Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era Pbdirect

Regime and Elites; Conflict and Collaboration

Mordechai Abir

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000156027
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Economics
• Subtopic: Economic History
• Index: Economics

Saudi Arabia has undergone a rapid social and economic transformation. When Ibn Saud declared the nation a unified kingdom in 1932, the majority of its population was nomadic and lived in a state of poverty or semi-poverty. Now the processes of modernisation, financed by the exploitation of the country's vast oil reserves, have produced a prosperous and predominantly urban population. However, this social change has not been without its tensions; the emergence of a rising middle class has called into question the monopoly of power of the House of Saud, its involvement in the kingdom's economy and its oil and foreign policy, while the rapid urbanisation of the rural population has eroded the traditional social structures and has not solved, but in some cases promoted, social division. This book, first published in 1988, explores the recent history of the Saudi oil state in an analysis of the struggle for social and political power in modern Saudi Arabia.

Part One

Ruling Class and Elites in Saudi Arabia

1

The Consolidation of the Ruling Class in Saudi Arabia*

The Saudi population at the beginning of the twentieth century could be considered, with some exceptions, a classless society: there was no upper class to speak of in Arabia at the time. Only a small proportion of the merchants and the ulama in the towns of Hijaz and Najd could be described as ‘middle class’. The great majority of the Arabians — townspeople as well as the rural nomads and agriculturalists — lived at or near subsistence level. The unification of the Saudi kingdom by Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud in the first decades of the century consolidated the power and authority of a new Saudi ruling class — the aristocracy. The development of the kingdom’s oil industry since 1938 and the modernisation of Saudi Arabia after World War II, produced, moreover — in addition to existing regional and other differences — new classes and a relatively rigid social structure. The latter depends not so much on power, wealth and education as on affiliation to the ruling family and on regional (Najd), tribal (noble) and urban or rural origin and citizenship. This chapter will examine the evolution and composition of the Saudi aristocracy and whether it has changed in recent decades, under the impact of rapid modernisation and the rise of new elites.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE SAUDI RULING CLASS

The reconquest of Riyadh in January 1902 is considered in Saudi annals as the beginning of the modern Saudi kingdom. The small army of Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud was composed at the time of a few score brothers, uncles, cousins, other relatives and in-laws and some Bedouin followers. During this crucial stage, Abdallah ibn Jiluwi was said to have twice saved the life of his ‘cousin’ Abd al-Aziz (henceforth also Ibn Saud). Subsequently, the Jiluwi family, a cadet branch of Al Saud,¹ gained a key position in the kingdom’s ruling class. Such a development is typical of considerations which influenced the formation of that class in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, all of Ibn Saud’s partners in the conquest of Riyadh, as well as members of his and other important families who helped him in the consolidation of his kingdom in the first decades of the century, were incorporated into the Saudi aristocracy². At their side, the ulama led by Al al-Shaykh (the descendants of Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabiyya), and important tribal and regional umara (singular ‘amir) who joined Ibn Saud‘s camp at this stage also won a preferential status and can be considered part of the Saudi ruling class.

Ibn Saud continued to expand his powerbase by numerous matrimonial alliances with traditional regional rulers and important tribal shaykhs (umara)³. As a Muslim, he was limited to four wives but, acording to custom, he could frequently divorce them and marry others whose offspring were regarded as part of the royal family. Thus he incorporated into his regime an important element of the regional and tribal umara. Most significant, however, was his affiliation with the powerful Sudayris of northern Arabia, who had intermarried with the Sauds in the past.

Contrary to the Wahhabi-Saudi ‘holy war’ (or jihad) of previous centuries, Ibn Saud’s military campaigns were not aimed at spreading the Wahhabiyya in the conquered areas but rather at reestablishing the authority of the House of Saud. The historical alliance between the Najdi ulama, at the head of which were Al al-Shaykh and the House of Saud, led by Ibn Saud, had not been automatically reinstated this time. The Najdi ulama viewed Ibn Saud’s government with reservation, if not with suspicion. Some, who lived under the protection of other Wahhabi rulers even supported his enemies. Eventually, however, most of the Najdi ulama agreed to recognise the authority of the young ruler, only on condition that, at least temporarily, his father, Abd al-Rahman, would carry the title of imam.

