Social Movement De-Radicalisation and the Decline of Terrorism

The Morphogenesis of the Irish Republican Movement

Gordon Clubb

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317390749
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Terrorism
• Index: Politics & International Relations

By drawing on social movement theories, this book explains how terrorist movements decline, using the case of Irish Republicanism.

The continuity of terrorism and political violence from generation to generation demonstrates the need to go beyond a focus on groups or individuals in order to explain how terrorism ends. The concept of de-radicalisation has been critiqued for its lack of explanatory value in accounting for disengagement from terrorism or how the risk of terrorism re-emerging is reduced. However, building on the morphogenetic approach, this book distinguishes between structure/culture and agency over time in order to analyse the causal influence between the two. Two processes are analysed: disengagement framing processes explain how actors change attitudes to violence and the book identifies which factors ensure frames resonate with audiences; and social movement de-radicalisation accounts for the outcomes of disengagement in initiating structural change which transforms the landscape the next generation finds itself in. The fundamental aim of the book is to provide theoretical and conceptual insights into how terrorism can not only come to an end, but can be prevented from emerging to be a significant threat again within a society.

This book will be of much interest to students of terrorism and political violence, social movement theory, British and Irish Politics, war and conflict studies, security studies and IR in general.

1 A social movement approach

Explanations of disengagement and de-radicalisation – or ‘how terrorism ends’ – have tended to underplay the social dimension of what are in essence processes of social change. De-radicalisation has been typically applied to individuals and groups, and in both cases there have been strong arguments to show that disengagement does not necessarily follow de-radicalisation either in an ideological sense or in terms of attitudinal support for terrorism and political violence.¹ While these conclusions have led to the conceptual utility of de-radicalisation being challenged, ideology clearly has some causal role in causing terrorism (and by logical conclusion, its demise).² Even if the occurrence of de-radicalisation is not necessary to ensure disengagement and recidivism reduction among individuals and groups,³ the attitudes and ideology of these actors can (unintentionally) inspire the next generation to engage in terrorism. In other words, in order to explain how terrorism ends among social movements – defined intra- and inter-generationally – de-radicalisation is an essential process to ensure terrorism within a movement does not continue or does not re-emerge (in the same way as recidivism reduction at the individual level).

In order to develop a theoretical approach to understand the de-radicalisation of social movements, it is first of all important to reiterate broadly how some of the key terms have been understood (although these are by no means uncontested). Given the nature of social movements – discussed in detail below – and how any multi-level analysis involves some form of synthesis, there are four concepts which are composites of what can be termed social movement de-radicalisation. Disengagement refers to a behavioural change away from using armed violence, motivated by a change in priorities in response to changing circumstances, but this change in behaviour can be accompanied by the maintenance of attitudes that drove involvement.⁴ The process of disengagement – or organisational disengagement – itself can act to encourage other groups to disengage – known as the domino effect⁵ – and reduce the risk of recidivism through disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration.⁶ De-radicalisation refers to the motivations, ideology and/or attitudes to armed violence changing genuinely, meaning the individual or group no longer wishes to engage in armed violence, thus reducing the risk of recidivism.⁷ As explained in the Introduction, the book’s argument is based on a critique of this conceptualisation, and instead it focuses on attitudinal change toward behaviour, with de-radicalisation being conceptualised as the process on the whole (at least when applied to social movements). Structural change, such as changes in technology, changes in the international arena such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and changes in political systems, can affect the group’s ability to mobilise resources and limit opportunities.⁸ One epiphenomenon of structural change is the changing attitudes of the next generation, whereby a militant group is unable to pass on the struggle to the next generation,⁹ or passing the struggle to the next generation leads to its degradation into an isolated, apolitical gang.¹⁰ These concepts are drawn upon to build a theoretical framework to conceptualise the de-radicalisation of social movements as a process of social change, encompassing processes of disengagement, the domino effect, attitudinal change and, broader structural changes.

