Part I
German Idealism, Naturalism and Metaphysics
1
THE LIMITS OF NATURALISM AND THE METAPHYSICS OF GERMAN IDEALISM
Sebastian Gardner
âIn einem schwankenden Zeitalter scheut man alles Absolute und SelbstĂ€ndige; deshalb mögen wir denn auch weder Ă€chten SpaĂ, noch Ă€chten Ernst, weder Ă€chte Tugend noch Ă€chte Bosheit mehr leiden.â
Nachtwachen von Bonaventura, Dritte Nachtwache
One issue above all forces itself on anyone attempting to make sense of the development of German idealism out of Kant. Is German idealism, in the full sense of the term, metaphysical? The wealth of new anglophone, chiefly North American, writing on German idealism, particularly on Hegel â characterized by remarkable depth, rigour, and creativity â has put the perennial question of German idealismâs metaphysicality back under the spotlight, and in much of this new scholarship a negative answer is returned to the question.
Recent interpretation of German idealism owes much to the broader philosophical environment in which it has proceeded. Over recent decades analytic philosophy has enlarged its view of the disciplineâs scope and relaxed its conception of the methods appropriate to philosophical enquiry, and in parallel to this development analytically trained philosophers have returned to the history of philosophy, the study of which is now regarded by many as a legitimate and important (perhaps even necessary) form of philosophical enquiry. At the same time, it remains the case that the kinds of philosophical positions most intensively worked on and argued about in non-historical, systematic analytic philosophy are predominantly naturalistic â and thus, on the face of it, not in any immediate and obvious sense receptive to the central ideas of German idealism. A primary impulse in recent work on German idealism has been, however, to indicate the consonance, unobvious though it may be, between German idealism, or portions thereof, and some of the leading strands in major systematic positions explored and defended within analytic philosophy. Characteristic of interpretations of German idealism exhibiting this tendency are claims such as the following: that the apparent baroque speculative metaphysics of German idealism, correctly understood, amounts to a richness of conceptual explanatory apparatus that is altogether innocent of the postulation of supernatural entities; that the ontological commitments of German idealism are no different from those of many contemporary naturalistic positions, and perhaps even compatible with a robust physicalism; that the relation of German idealism to religious ways of thinking, superficial appearances to the contrary, is no more intimate than that of many analytic naturalisms; that one of the essential, defining insights and metaphilosophical principles of German idealism consists in the idea that normativity is irreducible and occupies a position of ultimate explanatory priority; that the fundamental motor of German idealism lies in the concern to validate and give adequate form to and validate the modern conception of individual autonomy, a post-theocentric concern which is ours just as much as that of German thinkers in the 1790s and 1800s; that German idealism is to a great extent a radical deepening and extension of Kantâs Copernican revolution (or âepistemological turnâ), the necessity of which (in some form) as a corrective to naive empiricism, is widely accepted in the later analytic tradition; that, in a similar fashion, German idealism pursues Kantâs thesis of the primacy of practical reason, in a way that makes a crucial and favourable difference to the meaning of its apparently metaphysically formulated claims, and which forges a direct connection with the American pragmatist tradition; that in any case the contributions of German idealism to moral, political and social theory stand independently from its putative metaphysics; and so forth. The notion that in these ways and others German idealism can be shown to provide a significant historical resource for progressive, non-metaphysical contemporary philosophical developments has provided a powerful stimulus to the flowering of recent scholarship in that area.1
Accordingly, one task is to measure the new interpretations of the German idealists at the level of historically informed close textual exegesis. My intention here is, instead, to attempt to put the new development in perspective by taking a step back and offering a critical view of certain leading elements in our present philosophical situation, which has in turn, I will suggest, direct relevance for our understanding of German idealism. What I am supposing therefore for present purposes, in accordance with proponents of the new interpretations of German idealism themselves, is that what should be taken to count for us as the correct interpretation of German idealism is not something that need be determined altogether by the texts and historical data taken in independence from critical reflection on our present philosophical situation: in other words, that we should not seek to isolate the task of answering such questions as that of in what sense German idealism is metaphysical, from the task of determining what our present philosophical orientation should be, just as, conversely, German idealism (and all other historical resources) should contribute to forming that orientation.2
The end of idealism and the ascent of naturalism
To begin, I want to engage in a brief historical exercise, to set our present philosophical situation in relief by drawing the contrast with the outlook that prevailed at the beginning of the twentieth century. To bring alive the historical fact of the extraordinary transformation in the philosophical landscape of the English-speaking world over the last hundred years, a now little read but highly pertinent paper by Norman Kemp Smith serves well.
