Parliaments and Pressure Groups in Western Europe

Philip Norton, Philip Norton

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781135068172
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Pressure groups are fundamental to pluralist societies. But what is the relationship between those groups and parliaments? This work explores the links between parliaments and pressure groups, assessing the extent and impact of the contact that occurs. Is pressure group activity beneficial to parliament? And what are the implications for the political system?

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Putting Pressure on Parliaments

PHILIP NORTON

Societies rarely comprise an undifferentiated mass of individuals. Individuals get together and form groups. There a sons why they do so differ. Some groups may be formed for mutual recreation and discussion. Some may be created to provide services to members. Some may be formed to help others. Some may be formed to promote a particular cause or idea.

Such groups may develop organisational characteristics: for example, meeting regularly, keeping records of proceedings, establishing leadership positions, hiring staff and developing means of keeping in touch with members. They may begin to take some action on behalf of their members.

The existence of such bodies is an intrinsic feature of a pluralist society. It is not surprising that the United States, where de Tocqueville noted the propensity of citizens to join groups and in which citizens are more likely than citizens of any other country to belong to groups,¹ is a breeding ground of pluralist theory. Groups are a distinctive and well established feature of Western society. In the new democracies of central and eastern Europe, where freedom of association was previously restricted or denied, establishing non-governmental groups or organisations has been central to the development of civil society.

Most groups are not formed for the purpose of influencing public policy. However, public policy impinges on groups in various ways – for example, their status for tax purposes, their capacity to conduct business – and groups may on occasion seek to influence the outcome of policy deliberations. Some groups may even be formed for the purpose of achieving a change in public policy. In west European states, groups attempting to affect the outcome of public policy are numerous. Groups will make representations to policy makers – an activity known as lobbying, after the place (the lobby just outside the legislative chamber) where influence-peddlers used to operate – to try to get them to accept their desired ends. Nor is such activity confined to the national level. State and local government are targets for lobbying by groups.² So too are the institutions of the European Union.

Group activity is thus an important part of the political environment of Western states. The institutions of the state are not politically autonomous. They exist in an increasingly crowded political environment, shaped and constrained by political parties and buffeted by demands for action from a myriad of organised groups.

Yet just how much are group demands directed at the central elected assembly – the legislature?³ What is the relationship between parliaments and those groups attempting to influence public policy? The relationship is not one that has been the focus of much literature, either on parliaments or on policy analysis. It is this relationship that forms the basis of this study. Are parliaments ignored by groups or are they a magnet for group demands, and – if they are the subject of group demands – does that activity have any discernible consequence for the groups and for the parliaments? And what are the consequences of the relationship between pressure groups and parliaments for the political system?

PRESSURE GROUPS

The classic definition of a pressure, or interest, group is that it is a body that seeks to influence government in the allocation of resources without itself seeking to assume responsibility for government. This distinguishes pressure groups from political parties. Political parties do seek to assume responsibility for government and contest elections in pursuit of that goal.

It is common to distinguish between sectional groups and cause groups.⁴ Sectional groups exist to promote and defend the interests of a particular section of society, one usually defined by economic activity. Such groups are usually permanent, have a defined potential membership (all doctors in the case of a medical association, all lawyers in the case of a bar association) and frequently offer services to members (advice, information, discounted prices for goods and services, opportunities to meet and network with other members). Such groups do not have as their primary aim the influencing of public policy, but engage in such activity as and when it appears necessary to defend the interests of members. They have one important sanction they can deploy in their attempts to influence public policy: they can withdraw – or threaten to withdraw – their co-operation. A refusal by a group to co-operate in the implementation of a particular policy may make it difficult if not impossible for government to implement that policy. The clout of a particular group is maximised when its membership is close to the maximum potential membership.

Cause (or promotional) groups exist to promote a particular cause or idea. Where the cause is specific, the group may have a temporary existence: once the cause is achieved, there is no reason for the group to continue. Such groups are usually open to anyone who shares the goal of the group: thus the potential membership is the whole population. Such groups tend to lack the resources and the economic sanction of sectional interest groups: the threat to withdraw co-operation will not normally carry much political weight. They may, though, seek to have some impact by engaging in public demonstrations and, on occasion, civil disobedience.

