Croatia and the European Union

Changes and Development

Pero Maldini,Davor Paukovi?

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317156963
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The accession of Croatia to the EU marked the end of a long and arduous period of transition. Croatia had to meet significantly higher criteria than previous states with suspicion and concerns among existing members about further enlargement increasing. Meanwhile initially strong public support in Croatia declined as inconsistencies in EU policy, entry criteria and problems caused by the economic crisis all combined with fears about the loss of national identity and the ability to realize national interests. The successful Croatian accession to the EU in 2013 shows that, despite concerns on both sides, the EU continues to have meaning and significance and that membership remains highly desirable. Through nine mutually interrelated chapters the contributors speak not only about the political and social situation in Croatia, but also prospects for the European Union itself.

Chapter 1
Croatian Accession to the European Union: EU Democratization Potential and Issues of Democratic Consolidation

Pero Maldini

Introduction

Since the establishment of an independent Croatian state, the policy of accession to the EU is one of the few having general political consensus among most of the political parties—particularly the leading ones which mainly articulated it—in spite of their differences and rivalry. At the same time, the citizens’ mostly pro-European orientation during that period had its ups and downs, depending on the articulation of pro-European policy in Croatia, and on the perception of the EU based on the activities of its institutions, especially those concerning Croatia. With the accession of Croatia to the EU, a major political and social goal was accomplished. However, it remains questionable how (and how much) the accession process has influenced the consolidation of democracy and social development in Croatia. The problem of the noticeable cleavage between formal and substantive democracy is a serious one; it questions the democratization potential of the EU enlargement policy, and consequently the very meaning of joining the European Union.

In this context, however, the question arises as to whether the fulfillment of the specified requirements for full membership in the EU also means the completion of the process of democratic transition, i.e. the realization of a consolidated (substantive) democracy, or is it merely a formal normative-institutional compliance with the European acquis communautaire as a standardized set of requirements. In other words, does the accession to the EU have a significant democratizing dimension (a part of the already implied normative-institutionalism), especially in relation to the development of socio-structural and sociocultural prerequisites of the substantive democracy in post-transitional societies, such as a vibrant civil society, civic culture, political participation, and a developed public sphere—factors which, in developed democracies, allow a citizen’s voice and participation, and function as mechanisms for limiting and controlling the political power?

This chapter attempts to analyze this complex problem from three viewpoints. The first refers to the crisis of democracy in post-transitional societies of the EU, which is primarily a consequence of the incomplete democratic (socio-structural and sociocultural) consolidation of those societies. The second refers to the crisis of democracy in the old, well-established democracies; mostly a consequence of globalization and the implementation of the neoliberal doctrine on political processes (post-democracy). The third viewpoint refers to democratic deficits in the functioning of the EU itself, manifested both in the insufficient representativeness and the insufficient abilities of democratic control over the operation of the EU political institutions, the non-transparent process of making political decisions, and consequently their insufficient legitimacy. On one hand, those problems undermine the credibility and attractiveness of the EU, and bring into question its democratizing potential. On the other hand, the exemplar of Croatia joining the EU, despite many problems on the way and in the midst of a serious crisis of EU functionality, indicates that the desirability of membership in the Union is still present, as is the perspective of democracy, welfare, and security which it can provide to its member states.

Still, the question remains as to whether the EU enlargement policy is motivated primarily by the impetus of democratization, or the economic and political interests of its most developed members. The accession of all new member states, including Croatia, was preceded by the process of accepting and implementing the acquis, i.e. the process of adapting the national institutional-normative and economic market structure to the one in the EU, while the problems of socio-structural and sociocultural adaptation (which follow neither linearly nor necessarily the process of formal adaptation) were left as secondary.

