Moral Theory

An Introduction to Ethics

G. C. Field

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000049480
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

Originally published in 1921, updated in 1932 and re-issued in 1966 with an introduction by Stephan Körner, this book remains a classic introduction to the study of ethics. It clearly explains both the Aristotelian and the Kantian approach to ethical problems, by combining the advantages of a historical and systematic introduction. Much of the book is devoted to Aristotle and Kant, whose moral theories are important and who are influential forces in contemporary moral philosophy.

PART I

KANT AND THE GOOD IN ITSELF

CHAPTER II

KANT AND THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (I)

THE first of these typical instances which we shall examine is the short work of Kant’s, in which he gives a concise account of his theory of Ethics under the title of Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals.

This work, as indeed most of Kant’s writings, will probably appear to the student one of the most unattractive of the works which he is called upon to read. It is very rare to find anyone to whom Kant appeals at a first reading. The style is uncouth and the exposition extremely obscure. The conclusions he reaches seem particularly at variance with our ordinary ideas and our first impression is, that they are obviously absurd and perfectly easy to refute. The difficulty, indeed, seems to be to see how he ever got to them. But closer study will remove a great deal of this unfavourable impression. We shall see that he started from certain beliefs or assumptions about morality which we are all very apt to hold without seeing where they lead to, and that he got where he did simply by developing these, And we shall find that, so far from being obviously wrong, his general conclusions would be accepted by many modern thinkers, and that several modern theories of Ethics have a very great deal in common with his.

His preface gives us a fairly clear idea of what he was aiming at. We read, “ The present treatise is, however, nothing more than the investigation and establishment of the supreme principle of morality ” (p. 9). Or a little further back (p. 5), he asserts that it is “ Of the utmost necessity to construct a pure moral philosophy, perfectly cleared of everything which is only empirical.” That is to say, he wants to leave aside all consideration of particular moral judgments, all statements about what we ought or ought not to do in these or those circumstances. That would be a question of the special form that the moral law assumes in different particular cases. But what he asks is, “ What is the moral law, the one absolute rule of conduct which is the same in all circumstances, from which the particular rules for the particular circumstances can be deduced ? ” Or to put it in another way. When we say that different things are right and good, what is this rightness or goodness which is the same in all its different forms, and by what formula is it to be described ?

This, then, is what he is looking for. And his method of looking for it begins, at any rate, “ by proceeding analytically from common knowledge to a determination of its ultimate principle ” (p. 9). That is to say, he begins by taking our ordinary ideas about morality, analysing them, seeing what is involved in them, and where we get to if we think them out consistently. Indeed, he is pursuing this method throughout the greater part of the book. At the end of the second section, he says, “ This section, like the first, was merely analytical.” And in the same place he says that his conclusions have been arrived at “ simply ... by the development of the universally received notion of morality.”

We shall find on examination that Kant started from, or was influenced by, several assumptions about what is good and right, which, at first sight at any rate, would seem thoroughly acceptable to our ordinary ideas.¹ What these assumptions are will appear more definitely in the course of his argument, but they may be provisionally stated as follows :—

¹ He was also, no doubt, influenced (chiefly by way of repulsion) by certain philosophical views which were current at the time, and from which he strongly dissented, such as Hedonism, on the one hand, and on the other mere unreasoned dogmatism about what was right and what was wrong.

(1) We assume that if there is a moral law at all, it must be absolute and universal. It cannot admit, for instance, of exceptions for particularly favoured persons. It cannot be suspended in special circumstances, nor can we alter it to suit ourselves or our own convenience. This is for Kant, perhaps, the most important of the ordinarily received ideas about morality. He says, himself, for instance, “ everyone must admit that if a law is to have moral force, i.e., to be the basis of an obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity.”

(2) We assume, what is really much the same thing seen from a different point of view, that if a thing is really good, it must be good in and for itself. Its goodness must not depend on something else, and least of all upon its being a means to something else. For then obviously it is the something else which is good. This helps us to define what we are looking for.

(3) We assume that the rightness or goodness of an action cannot depend on what we want. Being right is quite different from being wanted or desired. We should even be inclined to ascribe an added virtue to doing right when we do not want to do it. And a further important point is that we want different things at different times, and that different people want different or even contradictory things. So that if the rightness of anything depended upon our wanting it, it would not be absolute and necessary.

(4) We assume that the goodness or rightness of an action does not depend upon its actual results. The results depend so largely on circumstances outside the action or the will of the person who acts, and so far as this is so the person cannot be held responsible for the result. And, a more important point still, if the goodness of the action depended upon the results, it would mean that it was the results which were really good in themselves, and not the action at all.

(5) We assume that the goodness of an action disappears so far as it is done under pressure from anything outside, so far as it is not dependent entirely upon the person himself. For then it would not be a free action, and the person could not be held really responsible for it.

Such, briefly and generally expressed, are the assumptions which Kant seems to have had in his mind at starting. It remains to be seen how he worked them out into a system.

