Active Shooter Response Training

Lone Wolf to Coordinated Attacks

Scott Hyderkhan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000092042
• Edition: 2
• Topic: Law
• Subtopic: Forensic Science
• Index: Law

Active Shooter Response Training: Lone Wolf to Coordinated Attack, Second Edition, provides expanded and updated training for police and security officers who must respond to an active shooter situation.

This manual addresses all facets of preparation and response, from complex logistical organization to collective and individual tactics, as well as special units or special skills tasks. Based on time-tested military training doctrine, the program described here offers a template for agencies of all sizes to offer training that effectively utilizes officers' available time. Hyderkhan and his expert contributors cover all aspects of the active shooter response (ASR) mission, from risk analysis to logistical planning for mass casualty events. He also addresses medical care and evacuation, reunification procedures, and post-incident investigation. Active Shooter Response Training, Second Edition, provides the tools needed to prevent or mitigate tragedy in our religious congregations, schools, and public places. The book includes a voucher code for a 50% discount off of the companion online library of training videos

This book is directed to law enforcement agencies, private security teams, training organizations, police leaders, and individual officers and trainers, in the US and globally. It also has potential as recommended reading in policing courses at the community college and university level.

Chapter 1 Active Shooter Small Unit Doctrine (ASSUD)

Overview

The Active Shooter Small Unit Doctrine (ASSUD) was developed from a comprehensive study of the evolution of the active shooter response, the evolutionary history of the US Army Infantry squad, and the terrorist small unit attacks and sieges of Mumbai, the Westgate Mall, the series of attacks on France and the San Bernardino terror attack. The following chapter outlines the research and methodology on how the doctrine was developed. This chapter also outlines the doctrine in detail. The ASSUD places a premium on the principles of speed, agility, and violence of action. These principles are achieved through simplicity, minimizing the size of the small unit and limiting the span of control.

Active Shooter Response Evolution and Influencing Events

Four- to Six-Officer Contact Team

The first-generation active shooter response tactics utilized close and confined formations. The diamond and box formations were commonly utilized. The minimum response size advocated was four officers, with a maximum of six in a contact team (see Figure 1.1). The distance between officers could vary from agency to agency; there was, however, a consistent emphasis by many agencies for physical contact between responding officers. The technique of maintaining a closed formation with physical contact between officers was utilized to improve control and in theory to prevent incidence of fratricide.

Single Officer Response

Figure 1.1 First Generation Movement Formations

In May of 2008, the Force Science Research Center published “Force Science News Transmission #97” (Ron Borsch), advocating single officer responses to active shooter incidents. This technique was advocated due to the amount of damage a single threat shooter could inflict within a short period of time. The technique was a response to two facts. First, the average law enforcement response time to an active shooter was longer in duration than the average active shooter event. Second, at the time of the Force Science Research Center’s single officer response publication, all but one active shooter incident in the United States involved a single shooter. The most recently published (16 September 2013, by the US Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)) study of active shooter incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013 supports the Force Science Research Center’s conclusions. The study states,

The findings also reflect the damage that can occur in a matter of minutes. In 63 incidents where the duration of the incident could be ascertained, 44 (69.8%) of 63 incidents ended in 5 minutes or less, with 23 ending in 2 minutes or less. As expected, therefore, many incidents ended before police arrived. Of the 160 incidents, at least 107 (66.9%) ended before police arrived and could engage the shooter, either because a citizen intervened, the shooter fled, or the shooter committed suicide or was killed by someone at the scene.

(Page 9)

The single officer response premise is simple. An initial arriving officer is not delayed by waiting for additional contact team members. The officer moves directly, without much delay, and is more agile, thus improving speed, violence of action, and span of control issues.

The Mumbai Terrorist Attack and Siege

The following facts and findings were extracted from the Rand Corporation Occasional Paper “The Lessons of Mumbai,” by Angel Rabasa, Robert D. Blackwill, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, C. Christine Fair, Brian A. Jackson, Brian Michael Jenkins, Seth G. Jones, Nathaniel Shestak, and Ashley J. Tellis.

The Mumbai assault and siege occurred in Mumbai, India from 26–28 November 2008. The attack was executed by 10 terrorists of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a terrorist group based in Pakistan (“The Lessons of Mumbai,” Occasional Paper published by the Rand Corporation). The plan was complex and consisted of reconnaissance, planning, specific training for the assault squad members, and communication (cellular phones). Command and control was superb. Controllers maintained command and control through cellular phone communications, providing guidance and motivation with the assault members throughout the operation. Specific targets were identified for the raid and siege and covered a rather large swath of the city. The targets were selected for their high concentration of potential victims (Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CRT), Mumbai’s main train station, and the Cama & Albless Hospital), religious affiliation (The Nariman House, administered by the Jewish Chabad Labavich), and high concentration of foreigners (Trident-Oberoi Hotel and the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel).

The assault squad organized into four teams operating independently. The four teams broke down into three small, two-man teams and one four-man team. The members of the squad were equipped with AK-56s (a Chinese version of the Russian AK-47), 8 to 10 fragmentation grenades, IEDs containing high explosive RDX, ball bearings, digital timers, and nine-volt batteries, and backpacks with 7 × 30 round magazines (the typical combat load of infantrymen) and 400 spare rounds.

