Contemporary Military Theory

The dynamics of war

Jan Angstrom, J.J. Widen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781136169199
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

The book aims to provide the reader with a state-of-the-art introduction to classic and modern military theory.

The text accounts for the most important theories within the field by developing and analyzing these theories, as well as problematizing both their normative and explanatory aims. While focusing on military theory, the book does not only reflect a single way of relating to knowledge of war and warfare, but furthers learning by introducing contrasting perspectives as well as constantly criticizing the theories.

There is a clear need for an introductory text for the entire field of military theory that focuses whole-heartedly on the theories – not on their context or how they are expressed in practice during war. This book covers such questions as how we should understand the changing character of war, the utility of force and how the pursuit of political ends is achieved through military means. It draws upon and illustrates military thought through a wide-ranging number of examples from the Napoleonic Wars to the current war in Afghanistan.

This book will be of great interest for students of military theory, strategic studies, security studies and defence studies.

1 Military theory

An introduction

Introduction

This is not a book about war. It is a book about ideas about war. Such ideas have probably existed at least as long as war itself but, in the early history of mankind, they were seldom set down in writing in an enduring and comprehensible manner for posterity. It is, therefore, difficult to know to what extent military theorizing has occurred in other contexts than in the modern Western world. Like similar texts therefore, this book is biased towards Western thought from the Age of Enlightenment onwards, when ideas about war began in earnest to be formalized in writing. Military thought at large was for a long time intended exclusively for officers’ training. It was not until during the Cold War that strategy started to be taught at a few civilian universities in the Western world (Freedman 1985; Betts 1997). However, towards the end of the Cold War, strategy in particular was hardly taught at defense colleges either. The near-frozen strategic situation and the superpowers’ mutual assured destruction, had not lent itself to creative theorizing regarding conventional use of force. Instead, increasingly during the Cold War, waging war began to be thought of in terms of following manuals and staff procedures (Kelly & Brennan 2009).

Arguably, this was detrimental, and as soon as the Cold War ended it was followed by a renewed interest in theories of war. This interest was further fuelled by the outbreak of war and an increase in the number of armed conflicts immediately after the end of the Cold War (e.g. Themnér & Wallensteen 2011). Moreover, the wars appeared different from before, even spurring some to talk of “new wars” and others to talk of a revolution in military affairs (e.g. Kaldor 2006). Accordingly, the literature on strategy and military theory grew rapidly. Existing introductions to military theory are plentiful and, in many respects, good and authored by leading scholars. However, it is difficult to find any individual introductory work covering the entire field with a coherent and applied pedagogical idea, as well as one with an analytical and a problematizing approach. The existing literature can be divided into four general categories: (a) field-specific texts, (b) texts on the history of ideas, (c) individual-centred texts, and (d) texts on the art of war.

The first category of literature, field-specific texts, is very extensive and tends to provide both varied and detailed analyses of a specific sub-field of military theory (e.g. Till 2013; Beckett 2001; Stone 2011). The problem is that these texts, despite often being of good quality, only introduce a certain segment of military theory. This may, for example, concern books dealing with specific sub-fields, such as sea power, strategy, logistics, or guerrilla warfare. Nor is it unusual for these texts to have aims that go significantly beyond the introductory, and which may therefore provide important contributions to the state of our knowledge, primarily as a syntheses of their respective sub-fields.

The second category, texts on the history of ideas, has the advantage of capturing the development of military theory and the intellectual context within which it is formalized. A history of ideas perspective can partly explain the content of the theories – and thereby often provides an original contribution – at the same time as introducing the field (e.g. van Creveld 2000; Heuser 2010; Gat 2001). The problem with these texts is that they often tend to be narrative rather than problematizing and analytical. The theories described, moreover, are seldom developed conceptually. The explanatory aims of these texts sometimes mean they are more suitable for someone who is already familiar with the field.

The third category, individual-centered texts, where thinkers rather than their ideas are at the core, is often closely related to the texts on the history of ideas but has a clearer biographical and individual-centred perspective (e.g. Paret 1986; Baylis & Garnett 1991; Heuser 2002). The focus of this literature on the individual theorists leads to a deeper understanding of the individual theorists’ works and often an analysis of their intellectual development. This means that it often provides important contributions on how we should understand specific thinkers’ military theories and why they formulated their ideas in a certain way. The problem with this category as an introductory text is that it tends to give a rather fragmentary picture of the field and often goes too deep, which makes it less suitable for beginners. The individual theorists in and of themselves are often at the centre of attention instead of comprehensive and conceptual analyses of the actual theories.

The fourth and final category, texts on the art of war, is characterized by its aim of discussing and problematizing the relationship between military theory and warfare. These texts (e.g. Lider 1983; Jones 1987; Baylis et al. 2010; Kassimeris & Buckley 2010; Gray 2007; Jordan, et al. 2008) contribute to analyses of how military theory has influenced doctrines, training and warfare and therefore provide an important contribution to the field. There are, however, problems with this category, in so far as it rarely develops the theories the texts discuss. Instead, military theory is introduced indirectly through its practical starting point in warfare or doctrine development. Establishing how military theory influences warfare is, however, problematic, as it is often difficult to decide whether it is the idea in and of itself or the actor putting it forward (and thereby a power structure) that has influenced the conduct of war (cf. Goldstein & Keohane 1993). This also means that this category of literature is more suitable for readers who are already familiar with the main features of military theory.

