Ethical Issues in Social Work

Richard Hugman, David Smith

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2002
• ISBN:
  9781134854455
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

It has always been recognised that the practice of social work raises ethical questions and dilemmas. Recently, however, traditional ways of addressing ethical issues in social work have come to seem inadequate, as a result of developments both in philosophy and in social work theory and practice. This collection of thought-provoking essays explores the ethics of social work practice on the light of these changes.
Ethical Issues in Social Work provides up to date critical analyses of the ethical implications of new legislation in community care and criminal justice, and of trends in social work thought and policy, such as managerialism, user empowerment, feminism and anti-oppressive practice.
This study provides important and stimulating reading for social work students and their teachers, and for all practitioners and managers who are concerned about the ethical dimensions of their work.

Chapter 1

Ethical issues in social work: an overview

Richard Hugman and David Smith

INTRODUCTION

Ethical issues are at the heart of a discipline such as social work. Social work is concerned with the care of people who have a variety of needs, with family relationships, with social responses to offending and with needs arising from structural causes (such as poverty). These are each, in different ways, moral concerns, embedded in the mores of society, and so are laden with social values (Timms 1983; Horne 1987). Herein lies the crux of the problem, because value-statements, being views about what is desirable in society, are highly contentious. They say ‘what ought to be the case’ (Shardlow 1989: 3), and so open up the potential for disagreement between individuals on grounds of belief and perception (for example, of politics, culture or religion). Not only does this mean that an activity such as social work will always reflect values, because it is required to intervene in important aspects of everyday life, but that it will often be disputed because the goals of social work may not necessarily be equally acceptable to every member of society. To this extent, ethics and values are inherently ‘political’, so any exploration of their implications must be concerned also with the contested nature of social work activity.

The choice for social workers, therefore, is not whether their work has an ethical dimension, but whether or not ethical questions are addressed explicitly and how they are to be explored (England 1986). The various chapters of this book engage in just such a task through the examination of a range of contemporary social work issues, each of which poses specific challenges to social work practice and policy. At the same time, it is recognised that the treatment of social work as a unitary phenomenon in such matters as questions of ethics is likely to be mistaken (Timms 1983: 2). Within, as well as outside, the profession there are different perspectives, and the discussions of the different contributors to this volume reflect a range of approaches and positions to the topics under examination.

ETHICS: THE MEANS-ENDS RELATIONSHIP

Ethical propositions are statements of value related to action. In the instance of social work with which we are concerned here, ethics concern the way in which that occupation is practised, organised, managed and planned. Value-statements may draw on abstract or ideal notions but at the same time they necessarily carry with them implications for the way in which individuals act and the relationship between people as members of social groups. For example, if we accept as an ethical principle that social workers should demonstrate a ‘respect for persons’ (Butrym 1976) then we must also be able to say something about the context in which action demonstrating respect occurs and by what criteria we may decide that respect has been demonstrated. To do otherwise is to be ‘hesitant and clumsy ‘ in our analysis, or even to lack analysis altogether (Timms 1983: 28). Timms goes further, and argues that ethical principles are not fixed directions in the manner of an instruction manual but are the basis for making choices in situations where a range of actions is possible (ibid.: 31-2). Similarly, Horne (1987) and Shardlow (1989) have been critical of writers on ethics and values in social work who have not grounded their understanding within a grasp of the concrete historical demands facing social workers day by day.

We shall return below to the specific example of ‘respect for persons’. At this point what we are emphasising is the extent to which questions of ethics and values have been dealt with as discrete issues in the social work literature, rather than as facets of a wider concern with the tasks social workers have to accomplish, the methods by which they work, the organisation and management of their services, and the way in which all of these things are judged. As statements of value, ethical principles provide an important yardstick by which particular actions can be evaluated. Moreover, they represent a measure through which the relationship between means and ends should be made clearer.

To illustrate the connection between means and ends Jordan (1990: vii- xiv) sketches out a fable in which the Director of Social Services in a mythical department is challenged by service users to justify the way in which the outcomes of services fail to reflect formal principles and objectives. The charge is that the immediate meanings of phrases such as ‘value each client as an individual’, ‘promote human potential’ or ‘assessment of need’ (ibid.: viii) are contradicted by the experience of receiving services. This, Jordan appears to be suggesting, is because social work methods, theories and systems often serve to aggregate people by type of need or problem and to deny services users’ own perceptions of their lives, thus communicating other, unstated objectives such as ‘controlling costs’, ‘limiting criminal behaviour’ or ‘rationing scarce resources’. This may be as a consequence of decisions taken elsewhere - for example, in Parliament - but if this is the case then the inherent values (as ideal objectives) are dominated by particular economic considerations or concepts of justice, such as retribution or deterrence, which are remote from social work practice. In such circumstances questions of ethics will concern the principles governing the allocation of resources or access to power in decision making (ibid.: 144).

