Policy narratives for a sustainable economy
There are currently two predominant perspectives on transitioning to a sustainable economy and society: pro-growth and no-growth. These perspectives differ fundamentally in their views on the possibility of combining economic growth with sustainability. According to the pro-growth perspective, absolute decoupling between environmental impacts and economic growth can be achieved through investment in green innovation and technology and by regulating polluting technologies and by changes in environmental behaviour. The economy can continue to function much as it does today, as policies for meeting sustainability challenges make market forces compatible with ecological concerns. The no-growth perspective argues that sustainability requires social and economic relations of production and consumption that can secure stable throughput of materials, and energy that is capable of providing welfare within ecologically determined limits, and that this, in turn, requires zero economic growth. While the pro-growth perspective suggests âa reconfiguration of the current global economyâ, the no-growth perspective âimplies a total transformation of the global economic systemâ (Urhammer and Røpke, 2013: 62).
Casting a wide net, Urhammer and Røpke conducted a discourse analysis of green macroeconomic narratives, based on policy documents from leading international organizations and associated research literature. Within the pro-growth perspective, they distinguish between âgreen growthâ and âgreen economyâ narratives, represented by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2011a, 2011b) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP, 2011), respectively. They share a positive view on the possibilities of combining economic growth with long-term ecological sustainability, while they differ on issues such as government intervention and poverty reduction. Four distinct no-growth narratives are identified: the great transition (New Economics Foundation, NEF, 2010), prosperity without growth (Sustainable Development Commission, see Jackson, 2009), steady-state economy (Centre for the Advancement of the Steady State Economy, CASSE, see Dietz and OâNeill, 2013) and degrowth (see Assadourian, 2012; Martinez Alier, 2009; Kallis, 2011). Although they differ in some respects, they share an underlying critique of economic growth and seek to achieve similar systemic change.
Urhammer and Røpke relate a diverse set of policies and measures advocated by each perspective, bringing these together under the two main directions of pro-growth and no-growth. We build on this work, focusing our analysis of policy measures into five spheres: mitigation and technology development, financial and business sector, distribution of income and wealth, labour and work, and consumption. Policies of the pro-growth and no-growth perspectives are presented below and summarized in Table 5.1.
Of these five spheres, policies for mitigation and technology development appear to be those about which there is most consensus across pro-growth and no-growth perspectives. Both perspectives call for price-based instruments (taxes, cap and trade) and more specific technology policies (subsidies, public procurement, favourable loans), but weigh these differently. The OECD emphasizes market-based instruments, which are deemed most cost effective and least intrusive on markets (OECD, 2011b); other instruments can be necessary but should be used with care. The UNEP presents a more balanced focus on market-based instruments and more active government intervention, signalling the view that market mechanisms are not sufficient to secure green transition (UNEP, 2011). No-growth perspectives also emphasize the need for measures such as taxes, cap and trade and green technology incentives, but place this in the context of the need for much more fundamental change. A common view among no-growth proponents is that there should be scientifically determined caps on emissions and on the use of natural resources, and that these should be distributed equally among citizens (Jackson, 2009; Kallis et al., 2012; Dietz and OâNeill, 2013).
Consistent with ascribing leading roles in green transitioning to private enterprise and finance capital, pro-growth perspectives argue that the substantial financial resources required for transitioning should come primarily from private funding. From this perspective, the main challenge is redirecting financial flows towards green investment. The UNEP report, for instance, refers to the last two decades as an era of âgross misallocation of capitalâ, financial investments pouring âinto property, fossil fuels and structured financial assets with embedded derivativesâ and relatively little into ârenewable energy, energy efficiency, public transportation, sustainable agriculture, ecosystem and biodiversity protection, and land and water conservationâ (UNEP, 2011: 14). Suggested policy measures include green bonds, publicâprivate partnerships and concessionary financing (OECD, 2011b; UNEP, 2011). Measures are limited to enabling and facilitating, while more direct control over and the regulation of financial resources and activities are not considered. The strong regulation of property rights, however, is considered essential for resource efficiency. âUndefinedâ or âincomplete property rightsâ (OECD, 2011a: 27, 29) and âlack of full property rightsâ are seen as barriers to green growth, and there are calls for âdevelopment of property rightsâ to facilitate the âemergence of green property as an asset classâ (UNEP), thereby providing financial institutions with incentives to invest in âresponsible propertyâ (UNEP, 2011: 97, 139, 596, 362).
