The Intelligent Design Debate and the Temptation of Scientism

A Theological and Philosophical Analysis

Erkki Vesa Rope Kojonen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317027331
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: Religion & Science

The controversy over Intelligent Design (ID) has now continued for over two decades, with no signs of ending. For its defenders, ID is revolutionary new science, and its opposition is merely ideological. For its critics, ID is both bad science and bad theology. But the polemical nature of the debate makes it difficult to understand the nature of the arguments on all sides. A balanced and deep analysis of a controversial debate, this volume argues that beliefs about the purposiveness or non-purposiveness of nature should not be based merely on science. Rather, the philosophical and theological nature of such questions should be openly acknowledged.

1 Introduction

The purpose of this book

The controversy over Intelligent Design (ID) has now continued for over two decades, with no signs of ending. For its defenders, ID is revolutionary new science, and its opposition is merely ideological. The conclusion that nature is designed is argued to be the clear result of the cumulative efforts of the various natural sciences, and proponents of ID believe this conclusion to be ‘so unambiguous and so significant that it must be ranked as one of the greatest achievements in the history of science’.¹ However, for its varied critics, ID is both bad science and bad theology. But the polemical nature of the debate makes it difficult to understand the real nature of the arguments on each side.

The purpose of this book is to provide a balanced analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of different positions in the debate. The book analyses the central philosophical and theological questions of the ID discussion, aiming to show how all sides can improve their argumentation. Although the empirical arguments for and against are also touched upon, the main focus is on the theological and philosophical questions.

This may be a surprising emphasis, since many participants of the debate agree that the natural sciences should be the main factor driving our conclusions about whether nature is purposefully designed or not. As Nathaniel C. Comfort has noted: ‘One point on which anti-Darwinists and anticreationists agree is that this is a pitched battle between dogmatic religious fanatics on the one hand, and rigorous, fair-minded scientists on the other. However, which side is which depends on who you read’.² Although both critics and defenders of ID often explain the beliefs of the other side as the result of ideological or religious bias, the importance of the philosophical and theological assumptions on one’s own side is not usually emphasized. However, it is my contention that using philosophical and theological arguments in this debate is actually necessary, and all sides depend on such arguments in addition to evidence from the natural sciences.

Teasing out the theological and philosophical background of the debate might be interpreted as a critique of the various positions, since all sides would rather identify with the scientists than with the religious fanatics described by Comfort. Of course we are right to be wary of fanaticism and dogmatism. But all theology and philosophy are not distorting ideology, and it is my intent simply to shed light on this part of the debate. I argue that the sidelining of theology and philosophy from the debate is actually an example of the influence of scientism, defined as the belief that science is the only way to gain reliable knowledge about the world. Not many in the debate consciously advocate such a position; often proponents of ID even state their rejection of scientism explicitly. The influence of scientism on the debate is more subtle, implicit in some of the arguments and emphases of the debate.

Because of the usefulness of the natural sciences for contemporary Western societies, it is understandable to experience a temptation to think that scientific methods are also the best or only way to settle age-old philosophical and religious questions, such as whether the cosmos is purposefully created or not. Because science commands near-universal respect in our culture, it is tempting to restrict one’s arguments to this highly respected medium, rather than engaging in more controversial, openly philosophical and theological dialogue. However, this leads to a problematic devaluing of those forms of rationality that fall outside the natural sciences. Of course, it is not uncontroversial that there is some problem in such a devaluing. For example, biologist Jerry Coyne argues that it is simply reasonable, since science is rational, and religion is not: ‘Science and religion, then, are competitors in the business of finding out what is true about our universe. In this goal religion has failed miserably, for its tools for discerning “truth” are useless’.³ One of the goals of the present volume is to show how philosophical and theological discussion of such matters continues to have value.

So, in addition to advancing understanding of the central positions and arguments in the debate, the purpose of this book is also to reconnect the discussion on ID into the broader philosophical and theological discussion of the same themes. In this way, the book aims to help participants on all sides formulate better arguments. The book is somewhat unusual for the debate because of the fact that its central purpose is not to argue for or against ID. I will not be attempting to persuade the reader that the cosmos is purposefully designed, or non-designed, or that proponents of ID or their critics are fools for rejecting obvious scientific truths. Where I offer critiques of various positions in the debate, I will also usually attempt to show how the position could be modified in a way that avoids the critique. Much of the study simply takes the form of systematic analysis of the debate, going over the central questions one by one to see what kind of insights emerge.