Jordan is indicating that ethical issues cannot be divorced from the standpoint of the actors involved. To the extent that this involves access to resources and decision making we are talking about social power. Social workers, along with other ‘caring’ professions, exercise considerable power (Hugman 1991), and so this must be addressed in any discussion of ethical issues in social work.

THE ‘CLASSIC’ WRITING: DECONTEXTUALISATION

Those writers who can be seen as forming the ‘classic’ phase in the formulation of social work values had a common interest in elucidating codifiable sets of principles. Probably the most influential of these was the 'seven principles of case-work’ outlined by Biestek (1961). These principles are:

1. unconditional acceptance of the client as a person;
2. a non-judgemental approach to clients;
3. the individualisation of the client;
4. the purposeful expression of emotion;
5. controlled emotional involvement;
6. confidentiality;
7. self-determination for clients.

Similarly, Butrym (1976: 47) outlined three principles or ‘propositions’, namely:

1. a respect for individual persons;
2. a belief in the social nature of each person as a unique creature depending on other persons for fulfilment of her or his uniqueness;
3. a belief in the human capacity for change, growth and betterment.

For Butrym these propositions underpin Biestek's principles listed above (1976: 48-55). They are statements of value or belief which provide the rationale for the more action-oriented ethical principles which Biestek had described.

Halmos (1978) similarly relates his understanding of the guiding ethics of social work (and other counselling professions) to questions of ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’. However, Halmos's work highlights a problem which has continued to be a source of confusion - namely, the extent to which a concern with ‘ethics’ can be separated from what he calls ‘moralising’ (Halmos 1978: 182-6). ‘Moralising’ is defined here as the making of judgements about the moral worth of other people or their actions as the basis for the provision of a social work service and so is regarded as antithetical to the establishment of an ethical code for a profession. In this context the rejection of moralising in favour of a concern with ethics is equivalent to Biestek's (1961) assertion of non-judgementalism.

A more recent example of the apparent failure to grasp this distinction is evident in the Report of the Panel of Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Jasmine Beckford, in which the social workers concerned claimed that their non-intervention was guided by the principle of non-judgementalism because they did not form a negative view about the consequences of the father's parenting (Blom-Cooper 1985: 293-4). A different understanding of what ‘non-judgementalism’ means might have suggested that it was the approach taken in the assessment and not the parenting practices in themselves which should have been subject to evaluation against an ethical principle of this kind. The parenting itself had to be judged, irrespective of any moral view of the parent(s), because social workers are obliged to consider the safety and well-being of children (see, for example, Wise 1988).

The first code of ethics for social work in the UK developed by the British Association of Social Workers (BASW 1975) represents an attempt to spell out the implications for practice of general ethical propositions of the kind listed above. This requires a recognition that social workers are not free agents, but employees of various agencies, and they may have several points of reference as a consequence (the client, colleagues, other professions, the employing agency and the general public) (BASW 1975).

However, Horne (1987: 4) argues that because the BASW code starts from an idealist set of abstractions, it, like the contemporary statements by the qualifying council (CCETSW 1976), fails to provide adequate guidance for social workers in the resolution of day-to-day conflicts of interest and the discharge of their responsibilities. The conclusion drawn is that implications of ethical principles must not only be spelt out but also must be located in the legal, organisational and political contexts in which social work is inevitably practised. The underlying charge is that the lists of principles on which the early BASW and CCETSW documents were based are decontextualised and therefore idealised in their portrayal of social work.

THE ‘CRITICAL’ WRITING: POLITICISATION

A similar criticism is made by the body of writing which can be grouped loosely together as ‘radical social work’. However, although these writers share with others the view that social work ethics must be grasped from the perspective of what actually happens in practice, the underlying theory on which this position is based is that of Marxist (or sometimes neo- Marxist) materialism. For example, Bailey and Brake (1975), Galper(1975), Corrigan and Leonard (1978), and Simpkin (1979) all argue that the framing of ethical questions as well as the answers at which one arrives are derived from the class positions of those involved. In other words, values are inseparable from the material relations of society.