Social movements

The lack of a more holistic multi-level analysis has meant that explanations of how terrorism campaigns end have faced a number of problems. Gvineria (2009) states that a consequence of ‘a near-exclusive preoccupation with terrorist [groups] as the unit of analysis’ is that the literature ‘often equates decline of an organisation with the end of terrorism’.¹¹ Crenshaw (1991) highlights the difficulties in assessing when terrorism has declined: some groups continue to exist despite apparent passivity and it is unknown when terrorism is likely to be reactivated.¹² Thus, disengagement and de-radicalisation processes are staircases that can be climbed up and down at any stage¹³ – former combatants can become militants again¹⁴ – but these metaphorical staircases to and from using armed violence can also be used by the next generation if the push and pull factors which cause of terrorism¹⁵ still remain within a society. The closest approach in terrorism studies to a multi-level analysis that would take into account these factors has been the waves of terrorism theory. Yet, a problem with the waves of terrorism theory is the object of analysis was too broad, conflating groups such as ETA, the Provisional IRA, the PLO and many other nationalist movements together – in other words, the theory is not grounded. While it groups together militant groups, it does not necessarily take into account the context in which each of these groups operates, namely, sympathisers, potential sympathisers and competitor groups who do not necessarily fit into the ‘nationalist wave’– such as Hamas (Islamist-nationalist), the Irish National Liberation Army (Marxist-nationalist), or the Ulster Volunteer Force (Loyalist-nationalist). Partly in response to these aforementioned problems, Schmid (2013) and Della Porta and LaFree (2012) argue that de-radicalisation needs to be scrutinised on the micro, meso and macro levels, and most importantly one describes the interplay between these dimensions, which a social movement approach does.¹⁶ Social movement theory provides a grounded and contextualised framework of analysis that can incorporate individual, group and structural explanations, enabling an analysis of the interaction between each level.¹⁷

Social movements, defined by Della Porta and Diani, are informal networks, based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilise around conflictual issues, through the frequent use of various forms of protest.¹⁸ However, recent studies have moved beyond seeing social movements as only informal networks. Social movements consist of groups and organisations with various levels of formalisation, ‘linked in patterns of interaction which run from the fairly centralised to the totally decentralised, from the cooperative to the explicitly hostile’.¹⁹ They can be networks of individuals or networks of organisations, or they can consist of a mix of multiple networks of organisations and networks of individuals.²⁰ As discussed above, most terrorism research focuses on militant groups, however, militant groups such as the Provisional IRA and Hamas are typically part of larger social movements. Thus, social movements consist of different degrees of active agency, with groups such as the Provisional IRA providing greater organisation and mobilisation in the context of a ‘radical milieu’ of casual supporters and sympathisers.²¹ A social movement approach not only helps to put terrorism and political violence in a broader context, it also contextualises the militant group and how it emerged.²²

A social movement approach also emphasises the processes of interaction between groups which constitute the movement over time and space, a process which is best understood with reference to the domino effect. The domino effect is a term coined by Ashour (2009), who observes that the disengagement of Islamist groups diffuses to other groups within the movement, bringing him to conclude that its dynamics ought to be a subject of future research.²³ The book would add that this domino effect not only diffuses to other groups; it diffuses throughout the movement, thus affecting the radical milieu and the next generation, and even Loyalist paramilitary groups. Nevertheless, the domino effect is by no means an inevitable process; it merely encapsulates the knock-on effects that group disengagement may have in addition to structural and attitudinal changes. It is also important to take into account factors which can have a reversing effect: these can be understood as recidivist factors. Whereas recidivism – or a slip-back into violence – has referred to the individual, its application to a social movement requires a broader definition. Recidivism at a societal level can be expanded to have a number of dimensions which involve: (1) the Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein officially returning to violence; (2) some of its members returning to violence; (3) emerging opportunities that strengthen dissident Republicans or maintain the existence of Republican militant groups; and (4) passing on the armed struggle to the next generation. The use of the term recidivism, with its roots in a criminological context, in the context of this book is not making the assumption that all or some of the actors within a movement have offended, re-offended or that they are (potential) criminals. The term (societal) recidivism is used as a heuristic to account for the processes by which a movement re-engages in violence or sees an upsurge of violence after the period in which key actors within the movement had sought to move away from violence.