The distinction is useful, though not watertight.⁵ Some sectional groups are small and have little economic muscle. Some cause groups are large and permanent. There are groups that are difficult to categorise. Furthermore, with such a simple dichotomy, each category is remarkably broad.

A more sophisticated taxonomy has been offered by Wyn Grant. In a study of British pressure groups, he distinguishes groups in terms of their strategies for influencing public policy.⁶ He draws a basic distinction between insider and outsider groups. Insider groups are regarded as legitimate by government and are consulted on a regular basis. Outsider groups are not consulted on a regular basis, either because they choose not to be involved in such consultation or because they are not regarded as legitimate by government.

In the first edition of his book, Grant refines each category. He identifies three types of insider group: high profile insiders (complementing government contact with the use of the mass media), low profile insiders (avoiding recourse to publicity) and prisoner groups (dependent on government or in the public sector). He also identifies three types of outsider group: potential insiders (wish to be insiders but have not yet won government acceptance), outsider groups by necessity (lacking the knowledge and skills necessary to achieve insider status) and ideological outsider groups (reject achieving change through the political process).

Grant’s distinction between insider and outsider groups is not dissimilar to the distinction between sectional and cause groups, in that sectional groups tend to enjoy privileged access to government whereas cause groups have to resort to public pressure to get their case over to policy makers. However, the correlation between the status of sectional and cause groups and the relationship to government is not complete: not all sectional groups enjoy an established institutional relationship with government and not all cause groups are excluded from such a relationship. Furthermore, the distinction between sectional and cause groups is static. Grant’s typology has the advantage of allowing for a change in status: a group may percolate from outsider to insider status or, indeed, be forced from insider to outsider status. Some groups previously treated with caution by policy makers may achieve insider status through public support or through demonstrating a sound command of the subject; some groups well regarded by government may lose their insider status as a result of a change of government or because of some change in the nature of the group.

GOVERNMENTS AND PRESSURE GROUPS

These typologies help give some shape to the many thousands of pressure groups that exist in Western countries. Grant’s typology helps give some structure to the relationship of groups to government and, indeed, is premised on the existence of such relationships. The existence of potential insider groups implies that groups in that category accord some importance to achieving insider status. Groups want to have a close relationship with government. But what is there in such a relationship for government?

For pressure groups, access to government is necessary and possibly sufficient for achieving a change in public policy. Industrialisation, which occurred in Western countries at different times, generated a more specialised society. Interests became differentiated and organised. Sectional groups developed and began providing particular services to members. Many also began to take an interest in public policy. Manufacturers’ associations, for example, were concerned about such things as taxation, tariffs and employment laws. Trade unions were interested in workers’ rights. Such groups started making representations to government on behalf of their members. As such groups grew in number, the demands on government increased. The demands changed both qualitatively as well as quantitatively: not only were demands greater in number, they were also more specific and complex in content. Lobbying of government by pressure groups became – and remains – a notable feature of west European countries.

Groups need government if they are to achieve a change in public policy. Conversely, government needs groups. It needs groups for information, advice and co-operation. Governments rarely have the resources to compile data on activities in all the sectors covered by sectional groups. Groups may and often are able to supply that information. Government may also seek advice from groups, primarily sectional groups, on the feasibility of particular policies or on how certain problems may be addressed. Indeed, where a particular group has recruited to its maximum possible membership, it enjoys a virtual monopoly in terms of knowledge. ‘If doctors are powerful’, as Rudolf Klein noted, ‘it is not just because of their characteristics as a pressure group but because of their functional monopoly of expertise.’⁷

Government is also frequently dependent on groups for co-operation in the implementation of policy. A refusal to co-operate may make it impossible to implement the policy effectively. However, such refusal is rare as problems are likely to have been resolved at an earlier stage through consultation. Insider status allows groups to make their views known directly, and usually privately, to policy makers and for policy makers to take those views into account in crafting a policy likely to prove acceptable.

Indeed, the relationship between groups and government is often symbiotic. Each needs the other. As groups have grown in number, governments in western Europe have tended to pursue the politics of accommodation, seeking to accommodate as many relevant interests as possible.⁸ One consequence has been the cooption of groups into the policy process. In some cases, groups are given statutory representation on public bodies. In some countries, the representatives of organisations representing business and labour have been brought into a tripartite relationship with government. At a minimum, it is common practice – and, in some countries, formally required – for government to consult with affected groups prior to the introduction of a bill.⁹

The sheer scale of the exercise has also meant greater reliance is placed on the bureaucracy, as ministers do not have the time to devote to all the demands made of them by groups. More and more discussion has taken place in policy communities – comprising the representatives of the various groups in the sector and the officials from the relevant ministry – with proposals for change, usually some policy adjustment, being agreed and passed to the minister for approval.

