Beppe Grillo's Five Star Movement

Organisation, Communication and Ideology

Filippo Tronconi

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317175148
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In 2009 Beppe Grillo, a well-known Italian comedian, established the Five Star Movement with the aim of sending a handful of citizens to municipal councils to act as the watchdog of a professional political class often perceived as corrupt and self-interested. However, in the Italian general elections of February 2013, despite still largely being considered a small protest movement, the party gained the undisputed role of leading political actor gaining just under 9 million votes and sending 163 Deputies and Senators to the Italian parliament. The birth and rapid rise of the Five Star Movement represents an electoral earthquake with no parallels in Italy and the whole of post-1945 Western Europe and a phenomenon likely to shape the Italian political scene for many years to come. Drawing on an extensive array of data and face-to-face interviews, this volume offers an empirically grounded explanation of the surprising electoral success of the Five Star Movement and presents a realistic picture of this party in its manifold aspects: organisational structure, communication style, linkages with civil society, ideological nature and positioning in the Italian political system.

Chapter 1
Beppe Grillo and the Movimento 5 Stelle: A Brief History of a ‘Leaderist’ Movement with a Leaderless Ideology

Rinaldo Vignati

The Importance of the Leader and the ‘Leaderless’ Ideology

One of the many paradoxes of the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S, 5 Star Movement) lies in the fact that, while it is a political movement with a strong ‘leaderist’ stamp, its ideology professes an equally strong ‘leaderless’ nature. On the one hand, according to a survey reported by Roberto Biorcio (2013), 66 per cent of Italians (including M5S voters) believe that ‘without Grillo, the M5S would be severely weakened and would break up’ and 55 per cent agree with the statement that ‘there is little democracy within the M5S because all decisions are taken by Grillo and Casaleggio’. If only those people who state that they intend to vote for the M5S are considered, these percentages fall to 44 per cent and 43 per cent, respectively. These data clearly indicate the importance of the figure of the leader in the Movement’s success. Indeed, even among the party’s own voters, almost half of those interviewed agreed that without Grillo the M5S would eventually break up.

In stark contrast with this prevalent perception, Grillo and Casaleggio, the two founders of the M5S, have always professed to uphold an ideology which they have defined as ‘leaderless’. In a post on his blog on 26 June 2010, Grillo declared his aversion to the very idea of leadership:

A nation needs citizens, not leaders. ‘Leaderism’ is the highest form of career that an elected politician who doesn’t give a damn for the voters can aspire to. In theory, MPs, Councillors and Euro-deputies are elected in order to implement a program that has been agreed upon: to work in the Regional Assembly, on the City Council, in Parliament. They are paid more than enough for what they do. If your plumber were to spend his time on television enunciating important (and unrequested) ‘political’ thoughts, writing articles and presenting books, you’d begin to doubt that he was working for you. You’d suspect that he was using his position to gain the visibility in plumbing circles that he would otherwise never have had: to become a local, regional or national leader. It’s surreal. And all this happens because you pay him to fix the water pipes in your house. You pay a plumber, but if you turn your back for a moment, you find a leader under the kitchen sink.

…

Leaders are usually oversensitive. For them, the approval of the voters is a signal from the heavens; the sign of a glorious destiny that awaits them at the head of the Italian people. Leaders are like shit; they attract bluebottles, usually in the guise of intellectuals, their inspiring muses. Fickle insects always on the lookout for fresher excrement. ‘Leaderism’ is a social disease. It arises when citizens take no interest in public affairs and give up exercising their duty to point the way and to oversee. If everyone is a leader, no one is a leader. Everyone counts for one. Every citizen is his own leader. If someone you’ve elected goes around playing the leader, ask him why he is away from his place of work and, with the greatest kindness, because he is a sick person after all, tell him to bugger off. (Grillo 2010)

This aversion to the figure of the leader underlies the slogan ‘one counts for one’, which is one of the founding myths of the M5S and its idea of direct democracy (for an analysis of the conception of democracy in the M5S, see Floridia and Vignati 2014). This kind of position has often been supported by references to David Graeber, one of the theorists of the ‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement, who has tried to depict – with the aid of ethnographic examples (see, among others, Graeber 2007) – a direct democracy without leaders or elite. Graeber has been quoted on several occasions by Casaleggio:

