8 This statistic is taken from the British Association for Adoption and Fostering (BAAF) website at: http://www.baaf.org.uk/info/stats/england.shtml (accessed on 9 May 2010). In short, not only have people diversified the ways in which they establish and maintain their adult relationships but also the ways in which they have and raise children have also altered dramatically. As Finch has commented, âall recent empirical work on contemporary families emphasizes the essential diversity of family composition and the fluidity of family relationshipsâ (2007: 67).
These changes in family life have, of course, occurred as a result of dramatic changes in the way in which our society lives more generally. We are less religious and our communities are more culturally diverse (Munby 2005). We marry (or simply live together) across faiths and within and across gender divisions. And we do all this in bigger or smaller family units that range from single person households to multi-family, multi-generational households. We share our lives with friends, partners or spouses, ex-partners or ex-spouses, parents, children, step-children, siblings, half-siblings, step-siblings, grandparents and great-grandparents. We have, in essence, begun to tolerate a vast matrix of relationships that brings together various adults and children in one household, or collections of people who consider themselves to be intimately related although they do not share a common household. Despite these vast changes in family life, what people do in these new family settings does not simply challenge family norms. Their living arrangements often borrow from the patterns of traditional family life and write those patterns into new family relationships (Smart 2000: 50; Diduck 2008a: 253), although these things are rarely done uniformly (Dewar 1998; Smart 2000; Diduck 2008a).
The clear statistical evidence of altered family norms is not, of course, analysed by commentators uniformly. Not everyone sees these transformations as dramatic (Silva and Smart 1999: 3; Parker 1987). There are also very different views on the extent to which changes in family life are a cause for celebration or for concern (Morgan 1999: 13). Gillies identifies three dominant approaches adopted within sociological research to intimate, personal, family relationships. She characterizes these as âbreakdown and demoralization, democratization and egalitarianism, [and] continuity and enduring power relationsâ (Gillies 2003: 15). The first sees a breakdown in family relationships that is the result of increased individualization and the pursuit of self-interest. Because these more selfish pursuits replace responsibility and obligation to others, this analysis presents a âgloomy picture of the future of human relations and society as a whole, suggesting that we are moving towards a dangerous, atomised, amoral existenceâ (Gillies 2003: 15). The focus of the second approach is upon âdemocratic values of respect and negotiationâ (Gillies 2003: 15). Here, greater individualization enables people to create more fulfilling relationships: âWith roles and identities no longer fixed, individuals generate their own relationship rules, leading to a wide diversity in the way intimate associations are expressed and livedâ (Gillies 2003: 15; Kennedy in this volume). The third approach claims that the evidence supports neither of these positions; changes in family life are neither radically dangerous, nor positively transformative. Instead this analysis stresses the continuity and enduring gendered and other power relations that still manifest themselves in family life (Gillies 2003: 16; Smart 2000). Gillies goes on to show that, whilst sociologists have identified the changes in post-industrialization that have involved the âde-traditionalisation and individualisation of social lifeâ (which have âcausedâ either breakdown and disintegration or the âdemocratisation of personal relationshipsâ), data indicates both a diversification in family form and the âenduring continuity of traditional tiesâ (Gillies 2003: 2; Smart 2000).
Clearly then, the family is changing. But it is also staying the same. The real families with which we are actually entangled (which Diduck (2003) characterizes as the âfamily we live withâ) may be changing. And, as Diduck suggests, these may be messy and complicated and they may let us down from time to time. But the âfamilies we live byâ (those family norms we idealize) continue to âprovide us with a needed sense of continuity and shared historyâ. These are relatively stable, supported by law and never âlet us downâ. Importantly, this âfamily we live byâ âsets up the standard by which to judge the more complicated families we live withâ (Diduck 2003: 20; Gillis 1997). And just as individuals negotiate their lives through the families they live with, reflecting on the normative families they live by, so too does the state. Part of the stateâs apparatus in doing so is law and the way in which law allocates (and then regulates) or declines to allocate responsibility.
It is this relationship between the responsibilities that people in their families, reflecting on idealized family norms, undertake and the lawâs allocation and regulation of family responsibility that is at the heart of this volume. There are many examples of recent reforms of family law which recognize that people take responsibility for each other in a range of circumstances which the law has previously failed to acknowledge: same-sex partners accepting marriage-like responsibilities are recognized in the UK in the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (and in other states in a variety of different ways) (Boshoff, Brower, Jackie Jones, all in this volume; Lind 2008); unmarried fathers who would traditionally have had no parental power in relation to their children can now acquire parental responsibility automatically (in the UK) under the Children Act 1989 (section 4, as amended by the Adoption and Children Act 2002, s. 111); step-parents taking parental responsibility for children for whom they have traditionally had no responsibility are recognized (in the UK again) in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (sections 21, 23 and 24), the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (section 112) and the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (section 75). In other states, again, there are other ways in which this is done (Kennedy in this volume); children born as a result of assisted conception and reared by people (including same-sex couples) who are not genetically related to them can have parental responsibilities towards those children (Children Act 1989, s. 4ZA inserted by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, s. 56) in the UK (Caroline Jones in this volume; Lind and Hewitt 2009). The responsibilities that unmarried partners take for one another have been acknowledged in statutes such as the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1995, and the responsibilities they take for children have been brought into law (Adoption and Children Act 2002). Of course many of these changes were pre-empted by judicial pronouncements that recognized the legal status of those who took responsibility for others (such as, for example, J v C [1970] AC 668 (in which parental responsibility undertaken by non-parents gained an enhanced legal position) and Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886 (in which, perhaps too gingerly, the responsibilities of unmarried partners were acknowledged in relation to the acquisition of property rights).
These are, of course, just some of the examples of the legal changes that have taken place. Before many of them had even materialized Dewar (1998) had described the encroachment of law into the ever-expanding realm of family responsibilities as chaotic. He contrasted functionalists â those who, in their analysis of the role of family law, focus upon family practices (what families actually do) â with constructionalists â those who set out to expose âthe way legal discourse privileges certain family forms, individual behaviours or orientations, or more generally âconstructsâ sexuality, or our subjective sense of ourselvesâ (1998: 467â468). Both the functionalist and constructionist models, Dewar argued, ascribe to family law much more coherence than it really has. They do this, he argued, in order to de...