For Simpkin the roots of orthodox social work values are to be found in Kantian philosophy, especially that element which posits the humanity of each individual person as an end as well as a means in our actions (Simpkin 1979: 97-100). This requires the recognition of each actual person as an instance of the ‘general human individual’ and so establishes ethics as impersonal principles, divorced from any recognition of the specific characteristics of any one person. In this way, the Kantian approach leads to an apparent removal of ethical issues from the subjective world of social relations to the level of abstraction.It is this, Simpkin concludes, which results in notions such as ’respect for persons’ being taken out of the social context in which social work is practised. The ‘individualisation’ of the client which follows therefore serves, at best, to disguise the social origin of problems with which people are faced (such as poor housing, unemployment and low income). At worst it results in a covert blaming of victims (which is not made explicit, because that would be judgemental).

It may be argued that the ‘individualisation’ which Biestek (1961) claimed as central to social work ethics was important in that it emphasised the status of the client as a unique person, with the rights and claims which that entails. However, the radical social work position is critical also of this argument as taking the individual out of context. What the materialist framework of radical social work points to is, rather, the location of human individuality in various groups formed by divisions within society, of which the most usual instance was class. In these terms ethics must be built not on the assumption of a general humanity, but a humanity that is divided within current social structures. It is impossible to speak or act in this sense without recognising that every person is a member of a specific social class and other objective groupings.

The critics of radical social work frequently focus on the detail of ‘radical practice’, arguing that it is barely distinguishable from ‘orthodox practice’ (summarised, for example, by Langan and Lee 1989). At the level of values, Timms (1983: 104) identifies a central theme in radical social work writing of ’the truly human’, which, he points out, itself makes an assumption about general humanity. Timms may be mistaken when he goes on to say that a Marxist definition of ’truly human’ does not exist (Marx, after all, was engaged in part in a critical ‘philosophical anthropology’; see, for example, McLellan 1970). However, he is accurate in his conclusion that what we are presented with is a set of claims which compete with ‘orthodox’ values and which themselves make philosophical assumptions which require elucidation. Moreover, many Marxisms and neo-Marxisms have developed, so it may be inaccurate to speak of one single position.

THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION

The radical social work critique, while it may sometimes be seen as remaining oppositional (Langan and Lee 1989), has also had a marked impact on ‘conventional’ social work values. This can be seen most clearly in the extent to which structural explanations of the problems faced by social work clients are now incorporated in practice and teaching which would make no explicit claims to being ‘radical’.Nowhere is this more evident than in the terms of the Diploma in Social Work (DipSW) set out by CCETSW (1991). Although still founded on primarily liberal principles involving the recognition of competing value positions, social workers are now expected to develop an awareness of structural oppression, understand and counteract stigma and discrimination of both individual and institutional kinds, and promote policies and practices which are non-discriminatory and anti-oppressive (CCETSW 1991: 16). As such, these terms attempt to contextualise ethical principles in the manner called for by critics of earlier CCETSW documents (see above). At the same time, as Husband argues in a later chapter in this book, they may fail to recognise other dimensions, such as that of culture, in which different concepts of the individual are normative.

To what extent, then, has the definition of core ethical principles in social work shifted between Biestek (1961) and CCETSW (1991)? Although the CCETSW document does not provide a list in quite the same way as Biestek, it is possible to identify key points which can be compared between the classic formulation of thirty years ago and the current position. In Table 1 Biestek's seven principles are listed alongside implications embedded in Paper 30 (CCETSW 1991: 15-16).

The shift in the ethical implications for social work illustrated in this comparison can be summarised as one from notions which are abstract and wide-ranging to those which are more specific in scope. This can be seen in point 2, where the move from non-judgementalism to anti-discrimination focuses on the areas in which social workers might introduce moral judgement, based on their own social position and experience, in relation to class, race, gender, sexuality and disability. Similarly, the general principle of confidentiality has become a more specific injunction to respect privacy and to maintain confidentiality within the limits of law, policy and procedure.

Not only does this development show something of the influence of radical critiques on social work, but there may also be a degree of convergence. As Pearson (1989) acknowledges, there are limits to what social workers realistically may be expected to achieve, because they are grounded in powerful and concrete social...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Ethical issues in social work
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Series editor's foreword
• Notes on contributors
• 1 Ethical issues in social work: an overview
• 2 In search of the holy grail
• 3 Ethical issues in social work research
• 4 Confidentiality, accountability and the boundaries of client-worker relationships
• 5 The morally active practitioner and the ethics of anti-racist social work
• 6 Feminist ethics in practice
• 7 Managerialism and the ethics of management
• 8 Enforced altruism in community care
• 9 Can social work empower?
• 10 Towards a new view of probation values
• Index