Alternatives to Neoliberal Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Africa

Redie Bereketeab

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000199918
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Economics
• Subtopic: Development Economics
• Index: Economics

This book critically interrogates the neoliberal peacebuilding and statebuilding model and proposes a popular progressive model centred around the lived realities of African societies.

The neoliberal interventionist model assumed prominence and universal hegemony following the demise of state socialism at the end of the Cold War. However, this book argues that it is a primarily short-term, top-down approach that imposes Western norms and values on conflict and post-conflict societies. By contrast, the popular progressive model espoused by this book is based on stringent examination and analysis of the reality of the socio-economic development, structures, institutions, politics and cultures of developing societies. In doing so, it combines bottom-up and top-down, popular and elite, and long-term evolutionary processes of societal construction as a requisite for enduring peacebuilding and statebuilding.

By comparing and contrasting the dominant neoliberal peacebuilding and statebuilding model with a popular progressive model, the book seeks to empower locals (both elites and masses) to sit in the driver's seat and construct their own societies. As such, it is an important contribution to scholars, activists, policymakers, civil society organisations, NGOs and all those who are concerned with peace, stability and development across Africa and other developing countries.

1 Introduction

Understanding peacebuilding and statebuilding in the era of neoliberalism

Introduction

Making sense of peacebuilding and statebuilding (PBSB) is a great challenge of our time – a time characterised by the omnipresent, yet contested, reign of neoliberalism; a time also characterised by state fragility, crisis, failure and collapse; by terrorism, fundamentalism, extremism and interventionism affecting primarily the global south. The challenge gains additional currency when viewed from the vantage point of the peacebuilding–statebuilding nexus. Following the end of the Cold War – which also heralded the collapse of the Soviet-led Eastern bloc and state socialism – there was a need to change gear, in order to reconfigure world power and international relations. The reconfiguration spawned the phenomenon that came to be known as the New World Order, indicating the emergence of a hegemonic mono-polar politico-economic global order that was enthusiastically welcomed by the high priests of neoliberalism, such as Francis Fukuyama (1992) and Samuel P. Huntington (1996). This mono-polarity of the politico-economic order was celebrated as the triumph of the West over the East in the ideological struggle, and warranted the declaration of the ‘end of history’ (Paris, 2010). The triumphalist exhilaration was due to the perception that the West had secured hegemonic world domination. The consequence of the triumphalism, however, became a highly unstable world order.

This chapter seeks to understand PBSB in the era of neoliberalism. The neoliberal era that became dominant following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of state socialism is also characterised by extensive interventionism of big powers, primarily Western in the internal affairs of fragile, non-Western societies. This interventionism was driven by at least three interwoven phenomena. First, although many conflicts were resolved in the wake of the Cold War, many new ones broke out; these went on to engender fragility, failure and even the collapse of many states. Secondly, as a consequence, the failed states were labelled a danger to their own people and the wider world. In addition, they were perceived as fertile ground for the gestation of extremism, fundamentalism and terrorism. The rise of terrorism was, in turn, seen as a threat to Western security and interests, and particularly to those of the USA. Thirdly, the danger and threat perception induced two associated doctrines. One was the need to intervene to repair the failed states that are the sources of danger and threat. This led to the principle of humanitarian intervention in the cause of PBSB under the neoliberal regime. The other doctrine that emerged was that of pre-emptive action wherever the USA deemed it justifiable – and felt itself entitled – to attack an imagined ‘enemy’ state before it attacked the USA (Murphy, 2005; Peilouw et al., 2015; Thiessen, 2011).

Such interventionism represents a violation of international law and the sovereignty of weaker states, particularly when it takes place without a UN resolution. Indeed, many of the acts of interference in the internal affairs of states have been unprecedented and constitute a breach of the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which to this day governs inter-state relations. They also breach the UN Charter. The Treaty of Westphalia is based on the principle of the equality of states, regardless of their size and power; it gives protection against interference, invasion and threat, particularly from powerful states. The invasions of Iraq, Libya, Somalia and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the blunders in Syria, Mali and Yemen were all in blatant breach of UN and international law.

This book explores two models of PBSB. The first is associated with the neoliberal interventionist model, which, broadly speaking, deals with short-term PBSB in the wake of a devastating war. The second is concerned with long-term PBSB and relates to the gradual construction of socio-economic and political institutions in societies. The second model is termed ‘popular progressive peacebuilding and statebuilding’. The two models succinctly attempt to analyse the challenges conflict and post-conflict developing societies face. In this respect, the scope of the book is to capture cases throughout the developing world. The aim of this chapter is briefly to introduce the two models. Those models are then fleshed out in detail in the remainder of the chapters.

