8 For another view see Richard H. Kohn, âThe Huntington Challenge: Maximizing National Security and Civilian Control of the Military,â West Point Senior Conference Paper, June 2007. Kohn asserts that the military should take responsibility for shaping the civilâmilitary dynamic. Scholars could play an important role in helping elected leaders with foundational normative theory â a coherent and well developed set of structure and norms to guide key civilâmilitary relationships. Presently elected leaders have a dearth of options to choose from when it comes to organizing their relationships with the national security establishment and they need more help. Therefore, this book is also a call to academia to generate more options, additional normative models.
The topic of civilâmilitary relations has taken on greater saliency in the public discourse over the past year and as national leaders (including 2008 presidential candidates) grapple with developing their philosophy towards âcivilian control of the militaryâ and what exactly that would mean in practice a reasonable place to turn for advice would be the community of scholars who have devoted much of their professional life to studying these questions. As a professional soldier, I am not a full-time member of this scholarly community but Iâve admired the work produced by it over the years and believe it can bring to the debate well considered arguments if so focused. Towards that end, this book introduces the âMadisonian approachâ for US civilâmilitary relations to help stimulate the discussion. Reactions, corrections, criticisms and alternative proposals are welcomed and encouraged.
In the prevailing literature there are really only two fully developed options as it relates to arranging civilâmilitary relationships: 1) subjective control, the type employed by McNamara and Rumsfeld, and 2) objective control, a method first advanced by Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington in the 1950s with great promise, but ultimately ridden with faulty assumptions about the nature of the civilâmilitary nexus, where options are generated, analyzed, and then conveyed along with advice to elected leaders.9
9 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of CivilâMilitary Relations (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957) and Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free Press, initially published in 1960). Post-Cold War reprises were Richard H. Kohn, âThe Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today,â Naval War College Review (Summer 2002): 9â59, and Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: The Free Press, 2002), respectively. Upon closer examination it will be revealed that objective control is really a false choice because it fails to provide insights on the preponderance of civilâmilitary interaction â the nexus where top-level civil and military leaders share responsibilities of helping elected leaders with understanding the strategic environment and sorting through issues and options prior to making weighty decisions. This leaves subjective control as the only fully developed model. However, because micromanaging a profession with political appointees who generally have lesser practical experience could result in reduced levels of effectiveness, most presidents have eschewed the subjective control approach.
More often than not, Presidents have operated without an established method or normative civilâmilitary relations construct and that has posed a different set of challenges.10 The confusion and ambiguity associated with this choice (no method) has contributed to criticisms at different times that one or both parties to the relationship has not performed their duties fully and effectively or that one side has overreached into the sphere of the other.11 But without clearly established expectations and standards, without an agreed upon framework, what constitutes dereliction or inappropriate behavior? Such are the circumstances today with subjective control freshly repudiated; elected leaders are without a method to organize civilâmilitary relations. Scholars must answer this calling with models that help shape solutions.
10 Some Presidents in the past have worked effectively with the military despite not having a conscious/established normative framework and the Madisonian Approach incorporates âbest practicesâ from some of these positive examples. The larger point on the need for a conscious method is that while any relationship should be sufficiently flexible and practical to deal with unexpected developments, establishing clear expectations up front in the form of a model, agreement or framework helps guide the relationship, especially in times of crisis, and provides the foundation for accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness. 11 Richard H. Kohn, âOut of Control: The Crisis in CivilâMilitary Relations,â National Interest, No. 35 (Spring 1994): 3â31. The Present Struggle
The US is engaged in a difficult struggle against a determined enemy who publicly declares his strategic aim the establishment of a caliphate in the Middle East and the ultimate destruction of the West.12 Now, in concert with allies and friends the list of whom the US should be endeavoring to expand, America is involved in a wide ranging conflict that spans across the dimensions of power (including diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments) to stop al-Qaeda and other declared extremists â the aim is to win.13
12 William McCants, editor and project director, Militant Ideology Atlas. Report from the Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, November 2006. Paul Eedle, âBroadband Jihad Television: Filmmaker looks at the role of the internet and television in contemporary journalism,â London Financial Times, 6 November 2006. Michael Scheuer, âal-Qaeda Doctrine for International Political Warfare,â Terrorism Focus (31 October 2006), Vol. III, No. 42. 13 Books on strategy, particularly military strategy, abound. See for example, Thomas Philips, Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics, Vols. 1 and 2 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1985). However, rare is it that a book on the practical contributions in the economic sphere of grand strategy is published. For an excellent recent account see, John Taylor, Global Financial Warriors (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007). In this work Taylor describes in detail how the US Government worked with other nations to freeze the financial assets of al-Qaeda in the months after the 9â11 attacks. When the 9â11 Commission Report was published in 2004 it cited these activities as the most successful counter-terrorist efforts to date. Although this study is not about that topic directly, what is presented is very germane and foundational to that overall effort. It is about how the US prepares for conflict and take decisions that shape national security â at its core are questions of civilâmilitary relations.
Civilâmilitary relations is defined as the delineation of duties among top-level civilian and military leaders as found in existing US legal structure (provisions in the US Constitution and US statutes) and in the norms that guide behavior in view of how these leaders contribute individually and collectively to the national security decisionmaking process, and in all efforts to provide for the common defense. The foundation for US civilâmilitary relations comes from the Constitution, which provides clear provisions for the relationship â simply put: elected leaders control the armed forces.
Article II bestows upon the President the powers of C...