The first two-man team made their way from the port via cab to the train station. At the train station they inflicted a large level of indiscriminate killing for 90 minutes before they were driven out by police. They made their way to the Cama & Albless Hospital, where they continued killing. After the hospital, they were en route to the Trident-Oberoi Hotel, when police intercepted them, killing one and capturing the second.

The second two-man team made their way on foot to the Nariman House (Jewish target), gaining entry via assault, taking 13 hostages and subsequently killing five of them.

The third two-man team made their way from the port to the Trident-Oberoi Hotel, killing indiscriminately, setting up in the hotel and demanding the release of all Mujahedeen prisoners in return for the release of the hostages. The siege lasted approximately 17 hours, culminating in the killing of the terrorists. Within the assault and subsequent 17-hour siege, 30 victims were killed. It appears that the train station/hospital team was en route to the Trident-Oberoi Hotel to link up with the third two-man team in order to form a four-man team for the siege.

The four-man team moved to the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel and entered the Leopold Café, assaulting and killing 10 victims. They approached the rear hotel entrance, walking the grounds and ground floor, killing along the way. They made their way to upper floors, setting fires and staying on the move, attempting to create chaos. The siege at the hotel lasted 60 hours, culminating with Indian commandos assaulting the hotel and killing the terrorists.

The Mumbai terror assault proved to be an effective terrorist action that was cost-effective, asset-light, and with little investment and big return. The terrorist squad consisted of under-privileged, uneducated young men. The two-man teams had a span of control of one and were quick and agile, staying one step ahead of police and government forces. The four-man team was utilized for the static large objective (Taj hotel), and they again utilized surprise, speed, and violence of action within the hotel to cause confusion as to their precise location and the size of their element. The fundamental understanding of small unit tactics by the planners was demonstrated by the use of small, agile two-man teams in engagement of multiple objectives over a wide area of the city, while utilizing the larger team at the Taj hotel. The planners’ ability to disseminate their vision and intent to the attackers and command and control them throughout the mission was demonstrated when the attackers attempted to have the first two-man team move to its third objective, the Trident hotel, in order to link up with the third two-man element at the hotel to form a larger force for the subsequent siege.

Multi-Assault Counter Terrorism Action Capabilities (MACTAC)

The facts and findings from the Mumbai terrorist attack were the catalyst for the development of the Multi-Assault Counter Terrorism Action Capabilities (MACTAC) doctrine. The idea is to build two- to three-officer buddy teams (see Figure 1.2) that subsequently join up and form into four- to seven-officer teams, led by a team leader and assistant team leader, finally forming into a squad of up to three contact teams led by a squad leader. The size or level of the response is determined by the threat. An emphasis on not over-committing to an effort came about due to multiple targets separated by great distances in the Mumbai attack. An over-commitment to an initial attack could leave a jurisdiction or region vulnerable to additional attacks with few or no assets to respond. The capability of building buddy teams into contact teams and subsequently into squads established a system that addressed multiple levels of attack and threat size.

A squad in MACTAC doctrine could possibly reach the size of three seven-officer teams, led by a squad leader. That is a total of 22 personnel, counting all leaders (see Figure 1.3). In this system, the squad leader is expected to be able to operate within a span of control of up to three team leaders. Team leaders are expected to be able to operate within a span of control of three to six officers.

The Active Shooter Response Training Manual

During the development of MACTAC, the Active Shooter Response Training Manual was in conception. In the maneuver portion of the manual, care was taken to ensure only truly proven infantry doctrine was presented. From movement techniques to maneuver, all was based on written US Army doctrine. Small unit tactics included team and squad tactics. Infantry doctrine dictates that teams are led from the front by a single team leader and teams are directed by a squad leader from a position that affords battlefield observation, communication to subordinates and higher, and command and control.

Figure 1.2 MACTAC Two- and Three-Officer Buddy Teams

Figure 1.3 MACTAC Squad

The manual emphasized that a two-officer element could employ squad maneuver tactics, with each officer acting as a mutually supporting separately moving element (see Figure 1.4). The manual also emphasized that the size of responding elements should be based on the threat level, with the largest configuration based on the US Army light infantry squad (nine-soldier squad, led by a squad leader with the squad composed of two 4 × soldier teams that include a team leader per team; see Figure 1.5). The nine-officer maximum squad limits the squad leader span of control to two officers and the team leader span of control to three officers. Care was taken to maintain the smallest possible span of control, while maintaining the same doctrinal small unit tactics utilized by a nine-officer squad. The nine-officer squad was perceived to be large enough to address a more robust threat, while still providing a short span of control to address command and control issues for novice officer experience in small unit tactics.

Figure 1.4 The Active Shooter Response Training Manual Employment of Two-Officer Squad Movement and Maneuver

Figure...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Series Page
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Contributors
• 1 Active Shooter Small Unit Doctrine (ASSUD)
• 2 Action Plan
• 3 Training Management
• 4 Rescue Task Force (RTF) Operations
• 5 Close Quarter Battle (CQB)
• 6 Individual Tasks
• 7 Collective Tasks
• 8 Action Drills
• 9 Combatives
• 10 Progressive Breaching
• 11 Facility Clearing and Evacuation
• 12 Command and Control in the Active Shooter Environment
• 13 Communications Planning
• 14 Site Threat Mitigation and Response Planning
• 15 Task Performance Evaluations
• 16 Patrol Special Equipment and Loadout
• Bibliography
• Index