No-growth perspectives see the current financial system as a root cause of ecological problems. Debt-fuelled economic growth, driven by a financial sector swelling well beyond the productive capacities of the âreal economyâ (production of goods and services), is seen as underpinning unsustainable resource extraction and exploitation of what ecological economists call the âreal-real economyâ â flows of energy and materials (Kallis et al., 2009; Martinez Alier, 2009). Policies proposed from this perspective include measures to regulate finance (e.g. state monopoly on money creation, taxes on financial transactions, barriers to tax evasion in tax havens) and to design a financial system conducive to a steady-state or no-growth economy in the long run. Another focus of no-growth policies is on supporting alternative business models such as cooperatives and non- or low-profit liability companies (see Chapter 10) and strengthening legal and institutional conditions to support alternatives to private property, such as communal property, land trusts and other forms of commons (Kallis et al., 2012; Bollier, 2003, 2014).
Pro-growth narratives include discussion on the need to address the distributional impacts of policies that adversely affect the poor. However, distribution of income and wealth is not seen as an essential issue for green transition. Adverse impacts on distribution are best addressed by general tools such as lower income tax, tax credits and social benefits (OECD, 2011b: 25). Reducing poverty is a major goal for the UNEP, claiming that âpro-poor orientation must be superimposed on any green economy initiativeâ (UNEP, 2011: 20). The focus is on poverty eradication, and there is little recognition of the wider issues and impacts associated with inequalities.
This contrasts starkly with no-growth perspectives, which see policies geared to equalizing distribution of income and wealth as crucial to a sustainable economy. In order to curtail growth, it is necessary to establish incentive structures that limit concentrations of wealth and gaps in income. No-growth is seen as necessitating a more egalitarian sharing of resources. Extensive research suggests that more equal societies fare better than unequal societies across a broad register of variables associated with welfare and with sustainability (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). Suggested policies include classical social democratic measures such as redistributive taxes, as well as more radical measures such as basic income, maximum income and maximum pay differentials (Jackson, 2009; Dietz and OâNeill, 2013).
In the pro-growth perspective, labour and work policies focus mainly on how to prepare labour markets for changes brought about by the transition to a green economy, whereby some jobs are lost and others are created. Flexible labour markets are considered important. Policies are geared for labour market inclusiveness (e.g. re-employment support, vocational training), labour market dynamism (e.g. moderate employment protection and labour taxes, strong product market competition) and adapting workforce skills (e.g. new skills in education) (OECD, 2011b).
No-growth perspectives acknowledge the major challenge of maintaining full employment in a steady-state economy. Channelling gains from technological progress and increasing efficiency and productivity of labour towards reducing work time â rather than increasing wages and profits â facilitates work sharing, a key policy for reducing unemployment. Another policy is that the state should be the employer of last resort in order to reduce labour insecurities (Dietz and OâNeill, 2013). This is linked to the proposal for a guaranteed basic income. No-growth narratives seek to redefine the meaning of work and advocate less division between paid and non-paid work.
Regarding consumption, pro-growth perspectives emphasize policies for changing consumer behaviour towards reduced wastefulness, for example more energy-efficient appliances and transport modes with lower emissions. Again, price-based measures in combination with softer policies such as labelling, information and education are the main policies on the agenda for ensuring that consumption stays within the limits of sustainability (OECD, 2011b; UNEP, 2011).
No-growth perspectives see substantial reductions in material consumption in rich countries as necessary, especially in view of the prospect of these consumption patterns on the global scale. Lorek and Fuchs (2013) distinguish between weak and strong sustainable consumptio...