Relations between Ibn Saud and the Wahhabi ulama were also somewhat soured by the fact that, in this period, they did not regard Ibn Saud as sufficiently pious. He toyed with technological innovations which they considered heretical innovation (a bid‘a). He did not conduct jihads against the polytheists (mushrikun) in the region, and he was known to associate with the British infidel authorities in the Persian Gulf.⁴

The cementing of the relationship between Al Saud and Al al-Shaykh through matrimonial arrangements, and the preferential treatment accorded to the religious hierarchy, undoubtedly contributed to the improvement of relations between the king and the majority of the urban Najdi ulama. Moreover, in order to establish a loyal military force to carry out his plans and overcome the natural opposition of Bedouin tribes to law and order, about 1912 Ibn Saud revived, or took under his patronage, the Ikhwan movement. Ulama volunteers (muttawwa‘in⁵), some of tribal origin, were sent to teach the Bedouin the principles of the Wahhabiyya, and land and funds were apportioned for their settlement. By 1930 this movement had led to the settlement of approximately 150,000 Bedouin in over 200 military-agricultural villages (hujar).⁶

After 1913 as the Ikhwan armies were principally responsible for Ibn Saud’s conquests including Jabal Shammar, the Hijaz and Asir, they became the mainstay of his regime. As a result the importance of the tribal umara and the muttawwa‘in who settled in the hujar, and the Najdi ulama in general, rapidly increased.

Thereafter Ibn Saud appeared to follow the Wahhabi code of behaviour more strictly, and frequently consulted the ulama and the Ikhwan leaders on different issues. But, as he became more dependent on them, the leading tribal umara, some of whom had been Ibn Saud’s bitter enemies in the first decade of the century, and the more fanatic ulama, exploited their new leverage to coerce their imam to accept their extreme interpretation of the Wahhabiyya and their right to intervene in the running of the kingdom. Although the attitude of the Ikhwan leaders increasingly infuriated Ibn Saud’s lieutenants, the Saudi ruler chose to overlook the Ikhwan’s excesses in order to avoid an open breach with them.

After World War I, Ibn Saud accelerated his efforts to establish a united centralised kingdom in the Arabian Peninsula. For this purpose he planned to introduce aspects of modern administration and western technology which he considered essential for effective government and not contradictory to the principles of Islam.⁷ Moreover, aware of the political realities in the region, he coordinated his activities as much as possible, with the British government and its local representatives.

Abd al-Aziz’s policies were anathema to the Ikhwan and to most of the Najdi ulama. Their traditional xenophobia had been whipped up by British activities in the region and they also regarded Ibn Saud’s internal policies as a betrayal of Wahhabi doctrine. The fact that the ruler had also begun to consolidate his dynastic rule and had taken to himself, instead of the traditional title of the Amir of Najd, the title of ‘Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies’ (1921) and later (1926) ‘King of the Hijaz’ only added fuel to the fire.⁸ Indeed, both tribal shaykhs and the ulama, especially those connected to the Ikhwan, were convinced that time was working against them and if they were not to stop Ibn Saud, or at least limit his authority, they would be incapable of doing so in the future.

The Ikhwan rebellion (1927–30)⁹ was thus not only a challenge to Ibn Saud’s policy but also a desperate attempt on the part of the leading Ikhwan amirs and some fanatic ulama allied with them to preserve their power and the traditional socio-political frameworks from which they derived it. Ibn Saud’s final victory over the Ikhwan in 1929–30, and the consolidation of the power of the Saudi state thereafter by establishing a national army and a centralised administration, deprived the tribal shaykhs and the ulama of the power to intervene, on their own initiative, in the conduct of state affairs.

CENTRALISATION AND THE DECLINE OF NON-ROYAL TRADITIONAL ELITES

There are about 50 senior tribal amirs and a few hundred shaykhs (umara) of secondary tribes and sub-tribes in Saudi Arabia.¹⁰ The power and authority of these amirs has been gradually declining since 1930 as the power and authority of the Saudi kingdom and its government were consolidated and its administration expanded. The foundations for the Bedouin ‘White Army’ (later the National Guard) were laid by 1930, a...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Tables
• Abbreviations
• Dedication
• Preface and Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• Part I: Ruling Class and Elites in Saudi Arabia
• Part II: Modernisation and Struggle for Political Reform
• Bibliography
• Index