Philosophy of Computational Cultural Neuroscience

Joan Y Chiao

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000170535
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Medicine
• Subtopic: Physiology

This book aims to illuminate theoretical and methodological advances in computational cultural neuroscience and the implications of these advances for philosophy. Philosophical studies in computational cultural neuroscience introduce core considerations such as culture and computation, and the role of scientific and technological progression for the advancement of cultural processes.

The study of how cultural and biological factors shape human behaviour has been an important inquiry for centuries, and recent advances in the field of computational cultural neuroscience allow for novel insights into the computational foundations of cultural processes in the structural and functional organization of the nervous system. The author examines the computational foundations of the mind and brain across cultures and investigates the influence of culture on the computational mind and brain. The book explores recent advances in the field, providing novel insights on topics such as artificialism, reconstructionism, and intelligence.

Philosophy of Computational Cultural Neuroscience is fascinating reading for students and academics in the field of neuroscience who wish to take a cultural or philosophical approach to their studies and research.

This book is the winner of the International Cultural Neuroscience Society's International Book Prize.

Part I

1

Agency

Introduction

Human agency consists of the mental and physical property for social and moral reasoning. At the level of the individual, the mental and physical states of agency in the human mind and brain function as consistent with the social and physical world in a state of truth. Human agency serves as a component of reasoning about the social and physical world that is based on factuality and confirmatory of events of the world that are plausible and existent. Human agency consists of the set of mental and physical properties that are congruent with the social norms and physical laws of the natural world.

The human mind has the capacity to understand the mental and physical states of agency in the other and is known to others through specialized functional properties of the social mind in the world. Agency is perceived as a dimension of perception in the human mind. The detection of agency reflects the perception of a human mind or the functional capacities of the human mind, including self-control, morality, memory, emotion recognition, planning, communication, and thought (Gray, Gray, Wegner, 2007). The perception of human agency in others is highly valued and associated with preference, altruistic motivation, and religiosity.

The perception of human agency in others reflects the detection of another’s goal or intention. The inference of agency from social concepts represented in characters (e.g., “robot” or “God”) demonstrates components of the mental representation of intentionality or goal state. Social concepts consist of mental trait attributes that are characteristic of other minds and are the content of social inferences of agency in exemplars of a particular type of character. Social concepts may reflect a continuum of agency from detection of minimal intentionality to conscious causal inferences of social attribution.

The functional purpose of mental agency reflects a cultural adaptation. The cultural capacity to understand the mental and physical states of agency in others serves to detect the mental property of other minds that is similar to the human mind. Imagine a possible social world in which all minds consist of the same mental property. The computation to detect the intentionality or goal states of each mind consists of a simple algorithm of an identity relation. Yet, in a possible social world comprised of distinct characters, with distinct mental property, the computation to detect the intentionality or goal state of each mind relies on detection along a gradient or a continuum of the mental property of agency. The inference of other minds as having the mental property of agency is detected not only in humans, but also in supernatural beings. Thus, agency as a mental property guides the mind towards the minds of other beings who are similar, but not necessarily identical, to humans.

The components of mental agency are detected not only in other biological beings, but also supernatural beings. The functionality of mental agency in biological and supernatural beings shares particular properties. The detection of mental agency in biological and supernatural beings may occur automatically and is specialized for the perception of goal and intentional states. The mental states of goals and intentions are the functional property of agency. Mental states of goals and intentions hold representational content that is temporal, based on a future projection of the being in the world. The physical instantiation of the mental states of goals and intentions represents a physical model of future projection generated by the being to navigate the physical world. Physical states of self-prediction, or prediction of the physical and mental state of the self that is ideal or motivated, reflects the internal representations of mental agency in the self.

Physical states of other-prediction, or prediction of the physical and mental states of others’ goals or intentions that are ideal or motivated, reflects the detection of the mental agency of other beings. The physical instantiation of other-prediction, or prediction of the physical and mental state of others that is ideal or motivated, reflects the generation of internal representations of other-projection or the other being’s self-projection. The physical instantiation of other-projection represents a physical model of future projection generated to predict the navigation of others in the physical world.

The mental and physical states of agency adaptively function to guide social inference and reasoning. Social reasoning of other beings requires an internal model of representational content regarding the future mental and physical states of self and others. The detection of mental agency facilitates the planning and coordination of social thought and action. The conscious deliberation of goals and intentions in self and others enables the long-term planning and coordination of social thought and action. The perseveration of goals and intentions reflects the outcome of planning and coordination of social thought and action in the world.

