Maritime Quarantine

The British Experience, c.1650–1900

John Booker

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781351919845
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: British History
• Index: History

As a maritime trading nation, the issue of quarantine was one of constant concern to Britain. Whilst naturally keen to promote international trade, there was a constant fear of importing potentially devastating diseases into British territories. In this groundbreaking study, John Booker examines the methods by which British authorities sought to keep their territories free from contagious diseases, and the reactions to, and practical consequences of, these policies. Drawing upon a wealth of documentary sources, Dr Booker paints a vivid picture of this controversial episode of British political and mercantile history, concluding that quarantine was a peculiarly British disaster, doomed to inefficiency by the royal prerogative and concerns for trade and individual liberty. Whilst it may not have fatally hindered the economic development of Britain, it certainly irritated the City and the mercantile elites and remained a source of constant political friction for many years. As such, an understanding of British maritime quarantine provides a fuller picture of attitudes to trade, culture, politics and medicine in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Chapter One
The Seventeenth Century

England

The plague, it seems, grows more and more at Amsterdam. And we are going upon making of all ships coming from thence and Hambrough, or any other infected places, to perform their Quarantine (for 30 days as Sir Rd. Browne expressed it in the Order of the Council, contrary to the import of the word; though in the general acceptation, it signifies now the thing, not the time spent in doing it) in Holehaven – a thing never done by us before.

This is an extract from the diary of Samuel Pepys dated 26 November 1663¹ and as Pepys was Clerk of the Acts to the Navy Board he is a reliable source. Indeed, the Oxford English Dictionary cites this extract as its first reference to the word quarantine. But it would be wrong to assume that maritime quarantine in England began in 1663. What Pepys appears to be saying is that this was the first instance of quarantine at Hole Haven, which is the estuary of an Essex creek where it meets the Thames by Canvey Island. It would also seem that this was the first occasion when the word quarantine was used in any Order or Proclamation in England; Pepys does not spell this out, but the novelty of the term is partly the reason for the lengthy parenthesis.

Quarantine in England can be traced back almost a century before Pepys was writing. G. Hadley, the eighteenth-century historian of Hull, referred to an outbreak of plague there in 1576: 'quarantine not being strictly performed, it [plague] was brought by seamen into this Town'.² This presumably means that detention measures were in place, though badly enforced. Four years later the Lord Treasurer ordered officers of the port of London to stop ships from plague-stricken Lisbon coming up the river, 'lymiting them a certen place of their staie until ther merchandises shold be ayred for the avoyding of further danger'.³ The Privy Council thought fit to let the Lord Mayor of London know this, asking him to assist the port authority with similar measures for suspect ships and cargoes from anywhere else, especially 'from Plymouth at this presente visited [with plague]'.⁴ It is not clear how long ships were detained, or how long the embargo was maintained.

In the early seventeenth century, Europe was rife with disease and the Privy Council took action from time to time when the threat seemed particularly great. It will become noticeable in this study that England and Scotland had different views as to the places whence danger was strongest. In 1629 London and specified outports were ordered to be on their guard against ships arriving from places as far apart as Amsterdam, Brittany and La Rochelle. Nothing and no one was to come ashore, and no one was to go on board until the goods had been aired for such time 'as may give hope and lykelyhood' that all was well.⁵ No indication was given of the number of days this would take. In 1634 even the airing of goods was felt to be inadequate against reports of the plague at Rouen. The Council, via the Lord Treasurer, absolutely prohibited any goods from there to be landed at London or outports.⁶ A ship from Rouen, with two dead men aboard, was to be detained by Customs officers wherever she might be intercepted.⁷

Plague was also reported at The Hague, Amsterdam and Leyden, and the Privy Council were sufficiently worried to ask the Lord Mayor of London for advice about what to do. This request, in a letter of 9 October 1635, implied that the Lord Mayor could himself initiate countermeasures, 'wherein if neede required we shall be readie to assist you from tyme to tyme w^ththe Arme of this Board.'⁸ The opportunity for direct action was not heeded and it took nearly two weeks for the mayor to give his recommendations: there should be a Proclamation against the landing of men or goods from infected places without licence from Customs officers; no liberty to land should be given 'till some certain days be overpassed'; and waiters or guardians should be put aboard each suspected ship on its arrival.⁹ The Privy Council agreed and on 1 November 1635 a Proclamation was issued in similar terms against vessels from infected places in France and Holland. The days to be 'overpassed' were given as 20.¹⁰ Here, then, was the first national imposition of maritime quarantine for a stated period, although the word quarantine was not used. It was also the first time that a Proclamation to this effect had been issued in England; it will be seen later that Proclamations in both Scotland and Ireland were issued earlier – in Scotland much earlier.

