Social Inequality in Post-Growth Japan

Transformation during Economic and Demographic Stagnation

David Chiavacci, Carola Hommerich

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317245339
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Sciences sociales
• Subtopic: Études ethniques

In recent decades Japan has changed from a strongly growing, economically successful nation regarded as prime example of social equality and inclusion, to a nation with a stagnating economy, a shrinking population and a very high proportion of elderly people. Within this, new forms of inequality are emerging and deepening, and a new model of Japan as 'gap society' ( kakusa shakai ) has become common-sense. These new forms of inequality are complex, are caused in different ways by a variety of factors, and require deep-seated reforms in order to remedy them. This book provides a comprehensive overview of inequality in contemporary Japan. It examines inequality in labour and employment, in welfare and family, in education and social mobility, in the urban-rural divide, and concerning immigration, ethnic minorities and gender. The book also considers the widespread anxiety effect of the fear of inequality; and discusses how far these developments in Japan represent a new form of social problem for the wider world.

Part I

Introduction

1 After the banquet

New inequalities and their perception in Japan since the 1990s

David Chiavacci and Carola Hommerich

For decades, Japan considered itself a homogeneous middle-class society of economic equity and equal opportunity. However, in the last two decades, Japan has entered a new era of post-growth. After the burst of huge speculation bubbles in real estate and stock markets in the early 1990s, Japan turned suddenly from a success story of growth into an economic problem case of enduring stagnation. Moreover, the still young and growing Japanese population of the late 1980s transformed into the oldest national population worldwide in less than two decades, marked by shrinkage and a total fertility rate far below replacement level. This economic and demographic stagnation has led to structural changes and a completely new self-image of Japan as a ‘gap society’ (kakusa shakai) with increasing differentiation and new forms of social exclusion.

The notion of Japan as an unequal society emerged as the result of and in conjunction with empirical research and academic controversies. As the increase of economically vulnerable groups is hard to miss, there is a general consensus amongst social scientists that inequality has increased, but to what degree has been fiercely debated. Some see fundamental structural changes that led to a turning point in Japan’s development (Allison 2013; Kariya 2001, 2013; Miura 2005; Satō 2000; Tachibanaki 1998; Yamada 2004). Others identify only limited change and claim that Japan never was as egalitarian as often assumed (Hara and Seiyama 2005; Ishida 2001; Ishida and Miwa 2011; Ōtake 2005; Sato 2007; Seiyama et al. 2011). In politics, new disparities were first ignored, and it is only since 2006 that topics of social inequality have made it onto the political agenda. Public discourse, on the other hand, is dominated by vociferous critique of increasing inequality (BSH 2006; Chiavacci 2008). In recent years, the shift in self-perceptions has triggered reactions by social and – lately also – political actors (Chiavacci 2010; Hommerich 2012; Sato and Imai 2011).

After more than a decade of social science research into these phenomena, we believe that it is time to take stock. The goal of this book is to paint a comprehensive picture of social inequality in present-day Japan by differentiating and analysing five dimensions of social inequality, which are especially relevant in the Japanese context: (1) labour market and employment system; (2) welfare state and family; (3) education and social mobility; (4) rural vs. urban divide; and (5) immigration and ethnic minorities. A sixth dimension, underlying all others and equally important, is gender.

For each inequality dimension transformations are addressed at three levels: (a) developments and changes in social structures of inequality; (b) new discourses about and changed framings of inequality; and (c) (re-)actions and adaptations by social actors at various societal levels. To provide a general backdrop to our story, we start with a short overview of the socio-economic changes that Japan has undergone over the past three decades and illustrate their perception in Japan.

