A Debate on God and Morality

What is the Best Account of Objective Moral Values and Duties?

William Lane Craig, Erik J. Wielenberg, Adam Lloyd Johnson, Adam Lloyd Johnson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000093254
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

In 2018, William Lane Craig and Erik J. Wielenberg participated in a debate at North Carolina State University, addressing the question: "God and Morality: What is the best account of objective moral values and duties?" Craig argued that theism provides a sound foundation for objective morality whereas atheism does not. Wielenberg countered that morality can be objective even if there is no God. This book includes the full debate, as well as endnotes with extended discussions that were not included in the debate. It also includes five chapters by other philosophers who have written substantive responses to the debate - J. P. Moreland, David Baggett, Mark Linville, Wes Morriston, and Michael Huemer. The book provides crucial resources for better understanding moral realism and its dependence on, or independence from, theistic foundations.

Key Features

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• A valuable debate about whether or not God is the best explanation for objective morality, bringing together theists and atheists working on the same subject who normally are not in conversation with each other.

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• Includes clear coverage of ontological and epistemological issues in metaethical theories, focusing on Divine Command Theory and Non-natural Robust Moral Realism.

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• Engaging and accessible throughout, making the book well suited for undergraduate and seminary classrooms.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Adam Lloyd Johnson

Let me begin by explaining what this debate is not about. First, it's not about the moral status of a specific action, such as abortion, euthanasia, or lying to Nazis at your front door. These are important issues to discuss, but that's not what this debate is about.

Second, this debate is not about whether atheists can be good people. Craig and Wielenberg agree that atheists can be, generally speaking, good moral people. Of course no one's perfect, but both men believe that theists and atheists can live good moral lives.¹

Third, this debate is not about whether atheists can know moral truth. Both parties believe that at least some moral truths are self-evident to theists and atheists alike. On the atheist's side, Russ Shafer-Landau has defended well the notion that some moral truths are self-evident.² He argued it's “… self-evident that, other things being equal, it is wrong to take pleasure in another's pain, to taunt and threaten the vulnerable, to prosecute and punish those known to be innocent, and to sell another's secrets solely for personal gain. When I say such things, I mean that once one really understands these principles … one doesn't need to infer them from one's other beliefs in order to be justified in thinking them true.”³ Similarly, many Christian theists maintain that basic moral truths are self-evident to people because of “the work of the Law written in their hearts” by God (Rom 2:15). Thus this debate is not about whether atheists are able to know moral truths.

Fourth, this debate is not about whether morality is objective or subjective—both sides agree that moral truth is objective. Whether or not morality is objective is an important topic to debate, and there's no shortage of folks eager to do so, but that's not the issue under consideration in this debate. Wielenberg is part of a growing number of atheists who affirm objective morality. Shafer-Landau, who holds a position similar to Wielenberg's, explained that the purpose of his book Moral Realism was to defend “… the theory that moral judgements enjoy a special sort of objectivity: such judgements, when true, are so independently of what any human being, anywhere, in any circumstance whatever, thinks of them.”⁴ Another member of this group, David Enoch, described objective morality as the position that “… there are response-independent …, irreducibly normative truths …, objective ones, that when successful in our normative inquiries we discover rather than create or construct.”⁵

1I'm using the term “good” here in a simple comparative way. It's an important part of most Christian theologies that all humans, including all atheists and all theists, are morally imperfect to one degree or another and thus require God's forgiveness in order to be reconciled back to a right relationship with Him.

2Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 247–266.

3Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism, 248.

On the theistic side, C. Stephen Evans agreed with Enoch's description and congratulated him for offering the most comprehensive and sophisticated case for objective morality to be found in the literature.⁶ Further, Alvin Plantinga wrote that

… moral truths are objective, in the sense that they are in a certain way independent of human beliefs and desires. It is wrong to torture people for the fun of it, and would remain wrong even if most or all of the world's population came to believe that this behavior is perfectly acceptable, and indeed came to desire that it be much more widely practiced.⁷

For example, if everyone in the world took a pill tonight that caused them to wake up tomorrow believing that rape was morally permissible, even if we all believed that tomorrow, that still wouldn't make rape morally permissible because the truth “rape is wrong” is an objective moral truth that exists outside of us beyond our attitudes and personal beliefs.

