Political economy addresses how resources are organized in societies. Critical political economy (CPE) refers to approaches that examine and critique the unequal distribution of resources and the power relations that sustain and reproduce such inequalities. In media and communication studies, critical political economy forms a distinctive sub-field, articulated in writings from the 1970s onwards. Its central claim is that different ways of organizing and financing communications have implications for the range and nature of media content and the ways in which these are consumed and used (Murdock and Golding 2005; Hardy 2014). Critical political economists generally share broader critiques of advertising as the leading ideological agency for capitalism due to its role in promoting consumerism and possessive individualism and for its regressive, stereotypical representations of gendered, racial, and other identities. Advertising has been examined as part of a system of communications that âengineers consumption to match production and reproduces the ideological system that supports the prevailing status quoâ (Faraone 2011, 189). My focus, though, will be on another path of CPE inquiry that considers the consequences of media dependence on advertising finance and marketersâ influence on media content and on what range of content and services media provides. Such analysis of the relationship between media and advertising is where I argue CPE has made its most distinctive contribution (Hardy 2014, 2015).
Media and Advertising Relationships
The critical political economy literature has tended to advance instrumental or structural explanations of advertiser influence. Instrumentalist explanations focus on the intentional actions and behavior of actors who seek to control communications. These may range from marketersâ efforts to shape specific content or actions to influence the editorial environment to efforts to influence the broader orientation of media firmsâ output and their allocation of resources for telling stories and reaching particular audiences. Numerous accounts such as Soley (2002) and Bagdikian (2004) examine instrumental power in the form of marketers intervening to censor or shape media content. Various studies have assessed advertisersâ use of economic pressure and the threat or actual withdrawal of advertising as a means of influencing media coverage and the extent of acquiescence or resistance by staff (Nyilasy and Reid 2011).
Structuralist explanations suggest that advertising operates as an âimpersonal forceâ (Curran 1986) created by the cumulative decisions of advertisers seeking the most cost-effective vehicles to reach target consumers, thus creating a source of finance that is unevenly distributed across media. Advertising subsidy functions as a de facto licensing system, determining which ad-dependent media have the resources to survive and thrive. One basis for structuralist explanations lies in economic analyses of ad finance, whilst another is rooted in historical scholarship that considers how the professionalization of marketing nevertheless resulted in a shift to less politicized and more âneutralâ decision making about advertising effectiveness, as media planners relied more heavily on quantitative data over subjective judgments (Curran 1978, 1986). Advertising influence can be impersonal too in that the âlicensingâ effect arises from the innumerable decisions of individual advertisers:
Advertiser influence is so built in to the market context that not only is it often difficult to prove, but advertiser influence frequently occurs without the advertiserâs inducing it by any specific act, sometimes even without the advertiserâs wanting it.
(Baker 1994, 103)
The implications of the uneven distribution of commercial subsidy for media serving poorer, ethnic minority audiences in the US are explored by Gandy (2000, 48; 1982, 2004) who finds: â[t]o the extent that advertisers place a lower value on gaining access to particular minority audiences, those who would produce content for that segment will be punished by the marketâŚ.â
Accounts such as Herman and Chomskyâs propaganda model combine structuralist and instrumentalist explanations, with advertising finance amongst the five âfiltersâ that shape what news content is published by encouraging media to become advertising-friendly in order to compete for advertiser patronage (Herman and Chomsky 2008, 2, 15; Murdock 2011). Other studies have suggested that advertising influence is largely internalized by media management, influencing editorial strategies designed to maximize revenue (Curran 1978, 1986). For Baker (1994, 44), the influence of advertising on non-advertising content can include favorable editorial coverage of advertisersâ products and corporate interests, creating an editorial environment conducive to marketersâ promotions, favoring higher- income audiences and reducing partisan or controversial content that may divide or delimit target audiences (Baker 1994, 44).