From role model to problem case: Post-growth Japan

Up to the early 1990s, Japan was regarded as a role model of economic dynamism and equality. The World Bank (1993) praised it for spearheading the ‘East Asian miracle’ of high growth and successful economic development based on social equality. Japan was regarded as a prime example of shared growth in East Asia, in which a developmental state and business leaders not only activated workers for fast economic expansion, but in which economic and political elites were also prepared to share the fruits of this hard work with the general population. As part of developmentalism, Japan’s welfare state and social security programs were very small. Social inclusion and well-being of the population was not achieved through redistribution and social protection, but by high growth and fast increasing productivity. Researchers identified this developmental or productivist welfare state model as an additional type of welfare capitalism to Esping-Anderson’s ground-breaking typology of ‘Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism’ (1990) and as a common feature in fast developing economies in East Asia (Choi 2013; Holliday 2000; Kwon 2005). The result of Japan’s developmentalism and shared growth seemed impressive. Many comparative studies of the 1970s and 1980s suggested that Japan was an exemplary case of equality in opportunities and in outcome when compared to Western industrial societies (Boltho 1975; Bornschier 1988; Dore 1987; Galtung 1971; Reischauer 1977; Sawyer 1976; Vogel 1979). This view was also shared in Japan: for decades, it considered itself as not only an ethnically, but also a socially homogeneous society of economic equity and equal opportunity. The strong self-perception as a ‘general middle-class society’ (sōchūryū shakai) summed up this view of Japan as a society that rewarded personal effort and hard work with upward mobility and in which wealth and income were distributed fairly. From the 1970s onwards, this model of Japan became prescriptive as the ‘Japanese way of life’ (Chiavacci 2007: 41–45). Takehiko Kariya (1995: i) summarizes the ideal male life course of the salaryman (sararīman), a white-collar worker in a large corporation or public service, as follows:

One attends a first-class juku [private cram school], passes through first-class middle and high schools and enters a top university. If one has achieved this, then one can enter a first-class company and have a happy life. Good education → good job → fulfilled life. In the Japanese post-war society this success story has been drummed into the people and spread as a life plan into every last corner of society.

Thanks to the meritocratic school system, every man, independent of his social origin, was believed to be able to realize this ideal if he studied and worked hard enough. The ideal life course for women – equally embedded in the ‘general middle-class society’ – was based on strongly separated gender roles (Gordon 2005; Ochiai 2003; Osawa 2002): women were expected to marry a successful salarīman and stay at home as an ‘education mother’ (kyōiku mama), responsible for the academic success of the children. Consequently, from the 1960s until the end of the 1980s, standard Japanese life course patterns were ‘emblematic of a culture of security’ (Brinton 2011: 18), allowing men and women to attain stability and success in their daily lives and to feel fully incorporated into Japan’s success story.

Collapse of ‘general middle-class society’: The end of social upgrading

In the late 1980s, Japan appeared to be the realization of an ideal case of growth and equality. It not only seemed the leading goose of the Asian flock of fast industrializing economies, but was even regarded as a model case of equity and growth, which Western industrial countries should emulate (Dore 1987; Vogel 1979). This success story, however, came to a sudden end in the late 1990s, mainly due to two parallel developments.

First, economic growth turned into economic stagnation. In the early 1990s, the burst of speculation bubbles in the stock and real estate markets led to a sudden economic downturn after the spectacular growth of the years before (Figure 1.1). Just as the Japanese economy seemed to have recovered from the burst of the bubble economy in the mid-1990s, a strong recession hit Japan, which was followed by poor growth up to 2002. The years from 1992 to 2002 came to be known as the ‘lost decade’ (ushinawareta jūnen) (Genda 2005: x). Japan, the former star of growth and economic dynamism, had turned into a problem case of stagnation.

Figure 1.1 Japan’s real GDP growth, 1985–2014.

Source: CAO (2015: 221).

Second, a fundamental demographic change in Japan marked the 1990s. Japan turned into a demographically stagnating and hyper-ageing society (Coulmas et al. 2008). The success story of post-war economic growth had also, among other factors, been promoted by the demographic dividend of a young and expanding population. Japan’s proportion of elderly people aged 65 or older was among the lowest in fully industrialized societies in the late 1980s. However, due to Japan’s late and very fast demographic transition, the speed of ageing since 1970 has been much faster than in Western industrialized countries (OECD 2009). Over the short time span of about 15 years from the late 1980s to the mid-2000s, Japan converted from being the youngest advanced industrial society into being the demographically oldest society worldwide (Figure 1.2). During the same period, Japan’s overall population started to stagnate and its total fertility rate (TFR) continued to fall well below long-term reproduction (MIAC 1984–2015). Hence, during the so-called ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s, Japan was not only confronted with a fundamental economic slowdown, but also had to face a huge demographic challenge as its young, dynamic society was transformed into an old, stagnating one.

