The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On

Lessons for the Future

Stephen Badsey, Mark Grove, Rob Havers, Stephen Badsey, Mark Grove, Rob Havers

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• ISBN:
  9781134268559
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Historia
• Subtopic: Historia del mundo

A fascinating new insight into the Falklands Conflict, covering every aspect of its origins and the political and diplomatic response to the Argentinean action as well as illuminating accounts of the military action to retake the islands, at every level of command.

In June 2002, exactly twenty years after the cessation of hostilities between Britain and Argentina, many of the key participants came together at a major international conference. This conference, held at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst and organized jointly by RMA Sandhurst and her sister institution Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, aimed to re-examine the events of spring 1982 from the perspective that only twenty intervening years can bring. The Conference mixed those who had participated in the events of spring and early summer 1982, diplomats, politicians, civil servants, soldiers, sailors and airmen, with historians, political scientists and journalists. These accounts and interpretations of the conflict shed new light on one of the most interesting and controversial episodes in recent British history.

PART 1
The Falklands Conflict in History

1
The Impact of the Falklands Conflict on International Affairs

LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

INTRODUCTION

There is an aspect to contemporary strategy that is impossible to quantify yet is of considerable significance, and is normally summed up by the word ‘legitimacy’. This is not quite the same as legality, although a backing in international law certainly helps; nor is it the same as morality, although conformity with traditional ‘just war’ principles is also an advantage. It needs to be gained abroad as well as at home, so just because a course of action has popular support does not give it legitimacy. Rather it is an amalgam of legality, morality and democracy, and it is the task of a government in a conflict to create a sense of legitimacy around its actions and to cope with the consequences of a failure to do so.

Throughout the Falklands campaign the British Government was very conscious of the legitimacy issue. It barely attempted to make a strong case in terms of strategic or economic interests, avoiding claims to great benefit in terms of Cold War rivalries or future oil wealth. Instead it concentrated on key principles: self-determination for the islanders, the inadmissibility of force as a means of resolving disputes, the inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter and the importance of not rewarding aggression. In making claims to foreign governments the emphasis was on the precedent set if the Argentinian occupation succeeded rather than the vital interests of the United Kingdom (UK).

The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 502 had played a large part in conferring an aura of legitimacy on Britain’s action, while the various declarations of support by other governments and such concrete steps as economic sanctions supported the view that Britain was acting on behalf of a wider international interest. As the fighting became more serious, however, the issue inevitably moved away from whether Britain’s cause was just, to the means adopted by Britain in the name of this cause. The just war tradition argued not only that a war be undertaken to right a wrong, but also that the means employed should be proportionate. This is not straightforward. Any use of armed force has to take into account not only some notional relationship to the ends being employed but also the means available to the opponent. There is an issue of proportion in relation to the threat. Moreover, there was also a question of when the principles at stake could be said to have been honoured: was it enough to get the Argentinians off the islands, if necessary through offering some concessions to their concerns, or must they be denied any face-saving compensation? Abroad, the urge was to get a negotiated settlement as soon as possible: at home, the urge was to see honour satisfied, whatever the damage to Argentinian honour. How should the consequences of actions be included in the calculation? What was the price worth paying for success in terms of lives, military capacity, resources and political goodwill, and how much should it matter if those costs were being imposed on those less directly involved?

BRITAIN’S FOREIGN RELATIONS

The development and implementation of this crisis response, as testing for the diplomatic service as the military campaign was for the armed services, began with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in some disarray. The Argentinian invasion had come at the exact moment when the Head of the Diplomatic Service was changing, although the retiring Sir Michael Palliser was soon asked to continue to advise the government for the duration of the crisis. The two cabinet ministers from the FCO, Lord Carrington and Sir Humphrey Atkins, both resigned, as did Richard Luce, the minister who had been dealing with the Falklands. Senior diplomats who had been handling the issue believed themselves to have been discredited, even though they were not sure what else they might have done, given the approach to the issue taken by the government as a whole. The new Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, was a figure respected in the Conservative Party and the Commons, but was being thrown in at the deep end and was not notably close to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

Yet this was to be an unusually testing time for British diplomacy. Few other governments, even amongst the most friendly, were quite sure why Britain was putting in such an effort and accepting such high risks to retake an asset with so little real value, and less sure why they should put themselves out to help. Whatever Britain wanted – from access to facilities en route to the South Atlantic, to information on arms supplied to Argentina, to adherence to economic sanctions – the case must be compelling and tenaciously argued. Ambassadors and High Commissioners around the world had to become overnight experts on the dispute and its ramifications. At the same time as the FCO became bound up with the many practical demands of the crisis, it had to keep a close eye on the political implications of every military move being planned at the Royal Navy (RN) headquarters at Northwood. It was expected to be at the fore in the search for a negotiated outcome to the crisis, but here the Prime Minister was very much in charge, aware that any apparent concession to Argentina was political dynamite at home.