Because the ideas of the ID movement are highly controversial, I contrast them to opposing views, mainly theistic evolutionism and naturalistic evolutionism. One cannot be fair to the debate by including only one viewpoint on the major issues. Accordingly, while preparing this study, I have read the arguments for each side as broadly as possible and have attempted to select the most crucial and most often repeated arguments for analysis. My hope is that persons of widely different persuasions reading this book can recognize that their own views are fairly presented and be stimulated in their thinking by the arguments I present.

The need for clarity and a balanced analysis has been stressed (for example) by philosophers Jeffrey Koperski and Del Ratzsch, who have called on scholars to analyse ID calmly to identify both the strengths and weaknesses of ID thought.⁴ This is the central purpose of the present study: to understand the cognitive landscape of the debate and the structure of the ID debate. Of course, understanding any system of thought can also help one see its flaws more clearly. However, my personal hope is that this analysis will not just result in pointing out flaws in the various viewpoints but also build bridges between them to help develop the debate more into a dialogue.

The need for such an analysis is also revealed in the varied nature of the criticisms directed against ID. For example, philosophically, ID’s design argument has been criticized both by arguing that the hypothesis of a designer is unfalsifiable and by arguing that ID’s design argument has been falsified. To make matters even more complex, in theological critiques of ID, its susceptibility to falsification by future scientific discoveries is often seen as one of its greatest flaws. Some critics of ID argue that design is excluded from science on philosophical grounds, while others argue that naturalistic science is open even to supernatural explanations, if there is evidence. Some argue against ID from atheist premises, regarding the design argument as the best sort of evidence for God. Others argue against ID from theistic premises, believing it to lead to a mistaken view of the Creator. Some of ID’s critics reject the possibility of all design arguments, while others defend broader cosmological design arguments themselves. Some critics even agree with ID that there are major problems in traditional Neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, but they do not agree that intelligent design is any better as a scientific explanation for life’s development. Rather, they argue for expanding the theory and searching for further natural explanations. This kind of disagreement on central issues leaves much room (and need) for a balanced theological and philosophical analysis of the movement’s ideas.

Proponents of ID emphasize the scientific nature of their design argument. Nevertheless, the ID movement is not the first to make use of design arguments, or teleological arguments as they have been traditionally termed. These arguments ‘focus upon finding and identifying various traces of the operation of a mind in nature’s temporal and physical structures, behaviors and paths’.⁵ In the tradition of natural theology, the existence of God is discussed in terms of what can be known based on ‘natural reason’ or ‘natural revelation’.⁶ Broadly speaking, natural theology speaks of knowledge of God available through human observation, memory and rational intuitions, as well as arguments based on them. Objections and defences of such arguments, and the general nature of religious rationality, have been extensively considered in the philosophy of religion, and I believe it is fruitful to relate the ID debate to this discussion.

The temptation of scientism

Defining scientism

I have titled the book The Intelligent Design Debate and the Temptation of Scientism. But what do I mean by scientism, and why is it a temptation that we should avoid? Usually, the term ‘scientism’ is understood as an epistemological claim, meaning a claim about the gathering of knowledge. For example, Alexander Rosenberg, who advocates scientism, argues that scientism ‘is the conviction that the methods of science are the only reliable ways to secure knowledge of anything – Being scientistic just means treating science as our exclusive guide to reality, to nature – both our own nature and everything else’s’.⁷ Of course, the success of the natural sciences in providing understanding of nature and the importance of technology for our daily lives provide a good argument in favour of the general value of science. But does this mean that reliable knowledge and rationality is truly restricted to science? How could we build such an argument? To many authors, this kind of extension of the cultural authority of science seems like unwarranted scientific imperialism.⁸

