The Social Significance of Religion in the Enlarged Europe

Secularization, Individualization and Pluralization

Olaf Müller, Detlef Pollack

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317015543
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: Religion, Politics & State

Engaging with some of the central issues in the sociology of religion, this volume investigates the role and significance of churches and religion in contemporary Western and Eastern Europe. Based on an extensive international research project, it offers case studies of various countries (including Finland, Ireland, Portugal, Germany, Poland, Russia, Estonia, Hungary and Croatia), as well as cross-country comparisons. Researching more precisely the present social relevance of church and religion at different levels, The Social Significance of Religion in the Enlarged Europe raises and responds to both descriptive and explanatory questions: Can we observe tendencies of religious decline in the various Western and Eastern European countries? Are we witnessing trends of religious individualization? To what extent has there been a religious upswing in the last few years? And what are the factors causing the observed processes of religious change? Marked by its broad range of data and a coherent conceptual framework, in accordance with which each chapter assesses the extent to which three important theoretical approaches in the sociology of religion - secularization theory, the market model of religion, and the individualization thesis - are applicable to the data, this book will be of interest to scholars of sociology, politics and religion exploring religious trends and attitudes in contemporary Europe.

Chapter 1
Church and Religion in the Enlarged Europe: Analyses of the Social Significance of Religion in East and West

Detlef Pollack, Olaf Müller and Gert Pickel

The Initial Question: Religion in Modern Europe

Religion and church continue to have a marked significance in European countries at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century. A glance at the events surrounding the disintegration of the Yugoslavian multinational state, the conflicts that repeatedly flare up in Northern Ireland, and the integration problems of Muslim immigrants in countries like France, Great Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany, makes it clear that beside language, history and nationality, religion also represents an active force that can assume both a unifying and a divisive character. Especially since the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York, religion has become a topic of public debate, and media attention on the topic of religion has increased. As of that point, the issue of religious conflicts has not disappeared from the agenda, and religion often seems to have taken the place of discussions that were formerly political and national in character. If the discussion between the Western and Eastern power blocs were decisive for public debate and the view of international conflicts until 1989, religious affiliations and identities now appear to have taken over as the central explanatory factor behind conflicts that transcend nations and cultures. One need not go as far as Samuel Huntington (1996), who interpreted the central international conflicts at the end of the Cold War as a religiously coloured clash of civilizations, in order to agree with the view that to a greater extent than in previous decades religion has become a decisive category for the perception and interpretation of political, economic and social processes and differences. The increase in the significance of religious factors for the explanation and interpretation of social, political, and international conflicts and changes also applies to Europe, which has changed greatly as a result of the collapse of state socialism and the re-entry of Eastern and East Central European countries into European history. In particular, the increased status in Eastern Europe of national churches, religious movements, and ethnic conflicts within the religious sphere is obvious.

If one wants to grasp and understand the changes and challenges connected with the process of European expansion, religion can in no way be disregarded as a factor. The purpose of the studies contained in this volume is to research more precisely the present social relevance of religion and church in Eastern and Western Europe. The question of the significance of religion in society and its change has always been one of the central points of discussion in the sociology of religion. Until now this question was treated primarily in terms of the model of secularization theory. But the interpretive frameworks accompanying secularization theory have in the meantime been increasingly questioned and replaced by a series of other hypotheses. The study of secularization theory and its critics will constitute the starting point for our introductory comments.

Secularization Theory Critiqued

Even if the debate on the interpretation of the observable processes of change in the area of religion is in full swing, researchers are agreed in one respect. It is undisputed that the observable religious change in Western Europe is characterized by a general de-churchification, i.e. an abandonment of the traditional churches by large numbers of the population. This assertion is supported by numerous empirical studies (cf. Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere 1993, Davie 1994, 2000, 2002, Bruce 1996, 2002, McLeod and Ustorf 2003, Pickel and Müller 2009, Pollack 2009). To be sure, it is already a matter of dispute as to whether this development should be interpreted as a general loss in the significance of religion or whether a sharp distinction should be made between ecclesiastical and religious processes of change.

Thus, in opposition to the claim of a general rejection of religion (cf. Berger 1973, Wilson 1982, Bruce 2002) is the view that religion has merely shifted to the private sphere as a result of individualization and pluralization. Whilst religion is therefore becoming increasingly ‘invisible’, it has not lost any significance (Luckmann 1967, 1991, Knoblauch 2009). In contrast to the decrease in significance of traditional forms of Christianity, a rise in new extra-ecclesiastical and non-Christian forms of religion could actually be occurring (Gabriel 1992, Davie 2002). Moreover, the modern optimistic utopias of progress themselves may produce religion and fulfil functions similar to those of classical religions (Hervieu-Léger 1990).

The questions that are raised in the analysis of the contemporary situation with regard to religion and the church are thus: Is the decrease in the significance of religion limited to its traditional institutionalized forms or are all forms of religion affected? Or is it only a change in the dominant social forms of religion that is occurring but not a loss in the significance of religion itself? In this context one should also investigate whether at least certain forms of religion are becoming more attractive and if the status of religion in society is therefore actually rising.

