In recent years there has been a rebirth of interest in the histories of atheism and deism. Long neglected, and sometimes caricatured, atheists and deists are again the objects of scholarly concern, although the pattern of the scholarship differs in the two instances. In this chapter we draw attention to methodological challenges raised by new approaches to the study of atheism and deism and then introduce the chapters in the book against this critical background.
Revaluing Atheism and Deism
Atheism and deism are back in vogue, partly because the role of heterodoxy in the Enlightenment and in the emergence of modernity is now debated throughout the world. Further, in recent years scholars have problematized concepts and labels that used to be employed without much consideration of historical usage or the ambiguities implicit in the standard definitions. 1 Nonetheless, there is still more work to be done on different usages in different European languages and on differences between sixteenth-century and nineteenth-century usages of terms such as âdeistâ, âatheistâ and âinfidelâ.
This volume concentrates on heterodoxy in England, but with the aim of raising issues which reverberate, albeit somewhat differently, elsewhere â for example, in Europe, in the Americas and in the Pacific. Deism in England had its own characteristics, although there were resemblances with European deisms and some interactions as well. Many eighteenth-century writers resorted to negative definitions. Atheists and deists were not true Christians and wished to dismantle all that was good and decent in society. Edward Goldney, for example, in a 1759 work dedicated to George II, hoped that âmy Epistle to the Deists may also be a means of undeceiving Practical Atheists and Deists ⌠and for the furthering and promoting of Real Vital Christianity in all your Majestyâs Subjectsâ. 2 In other words, deism could be conquered by the promotion of true Christianity. If one shouted loudly enough, deism and atheism would be defeated.
Such a view could be seen generations earlier in the writings of Mungo Craig, whose book, A Satyr Against Atheistical Deism (1696), contained part of his testimony against fellow University of Edinburgh student Thomas Aikenhead, the last person executed for blasphemy in Scotland. Craig saw deism as ânothingâ but âA Bodiless Shirt wanting the Sleevesâ and containing âAmputation of all Realitiesâ. 3 Others took a more moderate tone: deism was indeed an issue requiring attention, but the Church of England itself had fallen into a spiritual negligence that allowed deism and atheism, with their sharp critiques of religion, to gain footholds. William Stephens, for example, stated that the deists with whom he was acquainted âconceivâd so great a Prejudice against the Christian Faith, from the Behaviour of the Clergyâ. 4 By the end of the eighteenth century atheism and deism were firmly rooted in the fabric of society. John Ogilvie spoke for many when he claimed in 1783:
That the opinions of Deists and Sceptics have spread more universally during the last part of the last century, and in the present, than at any former era since the resurrection of letters, is a truth to which the friends and enemies of religion will give their suffrage without hesitation. 5
In due course the existence and spread of atheism and deism came to be taken for granted by historians, who saw the growth of critical attitudes toward established religion as a crucial step on the road to modernity. But what did it actually mean to be an atheist or a deist? If early modern writers who lived in the thick of the ideological battles struggled with the question, modern observers gazing back over several centuries were further hamstrung as the subtleties of the intellectual debates and nuanced word usage became faded and then lost to be replaced by generalizations and expected definitions. More than twenty years ago, Michael Hunter commented that the meaning of âatheismâ âinvites confusionâ, 6 while James Force urged a âcomprehensive definition of deismâ and yet the task would be difficult because, as Force phrased it, âdeismâ was âone of the dirty words of the ageâ conveying fear on the part of those who used it rather than specific traits of the accused. 7 Recently, historians, philosophers and other scholars of early modern Europe have taken a renewed look at concepts and labels that their predecessors employed without much consideration of historical usage or the various shading of definitions. Among the words receiving renewed inquiry are âorthodoxâ, âradicalâ, âatheistâ and âdeistâ, along with their respective âismsâ. 8 Such labels are now seen as carrying fine distinctions, which have not always been preserved by scholars, and careful work has shown that their original deployment and usage were more complicated than conveyed in the literature.