Hence, the main focus of this chapter is an examination of the reaches of the European model of democratization through integration using the example of the accession of post-communist countries to the EU, Croatia in particular. Special attention is paid to the level of democratic consolidation, as well as to aspects of democracy in the EU. The starting point for this analysis is the distinction between a formal and substantive democracy, and with a particular reason. The level of democracy is manifested primarily in the scope of realization of fundamental democratic values, particularly civil rights and liberties, political participation, and the possibility of effective control over the political authorities (the government’s responsibility and dependence on the voters) (Dahl, 1971; Diamond, 1999; Merkel, 2004; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Since these characteristics of modern democracy in particular are threatened, one can speak of its crisis (Crouch, 2004; Stoker, 2006; Wolin, 2008). Within the EU framework, it manifests itself as a crisis of political representation, of legitimacy, and a crisis of functioning—both at the level of nation-state and level of EU institutions (Habermas, 2011, 2012; Cipek, 2007).

From the viewpoint of democratization of Croatian society, this chapter attempts to show the constraints of the EU enlargement policy and its limited democratic potential. Although Croatia meets all criteria for a formal democracy, it seems that it does not possess sufficient capacities (both as a state and society) to achieve substantive democracy, and to be able to cope with the challenges brought on by the new, European framework. It is even more pronounced at present (2015), with the recent socioeconomic crisis bringing into question the democratic legitimacy of the EU system, and with democratic deficits visible even in its oldest member states.

Democratic Deficits and their Origins

The ambiguity of the term “democracy” stems primarily from different understandings of the extent to which the idea of democracy has been realized (Parry and Moran, 1994, p. 3; Dahl, 1971, pp. 2–4; Maldini, 2008, pp. 30–35). At the inception of the modern liberal democracy Tocqueville pointed out its two original meanings: first, democracy as a political order defined by rule of the people through institutions and procedure, and second, democracy as a society characterized by equality and civil rights, wide political participation, and autonomous action by citizens in order to bridge hierarchical mediation when regulating relations in a society (Tocqueville, 2001). The second meaning implies a societal prerequisite of democracy and suggests that it cannot be reduced to its formal, institutional aspect. A formal “electoralist” approach to democracy (postulated by transitional theory, optimistically predicting development of democracy on that basis) is therefore not suited for a qualitative analysis of democracy. The problems of democratic transition of post-authoritarian societies have specifically pointed out the danger of making this reduction and the importance of actual democratic content.¹

Substantive democracy, however, is marked by general consensus, wide political participation, responsibility of the government, civil rights compliance, tolerance, and pluralism. It assumes a democratic process which has to continuously reproduce; regulating power relations in a way that maximizes the possibilities of individuals by enabling them to participate in discussions and influencing decisions. On that basis, formal democracy is distinct from substantive democracy. That distinction separates the institutional and procedural aspects from their implementation and the way they are practiced in actual social conditions (Schumpeter, 1976, p. 260; Dahl, 1971, p. 4; Diamond, 1996, pp. 21–4; Maldini, 2008, pp. 30–35; Kaldor and Vejvoda, 1997, pp. 62–3). There are multiple reasons for using this distinction: on one side, despite a large number of newly established democracies, a growing gap between electoral (formal) and liberal (substantive) democracy is evident, especially in post-transitional societies, or as Zakaria put: “Democracy is flourishing; liberty is not” (Zakaria, 2007, pp. 17–18). The consolidation and development of democracy in post-communist societies have shown themselves to be complex and prolonged, independent of their relatively fast political transformation and normative-institutional constitution of democracy. It turned out that “building a house is not the same as establishing a home” (Brzezinski, 1989, p. 2), i.e. the realization of democracy takes a lot more than just establishing institutions, and that it is a complex and comprehensive process of social transformation, like “rebuilding the ship at sea” (Elster, Offe, and Preuss, 1998).

Democratic deficits of post-communist societies therefore stem mainly from the gap between formal democracy and substantive democracy. Deep changes brought on by the transition have marked a strong discontinuity in the political and socioeconomic development of post-communist societies. In the conditions of a new and changed political structure, the inertia of sociocultural patterns and a pronounced influence of authoritarian political legacy have marked a continuity of old social values and the patterns of their respective political culture. That discrepancy between the political structure and the patterns of the dominant political culture is one of the main factors of the hampered democratization of post-communist societies (Beyme, 1996; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).