France and Holland were not the only worry. Even before the Proclamation was issued, several ships began arriving at The Downs from the Straits of Gibraltar (where the plague was 'verie hott') having lost masters and crewmen during the voyage.¹¹ But this dramatic development warranted no more than a letter from the Privy Council to the farmers of the Customs. Until further order, the ships (unnamed) were not to enter the Thames, no person was to go aboard or come ashore, and no goods were to be landed.¹² It would seem that ships from the Straits were judged too infrequent to merit the constitutional weaponry of Order and Proclamation. In any event, potential danger from the Mediterranean was soon eclipsed by more problems across the Channel. In March 1638, Morlaix in Brittany was adjudged 'exceedingly infected w^th y^e plague', so that two linen ships making for London were to come no closer than Tilbury; in May the Lord Mayor of London and Customs officers stopped all linen ships from Morlaix unloading 'untill they have remayned upon y^e River full fortie daies.'¹³ A week later the Mayor and Customs officers at Exeter were authorized to allow a vessel from Morlaix carrying linen and wine to unload, also after 40 days.¹⁴ Thus it was in 1638 that quarantine in England was first practised, to a very limited extent, for the duration of its literal meaning.¹⁵

The episode mentioned by Pepys was the next real test of the English defences. The plague was particularly bad at Amsterdam, carried there by an Algerian warship, and letters to Clarendon from Sir George Downing, English Resident at The Hague, relayed the brutal statistics of death.¹⁶ Plague was also reported at Hamburg. Pepys noted on 19 October 1663 that the King was planning to keep all ships from infected ports out of the Thames.¹⁷ Charles adopted the traditional tactic of asking the Lord Mayor of London for advice, this time via Secretary Morice.¹⁸ The Lord Mayor responded very quickly that vessels from infected places should come no nearer to London than roughly Gravesend, at which point, following practice in other countries, 'some Repositories may be appointed after the manner of Lazaretoes, into w^ch the Shipps may be discharged & the Goods lye to be Aired for the space of 40 dayes after the unlading'.¹⁹ The initial reaction of the Privy Council, on 23 October, was to agree, with the lazaretto to be no nearer than Tilbury Hope, at such precise location as the City should agree with the farmers of Customs.²⁰

The lazaretto evidently proved too difficult to site, as no more is heard of it. On 6 November the Privy Council set up a committee to consider the Lord Mayor's recommendations; it reported a week later with some ideas of its own, which were implemented.²¹ The Postmaster General was to ensure that no passenger 'be permitted to be wafted over into England' in the packet boats from Holland, and two small warships, each with two Customs' officials, were to be stationed at the mouth of the river to interrogate every ship.²² Those from Amsterdam or Hamburg, or any other infected place, had either to turn back or perform 30 days' quarantine at Hole Haven, where a ketch with six men would keep an eye on the detainees.²³ Ships from uninfected places were to be given a pass and allowed to proceed up to London, showing their passes on the way to the commanders of blockhouses at Gravesend or Tilbury Fort.²⁴ For the period of detention at Hole Haven. Privy Council minutes used the novel word 'Triantane', an infelicity which has escaped the dictionary.²⁵ It can be deduced from Pepys's quotation that it was not used in the phrasing of the Order.

Correspondence from The Hague suggests that Downing was slow to grasp the English end of the crisis. In February and March 1664, he was still suggesting to Clarendon what quarantine precautions were advisable, while Pieter Cunaeus, Dutch secretary in London, w...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• List of Maps
• List of Tables
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• 1 The Seventeenth Century
• 2 The Baltic Crisis, 1709–1714: Policy and Procedure
• 3 The Baltic Crisis, 1709–1714: Mercantile Worries
• 4 The Marseilles Crisis, 1720–1723
• 5 Gibraltar and Minorca, 1720–1814
• 6 The Messina Crisis, and Legislation, 1728–1754
• 7 Indecision in Britain, 1756–1788
• 8 The Foul-Bill Dilemma, 1786–1800
• 9 Land or Sea? The Lazaretto Debate, 1793–1800
• 10 British Board of Health and Kentish Fiasco, 1803–1820
• 11 Malta: War, Peace and Plague, 1640–1814
• 12 Anti-Contagionism in Britain, 1805–1825
• 13 Malta and the Ionian Islands, 1815–1826
• 14 Mediterranean Misery, plus Cholera, 1825–1835
• 15 International Deliberation, 1835–1853
• 16 Malta, 1826–1851, and the Demise of Quarantine
• Glossary
• Bibliography
• Appendices
• Index