The constant dispute concerning the role of religion in modern Europe has a great deal to do with the use of foundational theoretical premises and conceptions. These determine not only the conclusions that are drawn on the basis of a certain initial empirical position but also to some extent the choice and interpretation of the empirical materials. If the focus of attention was for a long time on the process of dechurchification, the primary area of research is now extra-ecclesiastical religiosity, alternative forms of religiosity or phenomena of individualized spirituality. As a result, more and more social scientists are observing an increase in the significance of religion in the description of the contemporary situation of religion. After the question was raised 30 years ago as to whether religion has a future (Schatz 1971), researchers of religion all over the world are today increasingly using concepts such as ‘desecularization’ (Berger 1999), ‘re-spiritualization’ (Horx 1995), ‘deprivativization’ (Casanova 1994), ‘return of religions’ (Riesebrodt 2000), ‘spiritual revolution’ (Heelas and Woodhead 2005), or ‘post-secular society’ (Habermas 2001, 2009) to describe the contemporary situation. The notion of secularization arises less and less frequently in descriptions of the situation of religion in Europe.

The definition of the concept of secularization itself presents an important problem in this context. A procedure frequently used in the sociology of religion is to find varying dimensions of meaning in the concept of secularization. For instance, Larry Shiner distinguishes six meanings or ways of using the concept that do indeed partially overlap (Shiner 1967). The distinction made by Olivier Tschannen between differentiation, rationalization, and worldliness is more selective. Differentiation refers to a process through which religions and religious institutions lose their influence in other social areas and become increasingly separated from them. Rationalization means that individual areas – such as science or the economy – operate increasingly on the basis of their own functional principles and logic. These processes have repercussions for religion itself, which as a result of these influences begins to be concerned less with the beyond and individual salvation and more with the psychological well-being of individuals here and now (Tschannen 1991).

The distinctions proposed by José Casanova (1994) between functional differentiation, loss of the social significance of religion and the privatization of the religious has found wide support. Whilst Casanova sees the acceptable core of the theory of secularization in processes of differentiation between various function systems in society such as the economy, law, politics, religion, and science, he considers the decrease in the significance of religion and its privatization as processes that are independent of them. In Europe, these processes are accompanied by the functional differentiation of the religious, but there is nothing that indicates that they must be connected with them, and they are not connected in other areas of the world. An examination of religious processes of change outside of Europe will show that religion has not lost but rather has gained in public relevance. It is not the privatization of religion, as Luckmann claimed, that is occurring at the present time. Rather, a glance at American fundamentalism, at the people’s church in Brazil, or the role of the Catholic Church in Poland will show that religion has once again entered the public realm. Insofar as religious communities and churches do not oppose the separation of church and state, and do not strive for public or legal privilege, religion is compatible with the function principles of modern society. The place of religion in modern society, however, should not be the public sphere but civil society. There, religion may pursue political and public functions; for example, in working for the preservation of human rights or critiquing excessive forms of capitalism (cf. Casanova 1994).

Yet another concept of secularization was used as a basis by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2004) in their research. To explain the processes of change in religion, they start with the function that religion fills in different societies. The need for religion is higher in societies that are exposed to greater risks than in societies in which there is a higher degree of existential security. In their view, the position religion occupies in a society is thus determined by the feeling of existential security and vulnerability to physical, social, and personal risks. To some, existential security means freedom from natural disasters like floods, earthquakes, drought, and tornados; to others, it means freedom from socially produced risks and dangers like war, violations of human rights, poverty, and social inequality. The need for religious values, systems of faith and practices, and therefore the level of religiosity, is inversely proportional to the extent to which societies are able to guarantee existential security, i.e. to ensure peace, provide access to clean water and appropriate food stuffs, improve health care, increase the level of education amongst the population, guarantee increase in income, remove social inequalities, and install a social safety net.

The approaches based on secularization theory are critiqued primarily for their unilinear, deterministic, and teleological character. Processes of modernization do not necessarily lead to a weakening of the significance of religious practices and doctrines in society (Joas 2006). Rather, the process of modernization could be accompanied by a religious revival, as for example in England in the first half of the nineteenth century or in the developing countries in the twentieth (Casanova 2001: 137–190). In addition, the objection raised to secularization theories is that they treat religions merely as dependent variables. But religions are not only negatively affected by processes of rationalization, social differentiation, and cultural pluralization. They can also influence society and trends in rationalization, differentiation, and pluralization. Religion and modernity are not incompatible in principle; rather, many examples can be found in which religion takes on modern characteristics and can even become the engine behind modernization processes (Graf 2004: 97, Beck 2008, Hellemans 2010).