A consolidated democracy, therefore, means much more than a formal, political democracy. Along with the necessary normative-institutional structure, it includes a political-representative dimension (representativeness and legitimacy of the democratic government), socio-structural (developed and vital civil society), sociocultural (civil political culture and political support for the democratic order) and behavioral dimensions (political participation and action in accordance with fundamental values of democracy) upon which legitimacy and stability of the democratic regime can be built (Linz and Stepan, 1996a, 1996b; Merkel, 2004; Diamond, 1999).² It could be argued therefore that consolidation of democracy in post-communist societies presents a socio-structural modernization as much as a democratic re-socialization of society (Maldini, 2008).

On the other hand, democratic deficits of developed democracies are a consequence of domination of the neoliberal concept, i.e. the implementation of principles of economic (market) rationality on political discourse on issues of the political community, on political decision-making, and on functioning of state. Moreover, one could speak of post-democracy as a crisis of (neo)liberal democracy (Stoker, 2006, pp. 32–67, 68–85, 87–92; Crouch, 2004, pp. 1–52, 78–103; Wolin, 2008). Consequently, democracy in its classic sense (contestation about the public good) is transformed into a formal, representative political order which is putting aside the public good and the political deliberation of the community (Brown, 2005, pp. 40, 42).

These problems also affect the post-communist societies, and with their inherent problems further hamper their democratic consolidation. Post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe joining the EU is definitely an indicator of success of the democratization process, but is not necessarily a confirmation of consolidation of their democracies. On the other hand, there exists a series of indicators pointing to the fact that democratization of those countries and their integration in the common EU framework was led primarily by the political and economic interests of developed European states. The democratization of those countries seems to be realized just up to the point of their political and administrative compatibility with the developed part of the EU. From a political standpoint, it is primarily a matter of meeting the criteria of a formal democracy. The democratizing potential of EU accession policy therefore needs to be re-examined, as well as the level of democracy inside the EU itself, with an emphasis on the activity of its political institutions and the legitimacy of its political regime.

EU Enlargement Policy and Democratization: Its Reach and Limitations

The EU enlargement policy is undoubtedly the most important and perhaps the most successful instrument of democratization ever. By creating a specific political community, unprecedented in modern political history—by uniting nation-states into a politically and economically unified space—the EU strongly promotes democracy as a basis for political relations inside and outside its borders. That, in turn, forms its policy towards new member-states, which is based primarily on a partner-like relationship, instead of a hegemonic one. The process of the EU’s enlargement is not imposing EU interests upon the weak (at least not directly, and least of all forcefully), but is a gradual, voluntary, and democratic process with the explicit consent of the acceding states. Thus, European democratization through integration represents a unique model. Unlike some other models, which prefer a bottom-up approach, this model is based on a top-down approach which demands reforms led by governments through the process of adopting laws and work on their enforcement.³

In the formal sense, the basis of the EU enlargement policy was set by the European Council two decades ago, by the Copenhagen (political, economic, and legal) and Madrid (administrative) criteria, which define the level of democracy expected from candidate states (European Council, 1993, 1995). The meeting of these criteria was set as a prerequisite for their accession to the EU. Full membership and all its benefits represent a reward for meeting the criteria, with mechanisms to oversee and control the process provided. The goal was to equalize candidate countries according to uniform standards (formalized criteria) in order to enable them to access joining accession negotiations and to lessen the risks of possible political and economic instability of the new member-states, which might burden other EU countries (Balfour and Stratulat, 2011, pp. 6–7; Grabbe, 2006, pp. 10–11).