The level of economic dependence on advertising revenue has always been a key factor shaping the structure and content of different media. Baker (1994: 45â49; see also Rinallo and Basuroy 2009) usefully summarizes factors that can affect the extent on advertisingâs influence within a given media outlet. These include the level and kind of economic dependence on advertising, whether widely distributed amongst many advertisers or concentrated on individual advertisers or organized groups. Another factor is the acceptability of advertising influence on content decisions (and the âcostâ of public disapproval arising from knowledge of influence). When this âcostâ is internalized by media managers and workers, the influence of âprofessionalismâ may act to resist advertiser pressure, with âaccepted industry practiceâ another factor influencing behavior. Consumer expectations and awareness of ad disclosure and ad separation from editorial are other, increasingly significant factors. Finally, Baker includes the implications of conglomeration, citing examples of advertisers applying pressure on one part of the conglomerateâs business in order to influence another.
Political economists insist on examining interrelationships among corporate media, ad agencies, and big business. For example, the tobacco giant Phillip Morris held seats on News Corporationâs board, while News Corp. head Rupert Murdoch remained on the Morris board for 12 years. The pharmaceutical giant Pfizer had directors on the boards of Time Warner, Viacom, and Dow Jones. Such corporate interlocks indicate the âcontinuing symbiotic relationship between news, advertisers, and advertisingâ (Bettig and Hall 2012, 165; Bagdikian 2004). The ways in which executive boards influence operations and editorial decisions require situated analysis, yet the corporate integration of advertising and media raises profound issues for democracy, media, and culture about the powers of commercial speech. Transnational communications conglomerates such as Aegis, Omnicom, WPP, Havas, and Interpublic colonize media and political systems around the world (Sussman 2011).
Changing Conditions
The CPE literature is valuable both for its own efforts to address historical changes and as a resource for assessing changing conditions. It shows that the relations among marketers, media, and users are dynamic, suggesting in turn the need to consider different forms of power and influence by marketers in specific situations. Nevertheless, some general trends are discernible. First, marketer influence has increased across commercial media and media systems where commercial media predominate. Second, the countervailing influence of professional norms and institutionalized practices to restrict advertiser influence has tended to weaken, or in some cases collapse. Third, a complex range of challenges for marketers can mitigate and limit advertiser power. These range from the inherent risk and instability of cultural tastes to highly volatile market conditions. There are also on-going challenges from technological aids and cultural practices of ad avoidance, from remote control zapping (McAllister 1996) to contemporary ad blocking.
The results of surveys, interviews with practitioners, commentary, and analysis of corporate data indicate how pressures have increased on advertising-dependent media to comply with advertiser demands and offer a host of added benefits including exacting more and more âeditorial supportâ beyond paid advertising (McAllister 1996, 2000). Studies of US news media show increasing advertiser pressures across local and national TV and convergent print/online news (PEW State of the News Media Reports at www.journalism.org; FAIRâs Fear and Favour reports www.fair.org; McChesney 2013). The variant findings are important too, in that they highlight how different factors influence outcomes in specific settings. Price (2003) found that US national news correspondents felt insulated from advertisers, with only 7 percent reporting pressure to report a story because of advertisers, although that set a relatively high threshold for advertiser influence. Indeed, indirect advertiser influence may be captured in the 20 percent who reported owner pressure to cover or censor stories. De Smet and Vanormelingen (2011, 12) surveyed 100 news journalists in Belgium and found 35 percent experienced pressure from advertisers, with 13 percent often approached to favor marketers by one of the four agents identified (editor-in-chief, direct editor, marketing department, advertiser). Further, professional journalism norms such as the âfirewallâ between editorial and advertising established in US news journalism (Gans 1980) were never as firmly established in the entertainment business or in media sectors like consumer magazines, which were based on closer interdependencies between media and marketers. Far from being a uniform dynamic, the intensification of ad pressure has varied and met varying responses in changing work cultures and conditions, from resistance (Steinem 1990) to normalization.