He begins with a broad general statement that nothing is absolutely good in itself save a good will. All the other qualities are good only if they are under the direction of a good will : they derive their goodness from the good will and are not good in themselves. That is to say, to put it in more popular language, all that matters is that we should always want and try to do what we think right. It is not sufficient that we should merely wish to do right : “ not, to be sure,” says Kant, “ a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power.” Nor does it matter whether our particular actions succeed in their object. For that depends on circumstances outside ourselves, and we may be prevented, as he says, by “ the special disfavour of fortune or the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature.” That, however, would not lessen our merit, which depends on our wishing and doing all we can to do right.

This general statement of Kant’s is practically the same as the fourth of the ordinary assumptions set out above. Kant, indeed, really appeals to us to accept it on the grounds of its being such an assumption of our ordinary thinking. He speaks of the “ thorough assent of even common reason to this idea.” And the more or less popular appeals with which he tries to strengthen our readiness to accept it are not really intended to be convincing by themselves.

But these terms must be examined a little more closely, if we are to get a clearer idea of what he means. In the first place, what does he mean by “ will ” ? We need not, at this stage, attempt an exhaustive definition : it will be sufficient to arrive at a general idea. Will is clearly very closely bound up with action. It is not the mere wish to do something, nor is it even the making up of our minds that we will do it later. The will works when we decide to act, not in the sense of the decision to do so at a later date, but in the sense of immediate effective decision. And this really amounts to saying that the will is the action. Why that seems perhaps a little difficult at first is that when we speak of an action we are rather apt to think of it from an external point of view, as certain visible bodily movements. But if we attend to our experience of our own actions we shall also recognize the mental side of this, the decision in our mind that sets our limbs in motion. The will is the action looked at from the point of view of what goes on in the mind. A good will, when active, is the doing of good actions. And Kant, as a matter of fact, uses the terms “ good will “ and “ good action ” almost indiscriminately.

So much for his meaning of “ Will.” But it is even more important to see more clearly what he means by “ good,” or rather, perhaps, where he considers the goodness to lie. A good will is the doing of, or that which makes us do good actions. But what makes the action good ? We have already seen that it cannot be its results or effects. It must lie rather in the motive, that which impels us to do or to will this action. But, if the action is to be good, this motive cannot be the desire which moves us to the action. We have seen already how impossible it would be to get any fixed moral law from the consideration of desires, since they vary from time to time and from person to person. But for the present argument it is more important to realize that a desire is always for something. And if we looked for the goodness in the desire we should really be forced to look further and to seek for it in the thing which is desired. That would really be to put the goodness, again, not in the action itself but in the effects beyond the action : not here in the effects which actually are produced, but in the effects which are hoped for or desired. And so, once more, we should not have an action good in itself, because it would derive its goodness from something outside itself.

Where, then, are we to look for that which gives moral worth to an action ? Kant’s statement of this is difficult, and must be examined closely (pp. 19-22). The action, he tells us, derives its moral worth from “ the maxim by which it is determined.”

The “ maxim ” is explained as “ the subjective principle of volition.” And he speaks again of the worth of actions lying “ in the principle of the will.” The principle of the will seems to mean, more generally, the reason for which the action is done, with the important proviso, in so far as the reason does not lie outside the action itself. But if it must lie within the action, it can only lie in the nature of the action itself. That is what Kant appears to mean in speaking of “ what is connected with my will as a principle . . . in other words, simply the law of itself.” Here the word “ law ” is important. It appears, in this passage, to be used primarily in the sense in which we speak of a law of nature. A law of nature is really a statement of a universal fact about all the members of a class, a description of their general nature, or perhaps a universal connexion between some universal properties. Thus, for instance, the law of gravity is a statement of the fact that solid bodies attract one another with a certain definite force. This is a universal fact about solid bodies, it is a part of their nature. And laws of nature are thus more or less complete descriptions of the universal natures of certain kinds of things.

We may see reason later to believe that Kant himself was not always free from confusion in his conception of law, and not perfectly consistent in his use of the term. But we may be content for the present with the fact that this is the primary meaning which he attaches to it. So that the law of an action means primarily for him the nature of the action, its universal character. Thus he says (p. 20), that “ Nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law ” (that is, really, the fact that the action is of such a kind) “ and subjectively pure respect for this practical law.” The addition of “ practical ” is intended to distinguish it from other kinds of law. The law of gravity, for instance, that solid bodies attract each other, does not directly affect our wills. But the practical law which says that actions of this kind are good and therefore must be done is of direct importance for our wills and our actions.

But the most important new conception which meets us here is the idea of “ respect.” What does he mean by that ? He admits that it may be considered vague. He defines it, in one place, as “ the conception of a worth which thwarts my self-love.” And a little further back, he says, “ What I recognize immediately as a law for me I recognize with respect. This merely signifies the consciousness that my will is subordinate to a law,” and so on. Or again, “ The immediate determination of the will by the law, and the consciousness of this is called respect.”