The main goal, however, is certainly democratization and Europeanization of candidate states. The two processes overlap, since Europeanization essentially means influence of the EU on other (non-member) states, which primarily assumes support for democratization processes. Europeanization—spanning from acceptance of European values to implementation of normative and institutional arrangements of the EU—is possible only in a stable and functioning democratic framework (Dolenec, 2008, pp. 25, 35). Europeanization means the process of joining the EU and also the much wider process of the “return to Europe” after the transition from authoritarian rule. It actually implies “EU-ization,” which means the meeting of accession requirements and the adoption of EU norms, policies, and institutional models that were strongly connected to the wider processes of modernization and post-communist transition. It also means a significant impact to domestic political structures and public policy change (Grabbe, 2006, p. 5).

The main instrument of the EU enlargement policy is the political (or democratic) conditionality. It manifests itself in the insistence on certain democratic standards as prerequisites for membership: the EU sets them as indispensable conditions to be met by the acceding states in order to attain full membership. Political (democratic) conditionality became especially prominent in the fifth round of EU enlargement, i.e. in the process of accession of post-communist countries of Central and Central-Eastern Europe. In that process, those countries have undergone a specific process of external incentives model of governance which includes massive policy transfer under which the candidate states have to transpose the full acquis communautaire (Pridham, 2002, pp. 954–9; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, pp. 670–71; Grabbe, 2006, pp. 86–8).

Political conditionality, acting on the principle of “carrot and stick,” is twofold. Positive conditionality includes the expected benefits, often in terms of delivery of economic and administrative assistance, and finally admission to the EU, in return for the fulfillment of required conditions—political, economic, and social reforms needed to meet the criteria. Negative conditionality includes a penalty in case a specific commitment has not been met (e.g. delaying the negotiations, and/or sanctions such as reducing, suspending or withdrawing a reward until the state complies with the criteria set by the EU). The influence to change the status quo is usually based on a strategy to provide incentives for the targeted actors to succeed in meeting the conditions. Thus the relationship between positive and negative conditionality is usually asymmetric since it aims to help a country to accept the required conditions, which can only succeed in situations in which the expected benefits are greater than the cost of political change. Its effectiveness thus varies with the credibility of EU conditionality and the domestic costs of reforms implementation, but also with the subjective perception of the EU’s relationship toward their country, both among the citizens and political elites (which is noticeable in the case of Croatia).

The problems of insufficient preparedness for EU membership which were shown with some countries from the fifth round of enlargement, mainly Romania and Bulgaria (problems related to the rule of law, corruption, and a weak judiciary), have indicated a need for adequate measures even after the attainment of full membership (monitoring, benchmarking, and a safeguard clause as negative conditionality policy tools to maintain pressure even after the accession), and have significantly tightened accession criteria for the new candidates. Croatia, as the next candidate, had substantially longer and more extensive negotiations, because the criteria set for Croatia during the negotiations were more demanding than for any prior country. Those criteria are now also set for all future candidates for EU membership. They will be in the spotlight in the forthcoming process of enlargement to the Western Balkan countries, where political conditionality will be especially apparent. On one hand, those countries are geographically surrounded by EU member-states, and the need to join the EU is quite understandable. On the other hand, they are non-consolidated democracies with serious democratic deficits (e.g. Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania), some ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures and Tables
• Notes on Contributors
• Introduction
• 1 Croatian Accession to the European Union: EU Democratization Potential and Issues of Democratic Consolidation
• 2 Democratic Deficits, Delayed Democratization and Prolonged EU Accession
• 3 The Discourse on Europe: From the Return to Europe and the Escape from the Balkans to the European Union as a Solution of All National Problems
• 4 Croatia between the “Return” to Europe and the “Remaining” in the Balkans
• 5 Public Support for European Integration in Croatia: Utilitarian, Identity-based, Institutionally Driven or All of the Above?
• 6 Remembering War the European Way: Croatia’s Commemorative Culture on the Eve of EU Membership
• 7 Contextual and Institutional Characteristics of Croatian Accession to the European Union
• 8 Transformation of the Croatian Party System in the Process of EU Accession
• 9 Transformation of the Croatian Security and Defense System in the Euro-Atlantic Context
• Index