Both Craig and Wielenberg reject the idea that morality is subjective, that there are no objective moral truths that exist beyond our personal opinions. If morality were subjective, it wouldn't be possible to condemn someone for doing something objectively wrong because there would be no moral truth to appeal to. For example, we couldn't condemn racism as wrong; all we could say is that we don't like it. Both sides in this debate affirm that some things are objectively right and other things are objectively wrong. This doesn't mean it's always easy to know what's morally true, sometimes it can be quite difficult. But this difficulty isn't unique to moral truth; as finite human beings we face this difficulty in all areas of truth including science, history, theology, and philosophy.

4Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism, 2.

5David Enoch, “An Outline of an Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism,” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 21. See also David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

6C. Stephen Evans, God and Moral Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 166.

7Alvin Plantinga, “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience,” Faith and Philosophy 27.3 (2010): 249.

So what is this debate about? This debate has to do with the best explanation for how morality can be objectively true. Both men believe there are objective moral truths, but disagree over the best explanation for their objectivity. Hence the title of the debate: “God and Morality: What is the best account of objective moral values and duties?” Where do they come from? How can they exist “out there” apart from us?

Craig is part of a group of theists who claim that God is the best explanation for objective morality. For example, fellow theists Baggett and Walls argued that

[t]he authority of moral obligations needs an account [and] … [t]heism—entailing a loving, perfect God who commands, who knows us better than we know ourselves, who knows truly what is in our ultimate best interest, and who desires the best for us—can, we submit, most effectively provide it.⁸

Wielenberg argues against this claim that God is the best explanation for objective morality and has proposed an alternative account.

Some have quipped that if moral truth is self-evident then, by definition, it needs no explanation. In his debate with Craig, atheist Walter Sinnott-Armstrong claimed that if a moral truth is self-evident then no reason needs to be given for it. For example, since rape is self-evidently wrong there's no need to go further and explain why it's wrong. He wrote that “[y]ou don't need to add that humans were made in God's image or that we are His favorite species or anything religious.”⁹ He argued that a self-evident moral truth doesn't need an explanation because that's simply what it means to be self-evident. But those who make such assertions have confused knowing moral truth (epistemology) with the existence of moral truth (ontology). In that debate, Craig responded by noting this important distinction and explaining that Sinnott-Armstong's mistake was to “think that our ability simply to see that rape is wrong implies that no account need be given of why rape is wrong.”¹⁰

8David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning (Oxford University Press, 2016), 290.

9Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “There Is No Good Reason to Believe in God,” in God? A Debate Between a Christian and an Atheist, Point/Counterpoint Series (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 34.

10 William Lane Craig, “Reason Enough,” in God? A Debate Between a Christian and an Atheist, Point/Counterpoint Series (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 69.

The key difference here is between knowing that something is wrong and knowing why it's wrong. Theists and atheists alike can know something is morally wrong because it's self-evident, but explaining what actually makes it wrong is something else entirely. In other words, people can know that rape is wrong without appealing to God, but Craig argues that atheists don't have a sufficient explanation as to why it's wrong. This is a more fundamental issue than merely knowing a particular moral truth or knowing that morality is objectively true. It's not necessary to believe in the existence of God in order to apprehend moral truths but, so Craig argues, if there's no God then there's no ontological foundation for such moral truths to exist. Fellow theist Paul Copan similarly argued that “…...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of tables
• Preface
• List of contributors
• 1 Introduction
• PART I The Debate
• PART II Responses to the Debate
• PART III Final Remarks
• Index