From our perspective, the existing introductory literature on military theory therefore appears too ambitious toward details, too specialized or too practically oriented to introduce the field optimally. This means that the current literature is often more suitable as in-depth literature. There is, consequently, a need for a comprehensive, accessible introductory text for the entire field of military theory that focuses whole-heartedly on the theories – not on their context, their practical expressions in warfare or their advocates. Our approach is to systematically discuss military theory on the basis of its qualities as theory and – more precisely – as social science theory. By developing and systematizing military theory, this book can thus be said to complement and improve the existing literature. It is important to point out, however, that this book is primarily a textbook with only limited aims as regards originality. For example, we do not claim that our interpretation of, for example, Clausewitz’s reasoning on the nature of war is ground-breaking, but as an introductory book, its pedagogical approach, structure, analytical framework, and parts of its analysis have original features.

The book aims to provide the reader with a state-of-the-art introduction to classic and modern military theory. It will account for the most important theories within the field by developing and analyzing these theories, as well as problematizing both their normative and explanatory aims. It is a book about military theory that does not reflect a single way of relating to knowledge of war and warfare, but many alternative ways. Indeed, it is precisely by introducing contrasting perspectives, as well as constantly criticizing the theories, that learning is furthered. This approach will obviously cause certain problems. An introductory book that focuses on the actual theories and the concepts they have been built on will, by definition, lack large elements of the historical background that puts theories and theorists into context. This could lead to a limited understanding of the origin and aims of the theories and to the discussions in the book becoming more abstract than would otherwise have been the case. However, this approach has a proven pedagogical merit within political theory and there are no reasons to believe that it would be less advantageous for learning military theory.

Before we move on to a discussion of what military theory is, we would like to make the reader aware of two things that clarify, define and justify elements of the discussion to come: the relevance of exact and well-defined concepts and the question of how the views of large and small states differ. Concepts are key components within science and, thus, also within military theory. Rigorously formulated concepts will lead to boundaries being created where some elements of reality are excluded and some are included. This feature provides us with an analytical instrument and a tool for analyzing reality. Such tools are essential prerequisites for a systematic search for knowledge. Only precise and well-defined concepts allow valid generalizations and an effective exchange of knowledge between individuals.

Concepts also have other merits, e.g. the ability to make visible what we have previously only been able to perceive intuitively (or not even known). When, for example, the Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) formulated the concept of “friction” in order to capture the random elements in war, misunderstandings, bad weather, and technical problems etc. were not new phenomena per se. His concept made these problems visible, however, and served to categorize them as variables that those participating in war cannot avoid (Clausewitz 1993: 138–40; cf. Cimbala 2001). In this manner, concepts have a dramatic effect on how we perceive and categorize the world around us. They tend to simplify an efficient exchange of ideas between individuals, granting the possibility for criticism, which, in turn, is one of the strongest driving forces behind the search for new and better knowledge (Lakatos & Musgrave 1970). Concepts do not necessarily reflect an objective reality, but serve also partly to shape the manner in which we perceive this reality. Concepts are thus not only the end result of research, but also a prerequisite for this activity (Vasquez 1993: 14–40). The latter fact, in particular, has made it necessary in this book to discuss relevant concepts within military theory and their relationship to each other.

The majority of key military theorists in the Western world belongs to, or is closely associated with, the great powers of the world. Moreover, most of the empirical studies focus on cases where at least one side in the contest is a great power. This begs the question to what extent there is a great power bias in the field that renders generalizations to smaller powers invalid? There are obviously research results and theoretical arguments, generated from studies of great powers that only partly can be transferred to other countries and areas. An obvious case in point is nuclear strategy, since it is only a select few states that have acquired nuclear weapons. Samples that the results are based on may contain a bias towards the great powers’ conduct of war and use of force more broadly. Without supplementary investigations into how small states act, it is not clear what generalizations can be transferred. But assuming that military theory is influenced by great powers and their interests is not the same as stating that these theories lack validity for smaller powers. These theories may have to be supplemented or modified, but we cannot be certain until research has actually demonstrated this. Such investigations, to the extent that they are necessary and scientifically possible, require careful and extensive studies and are, by necessity, outside the scope of this book. The theories presented in the book are, therefore, in many respects, a reflection of the existing theory within the different areas of military theory, and not an attempt to select or interpret these theories through the lenses of a particular nation.

Defining military theory

It appears reasonable to begin a textbook of this kind by attempting to answer the question: what is military theory? This question can best be answered by deciding on whether all ideas or theories about military matters constitute military theory. In the discussion below, the concept of military theory will be exactly defined by distinguishing it from (a) military thought, (b) military doctrine, (c) military history, and (d) other research fields concerned with military activities.