The critical advice on the diplomatic strategy to be adopted if compromises on the core issues of principle were to be avoided, while entreaties for moderation were respected, was provided largely by the two Ambassadors at the most important posts in Washington and New York. The handling of the United States’ government was going to be crucial in arranging any political settlement and as a source of military support. Here the Ambassador was Sir Nicholas Henderson, an unusually experienced and independent-minded diplomat, with a personality admirably suited to making a mark in Washington. The most vital diplomatic battles would be fought in and around the UN in New York, where Britain’s Ambassador was Sir Anthony Parsons, a shrewd and popular diplomat, on the rebound from a difficult period as Ambassador to Iran during the time of the Islamic revolution. He understood the culture of the UN and the conflicting pressures that would influence the collective response to the unfolding crisis. Henderson and Parsons together had a clear sense of the amount of flexibility it was appropriate and necessary to show as they faced the unusually demanding audiences of the UN Security Council and the American media.

Sir Anthony helped redeem the FCO in the Prime Minister’s eyes by securing a notable victory in the UN Security Council, pushing through UNSCR 502 which put the onus on Argentina to withdraw. Institutionally Britain had an advantage as a permanent member of the Security Council, working from the commanding heights of the organisation and with the capacity to veto any unfavourable resolution. Yet while it had reason to expect solidarity from fellow members of the western alliance and from Commonwealth countries, the UN had been a difficult arena for some time because of the strength of third world opinion with its strong anti-colonial sentiment. The more the Falklands could be presented as a matter of colonialism, which is how it had previously been developed in the UN General Assembly, the more awkward Britain’s position could become. It did not help that it so happened that the two European non-permanent members of the Security Council at this time – Spain and Ireland – were the only two with their own territorial disputes with Britain. Moreover, while normally Britain would expect vital support from its closest ally, the United States, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, the United States Ambassador to the UN, was closely associated with the Reagan Administration’s Latin America policy and led the pro-Argentina camp in Washington. Argentina’s Ambassador, Eduardo Roca, who had arrived only in late March to take up his position in New York, could take Latin American support for granted, and hope for a helpful response from the Soviet bloc by opposing a leading member of NATO, and make the most of the UN’s devotion to anti-colonialism, while at the same time relying on a sympathetic hearing from Kirkpatrick.

From the start of April, when few appreciated the potential seriousness of the affair, to the end of May when it was becoming a matter of real concern, international opinion developed in quite distinctive ways. National answers to these fundamental questions of principle varied considerably. Of Britain’s traditional allies only the Old Commonwealth gave essentially unconditional backing. Canada, Australia and New Zealand all stood firm, with Prime Minister Robert Muldoon of New Zealand even offering a frigate to enable the RN to release another vessel for Falklands duties. By and large the New Commonwealth was also supportive, with many of the smaller African and Caribbean countries appreciating the need to put regional predators in their place. Although the Indian government adhered to its non-aligned position, Indian public opinion appeared to be with Britain, while publicity about possible South African arms deliveries to Argentina helped reinforce black African support. Kenya and Guyana were particularly helpful in the Security Council.

Elsewhere there was a clear preference for doing as little as possible. Japan, for example, was rarely disposed to disrupting trade on a point of principle. Japan voted for UNSCR 502, although there were reports of some hesitation. Thereafter, although the Japanese government claimed to have spoken firmly to Argentinian representatives and to have warned of the possible economic consequences, they took no clear economic measures for several weeks.

Europe

In Europe, France was in a critical position as being both a leading member of the European Community (EC), a fellow permanent member of the UN Security Council, and from the start, Britain’s staunchest ally. President François Mitterrand had ordered full support for Britain. This led at once to the embargo on arms and trade and support for UNSCR 502. France provided valuable practical help to Britain’s armed forces. Mitterrand appears to have been motivated by genuine gratitude at the stance taken by Britain during the Second World War and by the opportunity the crisis provided to demonstrate his socialist government’s reliability as a member of the western camp. It did not go down well in the Quai d’Orsay, where there were worries about the impact on relations with Latin America and an extension of Soviet influence. Mitterrand observed on 1 May, ‘If there isn’t a reflex of solidarity between England and France then between whom could such a reflex exist?’ At the same time he made clear that support was for the duration of the crisis and no longer, and certainly did not extend to support for British sovereignty. He was also able to separate this from all other issues, taking the opportunity to move against Britain over EC issues on the budget and agricultural prices. Throughout this period, arguments on budgets and agricultural prices persisted. Britain refused to accept that concessions on these matters were a quid pro quo for European solidarity, arguing that the Falklands was a matter of international principle and not just a British national interest.