Figure 1.2 Proportion of elderly population (aged 65 and older), 1950–2014.

Source: OECD Statistics, http://www.oecd.org/std.

It was only in the late 1990s that these two fundamental structural transformations led to a re-evaluation of Japan’s assumed exceptional degree of equality. Mainly two studies triggered an academic and public debate on new and rising inequalities in Japan: economist Tachibanaki (1998) claimed a sharp increase in household income inequality between 1980 and 1992; sociologist Satō’s (2000) research on social mobility patterns described Japan’s transformation into a closed society in which status attainment depends more on social background than on individual achievement. Both studies were criticized on the grounds of the data used and methodological aspects (Hara and Seiyama 2005; Hashimoto 2001; Ōtake 2000; Seiyama 2000). Considering the complexity of the analysis of income data and the restrictions of intergenerational survey data, however, it is hard to pass judgment. In any case, the two works became best-sellers, leading to a broad discussion of ‘new’ disparities, the collapse of the meritocratic school system and the social role of elites, and prompting numerous publications on the topic – both scientific and journalistic (BSH 2000; CKH 2001; Hashimoto 2001; Kanomata 2001; Kariya 2001; Miyajima and RSSKK 2002) – some of which confirmed new and rising inequalities since the early 1990s and started to declare the end of Japan’s ‘general middle-class society’.

In fact, a number of empirical studies had already questioned the model of Japan as a ‘general middle-class society’ earlier (Azuma 1994; Higuchi 1994; Ishida 1993; Ishizaki 1983; Tachibanaki and Yagi 1994). Why, then, did the studies of Tachibanaki (1998) and Satō (2000) cause such a stir, while earlier studies had hardly been taken up in public debate? Their publication coincided with a new zeitgeist, which gained momentum in the context of reform debates and matched actual experiences of the middle classes in their lifeworld (Chiavacci 2008). The ‘golden years’ of economic expansion and fast growth had come to an abrupt end in the early 1990s, but it took several years for the experience to sink in. A short growth period in the mid-1990s seemed to indicate that Japan had quickly overcome the collapse of its bubble economy (Figure 1.1). In 1998, however, Japan’s economy fell back into a full recession and many countries in East Asia were hit by capital flight and a currency crisis. Not only Japan, as the leading goose, but the whole East Asian model seemed to be disintegrating.

At the same time, Japan’s demographic transformation gained new public attention. In 1997, revised population prognoses by Japan’s National Institute of Population and Social Security Research predicted that the stark decrease in Japan’s TFR of recent years was by no means a temporary phenomenon, but would, in fact, turn into a long-term trend (Schoppa 2006: 152–153). Not only hyper-ageing, but also very low birth rates and population decline had by now become undeniable facts. Quite suddenly, Japan had transformed from a seemingly unstoppable model of dynamism and growth into a country marked by long-term stagnation and decline.

While Japan’s and East Asia’s model of shared growth ran into a fundamental crisis, the US and its liberal economy returned to a path of economic growth, success and innovation after years of problems and decline. In view of these diametrical developments, influential pundits and important politicians in Japan called for structural reforms and deregulation à la US (Nakatani 1996; KSK 1999; Watanabe 2001). One central goal of these reform efforts was to overcome ‘bad equality’ (akubyōdō), which was identified as a hurdle to Japan’s comeback (Nakatani 1997: 400):

The Japanese must realize the need to replace the post-war emphasis on egalitarianism with a more balanced vision recognizing the importance of fair competition for the sake of increasing efficiency. That is, Japan cannot be efficient and remain competitive in the world market if it continues to be preoccupied with the equality of outcomes seen in the overemphasis on the distribution of income. Egalitarianism, which l...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• List of Contributors
• Part I Introduction
• Part II Creation of inequality and its perception in Japan
• Part III Labour market and employment system
• Part IV Welfare state and family
• Part V Education and social mobility
• Part VI Urban-rural divide
• Part VII New immigration and ethnic minorities
• Part VIII Conclusion
• Index