The contention underpinning the analysis is that the two models of PBSB – popular progressive and neoliberal – are opposites. Popular progressive peacebuilding is historical, contemporary and futuristic.¹ Given this trajectory and evolution, there is a continuous time horizon connecting the past, the present and the future. The short-term interventionist neoliberal approach to PBSB – a theoretical and empirical notion that assumed prominence following the end of the Cold War (Call and Wyeth, 2008; Curtis and Dzinesa, 2012; Harrison, 2010) is time bound. As such, it cannot deal with the profound root causes of conflicts and wars, which by their very nature concern societal construction. The reason for the growing prominence of PBSB is invariably related to the rise of neoliberal interventionist ideology, which replaced the Cold War order (Harrison, 2010), and to the crisis of the state in developing societies. The triumphalist neoliberal cause embarked on a proselytising mission of moulding humanity with neoliberal values and norms. Western values and norms were elevated to universal values and norms, after which every member of humanity should strive (Tom, 2017). This proselytising drive has propelled an aggressive, interventionist approach to PBSB. Peacebuilding and statebuilding that did not follow neoliberal ideology were perceived not only as untenable, but also as a danger to world peace (Hutchful, 2012: 81; Zaum, 2012: 47).

Western interventionist PBSB offered an excellent opportunity to reconfigure societies under stress into neoliberal societies, along Western lines. Referring to this, Roland Paris (2002: 638) notes: ‘Without exception, peacebuilding missions in the post-Cold War period have attempted to “transplant” the values and institutions of the liberal democratic core into the domestic affairs of peripheral host states.’ He also designates it mission civilisatrice – a reminder of the European imperial powers’ duty to colonise dependent populations in order to civilise them. Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic (CAR), DRC and South Sudan became guinea pigs for the newly dominant neoliberal PBSB interventionist doctrine (Call and Wyeth, 2008; Eriksen, 2009; Nhema and Zeleza, 2008; Paffenholz, 2015; Tom, 2017; Zambakari, 2016). The source of the stress of these fragile societies was viewed as an inadequate dose of the ‘universal’ values and norms. The remedy for the dysfunctionality of fragile societies was therefore assumed to be international intervention, with the intention of restructuring and rebuilding post-conflict countries along the lines of neoliberal values and norms – that is, providing a bigger dose of ‘universal’ values and norms.

Critics, however, argue that neoliberal PBSB is unsustainable and dysfunctional, as it is an external imposition and fails to take account of the specific realities and contexts of the particular society: social, cultural, historical, economic, political, structural, institutional and ethnic (Harrison, 2010; Lederach, 1997; Mac Ginty, 2008; Paffenholz, 2015). Functional and sustainable PBSB needs to rely on the culture, history, social and political structures and forces of the society in question (Tom, 2017). It should draw on proven domestic institutions, mechanisms and authorities (Richmond, 2011). This is the underlying conception of the popular progressive model promoted in this book.

This chapter consists of six sections. The next section provides a broad overview of PBSB discourse. That is followed by an analysis of the conceptual framework. Then comes a discussion of the methodological framework. The next section provides the themes and organisation of the book. Finally, there are some concluding thoughts about how to deepen sustainable PBSB in Africa.

Peacebuilding and statebuilding: a broad overview

The project of PBSB is enduring and gradual. It is a long-term process (Maiese, 2003), not a one-time shot that sticks forever. Therefore, it needs continuous maintenance, refurbishment and innovation. The French historian Ernest Renan, in his classical piece of 1882a entitled ‘What is a Nation?’, called this phenomenon a daily plebiscite (Renan, 1991). That means it needs to be cultured, cultivated, fertilised, watered and nourished daily, in order to persistently and steadily grow healthy, strong and functional. PBSB as a general societal construction, like the nation not only demands constant attention but also perpetual renewal of the social contract that reinforces its perennial legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. In Renan’s own words,

A nation’s existence is, if you will pardon the metaphor, a daily plebiscite, just as an individual’s existence is a perpetual affirmation of life. That, I know full well, is less metaphysical than divine right and less brutal than so-called historical right. According to the ideas that I am outlining to you, a nation has no more right than a king does to say to a province: ‘You belong to me, I am seizing you.’ A province, as far as I am concerned, is its inhabitants; if anyone has the right to be consulted in such an affair, it is the inhabitant. A nation never has any real interest in annexing or holding on to a country against its will. The wish of nations is, all in all, the sole legitimate criterion, the one to which one must always return.