The M5S sees the word ‘leader’ as belonging to the past; it is a dirty word, perverted. Leader of what? It means that you attribute to others intelligence and decisional capability; it means that you are no longer even a slave; you’re an object … Behind the word ‘leader’ there is nothing. Let’s take the case of Occupy Wall Street: a spontaneous demonstration against financial institutions was held in New York. The demonstrators dubbed themselves ‘Occupy Wall Street’ and invaded the district of the American banks and stock exchange. The phenomenon then spread … but in the various demonstrations, no leader ever emerged: the important thing was the movement. David Graeber, who was among the organisers of the movement, defined it as leaderless, meaning that it gathers together intelligences without having to look to a supreme head. This falls within the very concept of community. (Fo, Grillo and Casaleggio 2013, pp. 10–11)

This ideology is accredited by some observers as a valid description of the M5S. For example, the cyberpunk writer Bruce Sterling interviewed Gianroberto Casaleggio for Wired a few months ago. He subsequently wrote that ‘the movement is leaderless because leaders get in the way. Instead of leaders, the M5S has Beppe Grillo, an orator who does not seek public office, and Casaleggio, who until a short time ago rarely said anything to anyone’.

Even some academics (Greblo 2011; Lanfrey 2011; Biorcio 2013) hold a similar view, emphasizing the role of M5S meet-ups and endorsing their independence from leaders. In our opinion, however, despite the fact that the M5S is a complex phenomenon which displays ambivalent features, its ‘leaderist’ character prevails over the ‘leaderless’ rhetoric with which it is imbued. A few considerations are enough to demonstrate this. The first concerns the ‘commercial ownership’ of the party logo, as ratified by its statute, and the ownership of the technological infrastructure that underpins the life of the party. The second concerns the fact that several individual representatives of the Movement, in parliament or in local institutions, have been expelled or disavowed by Grillo. The third regards the fact that the political agenda of the Movement – which issues should be given priority, whether and how a proposal should be put up for voting on the blog, etc. – is always decided by the leader, without any real debate. The fourth – which generalises these last two considerations – regards what we might call the ‘metaphysics of the rules’, which lies at the basis of the ‘founding myth’ of the M5S. The speeches of Grillo and other exponents of the M5S frequently contain calls to apply the ‘rules’ (it is the ‘rules’ that justify expulsions; it is the somewhat vague ‘rules’ that dictate the Movement’s strategic choices). By appealing to the ‘rules’ that must be respected, exponents and militants make the functioning of the party depend on a de-personalised claim that is higher than the individual participants and even than the leader. In reality, even a superficial observation of the internal workings of the Movement is enough to reveal that, at decisive moments, the ‘rules’ are always chosen and imposed without discussion by the leader himself; they are therefore a means by which he maintains command over the party.¹ The last consideration concerns the origin of votes for the Movement. The great success of the M5S in the 2013 general election and the fact that this success was not repeated in the subsequent local elections, in which Grillo did not play a direct role, indicate that the electoral consensus of the M5S depends to a great extent on the words and deeds of its leader rather than on its territorial roots.

Thus, of the two faces that characterise the M5S – ‘leaderism’ and direct participation – it is the former which has so far prevailed (though the latter should by no means be neglected). The present chapter, which summarises the principal phases of the formation of the M5S, therefore focuses on this singular figure of the comedian who turned himself into a politician.

Analysis of the M5S, and of the relationships between the leader and the organisation, runs up against a methodological, we could almost say epistemological, problem. Indeed, the best literature on political parties is based on a ‘realist’ postulate (in this regard, the main references are Panebianco (1982) in the specific sphere of the parties, and Crozier and Friedberg (1977) for what concerns the organisations in general). This approach is founded on the idea that the players involved are interested in extending their own power, both within the party and, prospectively, within the institutions through their control of the party machine. The party is therefore seen as the arena in which struggles are played out among subjects who are motivated by the desire to increase their own power.

In the case of the M5S, however, this postulate does not seem to be applicable. Neither Grillo nor Casaleggio runs in elections. They do not aim to occupy the top posts (or at least they have not so far manifested this aim); rather, they remain to some extent on the sidelines, functioning (according to the rhetoric underlying the Movement’s narrative) exclusively as a ‘megaphone’ for the initiatives autonomously taken by the active components of the Movement, and as ‘guarantors’ of the Movement’s basic principles.

