Deradicalising Violent Extremists

Counter-Radicalisation and Deradicalisation Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States

Hamed El-Said, Jane Harrigan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781136243639
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Infrastructure
• Index: Business

Terrorism remains one of the major threats facing the world community. While literature on the subject is dominated by discussion of the factors leading individuals and groups to join violent extremist, terrorist groups, the question of what can lead them to disengage from such groups is an equally important one. This book is the first study to provide a detailed analysis of both counter-radicalization and deradicalization programmes in eight Muslim-majority states, representing hitherto one of the largest, detailed, and most systematic inventory of such programmes in the world.

Drawing on detailed case-studies from a number of countries, the book:

• traces the historical evolution of violent extremist groups and individuals in each country case study, including the period before independence;

• describes in detail states' response to this phenomenon in each period;
• provides important empirical analyses for counter-and-deradicalization policies and programmes based on extensive fieldwork and interviews with state officials, former radicals, and members of civil society organizations in each country;

• provides a first systematic evaluation of the effectiveness and success of these programmes and policies;

• focuses simultaneously on factors that have led to deradicalization at an individual or organizational level, and on the macro environment, both external-global and internal, that encourages counter-radicalization and deradicalization of groups and individuals.

The detailed comparative analyses allow the reader to identify conditions, both internal and external, which are conducive to both success and failure of counter-radicalization and deradicalization programmes, and the authors identify best practice and provide policy implications for states facing threats from violent extremism, as well as for international institutions and organizations working in the field of counter-terrorism.

1
Introduction

Definitions and conceptual framework

Hamed El-Said

Introduction

Almost ten years after the infamous 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the subject of terrorism continues to occupy a significant place in international relations. In recent years, there has been a ‘renewed interest’ in the subject of terrorism (Horgan and Braddock 2010: 267), which is fuelled by proliferation of political instability and consolidation of Al-Qaeda and like-minded terrorist groups in such ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, West Africa, Libya and Yemen (Sharp 2011). In recent years, an important shift in focus, however, has taken place. Rather than focusing on what leads an individual or group to join a terrorist organization, the literature has now turned its attention into the equally significant question of what leads an individual or group to leave or turn against terrorism and their former colleagues (Bjorgo and Horgan 2008). A recent report by the International Institute for Counter Terrorism (IICT) summed up the shift in focus of literature in the following words:

Recently, we have been witnessing a new phenomenon – key figures in the Islamic world, who in the past took part in armed Jihad or at least ideologically supported it, are now working to counter the radicalization process and to minimize recruitment to terrorist organizations. This phenomenon is known as “retraction” … [which] reflects, particularly on the part of authorities within the Muslim world, to harness the Islamic sources being used for radical indoctrination and to instead employ them as tools for fighting Islamic extremism.

(IICT 2011: 2)

At least two factors have triggered this change in focus. First is the emergence of a new way of thinking with regards to violent militancy or terrorism. This followed a re-evaluation of efforts and policies to counter the phenomenon, not only in Muslim-majority states but also Muslim-minority or Western countries. This new school of thought first officially emerged in Europe following the 2004 and 2005 Madrid and London terrorist attacks respectively, and was triggered by the realization that many of the attackers were ‘home grown terrorists’ (Coolsaet and Swielande 2008: 158–9). As David Miliband, the UK’s former foreign secretary, stated in 2009:

European officials, including British officers quietly stopped using the phrase “war on terror” in 2006 … [because] the use of “War on Terror” as a Western rallying cry since 9/11 has been mistaken and may have caused more harm than good.

(Miliband 2009)

Mr Miliband also summarized the gist of the new approach, which came as a result of ‘a fundamental evaluation of our efforts to prevent extremism and its offspring terrorist violence’ (my emphasis). The new approach treats radicalization as a process caused by an ‘environment conducive’ to radicalization and extremism that leads to terrorism.¹ As Sageman (2008) noted, nobody is born a terrorist. The European approach, therefore, focuses on preventing violent extremism from occurring in the first place by focusing on the ‘root causes’ or ‘environment conducive to violent extremism’.²

Second, re-evaluating ‘efforts to prevent extremism and its offspring terrorist violence’ has been preceded by the emergence of ‘new innovative approaches’, the aim of which is to win the hearts and minds of segments of the population most affected by, and prone to, terrorist violence (Horgan and Braddock 2010: 267). For lack of a better name, such approaches are often referred to as counter-radicalization and deradicalization programmes.

Counter-radicalization and/or deradicalization are very loosely defined in the literature. Generally speaking, they refer to programmes introduced to cause a change in views and behaviour of detained and non-detained militants to abandon ‘permanently … violent activities’ (Chapo Central 2010: 5). They also aim at preventing the emergence of a new generation of terrorists in the future (IPI 2010).