(Renan, 1882b: 4)

PBSB is also intimately and dialectically connected with culture; history; socio-economic structures, institutions and traditions; authority of the particular society; moral and ethical imperatives. It is about integration, cohesion, developing commonalities and peaceful coexistence within a limited territory, under the umbrella of a common state. It rests on continuous and relentless hard work, preservation, innovation and lifetime caring. Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peacebuilding as ‘action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict’ (quoted in Barnett, 2006: 87).² In other words, it depends on the continuous and watchful attention of those who gain or lose from its decline or absence. The discourse of PBSB continues to engage and intrigue scholars, policymakers, activists, religious leaders and common citizens. Yet, discursive engagement is, most of the time, marked by radically diverging opinions; theoretical and ideological persuasions; epistemic, ontological and methodological controversies; and empirical strategies, policies and tactics. All this renders the field of PBSB a highly contested one both discursively and empirically.

At least four general theoretical conceptualisations of peacebuilding run through the mainstream literature: (i) structural violence theory, (ii) transformation relationship theory, (iii) protracted social conflict theory and (iv) relationship building (conflict resolution) theory (Paffenholz, 2015: 859). Peacebuilding is often defined as ‘efforts at national, local, or international levels to consolidate peace in war-torn societies’ (Call, 2008: 6). Statebuilding is also construed as a necessary requirement for peacebuilding. In this perception, a fully developed and functioning state arguably provides the infrastructures that underpin peace and peacebuilding. Ultimately, durable peacebuilding is concerned with the development of the will to live together, based on shared overarching values, interests, emotions and cognitions, mutual acceptance and recognition, cooperative interaction, common security, complementarity, institutionalisation of mechanisms for problem solving, widely shared goals and expectations (Gawerc, 2006: 442). These distinct properties gain extra validity in poly-ethnic, poly-glottic, poly-cultural and poly-religious societies. In other words, they are concerned with the protracted process and project of state- and nation-building (Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako, 2016; Zaum, 2012). This conceptualisation of PBSB runs along the line of the progressive and popular conception suggested in this book.

Counter to the popular progressive notion of PBSB runs the neoliberal notion or ideology. Neoliberal ideology was popularised following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of state socialism, when post-Westphalian neoliberalist discourse and practice began to assume prominence (Hameiri, 2014; Tutuianu, 2013). For some, it was the demise of Keynesianism that paved the way for neoliberalism: ‘One school of thought, common to those of an idealist disposition, views the shift from the Keynesian to the neoliberal era largely as the victory of one ideology over another’ (Mitchell and Fazi, 2017: 36). Post-Keynesianism coincided with the post-Cold War era, which brought a double shift of absolute Western economic and political neoliberalism. Neoliberal hegemonic narrative and discourse embarked on the mission of reconfiguring the world order in the image of Western societies, and neoliberal high priests declared the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1992) and the ‘clash of civilisations’ (Huntington, 1996). The Hegelian notion of linear history is that it reaches its zenith with the final construction of the perfect state and is propelled by the struggle of opposites. Fukuyama’s claim, therefore, was informed by his conviction that history had been driven by the struggle between liberal democracy and communism; and with the demise of the Soviet Union and state socialism, the triumph of one world order had been secured. For Huntington, on the other hand, the struggle of the political and ideological would be replaced by the struggle of civilisations, with a clash between Western civilisation and Islam. Neoconservatives in the USA took this literally in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA, and declared war on Islam.

Post-Cold War and post-conflict neoliberal interventionist PBSB has attempted to shape and reshape African societies in the Western mould of societal formation. The contemporary global order is to be refashioned along Western lines (Andrieu, 2010; Badie, 2000). Instead of bringing peace, however, this neoli...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• 1 Introduction: understanding peacebuilding and statebuilding in the era of neoliberalism
• 2 Neoliberal peacebuilding and statebuilding
• 3 Popular progressive peacebuilding and statebuilding
• 4 State emancipation and societal pacification as prerequisites for peacebuilding
• 5 Statebuilding and peacebuilding: harmony and discordance
• 6 Conclusion: summary and highlights
• Index