European Security

The Roles of Regional Organisations

Bjørn Møller

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317139355
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Frieden & globale Entwicklung

Europe has undergone quite profound changes since the end of the Cold War. Having been a highly militarised, conflict-ridden and war-ridden region, the core of Europe today constitutes a security community where armed conflicts among the constituent states has become inconceivable. This comprehensive book offers a theoretically founded and thoroughly documented analysis of European security, with a special emphasis on the role played by the United Nations and the various regional and sub-regional organisations, especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the European Union. When it comes to explaining peace in Europe opinions differ widely. Some argue that it was only because the West refused to give in to Soviet threats that the latter eventually gave up; or that the 'long peace' in Europe was due to the combination of a bipolar alliance structure, pitting the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) against the Warsaw Pact, with the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides. Others point instead to the extraordinarily dense network of international institutions and organisations in Europe, offering a wide panoply of fora in which to handle disputes peacefully; or to the web of interdependence in economic and other affairs, tying together all states in Europe in relations which militate strongly against war. Still others believe that the external peace between the states in Europe is simply a reflection of a convergence of cultures, democracies with marked economies that are open towards the world market. These questions are the focal point of this book, which concentrates on security, albeit not in the sense of being a treatise on military matters, but security obtainable by much more indirect and non-military means. It will be required reading for all students and scholars of European security and the organisations which underpin it.

Chapter 1
The Concept of Security

As an academic term, ‘security’ was until fairly recently almost monopolised by the International Relations discipline (IR) which employed the term in quite a narrow sense, i.e. as almost synonymous with military power (Buzan and Hansen 2009). According to this simplistic logic, the more military power, or the more favourable the military balance, the more security.

Definition or Social Construction of ‘Security’?

Surprisingly little was, however, written about the concept of security (as opposed to presumed strategies for achieving it) by the IR theoreticians. In his seminal work on Realism, for instance, Hans Morgenthau thus hardly bothered to define the term at all. The closest he came to a definition was that ‘National security must be defined as integrity of the national territory and its institutions.’ (Morgenthau 1960: 562; cf. Scheuerman 2009). In another connection, he added ‘culture’ to the list, emphasising that the ‘survival of a political unit in its identity’ constitutes ‘the irreducible minimum, the necessary element of its interests vis-à-vis other units.’ (Morgenthau 1971: 219).

Arnold Wolfers was thus almost alone in venturing a definition, which has therefore become standard: ‘Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.’ (Wolfers 1952: 485). Even this definition leaves open a number of questions. Whose values might be threatened? What are these values? Who might attack them? By what means? Whose fears should count? How might one distinguish between sincere (albeit perhaps unfounded) fears and faked ones? And should the ‘absence’ of threats and/or fear be understood in absolute or relative terms? I shall return to most of these questions in due course.

In contrast to IR, peace researchers have for decades endeavoured to develop more meaningful conceptions of peace, security and violence – a preoccupation that also reflects their long-standing interest in development issues and a desire to break those bonds of ethnocentrism that have always characterised IR (Wæver 1999; Ayoob 1995). Both Johan Galtung’s term ‘positive peace’ (1969) and Kenneth Boulding’s ‘stable peace’ (1978) could thus, in retrospect, be seen as precursors of the emerging, expanded concept of security. For ‘security’ to be genuine and durable, it would have to be based on a positive or stable peace structure. This would entail considerably more than a mere ‘negative peace’, in its turn equated with an absence of war, representing merely one particular form of ‘direct violence’. Genuine peace and security would thus presuppose an elimination (or at least a reduction) of what Galtung called ‘structural violence’, i.e. the relative deprivation of large parts of the world population. Thus conceived, a ‘positive peace’ was more or less synonymous with what is today referred to as ‘human security’ (vide infra).

Belatedly, members of the IR community came to accept the challenge of developing broader conceptions of security. Barry Buzan and his collaborators at the now defunct Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) have belonged to the theoretical vanguard in this endeavour by virtue of their analyses of national as well as ‘societal’ security, to which we shall return in due course (Buzan 1983; 1991; Buzan et al. 1990; 1998; Wæver et al. 1993). However, while acknowledging the need for shifting the focus from the East–West conflict and military matters, most members of the ‘strategic studies’ (now often relabelled ‘security studies’) community have continued their rearguard battle against what they regard as an inappropriate expansion of the concept of security. Even though a consensus thus seems to be emerging on the need for a certain widening, disagreement persists about where to draw the line. To expand the notion of security too far – say, to include the absence of all types of problems – would merely create the need for an additional term for ‘traditional security’, now relegated to being merely one species of the genus ‘security’. Not to widen the concept at all, on the other hand, might relegate ‘security studies’ to a very marginalised position, if (as seems likely) traditional security problems will be perceived as having a sharply diminishing salience – at the very least as far as the West (or North) is concerned.

The quest for a ‘correct’ definition of an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Gallie 1955) such as ‘security’ is probably futile. Rather, this is a matter of definitions, which may be more or less useful or relevant, and which may both reflect and impact power relations, but which can be neither right nor wrong. The ‘constructivists’ within Political Science and IR are probably right in rejecting as futile the quest for concepts that are correct in the sense of corresponding to an objectively existing reality, if only because this reality is itself socially constructed, inter alia by means of concepts and theories (Berger and Luckman 1967; Pettman 2000; Wendt 1999; Huysmans 2002; Ruggie 1998b; Guzzini 2000). Thus conceived, ‘security’ or ‘insecurity’ are not properties of reality as such but inter-subjective phenomena, i.e. social constructions, which only become constituted as (social) reality when talked about. Mindful of being part of the game himself, what the analyst can do is merely to analyse how concepts are used, and how the security discourse is evolving (George 1994; Milliken 1999).

As argued by Ole Wæver and others the challenge is thus to analyse the security discourse as a complex ‘speech act’ or what Wittgenstein called a ‘language game’ (1963; cf. Austin 1962), i.e. to explore the evolving ‘securitisation’ and ‘desecuritisation’ of issues (Wæver 1995; 2010; Buzan et al. 1998; Stritzel 2007. See also Campbell 1998; Fierke 1998. For a critique see McSweeney 1996; 1999). Among other advantages, this approach may serve as a caveat against any mindless discursive transformation of problems into ‘security problems’, which inevitably has political implications, some of which may be undesirable.

First of all, to label something a security problem is a discursive move which lends itself to abuse. It may, for instance, be used by the powers that be – mainly, but not exclusively, in non-democratic states – to proclaim a controversial issue ‘taboo’, thus transforming political opponents into traitors (Vuori 2008; Wilkinson 2006). A matter with alleged national security implications is arguably off limits, i.e. not a totally legitimate subject for political or academic debate, but one where everybody has to ‘rally around the flag’ and show loyalty to the common cause. In order to prevent such a closure of important debates, a relevant political goal might be a ‘desecuritisation’ of pertinent issues, which may allow for a more open and fruitful debate. Secondly, certain strata in society may benefit from securitisation, e.g. because they are traditionally viewed as responsible for ‘security’, however defined. To securitise various problems may, for instance, provide the armed forces or other elements of the security sector with a justification for their claims on national resources, which may not be desirable as such claims can only be met at the expense of other parts of the state budget such as health or education – the perennial ‘guns versus butter’ controversy. ‘Critical security studies’ devote themselves, inter alia, to uncovering these interests and power games underlying the security discourse (Krause and Williams (eds) 1998; Jones 1999; Fierke 1998).

On the other hand, to proclaim something a security problem may certainly be justifiable, as it attaches a label of urgency to an issue. Hence the attraction of, for instance, securitising environmental problems, which is tantamount to elevating a problem to one of ‘existential’ importance. Unless solved without delay such a problem may destroy all other values, which warrants giving it absolute first priority:

‘Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics (…). ‘Security’ is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat. (…) The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization. (Buzan et al. 1998: 23–5)

In principle, anything may be securitised by anybody through a securitisation move (Vaughn 2009; Buzan and Wæver 2009), but whether this move will succeed depends on whether the audience accepts it or not – which in turn also depends on the ‘weight’ of the securitising actor (Balzaco 2005). As pointed out by Michel Foucault, knowledge and the ability to determine what is true is power:

Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enables one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.(…)

‘Truth’ is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. ‘Truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extends it. A ‘regime’ of truth. (Rabinow (ed.) 1991: 72–5)

Hence, the knowledge/power which an actor already possesses also determines the chances of his or her securitisation attempts. However, this power need not be political or economic, but can also reflect the social and cultural ‘capital’ of the actor (Bourdieu 1984: 412–54; cf. Maton 2008; Moore 2008; Jenkins 2002: 137–49; Lamont and Larau 1988; Anheier et al. 1995; Robbins 2005; Lizardo 2004), including the privileged access to the media and therefore to the minds and attention of the audience which a newspaper editor, a TV journalist or anchor-person, a renowned expert, or for that matter celebrities such as movie or rock stars usually enjoy. Especially if such actors form a network and constitute an ‘epistemic community’ (i.e. a group of people thinking alike), they will stand a good chance of succeeding in their securitisation attempt (Haas 1992; Adler and Haas 1992).

Not only can anybody take his or her chance as a securitising actor, but securitisation attempts can also pertain to any kind of threat to any referent object (see below), ranging from individuals to entities such as states and nations, civilisations or perhaps even such almost metaphysical phenomena as ‘freedom’ or ‘religion’. Even before proclaiming a ‘war on terror’ the United States thus had something of a tradition of proclaiming ‘wars’ against various phenomena – which is logically tantamount to securitisation – including drugs, crime, and even obesity (Elwood 1995; Witford and Yates 2003; Krisberg 1994; Herndon 2005), to which might be added a private ‘war on abortion’ waged by members of civil society who are likewise arguing their case in securitisation terms.

The issue of immigration has motivated several (mainly right-wing and/ or xenophobic) political actors in Europe and elsewhere to securitise migrants or immigration as such as threats to national identity (Bigo 2002; Buonfino 2004; Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; Crépau et al. 2007; Ibrahim 2005; Boswell 2007), also sometimes referred to as ‘ontological security’, i.e. security about what one is, either individually or collectively (Kinnvall 2004; Mitzen 2006; Huysmans 1998; Zaretsky 2002; Noble 2005). On the same basis it is also possible to securitise others for what they are, rather than for anything they might presumably do, for instance on the basis of their religion (Laustsen and Wæver 2000) or of their ethnic or racial identity (Muller 2004). This was argued by Samuel Huntington in his work The Clash of Civilizations (1996), to which he later added a work on the threat to American (WASP, i.e. White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant) identity allegedly posed by Hispanic immigrants (Huntington 2004. For a critique see Etzioni 2005).

To securitise terror, as the United States has done with its proclamation of a ‘war on terror’, has also opened up a can of particularly nasty worms. Following the lead of Israel (Uildriks 2000; Reichman and Kahana 2001) official permission to use torture has thus been granted (Greenberg and Drated (eds) 2005; Hooks and Mosher 2005; Greer 2004) and serious debates have taken place between otherwise quite respectable and civilised intellectuals about the permissibility of using torture (Aviv 2004; Dershowitz 2002: 131–63; Kershnar 2005; Slater 2006), which has partly revolved around the question of whether it works or not (Morgan 2000; Fiala 2006; Bufacchi and Arrigi 2006). It has also allowed for the indefinite detention of mere suspects at a location which has been deliberately chosen because it is beyond the reach of both US and international law such as Camp X-Ray at Guantánamo Bay (Marguiles 2004).

Securitisation does not even have to pertain to an actor, but can also be applied to threats from nature such as disease. HIV/AIDS has thus arguably been securitised, even by the UN Security Council, which, in its resolution 1308 (17 July 2000), stated that ‘the HIV/AIDS pandemic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security.’ (ICG 2001a, 2004c; Elbe 2006). It is also possible to securitise natural hazards such as tsunamis (Hyndman 2007), or global warming for that matter. The latter was exactly what former Vice President Al Gore did with his controversial film An Inconvenient Truth, which even earned him half a Nobel Peace Prize, the other half going to the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In his speech to the Nobel Institute Gore said the following, couched in unmistakable ‘securitisation rhetoric’:

We, the human species, are confronting a planetary emergency – a threat to the survival of our civilization that is gathering ominous and destructive potential even as we gather here. (…) We must quickly mobilize our civilization with the urgency and resolve that has previously been seen only when nations mobilized for war. (…) Now comes the threat of climate crisis – a threat that is real, rising, imminent, and universal. Once again, it is the 11th hour. The penalties for ignoring this challenge are immense and growing, and at some near point would be unsustainable and unrecoverable. (Gore 2007. See also 1992; 2006)

The referent object of securitisation certainly does not have to be universal as in the quote above, but may just as well be particularistic, as when (usually self-proclaimed) spokespersons for one ethnic or religious group securitise another group as threats to their collective identity or survival. History’s perhaps most terrifying example of this was the systematic hate propaganda against the Tutsi by Hutu extremists in Rwanda in the run-up to, as well as during, the 1994 genocide. The media – above all the journal Kagura and the radio station Radio-Télevision Libre des Milles Collines – apparently succeeded in convincing a staggeringly high percentage of the Hutu population that the Tutsi as a group represented such a mortal danger that they had to be exterminated as a group (Thompson (ed.) 2007; Li 2004. On the number of perpetrators see Strauss 2004).

One might also mention the various conspiracy theories prominent among Identity Christians in the United States about an ominous and nebulous ZOG (the Zionist Occupation Government) plotting against the true Aryans to establish a world government controlled by Jews or blacks, forcing their ‘chosen’ people or race to fight a battle a l’outrance against these ‘mud people’ (Stewart 2002; Levin 1998; Stern 2000; Barkun 1989; Gallagher 1997; Michael 2006). One of their adherents was the perpetrator of the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, Timothy McVeigh, who was selling as well as carrying a copy of the notorious Turner Diaries – written by an ‘Andrew Macdonald’, a pseudonym for William Pierce – which features, among other outrageous accounts, a description of ‘heroic’ nuclear terrorism leading to a global nuclear conflagration resembling the battle of Armageddon, but resulting in the eventual global domination of the white race, having effectively exterminated the rest of mankind, including moderate whites (Pierce 1978. See also Durham 1996; FBI 1999; Michael 2003). Judging by his bizarre manifest, 2083: A European Declaration of Independence, written under the pen-name Andrew Berwick (2011), the right-wing Norwegian ‘lone wolf’ terrorist Anders Behring Breivik was motivated by very similar concerns when he, on 22 July 2011, not only blew up government buildings in Oslo, but immediately thereafter proceeded to the small island of Utøya where he single-handedly and in cold blood shot dead 69 teenagers (Juergensmeyer 2011).

It is impossible to predict in advance whether a securitisation move will succeed or not, but this may be ascertained ex post facto, the criterion being whether extraordinary measures have been taken and generally accepted. However, what should count as such ‘extraordinary measures’ may differ from country to country as well as change over time.

To Expand or Not (and How), That Is the Question

With all these caveats in mind, we shall now proceed to survey how ‘security’ can actually be conceptualised. Whether to expand the concept of security or not, and if so in which direction and to what extent, is a matter both of political choice and analytical convenience. In the following I shall analyse how it might be expanded whilst paying a certain attention to both the positive and negative political implications thereof. In principle, expansion can take place along different ‘axes’, i.e. as answers to various questions, which may be subdivided according to how radically they depart from the prevailing orthodoxy.

• Whose security? This is the question of focus, i.e. of the appropriate ‘referent object’ in the terminology of Buzan et al. (1998: 35–42), whereas Bill McSweeney (1999: 87) prefers the term ‘subject’. Three types of entities immediately spring to mind which might be secure or insecure: the state, other human collectives and the individual, more about which shortly – but one might also use the environment, e.g. the global ecosystem or various endangered species, as the referent objects. The fact that this rarely happens may simply be due to the fact that all participants in the security discourse happen to belong to one of the planet’s thousands of species, i.e. that of Homo sapiens.

• Security of what? Depending on whose security is at stake, ‘security’ will be a matter of an absence of threats to different values in the terminology of Wolfers (1952) and it may have completely different connotations.

• Security from whom? This is the question of the source of threat. Different values may obviously be placed in jeopardy by different actors, in addition to which there may be numerous ‘structural’ threats (global warming, for example) without any agents, at least not in the direct sense. Even though such threats may also be securitised, they rarely are.

• Security from what? This refers to the form of threat, e.g. whether it is military or non-military, both of which categories lend themselves to further sub-divisions.

Answers to these four questions provide a classification matrix set out in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1 Concepts of security

‘National’ Security

What characterised the traditional IR approach to ‘security,’ especially during the era of almost unchallenged dominance of Realism (Morgenthau 1960; Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981. See also M.J. Smith 1986; Guzzini 1998; Vasques 1998; Scheuerman 2009), was a focus on the state as the referent obje...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Dedication
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• List of Acronyms
• Preface
• 1 The Concept of Security
• 2 Multilateralism, Institutions, Regimes and Organisations
• 3 Regions and Regionalism
• 4 The United Nations, Global and Regional Security
• 5 Europe and its Distinguishing Features
• 6 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
• 7 The Council of Europe and the OSCE
• 8 The European Union
• Conclusion: Comparative Score-Cards
• Bibliography
• Index