In connection with the research into secularization processes in general, it should be kept in mind that one cannot draw conclusions directly from findings concerning the religiosity of single individuals for the social relevance of religion in society as a whole. One should not be guided by the rash conviction that development occurs equally on all levels of society and to the same extent. A decrease in church membership amongst the population can put the churches under pressure; nevertheless, we cannot draw conclusions from that fact about the influence of the churches in society as a whole. At the time of the German Empire, church membership and participation amongst Protestants were extremely low, but Protestant churches still carried great weight in society (McLeod 1997: 84). Similarly, references in the constitution, for example, to a general accountability to God or the judicial granting of the right of freedom of religion say little about the actual religiosity of the people or the variety of religious groups in the country. There are various structures of opportunities, constitutional restrictions, and temporal horizons for each of these levels (Tyrell 1983: 76). A complete picture of the relevance of religion in society requires that one look at what is happening on each of these levels (cf. also Wilson 1985).

Karel Dobbelaere has already referred repeatedly to the necessity of distinguishing between different levels of secularization (Dobbelaere 1981, 1999). Thus, he distinguishes between societal, organizational, and individual secularization. By societal secularization he means in essence the increasing emancipation of social sectors (like politics, the economy, law) from religious guidelines and norms as a result of the differentiation of different societal subsystems (Dobbelaere 2002: 29–35, 45–103). Secularization on the organizational level concerns the secularization of religion in view of, for example, the change in the social form of churches or the objectives and self-understanding of new religious movements (Dobbelaere 2002: 35–38, 105–135). Finally, secularization on the individual level characterizes the process of the growing distance of people from the church and religion on the whole (Dobbelaere 2002: 38–43, 137–155).

If we now summarise the status of research concerning the understanding of the concept of secularization at this point, secularization can thus be understood in a rather general way as a process ‘through which parts of society and sectors of the culture are freed from the domination by religious institutions and symbols’ (Berger 1973: 103), or as a process ‘by which religious institutions, actions, and consciousness lose their social significance’ (Wilson 1966: 14). That is, not only is the (Christian) church suffering from a loss of authority, but also religion as a whole (Chaves 1994: 750), and this loss in significance concerns not only one level of society, e.g. the public, but others as well, such as the individual.

Alternatives to Secularization Theory

Alternatives to the secularization theory under consideration include on the one hand the individualization theory already mentioned above, and the so-called economic market theory that was developed primarily by American sociologists of religion to register the particularities of the religious landscape in the US but was also applied to other areas of the world, including Europe.

Proponents of the individualization theory hold that the modernization of society leads not to a weakening of the position of religion, but only to changes in its forms. The argument is that, whereas religion was institutionalized in the churches in pre-modern societies, the connection between religiosity and churchliness is increasingly dissolving in modern societies. Whilst churches are losing a great deal of social acceptance, religion and religiosity are gaining in social significance. They are to be found today in places where they would not have been expected previously: in psychoanalysis and physical care, in the entertainment world, and the cult of community, in tourism, and in sports. What the individual believes is no longer determined for him by institutions. Rather, each individual today must choose his or her worldview orientation from a wide range of ecclesiastical and extra-ecclesiastical religious offerings. That is the reason why religiosity is increasingly being characterized as an individually justified mixture or bricolage of different religious orientations. The decline of the social significance of religious institutions is thus not accompanied by a loss of significance on the part of religion for the individual. On the contrary, institutionalized religion and individual spirituality are inversely related to each other. For that reason, the churches’ decline in significance is connected in general with a rise in individual religiosity. Important advocates of this approach are Grace Davie (1994, 2002), Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead (2005) in Great Britain, Danièle Hervieu-Léger (1990, 2000) and Claire de Galembert (2004) in France, Roberto Cipriani (1989) in Italy, Michael Krüggeler and Peter Voll (1993) in Switzerland, Thomas Luckmann (1967, 1991) and Hubert Knoblauch (1991, 2008, 2009) in Germany, and Wade Clark Roof (1993, 1999), Robert Wuthnow (1998), and Robert C. Fuller (2002) in the US.

The critical objections to individualization theory have to do simply with the broad concept of religion that, for the most part, is fundamental to this theory. If elements of religious meaning can be found in all areas of society, in the body cult at fitness centres, ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Notes on Contributors
• 1. Church and Religion in the Enlarged Europe: Analyses of the Social Significance of Religion in East and West
• 2. Church, Religion and Spirituality in Finland
• 3. Ireland in the Twenty-first Century: Secularization or Religious Vitality?
• 4. Portugal: Secularization and Religious Vitality of the Roman Catholic Church in a Southern European Country
• 5. The Religious Landscape in Germany: Secularizing West – Secularized East
• 6. Questioning Secularization? Church and Religion in Poland
• 7. Secularization or De-secularization? The Challenges of and from the Post-Soviet Experience
• 8. Some Aspects of Religiosity in Estonia
• 9. Church and Religion in Hungary: Between Religious Individualization and Secularization
• 10. Croatia’s Religious Story: The Coexistence of Institutionalized and Individualized Religiosity
• 11. Differentiated Secularization in Europe: Comparative Results
• Index