In West Germany, by contrast, the response was more equivocal. It took until 7 April before Chancellor Helmut Schmidt spoke to Prime Minister Thatcher, although he interrupted his Easter break to preside over an emergency cabinet meeting on the previous day. The West Germans joined enthusiastically in the NATO declaration of support, and despite their strong aversion to embargoes and their reluctance to set precedents which could later be used against them, they applied the arms embargo and agreed to the EC’s import embargo with uncharacteristic speed. So far this had been an instinctive gesture of support for an ally, an EC partner and a close friend. At the same time they were cautious about endorsing British policies.

A sense of the trouble which nationalism and a predilection for military solutions could cause led to German unease when observing the surge of patriotic enthusiasm in Britain, fully aware of how unhappy others would be if Germans betrayed the same tendencies. The aversion to armed conflict ran deep, with the supposition always that there must be a better way. For those of this view, it would be best if military action was delayed while the better way was found, even if this meant putting to one side the issues at stake. After the sinking of the General Belgrano the position became difficult with West Germany.

The German interest in trade with Argentina was substantial, as they took 28 per cent of all the EC’s imports from Argentina in 1980. There was also concern at the diversion of British forces from their NATO tasks. The Berlin parallel was invoked, including by Mayor Richard von Weizsäcker of West Berlin and Federal President Karl Carstens: a country that could respond to aggression against one isolated outpost was likely to respond to a threat to another, although others denied any parallel between the Falklands and one of Europe’s great cities.

In some ways the Italian position was the most interesting of all, and while it caused Britain a number of problems this could easily be explained by the political situation within Italy. According to the press the hostilities were ‘absurd’ and Britain’s reaction to the Argentinian invasion disproportionate, but the Italian government was always careful to express sympathy for Britain’s position despite the constraints on its own position, and it was known that Italy had condemned Argentina privately and directly. About half of Argentina’s population was of Italian extraction. There were over 1 million Italian passport holders in Argentina who were entitled to vote in Italy’s national elections and therefore formed an important lobby. Italy also had important commercial interests in Argentina and generally in South America. Against this background many Italians saw sanctions as contributing to the escalation of the conflict, as well as opportunities being created for the Soviet Union, and the adverse effects on long-term relations between Europe and Latin America. Lastly, there was a matter of political culture. British diplomats observed that Italian politicians tended to assume that there was no problem that could not be solved by negotiation. Political life was geared to a search for compromise even if this meant that big issues tend to be sidestepped rather than tackled head on. Sanctions was the difficult issue. There had been a battle over sanctions within the governing coalition, who were desperate for an economic embargo of the shortest possible duration and a negotiated settlement.

Spain was even more difficult. As the conflict broke, delicate negotiations were in progress over Gibraltar. On 20 April, an announcement was due concerning the opening of negotiations between the two Foreign Ministers, ‘aimed at overcoming all the differences between them on Gibraltar’ on the basis of the Lisbon agreement of 10 April 1980. These were postponed. Yet while the Argentinian Junta represented exactly the sort of outmoded mentality which Spanish democracy was dedicated to opposing – not surprisingly, Francoists were the more enthusiastic supporters of the Argentinians – and Spain was intending to join NATO in 1982 and the EC later, Spain also supported the Argentinian claim to the Falklands, and the Spanish press, while almost unanimously opposing a similar use of force against Gibraltar, was jubilant at the Argentinian invasion. The unavoidable role that Gibraltar was playing in support of the Task Force did not help, however much this was played down.

The extent to which national problems influenced stances on the Falklands can be illustrated further by Greece, where the government had in mind the position of Cyprus. The Greek position on Cyprus was similar to the British view on the Falklands in denying that geographical proximity was in itself the basis for sovereignty, and in opposing the use of force and occupation as a means of asserting sovereignty. Couple this with the Greeks’ own unhappy recent experience with a military Junta, and the surprisingly close rapport between Thatcher and Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, and the basis for Greece’s close support for Britain can be found.

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Table of contents

• COVER PAGE
• TITLE PAGE
• COPYRIGHT PAGE
• NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS
• SERIES EDITOR’S PREFACE
• EDITOR’S PREFACE
• LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY
• INTRODUCTION: A PERSONAL VIEW
• PART 1: THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT IN HISTORY
• PART 2: THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT IN PERSONAL MEMORY
• PART 3: THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT IN WIDER PERSPECTIVE
• PART 4: LESSONS OF THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT FOR FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS