Food and War in Mid-Twentieth-Century East Asia

Katarzyna J. Cwiertka

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317134435
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: 20th Century History
• Index: History

War has been both an agent of destruction and a catalyst for innovation. These two, at first sight contradictory, yet mutually constitutive outcomes of war-waging are particularly pronounced in twentieth-century Asia. While 1945 marked the beginning of peaceful recovery for Europe, military conflicts continued to play a critical role in the historical development of this part of the world. In essence, all wars in twentieth-century Asia stemmed from the political vacuum that developed after the fall of the Japanese Wartime Empire, intricately connecting one region with another. Yet, they have had often very diverse consequences, shattering the homes of some and bringing about affluence to others. Disarray of war may halt economic activities and render many aspects of life insignificant. The need for food, however, cannot be ignored and the social action that it requires continues in all circumstances. This book documents the effects of war on the lives of ordinary people through the investigation of a variety of connections that developed between war-waging and the production, distribution, preparation and consumption of food throughout Asia since the 1930s. The topics addressed range from issues at stake at the time of the conflicts, such as provisioning the troops and food rationing and food relief for civilians, to long-term, often surprising consequences of war waging and wartime mobilization of resources on the food systems, diets, and tastes of the societies involved. The main argument of this volume is that war has not been a mere disruption, but rather a central force in the social and cultural trajectories of twentieth-century Asia. Due to its close connection with human nourishment and comfort, food stands central in the life of the individual. On the other hand, owing to its connection with profit and power, food plays a critical role in the social and economic organization of a society. What happens to food and eating is, therefore, an important index of change, a privileged basis for the exploration of historical processes.

PART I
Supplying Nutrition

Chapter 1
From Riots to Relief: Rice, Local Government and Charities in Occupied Central China

Toby Lincoln

In the spring of 1940, the Wuxi County magistrate received a report from Wei Zhangzhen, the head of the police force. Several days before, at nine in the morning on 21 February, some four to five hundred people surrounded the Yongsheng rice dealer with baskets in their hands, all jostling to buy rice. Suddenly, they turned violent, burst into the shop and stole its stock. The police arrived, but had to call in armed assistance to help quell the disturbance, and the crowd eventually disbursed. This was one case in a qiangmi fengchao (wave of rice robberies) that plagued not just Wuxi but the whole of the central China occupied region that spring.1 The following year the Grain Trade Association complained that rice dealerships just west of the city walls had been robbed, but acknowledged things had improved since ‘showing concern for the people, your government has entrusted the Red Swastika Society to sell rice at a reduced price during this time of shortage. Our organization is earnestly providing assistance, and the rice dealers are making large donations and painstaking efforts to relieve the suffering of the people.’2

The wave of rice robberies in Wuxi and the reaction of, and interaction between, local government, businesses, trade associations and charities reveal much about life in occupied China. In the Lower Yangtze Delta, as elsewhere, harsh policies of grain extraction combined with other factors, such as the devastation of the invasion and natural disasters, to produce food shortages for Chinese, and problems for local businesses and officials.3 This chapter adds to the growing literature on the impact of Japanese policies on the Chinese economy, but also moves beyond these discussions to focus on the reaction and nature of the local collaborationist state. I argue that, in the face of harsh Japanese policies, multiple local actors worked together to establish systems of rice relief, which illustrates that the Chinese state remained a powerful force in local society. Moreover, just as before the war, officials cooperated with local elites, charities and other organizations to alleviate social problems, and, in doing so, continued a long tradition of providing aid in times of crisis.4 However, such cooperation was not without its problems. Rare wartime archives reveal disagreements, as the legitimacy that charities and trade associations gave the new local officials did not stop business leaders from complaining about the occupation. Indeed, at times criticisms were particularly vicious, although they were not consistent throughout the occupation, but were voiced as the result of temporary crises. This illustrates how some sectors of Chinese society were primarily interested in survival, and supports the view that collaboration was often a matter of expediency rather than active support for the enemy regime.5 Not only is there a spectrum of collaboration and resistance, but both people’s allegiances and their willingness to express opposition changed throughout the occupation.

I explore these themes by concentrating on the rice industry in Wuxi City, which for centuries had been a major hub for the region’s agricultural market. The Taiping Rebellion hit this trade hard, but after its suppression the number of rice hang (dealers) grew steadily from 80 to over 140 on the eve of the Great Depression. In the twentieth century mechanization transformed the industry, and by 1930 there were 21, mostly diesel-run, mills, many attached to the warehouses which lined the canals north of the city walls.6 This long history meant that, despite the devastating Japanese invasion, the industry had a solid base from which to recover.

Invasion and Recovery, 1938

The Japanese invasion of the Lower Yangtze Delta left a trail of devastation in its wake, and Wuxi certainly did not escape unscathed.7 However, some infrastructure survived intact, and after the front line moved westwards, the Japanese soldiers remaining in the city occupied 18 grain warehouses, of which 12 had been either burned or plundered.8 This left stores of flour, rice and wheat, which local businesses wanted to extract as quickly as possible to restart operations. They, and the trade associations which re-emerged to represent them, asked officials to intercede with the Japanese, illustrating the legitimacy of the local Chinese state in the eyes of the population at large. In the first few months of 1938 governmental structures had to be re-established. In Wuxi, the Self Government Committee (SGC) and the county government that followed it in June of that year were very effective at getting the city back on its feet, although at the outset Japanese control of the food supply was a problem on the ground.9

In such an environment, the business community turned to local officials for help and gave legitimacy to the new collaborationist regime. In January 1938 the Wuxi Grain Trade Association complained to the SGC that Japanese control of grain stores and limits on transport were hampering efforts to restore food supplies, and requested the enemy hand control of the industry to the Chinese.10 Local officials had no power to grant this request, but they took steps to organize food supply, designating five centres across the city where rice could be sold. By the end of the month over 100 former rice dealers had applied for licences to restart operations. They were not allowed to sell more than 10 shi of rice per day, at a price set by the SGC, and a fee of 3 jiao per shi was imposed.11 The price of rice was initially set at 6.5 yuan, although within a month the market price had risen to over 8 yuan, prompting complaints that dealers were selling in more profitable markets in neighbouring cities. In response, the SGC raised the price by one yuan and, almost certainly at the behest of the Japanese, banned the transport of rice out of the county.12 Despite these measures, prices continued to rise, and although the SGC obtained permission for some rice to be transported into the city, shortages continued, prompting complaints from mill owners.13 In addition to this, officials also worked with the Wuxi branch of a national Buddhist charity, the Red Swastika Society, which had a long history in the city. In March the SGC entrusted the provision of zhou (rice porridge) to this organization. In a procedure that was to be repeated on a larger scale in 1941, families in need of aid applied directly to the offices of the Red Swastika Society for a permit, which they were then able to use at the distribution centres.14 It is clear that from the beginning of the occupation Wuxi officials, businesses and their trade associations, and local charities were all involved in ensuring rice supply to the people of the city.

This is not to say that there were not problems. From the outset the Japanese army had been in control of those stocks of rice and other crops that had not been destroyed during the invasion, not to mention silk cocoons and other produce in Wuxi warehouses. It operated a policy known as yiliang chang (clothing and food factory). One recent local history of Wuxi uses the term to describe special units of Japanese soldiers sent to occupy those factories not destroyed in the invasion.15 Some months later local businessmen were citing this policy in complaints to officials, arguing it stipulated that the Japanese should return 50 per cent of grain, rice and other stocks in local warehouses to the Chinese. The policy warrants further investigation to establish whether it was a military or civilian initiative, and if it points to enemy support for Chinese industry before the founding of the Central China Development Company (CCDC), which is normally given as the date from which Japanese turned from simple plunder to investment in the economy of the region.16 It could, of course, have been cover for the army’s continued seizure of produce, and the evidence from Wuxi shows that, either way, wresting the stocks from enemy hands was no easy task.

In an effort to revive their operations as quickly as possible, the business community appealed to officials to intercede with the Japanese army. As early as February 1938 the SGC attempted to gain entry into warehouses to investigate the state of rice stores, but it was only in the summer that the true situation became apparent.17 Yang Hanting wrote to the county magistrate describing how the Fuxing Mill was attached to the Yiyuan Warehouse, and under the policy of yiliang chang had been given permission by the army to mill rice on its behalf. Despite this, the army refused to release 4,000 dan (piculs) of rice stored in the warehouse. He also expressed concern that once work had started up again, he wouldn’t be able to operate freely.18 Writing in the same month, the head of the Hengyuan Rice Mill complained that the Japanese had still not returned half of the 1,950 dan of rice confiscated from the company. Moreover, some of this rice was held as debt security for a private client and had been moved to another warehouse.19 Even long-established local industrial families such as the Tang had little luck. The Shenghe Warehouse dated back to the late Qing dynasty. According to a May survey 5,000 dan of rice had been in storage, but by the end of June only 1,000 remained. Although it was supposed to be returned to the warehouse, the owners were concerned that the army would keep it, and so asked the county magistrate ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Maps, Figures and Tables
• Notes on Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• PART I Supplying Nutrition
• PART II The Complexity of Eating
• Index