Atheism and deism in Britain between 1650 and 1800 are topics of the first importance, partly because both have been written about in caricatural terms by historians prejudiced against them and partly because the nature of atheism and deism in Britain between 1650 and 1750 goes to the heart of contemporary attempts to reinterpret the Enlightenment. If it is relatively simple to determine who were atheists and who were deists in this period and if atheism, broadly conceived, was the future of humanity preappearing in repressive societies, then those who see the Enlightenment as an historical telos gain considerable support. If, however, atheism and deism are rather difficult to study in this period because the issues at the time were not the issues now nor even the issues which the modern historian might initially assume, then this goes to how the case for the global significance of the Enlightenment should be made. The editors of this volume support the view that the Enlightenment was of enormous significance for humanity and a turning point in global history. However, they are also conscious that detailed historical scholarship in this area requires considerable historical sensitivity, not least because actual contexts are often different from those many historians tend to assume.
Both atheism and deism were shifting designators in this period and often cannot be understood in twentieth-century or even twenty-first-century terms. Further, the relationship between atheism and deism remains relatively underexplored, even though work in this area may sometimes undermine both categories.
By revaluing atheism and deism the editors seek to rehabilitate figures long either misinterpreted or overlooked. Atheism is suddenly hyper-fashionable and this in itself will contribute to revisionist histories. On the other hand, the philosophical and theological dimensions of atheism are still little understood by historians, many of whom find technical philosophy dull and technical theology unreadable. In both cases what looks like a matter of taste arguably limits attempts to reconstruct British thought between 1650 and 1800. In a similar way, disinterest in classical culture, especially classical Greek, sometimes leads historians with well-stocked modern minds not to discern the classically oriented thinking of writers they discuss and to attribute to them levels of optimism unlikely in classically trained thinkers.
Over all, large parts of the historiography of atheism remain problematic. Many books on the history of atheism are either introductory or written with reference to Christian theology, rather than from the perspective of those whom contemporaries called âatheistâ. 9 Moreover, in recent historiography âatheismâ is often used as an alternative label for thinkers who had heterodox, deistic or sceptical views instead of a category of its own. What is more, some historians with secularist sympathies deploy âatheismâ as a term of approval to characterize the thought of a mind that has awakened to the delusions of religion. But the term âatheismâ arguably cannot be used in this way without qualification with reference to Britain in this period, because âatheismâ was a shifting designator and we need to know how a particular thinker saw matters, not how they appear to modern intellectuals. In many contexts the term âatheismâ cannot be used both to designate analytically a generic intellectual position and to describe contextually how the writers understood their own stances, at least not without considerable caution. Those who thought of themselves as atheists do not always meet generic definitions, while those who meet generic definitions did not always think of themselves as atheists.
The case with deism is somewhat different because hardly any contemporary historian thinks of themselves as a deist. Deism is past, in a way in which atheism is not. This means that it is easier to register the historical complexities for deism than for atheism. Moreover, the justice issue is acute. Deism has long been both trivialized and neglected. In much of the historiography it has been seen as a halfway house between theism and atheism. Many of the eighteenth-century Boyle Lecturers, as the distinguished work of Margaret Jacob shows, took this view when they placed âdeismâ and âatheismâ on a sliding scale with the former the inevitable precursor of the latter. 10 Recent studies, several by the editors of this book, have restored deism as an intellectual category in its own right. 11 Although this work has done much to alter current understanding of deism in England and help to create renewed interest in the subject, there remains much that has not been addressed. A wealth of new scholarship on âdeismâ has emerged since the last edited collections of deism studies appeared several years ago. 12 Indeed, detailed examinations of deism reveal how much scholars have taken for granted in this area and, therefore, challenge and problematize often âtotalizingâ or âteleologicalâ interpretations of various thinkers commonly labelled âdeistsâ.
On the other hand, atheism and deism were important in and across many contexts and their appearance as possible subject positions marks structural shifts of major historical significance. Once individuals could describe themselves as deists or atheists the social character of religious belief began to change. Moreover, the new subject positions were associated in many contexts with radical programmes of political, social and cultural reform, as Jacobâs classic study first revealed. 13 More recently, and to a greater ex...