Mental states of agency are valuable, consisting of truth and falsity. Mental states of goals and intentions that are consistent in the present or can become consistent in the future with mental and physical events in the world comprise agentic mental states that are true or consist of truth value. Mental states of goals and intentions that are unrealized in the present, not idealized or considered unlikely to occur as a mental and physical event in the world, comprise agentic mental states that are false or consist of false value.

The interaction of culture and the environment guides the valuation of agentic mental states through cultural adaptation. Cultural adaptations consist of mental and physical events that have truth value and are factually consistent in the natural world. Cultural adaptations are reinforced as valued patterns of goals and intentions in thought and action. Mental events that are false or inconsistent with the natural world may alter the valuation of agentic mental states and require a change in truth value before reinforcement as a cultural adaptation of a thought or action pattern in the world can occur.

Human agency reflects the goals and intentions of moral thought and action that enhance the genuineness and quality of life in the world. The mental and physical functional properties of the mind and brain have goals and intentions to detect social and physical events that are factually consistent with the natural world. The internal motivation of the agentic mental state is to respond to the sense data in the environment that is true to the intention and goal of the individual. The mental state of agency consists of the goals and intentions that conform to the social norms of the environment and that perform causal reasoning that is forthright to the physical laws of the natural world.

Human agency carries the natural expression of faith and devotion in the religious world. The mental and physical property of faith includes the perception of mind that is consistent and allowable in the religion. The perception of the human mind includes the functional capacities for intention and reasoning of faith. Faithful thought and acts of devotion are a lawlike component of human agency that is characteristic of religion. The internal motivation of the agentic mental state is to respond to the sense data in the environment that is true to the intention and goal of the individual of faith.

Human agency is considered a dimension of the human mind that is related to the perception of moral agency and responsibility. Agency implies that a human can intend or be motivated for moral action, and ascribed responsibility for protection or punishment. Moral attributions, such as those of protection and punishment, are more likely to be related to perceptions of human agency. The detection of human agency occurs as a lawlike regularity of social or moral reasoning of the human mind that occurs in the world, linking the perception of human agency to moral attributions and social explanations of behavior.

Human agency is foundational to the philosophical rationale of human rights. The human capacity for detection and expression of intention in thought and action reflects the plan for lawlike action that is proper and fair in the natural world (Conway, 1894). Human thought as a goal or an intention encompasses a natural and inherent human right for the free and equal expression of lawlike regularity of human mental and physical property. The human capacity for social and moral reasoning, such as attribution of a cause to the social or physical world, reflects the perception of human agency in others. The mental and physical property that allows for the expression and perception of human agency in the self and others is sacred and a natural and inherent right. The consequences of protection and punishment in human agency are as common sense as that in the sacred thought of religion.

Supernatural agency describes characters that represent the lawlike expression of religion. Supernatural agents refer to agents or beings that have goals and intentions that are religious or spiritual, such as gods, goblins, and spirits, and whose actions are counterintuitive to the natural world (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004). Supernatural agents encompass social and moral attributes of benevolence or malevolence, with mental capacities to perform a spectrum of moral or immoral actions that are supernatural. Supernatural agency may constitute the property of benevolent or malevolent characters that exhibit patterns of mental states of “good” or “bad,” ranging from plausible and existent to physically implausible or nonexistent in the natural world.

On the one hand, supernatural agents may consist of characteristics that are at least, in part, consistent with social and physical beings of the natural world. Supernatural agents are thought of as models of behavior, characters whose moral actions serve as a model of cultural learning. Supernatural agents that are thought of as a “good” character may encourage cultural transmission of religious beliefs. The moral mental states of the benevolent supernatural agent (“helpful” and “honest”) may undergo cultural selection as a set of persistent traits acquired and communicated through social interaction. Supernatural agents that are thought of as a “bad” character may encourage cultural regulation. The immoral mental states of the malevolent supernatural agent (“harmful” and “deceitful”) may undergo cultural selection as a set of traits to be detected and regulated for in social interaction.

Beliefs about the physical states of supernatural agents may encompass to some extent characteristics relatable to “good” and “bad” characters in the natural world. Beliefs of the physical states of supernatural agents are thought to include the resemblance of the physical bodies of humans and animals and the physical forms of plants and substances. Religious beliefs of supernatural agents such as gods and goblins refer to physical bodies with configurations of body parts similar to humans and animals. Spirits refer to a type of supernatural agent that may encompass the physical form of a social plant or substance. Supernatural agents may demonstrate “good” characteristics, such as cultural expressions of joy and calm and trust behavior, as well as “bad” characteristics, such as cultural expressions of contempt and anger and deceitful behavior. Beliefs of supernatural agents as possessing physical states of humans and animals consistent with those observed in the natural world engender social reasoning of supernatural and human agents that is intuitive to the natural world.