First, we should distinguish between military thought in general and military theory. The relationship between them can, perhaps, be most easily expressed as follows: while all theories constitute thought, not all thought amounts to theory. Theory is therefore a sub-set of thought. The boundary, however, is far from clear-cut and requires further clarification. A theory is more systematic than an idea and is consequently a more complex thought pattern that expresses links between different ideas. A comparison with political theory is fruitful here. Political theory deals with what politics is, how society should be governed and how human communities should be organized. This makes interpretations of concepts such as justice, power, equality and freedom key areas within political theory (e.g. Goodin & Klingemann 1996). This also means that, as not all political opinions constitute political theory, not all ideas or opinions that concern military matters are military theory. Both political theory and military theory are attempts at systematically organizing evidence of the empirical world to a varying degree of universal validity. Theories are thereby of a generalizing nature, which not all ideas need to be.

The word theory comes from the Greek theoria, literally meaning “contemplation.” From the linguistic meaning of the word, we can also deduce a key feature of theories. They are abstractions and thereby not something we can “touch.” Although this observation is hardly controversial, the concept of theory, as indicated above, is far from uniform. It is used in different ways by different individuals, but can also be interpreted differently in different academic and professional disciplines. A minimalist interpretation of the concept may contain elements where theories organize our observations through categorization and formulation of concepts, while theories with a higher aim can express a causal link between several quantities (cf. Parsons & Shils 1951). In this way, theory can include both statements that are not yet entirely proven and those that, through a great number of experiments and/or observations, have proven to be valid.

Naturally, there is a greater tendency to rely on a theory that is verified by empirical results (or at least not yet falsified), rather than an unproven or even improvable theory (cf. Popper 2002; Williams & May 1996). What is, instead, of vital importance for the value of the theory is how it is formulated, its logical consistency and its ability to correspond to systematic experiences (empirical data). But it is often difficult to determine how far a theory is in agreement with systematic experiences. This is sometimes due to the fact that there is, quite simply, not a sufficiently great amount of data or when that data is available, it is difficult to interpret. Of course, the theory’s value also depends on whether its assertions have any practical application. When applying theories, it is important to establish in which situations the theories can and cannot be applied, and when a theory can or cannot explain various phenomena. A major part of the scientific process consists, therefore, of various attempts at identifying the scope of a theory. How many and what observations can the theory explain? What is the theory’s explanatory power i.e. how detailed are the explanations of the observations in question? We can also state that, even with a minimalist interpretation of the concept of theory, the concept of thought is wider as it may contain claims of the kind that cannot be generalized, such as elements from doctrines, opinions and vague ideas. Our aim in this book is to concentrate as far as possible on military theories rather than on military thought.

Second, we should distinguish between military theory and military doctrines. Although both theory and doctrine could be said to constitute knowledge (and the terms thereby overlap to some extent) it is important to differentiate between them (cf. Hoiback 2013). Even with a rudimentary understanding of theory as being a systematized abstraction of reality with a view to establishing the link between two or more quantities, major differences emerge, compared with the concept of doctrine. Military doctrine is institutionalized knowledge of how, for what and why military resources should be utilized (Posen 1984: 13–14). It is thus considerably more specific in terms of time and space than theory. While doctrine should be regarded as an actor’s decision on how something should be carried out in a specific context, theories are more general and need not necessarily have normative aims. Geoffrey Till (2013: 51), a leading sea power scholar, described the difference as being that, while theories deal with “the art of cookery, doctrine is concerned with today’s menus.” Both are important, but also different. For obvious reasons, it seems natural for this book to focus on military theory rather than on military doctrine.

Third, we should separate military theory from military history. Somewhat simplified, military theory, unlike military history, deals with the general rather than the specific, the abstract rather than the tangible, and the timeless rather than the contextual. In military history, researchers tend to see their specific object of study as meaningful in and of itself, while, in military theory, they view the subject of research as a case of a large universe of comparable phenomena. This does not, however, mean that military historians never theorize or that military theorists never investigate the unique (Gaddis 2002: 62–70; Carr 1964). On the contrary, it is common for social scientists and historians, who study the same object, for example war, to have more in common with each other than with other representatives of their respective disciplines. The difference between their approaches has, however, consequences with regard to the extent that generalizations can be regarded as valid and relevant. The perspective that the object of study is unique per se is, if we take it to its logical conclusion, not compatible with generalizing one’s conclusions to other cases (Elman & Elman 2001; Kaufman 2001). By definition, military theory has, therefore, generalizing aims and it is something “more” than just a description of war and warfare (Eccles 1965: 26–8). As far as this book is concerned, this means that texts of a purely military historical nature will not be discussed. They are simply not th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• Preface and acknowledgments
• 1 Military theory: an introduction
• 2 War
• 3 Strategy
• 4 Operational art
• 5 The principles of war
• 6 Joint operations
• 7 Land operations
• 8 Sea operations
• 9 Air operations
• 10 The dynamics of war: some conclusions
• References
• Index