Counter-radicalization and deradicalization programmes (referred to thereafter as Counter-derad programmes), have become increasingly popular in Muslim-majority states. Spared by Algeria and Egypt in 1997, the novelty of their application has become the basis for other, sometimes more comprehensive and sustained programmes, in Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Morocco, Bangladesh, Iraq, Indonesia, Tajikistan, Yemen, Pakistan and Jordan. They have not only inspired other Islamic radical movements in Western countries, such as Liberation Party Factions in the United Kingdom, which have renounced violence and resorted to more civil means of expressing their objectives. They have also inspired many Western and Muslim-minority states, like the Netherlands, UK, Canada, Singapore and Australia (Ashour 2009: 13; Boucek 2008).

Although Counter-derad programmes ‘have been deemed more successful’ than traditional military approaches in winning ‘hearts and minds’ and preventing fomentation of future generations of terrorists (IPI 2010: 1), little remains known about these programmes’ composition, sequences, timing and conditions conducive to their success or failure. As Horgan (2008: 18) emphasized: ‘we know little about the processes of disengagement from terrorism, and even less about the multiplicity of routes via which individual terrorists come to leave terrorism behind’. While assessing deradicalization programmes in some Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority states, Horgan and Braddock (2010: 267) also recently noted that ‘despite their popularity, data surrounding even the most basic of facts about these programs remain limited’. Seifert concurs: ‘Exactly how’ these programmes are ‘accomplished is not entirely clear’. Finally, Ashour (2009: 3) eloquently assented when he summarized the ‘lacunae in the literature on Islamism’, in the following words; despite the fact that deradicalization programmes:

… had removed tens of thousands of former militants from the ranks of al-Qua’ida’s supporters and acted as disincentive for would-be militants, there is not one single detailed book on the causes of de-radicalisation processes.

(Ashour 2009: 3)

More importantly, and in spite of continued great and renewed interest in explaining violent extremism and processes of disengagement from terrorism, ‘it is difficult to distinguish the variables that influence senior members in Jihad organizations to “retract” their radical beliefs and to understand the relationship between such factors’ (IICT 2011: 3).

To be sure, some ‘value-adding’ research has recently emerged on the subject. Authors such as Omar Ashour (2009) have shed important light on the factors that led to the successful deradicalization of violent extremist ‘organizations’ in both Egypt and Algeria. Ashour’s work focused on the deradicalization of the Egyptian Islamic Group between 1997–2002, the al-Jihad Organization after 2007 and the Algerian militant Groups between 1997–2009. Michael Jacobson (2010) has also produced an important study into what he terms ‘the flip side’ – ‘those who decide to leave terrorist and extremist organizations’, or the ‘drop-out phenomenon’ among ‘individuals’ rather than groups and organizations. Both Ashour’s organizational framework and Jacobson’s individual approach, however, largely tend to ignore the general or macro environmental conditions that catalyse the initial radicalization and any subsequent deradicalization. Hence, the conditions and environments, both national and international, under which such programmes can be nurtured and implemented more effectively and successfully remain unknown and under-researched (Cline 2009: 4).

This book, therefore, fills an important gap in the literature by focusing on the conditions conducive to successful Counter-derad programmes. This is achieved by studying and analyzing the Counter-derad programmes in eight Muslim-majority states, known for implementing successful Counter-radicalization, deradicalization or both programmes simultaneously. These countries are: Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Although the number of programmes studied is relatively small, the book remains today the most comprehensive study of Counter-derad programmes in Muslim-majority states. It is the first detailed study of conditions conducive to successful Counter-derad programmes at the macro level, including national and international levels.

The main questions, which the book seeks to answer, are the following: what are the national conditions conducive to successful Counter-derad programmes in Muslim-majority states? What is the relationship between developmental states and radicalization and effective Counter-derad programmes? What is the relationship between strong/weak states and radicalization and the ability to fashion effective Counter-derad policies? What is the link between radicalization, Counter-derad on the one hand and external and global factors on the other? Who are the main actors and stakeholders involved in Counter-derad policies and efforts? And what are the transferrable lessons that can be derived from studying the experience of Muslim-majority states to other Muslim-majority and non-Muslim-majority states alike facing the threat of terrorism?

To address these questions and shed light on conditions conducive to successful Counter-derad programmes, the book studies policies in eight Muslim-majority states known for implementing policies and processes in this important area of national security. In addition to reviewing and relying on written material, media and library literature on the subject, the book relies heavily on fieldwork and personal interviews carried out with state officials, academics and experts, members of civil society organizations, Islamists and former radicals who graduated from Counter-derad programmes in their respective countries.

But first and before embarking on analysis of counter-derad-programmes in Muslim-majority states, it is important to provide definitions for the terms and concepts used throughout the book, as well as sitting the conceptual framework against which the analyses of the book will be based, including an explanation for conditions conducive to successful Counter-derad programmes.

