage in military or naval conflict had waned. It was clear that Russia was not in a position either politically or financially to throw its weight around on the international stage, wh...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Abbreviations
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1. Russian foreign policy under the last Tsar
• 2. The Russian revolutions of 1917 and the Russian Civil War in international context
• 3. Soviet foreign policy in the 1920s
• 4. Soviet foreign policy under Stalin in the 1930s
• 5. The Soviet Union and the Second World War
• 6. The Soviet Union and the early Cold War, 1945–53
• 7. From Stalin to Khrushchev, 1953–56
• 8. Peaceful coexistence and confrontation: Soviet foreign policy, 1957–64
• 9. The Brezhnev era
• 10. Gorbachev and the end of the Soviet Union
• 11. Russian foreign policy in the last decade of the twentieth century
• Select bibliography
• Index