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Encountering the ‘refugee’
Crafting the policies
The Partition of colonial India into the two new bordering nations—India and Pakistan—in 1947 initiated one of the largest processes of human displacements in the 20th century. Partition on the basis of religion became imminent in two provinces, Punjab and Bengal. The conceptualised division had been implemented through the recommendation of the Radcliffe Award and South Asia thus experienced its first mass migration and relocation of communities. Division of lands, properties and assets was as tough as separation of population (Sengupta 2018: 43). The emergence of a ‘new community’ was inevitable with the Partition. These uprooted populations were initially treated as ‘Partition-displaced’ people who needed to be dealt with politically (Rao 1967: 1–3). Yet, the irony of the situation was that when the rest of the masses in both countries were engrossed in the discussion and experience of freedom, the ‘displaced persons’ were not in a position to plan their future (Islam 2012: 24–27).1 Contrary to popular perception, the Partition in the eastern borders or flow of refugees was not confined to West Bengal only. It affected almost the whole eastern frontier, including northeastern states like Assam and Tripura, Lusai Hills in Mizoram (bordering Chittagong), Garo Hills, Khasi and Jaintia Hills in Meghalaya (Nag 2002: 21–24).2 It was such a disaster that demanded separate attention. A huge segment among the middle-class and upper-middle-class people who migrated in the first and second waves did not even register themselves officially as ‘refugees’, though they added to the population growth of post-Partition West Bengal, Assam and Tripura (Banerjee 2017: 552).
Throughout the 1940s, major political events in India like Quit India Movement, Naval Movement and worldwide economic depression gradually were pushing the Raj to make concrete decisions about its colonies. Congress, Muslim League and Hindu Mahasabha had open discussions on the numerous probabilities of the transfer of power. Surprisingly, although the political leaders and the Raj were aware of the displacement that would be an essential outcome of Partition, none of them insisted on or cared about making rules and design definite policies for the refugees and other religious minorities. They preferred to leave the issue on the administration. When Partition had been implemented, it kept the Raj busy, as all the political parties and pressure groups in England were engaged in bargaining for a better deal (Tunzelmann 2007: 160–64). Yet the expectations, contradictions, undercurrents and signs of catastrophe could be sensed in both the geographical locations, though a bit differently (Page 2002: xix). The planners of Partition and the concerned authorities never could imagine or visualise the untold miseries of the homeless refugees and minorities in both countries.3 Initially, a definite religious identity was the dominant identity given to them in government records. Gradually, they were categorised legally as displaced persons and finally as refugees, which subsequently became the only identity for them. Both the newly created nation-states ideologically agreed to provide space, privilege and preferences to the refugee community. But in reality, the policymakers and administrators were aloof about the future of these floating groups, whose socio-political and economic position changed with the ideological shifts or by practical needs. But they did not get so perturbed by the prospect of Partition, or see this community as a positive workforce, an asset for the nation-making process. They tried to chalk out plans in papers for the refugees, stamped them after a nod to finalise it (Partition Proceedings 1949, 1: 182–84).
After Partition, India adopted secularism as an ideology for nation building, when Pakistan sought to build a state by laws on Islamic principles (Chatterji 2013a: 41). The Hindu leaders of Congress and Hindu Mahasabha promised the East Bengali Hindus that they would get land and a new address on the other side of Bengal. West Bengal had always been a place of attraction for them. It was urban, had modern amenities, a flourishing industrial economy and a thriving city-centred cultural ambience, and moreover, appeared more sophisticated than the overwhelmingly agrarian society of East Bengal.4 Hence, the option of permanent migration to Calcutta was tempting for some educated, salaried middle-class families which would love to move to the ‘new paradise of Hindus’ (Mukhopadhyay 2013: 50). The Congress leaders promised to resolve the problems of the refugees as their primary responsibility, as they supported them throughout in the freedom struggle (Kapil Krishna Thakur 2011, 2: 18–9). But in reality, when the migrated refugee families reached the other side of the border, their identity changed as ‘East Bengalis’ (Mukhopadhyay 2002: 31–41). Initially, they were even bothered by difference in accent, rituals or professions. Factors like regionalism, clan, class and caste dominated their thought in making of a new identity.5 These factors were merged later when the tendency to incorporate such issues as a barrier in constructing larger identity comparatively became lesser (Kapil Krishna Thakur 2011, 2: 30–31).6
This chapter actually focuses on the making of border or boundaries and defines the term ‘refugee’ in regional context, keeping it under the structure of ‘high politics’. It tries to argue that the process of articulating a historical milieu for understanding of the term ‘refugee’, and alternation of their identities, should be analysed against the background of the political culture of contemporary nationalist ideology, as well as the nature of Indian state. Thus, this chapter aims to locate diverse layers of complexities that emerged out of Partition, though the chief focus is on the process of transformation of the legal and other identities of the refugees. The design of an imaginary border and its implementation had taken in hand to mobilise the masses, the refugees, in both the nation-states. On both sides of the Radcliffe Line, the nation-states began to look at interests of the state itself and withdrew from their commitment to safeguard the uprooted populace and stay back of the ‘uneasy minorities’ in countless numbers as ‘internally displaced’ (Chatterji 2013b: 273). It argues that the journey of the major Indian political parties to attain independence and the ambitions of leaders actually left the masses, their citizens, on the edge. The Partition-displaced refugees were born out of the twist and turns of political events, social unrest, economic crises and religious obscurity that accompanied the nationalist movement. The role of the state was thus crucial in their case, as the design of geographical divide finally led to human catastrophe, and the refugees became the worst sufferers.
There were several trial-and-error methods experimented with the ‘refugees’ in the next few decades after Partition. Both the states, India and Pakistan, rather introduced measures to check the influx and discouraged return of the evacuees for taking over properties. For the entire eastern region, India and Pakistan agreed ‘there would be no state-assisted evacuation of refugees’, and it decided, ‘The vacant property of emigrant minorities would not be deployed for the rehabilitation of incoming refugees’ (Chatterji 2013a: 41). The ordinances of 1949 had taken over all Muslim properties from ‘the affected areas’, excluding West Bengal, Assam and Tripura (Chatterji 2013a: 41–42).7 The Delhi Pact (1950) was the first major step taken for checking the flow of the migrants.8 Introduction of the passport system, or visa regime (1952), and other regulations made the refugees vocal about their rights, by not trusting the state system or the words of the statesmen. This chapter scrutinises their journey from ‘border slips’ and ‘migration certificates’ to ‘citizenship’. The trail of mistakes born out of the altering policies of the nation-state and consequent miseries made the refugees vulnerable. The chapter argues that when the states failed to define their roles, they started posing threats to the state system itself. India, the first declared and practising democracy of post-colonial South Asia, had painfully fallen short of the bare minimum expectation of this hapless category of humanity, created as a by-product of a nation-state making process.
Impending Partition
Though the social and political polarisation of communities started in the late 1930s, the idea of separating people along communal lines was not seen as something feasible. The outbreak of World War II realigned world politics, impacted the nature of power relationships and reshaped attitude of governance (Chakrabarty 2002: 138). It however inaugurated ‘a decisive period for national liberation movement’ and the Indian political parties were finally in a position to bargain with the Raj for involving India in the war without its consent. It imposed a huge economic burden on India for a war that was actually not theirs (Dutt 2008: 430–35). The Congress and Muslim League tried to make use of the situation when the Raj indeed was ready for a dialogue. In March 1940, Congress held an open session at Ramgarh and declared that ‘nothing short of complete independence can be accepted by the people of India’ (McMahon 2010: 41). Th...