Definitions and conceptual framework

First, we use the terms violent extremism, violent militancy and terrorism interchangeably in this book. The reason for using the term terrorism here is due to our belief that terrorism, which includes the killing of innocent people, both Muslims and non-Muslims, for whatever reason is non-Islamic and violates the basic tenets of Islamic faith. As the Qu’ran instructed the Prophet (Muhammad) to tell people in Surat Al-Ahqaf (part 26: 9):

I am not a new thing among the Messengers (of Allah, i.e. I am not the first Messenger) nor do I know what will be done with me or with you. I only follow that which is revealed to me, and I am but a plain Warner.

Killing an innocent soul in Islam is a major sin and is not justifiable except in the case of a mistake. This is made clear in Surat Al-Nisa (part 5: 91), which states that: ‘It is not for a believer to kill a believer except (that it be) by mistake’. In other words, the Messengers were not ordered to fight people, including those who do not believe in their messages. This particular responsibility – punishment – was made the sole responsibility of, and preserved for, the creator himself. As the Qu’ran stated in Surat Al-Ghashiyah (part 30: 23–6): ‘ … who turns away and disbelieves. Then Allah will punish him with greatest punishment. Verily, to Us will be their return; Then verily, for Us will be their reckoning’. We therefore do not shy away from using the term terrorism in this book to describe the killing of innocent people for political, ideological or religious motivations.

We do not however treat self-defence, or defending one’s country and people from foreign aggression as terrorism. Jihad is rooted in the Qu’ran precisely for self-defence and nobody can undermine the true interpretation of jiahd. Yet Islam clearly and unambiguously delineated the boundaries of jihad and provided a powerful ethical and moral framework for resorting to jihadi activism. Deviating from the true principles and ethics of jihad, as defined and outlined by the Qu’ran and the Sunna, in order to consciously kill or harm innocent people for political, ideological or religious motivations is what we refer to as terrorism or violent extremism in this book.

By extending the above analysis, we also do not believe that terrorism is ‘Islamic’ or confined to groups and individuals belonging only to the Islamic faith either. Indeed, Muslims are latecomers to terrorism, and groups and individuals belonging to all other faiths and cultures have long resorted to terror tactics throughout history even before some radical Islamists did so (Laqueur 2007). As John Brennan, Assistant to the American President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, stated:

Violent extremism is neither unique nor inherent to any one faith. Violence is something that every faith rejects but every faith had to confront … there is nothing – absolutely nothing – holy or pure or legitimate or Islamic about murdering innocent men and children … As families with relatives and friends around the world, you know that it is actually Muslims who have suffered most at the bloody hands of violent extremism. It is your Muslim brothers and sisters … who have paid the highest price. As one study recently noted, in recent years, nearly all of al-Qaida’s victims (98%) have been innocent from Muslim countries …

(Quoted in Neuman 2011: 31)

This is why we use the terms violent extremism, violent militancy and terrorism interchangeably in this book. We do accept the argument, however, that ‘Today Islamist’s radicalisation is the most prominent form of radicalisation … even … if Islam is not the essence’ (Coolsaet and De Swielande 2008: 158); hence, the reason for our specific focus in this book on Muslim-majority states.

Second, we define radicalization as a change in the views and behaviour of groups and individuals towards embracing more uncompromising political and ideological positions and ideas, with willingness to take unusual and concrete actions to see them implemented. This does not necessarily mean violent actions. In fact, ‘being radical … is not illicit – and even when it goes against the law, it can be legitimate’ (ibid. 156). Embracing acts of violence and criminology for political or ideological motives (e.g. terrorism), the subject of this book, is illicit.³

Third, counter-radicalization is a term used to refer to measures and policies implemented to prevent the emergence or fomentation of a new generation of terrorists or violent extremists in the society. Counter-radicalization refers to antedate measures that are taken before groups and individuals become violent extremists, or to reduce the level of radicalization in the society. Counter-radicalization focuses ‘on the communities that are targeted by terrorists for recruitment. The aim is to protect, strengthen and empower these communities so that they become resilient to violent extremism’ (Neumann 2011: 7). Counter-radicalization measures are usually delivered through multiple channels and entities, with an unlimited range of relevant activities, none of which are coercive (ibid.). They can include such policies and measures as reforming religious institutions, organizing conferences and workshops to counter radical ideology, fighting corruption, implementing economic reforms to address deep rooted socioeconomic grievances, making greater use of mosques and media, including TV, satellite channels and the internet to expose the danger of terrorism and undermine r...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• CONTENTS
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction: definitions and conceptual framework
• 2 Clemency, civil accord and reconciliation: the evolution of Algeria’s deradicalization process
• 3 The rise of religious-based radicalism and the deradicalization programme in Bangladesh
• 4 Group deradicalization in Egypt: the unfinished agenda
• 5 Jordan’s response to jihadi salafism
• 6 Malaysia: a history of dealing with insurgency and extremism
• 7 Counter-radicalization without deradicalization: the case of Morocco
• 8 Saudi Arabia: the master of deradicalization
• 9 Yemen’s passive approach to countering terrorism
• 10 Conclusion
• Index