Having outlined the benefits of a social movement approach and what this consists of, the chapter will now outline the theory that underpins this approach, which will inform the book’s conceptualisation of social movement de-radicalisation. Social movement theory ‘is neither homogenous, nor a theory in the strictest sense of the word. It contains a broad set of analytical frameworks for exploring social movement dynamics.’²⁴ This broad set of analytical frameworks overlap and have therefore tended to be synthesised,²⁵ as each social movement theory explains different social movement dynamics. Critical realism (discussed in the Introduction) underpins the world-view presented and shows how social movement theories are synthesised – in this sense the book speaks in the language of social movement theories but its delivery is informed particularly by Archer’s critical realism and the morphogenetic approach to social change.²⁶ The approach presented here therefore cannot necessarily be identified solely as a framing approach, relational approach, or the resource mobilisation approach – the morphogenetic cycles under examination, however, do amplify certain approaches. For example, T1 and T4 stages, which account for the structural process and the conditioning of agency, draw upon resource mobilisation, particularly Hafez’s (2003) application of it to explain the causes of Muslim rebellion.²⁷ The T2–T3 stage of agential interaction requires an interpretivist approach, hence why a framing approach is used, while recognising that relations and social networks are important causal explanations. The emphasis on the framing approach is because it is this process which can be seen as one of the engines of social movement de-radicalisation.²⁸ A framing approach demonstrates how attitudes to violence and its representation within the movement have changed over time. Crucial to de-radicalisation of social movements is that changing framings of violence, namely those which oppose violence, resonate with the Irish Republican social movement and the next generation.

Frame resonance does not emerge simply because of the quality of the frame or narrative but instead is causally influenced by relational and structural/cultural conditioning (T4): (1) the organisational structure and shape of networks;²⁹ (2) the stages and cycles a movement undergoes, and how each of these differ;³⁰ (3) and how the structural environment and the political system can provide opportunities for those wishing to use (or not use) terrorism and political violence.³¹ Each of these aspects helps to explain how terrorism ends in a social movement.

Attitudinal change: a framing approach (T2–3)

For terrorism to end with any degree of durability, there must be a decreased risk of recidivism, which can reflect organisational, structural and attitudinal change. The question posed in the context of the de-radicalisation versus disengagement debate is what type of attitudes are needed or not needed to reduce the risk of individuals, groups, and social movements re-engaging in violence. At the core of the de-radicalisation versus disengagement debate is the extent to which there is a causal connection between types of attitudes and behaviour. With regard to the behaviour, it generally refers to involvement in or support for groups who use political violence and terrorism, or in the use of political violence and terrorism itself. However, there is a lack of agreement on what the attitudes encompass, with one perspective emphasising radical ideology, beliefs, goals and tactics, while another perspective emphasises tactics. The distinction is important: in the first perspective (the broad approach), an actor’s belief in Republicanism, the removal of British influence from Ireland, and the validity of armed struggle makes it likely for them to engage in or support armed struggle; in the second perspective (the narrow approach), an actor’s belief in the validity of armed struggle alone makes it likely for them to engage in or support armed violence. The narrow approach would lead one to argue that de-legitimising such violence is sufficient to reduce the risk of recidivism and spread disengagement to others, while still being ideologically committed to the cause.³² There is a lack of consensus on whether the narrow approach should even be considered de-radicalisation in academia and in policy circles. Silke (2011) refers to the public de-legitimisation of armed violence by European leftist militants as disengagement and not de-radicalisation, despite this surely being the core aspect of de-radicalisation rather than ideological change.³³ Schmid (2013) argues that continuing to hold a radical ideology can be a factor in radicalising others, hence why the broad approach to de-radicalisation is important.³⁴ One senior British counter-terrorism policy-maker referred to the de-leg...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: waves of terrorism and morphogenesis
• 1. A social movement approach
• 2. The Irish Republican movement
• 3. Framing disengagement
• 4. The disengagement domino effect
• 5. The next generation
• Conclusion: social movement de-radicalisation
• Index