In âThe present situation in philosophyâ, his inaugural lecture at Edinburgh in 1919, Kemp Smith gives a universal typology of philosophical positions, and explains how, in his view, the balance of argument lies between them.
There are, in Kemp Smithâs account, only three basic types of philosophical position: âidealismâ, ânaturalismâ, and âskepticismâ. Naturalism he defines as the view that âman is a being whose capacities, even in their highest activities, are intelligible only as exercised exclusively in subordination to the specific requirements of his terrestrial environmentâ.3 Idealism by contrast treats man as a âmicrocosmâ of a larger reality and measures him âagainst standards for which it [manâs natural environment] cannot accountâ.4 Its âsupreme concern is to show that the aesthetic and spiritual values have a more than merely human significanceâ, and that âintellectual and spiritual valuesâ â where intellectual means: pertaining to theoretical reason â âstand on the same plane of objectivity, and thereby justify parity of treatmentâ.5 Idealism, he says, is âprobably the philosophy of the great majority of menâ,6 and Kemp Smith considers that the overall tendency in the history of philosophy has been towards it.7 Skepticism â which Kemp Smith also calls âagnosticismâ, and under which heading he includes also nineteenth-century positivism â is a kind of pseudo-position, not on a par with idealism and naturalism: it has, he says, no âengine-powerâ and is âat most, a kind of Greek chorus, commenting ironically on the course of the actionâ.8 It has affinities with both naturalism and idealism â with the former because it leads smoothly into the view that â[t]hought is an instrument developed through natural processes for the practical purposes of adaptationâ,9 and with the latter because it upholds a distinction of reality and appearance which opens the way to âidealist teachingâ. Skepticism thus resolves itself ultimately, according to Kemp Smith, into either naturalism or idealism.
So it is the great antagonism between idealism and naturalism that lies at the heart of all philosophy, and here there has been, Kemp Smith thinks, some change: whereas until recently idealism predominated, by virtue of its appeal to âmoral, social, religiousâ considerations, the nineteenth century (through the growth that it witnessed of the human sciences) has seen the development of a âvery greatly strengthenedâ naturalistic position that âcan now profess to meet idealism on more equal terms within its own field, that of our specifically human activitiesâ.10 This fortified naturalism is further strengthened by having shed its positivistic elements: it now âclaims to be realisticâ, âdealing with realityâ not in the manner of Mill or Huxley but âas apprehending it face to faceâ.11
However, the opposition remains as sharp as ever: the naturalist holds that we are parts of the Universe which are simply âmore complexâ, âmore completely unified than is the Universe as a wholeâ, while the idealist interprets the Universe as a whole in the light of this âpartâ.12 And although the decision between naturalism and idealism has become marginally less easy to make, Kemp Smith considers that idealism retains its edge, for two reasons, both having to do with values. First, because naturalism must hold that our values have value âonly by reference to the detailed contingencies of terrestrial existenceâ,13 only idealism is compatible with the claim for their absoluteness. He writes: âNow since the only basis upon which idealism can rest this far-reaching conclusionâ â namely that man (purposive self-consciousness) is the model for grasping the Universe as a whole â âis the contention that spiritual no less than intellectual criteria have an absolute validity, idealism must stand or fall according to its success or failure in upholding this latter position, in face of the counter-arguments of the naturalistic philosophies.â14 Second, Kemp Smith believes that the best that naturalism can achieve is a sideways-on view of values: the naturalists, he says, âkeep their eyes off the human valuesâ in so far as they âapproach them only through the study of our natural and economic setting, or through analogies derived from the study of animal behaviourâ, with the result that âthey do not study them at allâ.15 The two criticisms are of course connected: Kemp Smith believes that to take a non-sideways-on view of values, to look them in the face, is to view them as absolute, as beyond all natural contingency.
Kemp Smithâs outlook was in its day quite the opposite of idiosyncratic. The era which he represents was at the time of his lecture fast disintegrating â only three years later Roy Wood Sellars would write: âwe are all naturalists nowâ16 â but it had enjoyed a remarkable hegemony. As the philosophical journals of the period show very clearly, British and American philosophers had for several decades shared exactly Kemp Smithâs view of the philosophical geography.17
The nature of the historical change is therefore clear: once upon a time idealism seemed without doubt philosophically superior to naturalism, whereas we now think, more or less, the exact opposite. Indeed, our conviction of the correctness of naturalism is so well entrenched that Kemp Smithâs broad category of naturalism is no longer particularly meaningful for us: for us it does not pick out a unified philosophical outlook but merely points towards a wide variety of differentiated positions which, we would say, have it in common just that they reject sup...