Pressure for change does not always originate in groups. Governments may be committed to particular policies by virtue of popular demand or ideological belief. However, it is usually in their interest to solicit the support of affected groups. That support may be crucial in ensuring smooth implementation of the policy. It may also be valuable to government in selling the proposal to others in the political system. If a policy can be promoted as having the support of the relevant groups – the groups with the expertise in the field – it then becomes difficult, though by no means impossible, for others to challenge it.¹⁰ Among those who may find it difficult to challenge the policy are members of parliament.

PARLIAMENTS AND PRESSURE GROUPS

Industrialisation limited the role of parliaments in public policy making. It did so in two ways. It generated a middle class and a body of artisans who demanded a political voice. The widening of the franchise precipitated the development of mass- membership political parties. Parties acted as the conduit for the transfer of power from parliaments to party-dominated executives. The dominance of parties, with members being elected to parliament on the basis of a party label, sapped the political will of parliaments to challenge consistently and effectively the measures and actions of government. A parliamentary system of government is the norm in western Europe and a majority of members of a parliament are not willing to say ‘no’ on a regular basis to a government that is of the same political hue, or formed of parties representing a majority of the chamber. This development explains, in part, why government is the focus for group attention: government is the site of policy making. Once policy has been agreed and formulated by government, it is placed before the legislature for approval and that approval is usually forthcoming. The parliaments are not the site of policy making – in Mezey’s terminology, they are reactive rather than active legislatures¹¹ – and party limits their capacity for substantial independent action.

Not only do parliaments normally lack the political will to challenge government measures, they also often lack the knowledge to do so. This brings us to the other consequence of industrialisation. Industrialisation, as we have noted already, produced a more specialised society. Interests became more organised and variously sought to influence public policy. The scale of the demands, and their complexity, were too much for a parliamentary assembly to cope with. A body of sometimes several hundred parliamentarians could not process and respond promptly to the growing body of specific demands. The greater the specificity and the complexity of the demands, the less easy it was for the member of parliament – usually not an expert in the subject – to comprehend the merits of the case. At the same time, the government was acquiring greater knowledge through contact with such groups.

What, then, of the present role of parliaments in relation to pressure groups? We proceed on the basis of two hypotheses. The first is that the developments we have described have pushed parliaments from the initiating and formulating stages of the policy process, leaving them operating instead primarily at the deliberative stage.¹² We have explored elsewhere the relationship between parliaments and governments.¹³ As reactive legislatures, parliaments in western Europe respond to what government brings forward and the normal response is to give approval. There is some variation in the extent to which the parliaments constrain government – some exert greater influence than others – but the difference is relative. The more institutionalised parliaments have a greater capacity to constrain government than less institutionalised ones, but the constraint is occasional rather than regular and rarely if ever on matters of high politics. Although we have explored this hypothesis in depth in our other study, it does have a particular relevance for this volume. What flows from it is that government is the principal target for pressure group demands.

Our second hypothesis is that parliaments are a target for some group pressure because of their consequences for the political system. Although parliaments may now be limited in terms of policy making – what Robert Packenham has termed their decisional functions – they have other consequences for the political system; indeed, as Packenham has argued, these normally have greater significance for the political system than the decisional, or law-making, consequence.¹⁴ We would expect a parliament to be a...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Half Title
• THE LIBRARY OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• List of Contributors
• General Introduction
• 1. Introduction: Putting Pressure on Parliaments
• 2. The United Kingdom: Parliament Under Pressure
• 3. Germany: Bundestag and Interest Groups in a ‘Party Democracy’
• 4. Parliament and Pressure Groups in Italy
• 5. Belgium: Insider Pressure Groups in an Outsider Parliament
• 6. The Netherlands: Parliamentary Parties Rival with Pressure Groups
• 7. Parliaments and Pressure Groups: The Irish Experience of Change
• 8. The European Parliament: Getting the House in Order
• 9. Conclusion: Conflicting Pressures
• Index