Thus, the debate over this party tends to oscillate between two opposing visions of the role of Grillo and Casaleggio. On the one hand, we find the ‘plot theory’, according to which the two leaders are claimed to exploit the Movement for banal commercial ends (advertising and marketing of the blog) or to promote obscure economic interests (whereby the Movement is held to be, in reality, a political façade for a variety of unidentified economic interests). On the other hand, we find the notion of the disinterested leader (a leader who does not run in elections? A ‘dictator’ who does not aspire to office?). Grillo has depicted his ‘entry into the political arena’ in terms which are in some ways similar to those used by Berlusconi. This latter utilised the gospel reference to ‘drinking from the bitter chalice’ to describe his duty to go into politics. Similarly, Grillo has explained his progressive entry into the fray as being dictated by politicians’ dereliction of their duty, almost as if he had been forced to take part – ‘I just want to be a comedian! I can’t be the one you come to hear, the Fount of Truth; I can’t manage that, it’s not part of who I am, it’s not in my nature! … I’m a comedian; I’d die for a gag … Straight after the elections, once we are in Parliament, I’ll go back to doing theatre, doing my stuff’. And yet it is still not clear what his true intentions are nor what political design it is that drives his and Casaleggio’s actions.

A Comedian Turned Political Leader

Who is Grillo and how did he construct his capital of political trust? Born in Savignone (Genova) in 1949,² Beppe Grillo became famous as a comedian. He first worked in cabaret before moving into television. In the first half of the 1980s, he became one of television’s most successful celebrities. At that time, his comedy centred chiefly around themes of ‘custom’, only rarely and blandly touching on politics.

In the cinema, he worked only occasionally and with mediocre results. Among the few films he acted in, however, Fou de guerre (1985) by Dino Risi, in which he played alongside Coluche, is worthy of note. His meeting with the French comedian deserves attention, in that Coluche, a few years earlier, had been the protagonist of a political adventure that in many ways was a forerunner of Grillo’s own exploits – in some of its content at least, if not in its outcome. Indeed, in 1981 the Frenchman ran for President of the Republic, attacking the entire political and economic establishment with catchy slogans that often hinged on the use of popular and openly vulgar language (‘Tous ensemble pour foutre au cul avec Coluche’ seems to be almost a direct anticipation of the ‘Vaffanculo’ (‘Bugger off’) that Grillo would throw at all politicians of his first V-Day in 2007).³ Coluche’s presidential bid initially gained a high profile; he obtained the open support of some intellectuals (Pierre Bourdieu, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, among others⁴) and won the approval of a sizeable slice of the electorate (according to some surveys, the intention to vote for Coluche reached 16 per cent). Coluche, however, did not carry his candidature through, but withdrew from the race (various hypotheses have been put forward to explain this: the difficulty of obtaining the signatures of the electors needed to ratify his candidature; threats; a promise by Mitterand to support his charitable initiative ‘Restaurants du coeur’ in exchange for his withdrawal).

It is above all in Bourdieu’s reflection on his support for Coluche’s candidature that we can discern some features that are common to Grillo’s initiative. At the centre of both Coluche’s candidature and Grillo’s initiative, lies the desire to heal the fracture between politics and the people: ‘On reflecting on his support, Bourdieu expressed his concern at the way the political field had changed as it became more and more professional and autonomous. It now looked after its own interests rather than those of the people it claimed to represent. Moreover, he drew a comparison between the world of politics and religion; both strongly guarding entry or access to positions which confer “blessing” … The attraction of Coluche’s candidature for Bourdieu was, therefore, the way it showed up this attitude of monopolisation among all the politicians and commentators who denounced both him and the people who supported him as “irresponsible”’ (Greenfell 2004, pp. 144–5, original emphasis). Bourdieu said that: ‘One of the virtues of those who are irresponsible – of whom I am one – is to show up the tacit presuppositions in the political order … I remember that Coluche was not really a candidate but he said that he was a candidate in order to remind everyone that anyone can be a candidate. All the political-media field became mobilised to condemn this radical barbarity which consisted in questioning the fundamental presupposition that it is only politicians who can talk about politics’ (Bourdieu, 2000, pp. 55–6).