Beliefs of supernatural agents as possessing physical forms of plants and substances require social reasoning of supernatural and natural agents that is based on the counterintuitive world. The counterintuitive world consists of beliefs that are counterfactual, or inconsistent with fact-based knowledge. Counterfactual beliefs may be physically implausible or nonexistent in the natural world. Counterfactual beliefs contradict facts or factual assumptions of physical and social knowledge of the natural world. Supernatural agents in the physical form of plants and substances consist of mental states and perform actions that contradict social norms and physical laws observed in the natural world. The notion that supernatural agents are omniscient and omnipotent, limitless in knowledge and power contradicts the common-sense knowledge of beings as bounded by knowledge and power of the natural world.

Beliefs of supernatural agents guide perception and action in social inference. Belief of a benevolent supernatural agent may heighten knowledge of moral perception and action, while belief of a malevolent supernatural agent may strengthen motivation for regulation of immoral perception and action. Intuitive beliefs refer to an object or being with a property from the same ontological category (e.g., “melting ice”). Minimally counterintuitive beliefs of supernatural agents include the generation of novel concepts such as an object or being with a property from a different ontological category (e.g., “thinking mineral” and “giggling seaweed”). Maximally counterintuitive beliefs of supernatural agents refer to the generation of novel concepts that associate two properties from a different ontological category with an object or being (e.g., “squinting wilting brick”).

The mental capacities and capabilities of supernatural agents may be perceived as primarily representative of the counterintuitive world. Benevolent supernatural agents may be perceived as having supernatural goals and intentions, with capabilities of performing supernatural moral actions. Religious beliefs may imbue benevolent supernatural agents with capabilities to strengthen human protection from threats, deception, and mortality; by contrast, religious beliefs may imbue malevolent supernatural agents with capabilities that weaken human protection.

In the counterintuitive world, the characteristics of supernatural agents may extend beyond the notions of a “good” or “bad” character in the natural world. The beliefs of supernatural agents expand into a reality of beliefs without a truth condition. The capabilities of supernatural agents to protect in the counterintuitive world may necessarily be perceived as physically implausible or inconsistent with the capabilities of humans who perform moral actions in the natural world. In the strictest sense, the criterion of a characteristic of a supernatural agent may be that it is not physically plausible or is in fact nonexistent in the natural world.

Cultural transmission guides social thought and coordination of supernatural agency. Beliefs of supernatural agents arise from sensory pageantry. Sensory pageantry allows for the cultural transmission of religious beliefs and practices about supernatural agents through the coordination of sensory systems for ritual practice. Perception of the supernatural agent occurs across sensory modalities. Knowledge of the supernatural agent builds from knowledge of the physical world as inferred from sensation.

Cultural transmission of sensory pageantry through social thought and action encourages the transmission of supernatural agency across individuals and groups. The expression of sensory pageantry through language popularizes and spreads the knowledge of religious beliefs and practices. The symbolic representation of sensory pageantry serves as the physical and social realism of supernatural agency in the world. The persistence of religious belief in the mind and the world reflects the potency of cultural transmission and sensory pageantry of supernatural agency.

Agency in Mind and Machine

Agency refers to the mental construct for the detection of agents with distinct goals and internal motivations to reach goals in the physical and social environment. Agency may be detected from contingent movement or interaction between objects and people, such as the movement of dots or geometrical objects that is perceived as dependent on each other or as a singular event (Heider & Simmel, 1944; Blakemore et al., 2003). Mechanical contingency refers to the detection of interaction of objects that occurs due to mechanical causality, such as that characterized in Newton’s laws of motion. Intentional contingency refers to the detection of interaction of objects that occurs due to intention or causation at a distance, such as that observed in the social environment.

One characteristic of agency is the detection of animacy or self-propelled movement of an object. An object that moves at a distance through self-propulsion is thought to exhibit animacy or the capacity to produce physical movement through the self. Another characteristic of agency is the detection of nonmechanical contingency or causation at a distance. Causation at a distance refers to an object that follows another object or responds to the movement of another object. Both characteristics of agency comprise fundamental components of theory of mind, or the capacity to understand the mental states of others.

The detection of agency is subserved by brain regions associated with social processes. The superior temporal sulcus (STS) is a brain region located within the upper bank of the temporal lobe consisting of layers of neurons dedicated to the detection of biological motion (Allison, Puce, McCarthy, 2000; Castelli, Happe, Frith, Frith, 2000). The STS is responsive to the percei...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Information
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• Part I
• Part II
• Part III
• Conclusion
• Index