The upshot of this seems to be that it hardly ought to be called a feeling at all, though Kant speaks of it as such. It seems to be more truly the knowledge or the consciousness or the recognition of a certain fact. We respect the law simply by recognizing that it is the law, that the action is good and therefore must be done. What moves our will or makes us do the action is the knowledge or recognition—a cognitive process—that the action is of a certain kind, i.e., good.

Now if we have interpreted Kant fairly, there is the obvious appearance of a vicious circle here. The rightness or goodness of an action consists negatively in the fact that we are not moved to do it by anything outside the action itself. Positively, it is determined by the principle of volition, the reason for which we do it. The action is right, then, if it is done for a certain reason. But for what reason ? We can only say that for the reason that it is right, and we recognize it as such. That is to say, it is right because it is done because it is right.

Now the circle as it presents itself to us did not so present itself to Kant, because he did not use the same terms. He used much more obscure and ambiguous terms which served to hide it from him. On the other hand, from a different point of view, Kant undoubtedly did face the real difficulty here presented in this form. Perhaps a little further consideration will serve to solve the apparent circle.

To do right we must act because it is right to act in that way. This is not a mere empty form of words. It at least serves to narrow down the field of action which we call right, by laying down that rightness can only belong to actions which are done in obedience to or out of respect for a law. We recognize these actions as being of a certain kind—good or right—in themselves, as being universally and necessarily such and therefore always to be done. And we must do them because we recognize them as always and universally and necessarily to be done, and not because of any particular appeal they make to us at that particular time or in those particular circumstances. That is to say, we must act by rule and with the rule in mind ; each particular action to be right must appeal to us as an instance of a universal kind or universal rule of action. Or, in Kantian language, we must act thus in obedience to or out of respect for a law.

If, now, we want to put our difficulty into more Kantian language we should say, at this point, that the law according to which we must act seems to be nothing more than the law that we must act according to the law. And Kant would, in a sense, admit this to be true, though he would deny that there was any real contradiction or vicious circle. We find him asking (p. 22), “ But what sort of law can that be ? ” Clearly we cannot look for it in any particular law which we can formulate in detail. Such a law would only apply to certain circumstances or certain special kinds of actions. Take, for instance, the commandment, “Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.” This law is absolutely valid, no doubt, and absolutely necessary. But it only applies in certain circumstances, when, that is, it is a question of giving evidence about another man at all. And there are numberless actions to which such a rule would have no application at all. It must derive its rightness therefore from some general fact which is present in it and in all other kinds of right action as well. And what we are looking for is a description of this fact. In other words, we want to know what is the rule or law of action.

Now, if we thus refuse to admit any particular rule, any rule that applies to particular actions or in particular circumstances only, as the moral law, what do we get left ? We get, as Kant says (p. 22), “ Nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general.” That is to say, we get nothing left in which we can look for the moral law, except the universal nature of law as such. And the essence of law as such is that it should be universal. We are left, as Kant would say, with the bare form of universality, which is the essential nature of law as such. And so we get (p. 22), the all-important first maxim, “ I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.” So that he does really accept the position that the moral law is simply that we should act in obedience to law, that is to say to law as such.

This is the essence of goodness, this is the moral law from which all particular rules of conduct are to be deduced. Kant proceeds to show how this is to be done, how particular moral rules follow from this. Thus we say that it is wrong to tell a lie. If we ask why, the answer is that if lying were right it would have to be a universal law. Everybody would have to lie whenever they spoke. But if we try to imagine a state of things in which such a rule was accepted, we can see at once that it would be an impossible one and that the rule would be shown to be self-contradictory. Suppose that such a state of things existed and every one lied, that is, said the contrary of what they believed to be the case. In that case, it would soon cease to be lying, because it would not convey a false impression and would deceive nobody. The possibility of deceiving anyone by a lie (and therefore the temptation to tell a lie) depends on there being some people or a majority of people who tell the truth. Universal lying is impossible or indeed unmeaning. Therefore, as we could not make lying a universal rule, it cannot be right. Or, again, we say that suicide is wrong. For if it was ever right, it would have to be right in itself, and therefore always right. That is to say, every one would have to commit suicide, so that very soon there would be no one left to go on practising the virtue of committing suicide. It cannot be universalized, and it contradicts itself if we try to universalize it. So we have here a clear test of what is right and what is wrong. If any sort of action is really right, right or good in itself, then it must always be so. If it really ought to be done as something good in itself, then it always ought to be done. And if it cannot be done always or by all people, if the attempt thus to universalize it as a rule of con...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Preface
• Preface to the Second Edition
• Contents
• Introduction
• Introductory
• Part I Kant: The Good In Itself
• Part II Aristotle And The Good As Purpose
• Part III Towards A Constructive Theory
• Bibliography
• Index