As a European (Finnish) writer, I would be less troubled by scientism if we were to use the word ‘science’ in the way Germans use the term ‘wissenschaft’ to refer not only to the natural sciences but also to the humanities, to philosophy and also to theology. On this usage, science means simply the systematization of our thought and reasoning, whatever the field. Yet even with this broader usage, restricting knowledge and rational beliefs to science would still not be a credible position. This is because it still excludes even obviously rational everyday beliefs from the realm of rationality. The methods of science require strict conditions and typically aim at solving highly specialized problems. We cannot present scientific evidence even for such simple beliefs as ‘my wife loves me’ or ‘I love my wife’ (unless we adopt a very broad definition of ‘science’). Now it is true that many of our everyday beliefs, such as ‘I ate some bread for breakfast this morning’ could in principle be corroborated by scientific inquiry (such as by investigating a sample of my blood), but this does not mean that we are not already justified in believing such things before scientific inquiry.

The problem with scientism is not that we love the natural sciences too much; I have no desire to argue against valuing science. Rather, the problem is that we undervalue the importance of philosophy, theology and everyday methods of reasoning. Actually, practicing the natural sciences itself requires a broader conception of rationality, allowing some reliability for rational beliefs through observation, memory, rational intuitions and so on. For example, in order to perform experiments, one has to be able to trust ordinary experiences like ‘I see such and such through the microscope’. To function in the community of scientists, we need to trust in the existence of other minds, our ability to plan intentionally, the rationality of accumulating evidence and so on. Of course, the intersubjective testing of experience improves reliability, but that also does so only by assuming that experience is valuable. Therefore, it seems that if natural science is reliable, reliable knowledge and rational beliefs must also be possible outside the natural sciences.⁹

There are further broad problems with scientism. For example, it seems reasonable to understand the restriction of knowledge to science as a philosophical claim. However, in this case scientism appears to be self-refuting, because this philosophical claim is itself not the result of scientific research. So it seems that defences of scientism assume that there must be knowledge outside of science; otherwise scientism itself could not be defended. But if this one philosophical idea can be rational outside of the natural sciences, then why could not other philosophical ideas also be rational? It is true that natural science has been successful in gaining knowledge about many things, but this success can also be valued without assuming that science is the only way of gaining knowledge. Other fields could also employ evidence-based reasoning, even if they are very different from the natural sciences.¹⁰

Scientism in the context of the ID debate

Very few thinkers explicitly defend scientism generally or in the context of the debate over ID.¹¹ Proponents of ID themselves would balk at the suggestion that scientism is influencing their strategy or arguments; they aim to oppose scientism, not to defend it.¹² If you are a reader who is inclined to think that talking about scientism in religion and science discussions is a ‘canard’, like biologist Jerry Coyne argues,¹³ I recommend that you read some of the good academic studies on scientism. For example, Mikael Stenmark’s now classic study Scientism: Science, Ethics and Religion (2001), published in the same series as this book, contains good definitions, documentation and critique of various forms of scientism. Many other good studies of the matter are also available.¹⁴ Furthermore, even if scientism were generally a ‘canard’, the concept is definitely relevant for the discussion on ID. The later chapters of this book will in any case critique the ways in which scientism adversely affects the debate over ID. These chapters will also more closely reveal what I think about the relationship of faith and reason generally.

To give the reader a general idea of what I am going to say, I believe the influence of scientism on the ID debate is implicitly visible in the overt focus on arguing over whether ID is part of the natural sciences or not, and in the undervaluing of arguments and forms of rationality that are not part of the natural sciences, such as philosophy and theology. Arguments based on the natural sciences are valued, while philosophical and theological arguments are often hidden or put in the sidelines on different sides of the debate. I agree that discussion of biological design arguments, for example, is very much affected by the theory of biological evolution, as well as by the empirical details of biological organisms. So in this sense discussing science is indeed crucial for the debate. However, what is often overlooked in the debate is that the overall questi...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Mapping the landscape of the debate
• 3 The cosmological debate
• 4 The biological debate
• 5 Intelligent Design as science or pseudoscience
• 6 The designer of the gaps?
• 7 The intuitive possibility of design
• 8 The logic of design arguments
• 9 Design, natural evil and bad design
• 10 Intelligent Design and theistic evolutionism
• Afterword: towards better discussion of Intelligent Design
• Bibliography
• Index