Those who are familiar with the issues that Grillo has dealt with during his activity as a political leader will find surprising affinities with the arguments underlined by Bourdieu (the rhetoric of ‘irresponsibility’; the idea that politics is everyone’s business and not the exclusive domain of professional politicians, etc.). The ability to transcend the separation between left and right is also common to the two comedians (while the pro-Coluche appeal was signed mainly by left-wing intellectuals, support also came from Gérard Nicoud, the leader of artisans and small business people, who was of the opposite political orientation).

This does not mean that Grillo took his inspiration from Coluche. Nevertheless, the meeting of the two comedians has an emblematic value that should be borne in mind (the similarities between Grillo and Coluche have also been underlined by Biorcio and Natale 2013, pp. 16–20). Opposition to the closure of the political field is constantly present in every political system (and the comedian – whose propensity is to turn hierarchies on their head and to throw reality into clownish disarray – is the one most willing to represent this sentiment⁵). Normally, sentiments and reactions of this kind remain on the fringe, or display only sudden and transient consensus (as in the case of Coluche). However, Grillo’s success, which has been greater, more pervasive and long-standing than any other similar experience, stems from the crisis of the Italian political system (in this regard, we can use the term ‘deinstitutionalisation’, Corbetta and Vignati 2013a, 2013b) and from the fact that, as we will see, Grillo’s alliance with Gianroberto Casaleggio has endowed the Movement with a technological and organisational infrastructure that has proved particularly effective.

Grillo’s entry into politics was not sudden; it came about in stages. A watershed moment in Grillo’s career was his ‘expulsion’ – in November 1986 – from national television as a result of a gag aimed at the Socialist Party, the party of the then prime minister Bettino Craxi. Made at peak viewing time on a state TV channel, the gag – which branded the socialists as thieves – led to the comedian’s almost total ostracism from national television (on a few occasions he was allowed to make brief appearances, but his scripts were vetted in advance in case they contained any potentially offensive material). From then on, Grillo found his ideal setting in shows in theatres and sports arenas, where he had direct contact with the audience. The greater freedom offered by these occasions prompted him gradually to redefine his repertoire, which increasingly centred around scathing criticism of the political class and economic powers (big industry, finance), and which, more and more often, targeted specific individuals by name.

A major step on the path that was to lead Grillo to political prominence was taken in the autumn of 1993, when he returned (with great success) for two evenings to state television. In Italian politics, 1993 was an important year. The great change that would be brought about by the elections held the following March was already looming; under the onslaught of judicial enquiries and faced with a slump in the opinion polls, the governing parties had already got wind of the approaching storm.

Seen today, Grillo’s 1993 TV show reveals some themes which would become central to his political proposal. It featured a Grillo who meditated on the figure of the comedian who says things that a comedian is not entitled to say (when he seemed to be taking himself too seriously, he would put on a clown’s red nose and go back to his proper role, occasionally quipping ‘I shouldn’t be saying this; I’m a comedian’ – a refrain that would often follow his outbursts⁶). To tell the truth, in the show, Grillo’s criticism of politics was fairly low key. In the name of feisty consumerism, his main target was the economic and financial world, and politics took a back seat. At a time when the political class was being hammered by judicial enquiries, this choice was somewhat unorthodox, since politicians would have made far easier targets. Instead, most of his arrows were aimed at entrepreneurs and the big names in finance. As the real power was in their hands, it was these figures who should come under public scrutiny. Subsequent years (from the foundation of the blog onwards), however, would see a progressive shift in this stance, with politicians increasingly becoming sca...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Notes on Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Beppe Grillo and the Movimento 5 Stelle: A Brief History of a ‘Leaderist’ Movement with a Leaderless Ideology
• 2 The Organization of the Movimento 5 Stelle: A Contradictory Party Model
• 3 Between Blog, Social Networks and Territory: Activists and Grassroots Organization
• 4 The Electoral Base: The ‘Political Revolution’ in Evolution
• 5 From ‘Citizens’ to Members of Parliament: The Elected Representatives in the Parliamentary Arena
• 6 An Internet-Fuelled Party? The Movimento 5 Stelle and the Web
• 7 The Movimento 5 Stelle and Social Conflicts: Between Symbiosis and Cooptation
• 8 A Vote(r) Like Any Other? Exploring the Protest Component in the Vote for the Movimento 5 Stelle
• 9 Beyond Protest: Issues and Ideological Inconsistencies in the Voters of the Movimento 5 Stelle
• 10 Conclusion: The Organisational and Ideological Roots of the Electoral Success
• Index