PART I
Introduction Chapter 1
Collaborative Creativity and Creative Collaboration: Troubling the Creative Imaginary
Margaret S. Barrett
Introduction
Creative thought and practice in the domain of music has been the focus of research across diverse scholarly disciplines including those of musicology, music psychology, music education, music sociology and music philosophy. Investigations have sought to uncover historical perspectives of creative thought and practice (Nelson, 2010; Pope, 2005), to understand the characteristic features of eminent creative persons (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, 1998; Gardner, 1993a, 1993b, 1995, 1997), creative processes (Bindeman, 1998; Sternberg, 1999), products (Runco, 2007), places (Florida, 2003, 2005, 2008) and ecologies (Barrett, 2012; Howkins, 2009), and to identify the teaching and learning processes that underpin expert creative thought and practice in music composition (Barrett, 2006; Barrett & Gromko, 2007). Much of this work has focused on the individual creator working in relative isolation, with less attention paid to those characteristic features of persons, processes, practices, places and ecologies that support collaborative creative thought and practice.
In recent years, the notion of the individual creator, a product in part of the Western Romantic ideal, has been troubled by accounts of creative thought and practice as a social construct (e.g. Burnard, 2012; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). Even those who work seemingly in isolation build on the work of those who have gone before them. As noted by Galenson (2006), âartistic innovations are not made by isolated geniuses, but are usually based on the lessons of teachers and the collaboration of colleaguesâ (p. 66). Recognition of the ways in which creativity emerges from joint effort has given rise to the investigation of creative collaborations and partnerships (Farrell, 2003; John-Steiner, 2000; Moran & John-Steiner, 2003, 2004) and the notion of group creativity (Sawyer, 2003a, 2003b, 2006, 2008).
The contributions to this volume explore the ways in which collaborative creative practices underpin musical thought and activity across the disciplines of composition, musicology, performance and music education. Whilst investigations of creativity in music have tended to focus on contemporary (popular, rather than Western classical) composition and improvisation practices as the location of creative thought and practice, these authors consider the ways in which collaborative creativity underpins thinking and practice in and across multiple musical practices. In doing so, the chapters contribute to discussions of the âcreative imaginaryâ in music (Barrett, 2012), and consideration of the role of collaborative practices within the domain. In this chapter I provide a summary of some of the key discussions in creativity research and consider the implications for collaborative creativity in musical thought and practice.1
Troubling the Creative Imaginary
The prevailing âcreative imaginaryâ (Barrett, 2012), that is, the set of propositions, beliefs, values and practices that shape our views of âwhereâ creativity occurs, how it is manifested, and âwhoâ and âwhatâ is creative is characterized by a number of tensions. These include but are not limited to those that hold between:
⢠general and domain-specific views of creativity;
⢠consideration of the defining dimensions of creativity and the role of novelty and value in definitions and descriptions;
⢠consideration of the parameters of creative thought and activity; and
⢠individual and social views of creativity (see also Sternberg & Kaufman, 2010).
Each of these tensions holds implications for our understanding of creativity as an individual and/or collaborative enterprise. In the following, I address each of these tensions in turn, briefly, as a means to outlining the collaborative creative possibilities within each âtensionâ.
General Versus Domain-Specific Views of Creativity
Advances in creative cognition in the 1990s presented the view that creativity arises from ordinary cognitive processes employed at an optimal level (e.g., Smith, Ward, & Finke, 1995). Such research presents creativity as a mental phenomenon or general capacity that can be developed through training and is therefore within the grasp of all. As the development of the capacity for creative thought and activity has come to be viewed as an essential component of school curricula in a number of countries, the cultivation of mental skills, habits and dispositions that are believed to support creativity has become a focus. These include the capacity to: collaborate with others (Craft, Cremin, & Burnard, 2008); to persist, be independent and self-reliant (Johnson, 2007); to engage in critical self-reflection and leverage failures to advantage (Gardner, 1997); to pay attention (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996); and to tolerate ambiguity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). In addition, curiosity and drive (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Kashdan & Fincham, 2002), and ideational fluency (Sawyer, 2003a), are viewed as important qualities to develop. Despite the recognition of these dimensions, the term âcreativityâ rarely occurs without a modifier (e.g. musical creativity), and those skills, habits and dispositions identified above are only recognizable when implemented in a specific domain of practice.
Those researching the development of expertise â arguably a component of advanced creative thought and practice â have identified deep domain knowledge, coupled with supportive âenvironmental conditionsâ and âappropriate training (deliberate practice)â (Ericsson, Nandagopal, & Roring, 2005, p. 291), as being fundamental to the development of expert (creative) practice in any domain. More recently, Ericsson and colleagues comment:
The development of genuine expertise requires struggle, sacrifice, and honest, often painful self-assessment. There are no shortcuts. It will take you at least a decade to achieve expertise, and you will need to invest that time wisely, by engaging in âdeliberateâ practice â practice that focuses on tasks beyond your current level of competence and comfort. You will need a well-informed coach not only to guide you through deliberate practice but also to help you learn how to coach yourself. (Ericsson, Prietula, & Cokely, 2007, p. 116)
Here Ericsson and colleagues emphasize the need for both domain knowledge and skills developed through âdeliberateâ practice and the more general skills of being able to âcoach yourselfâ.
Rather than categorize creativity as either a general mental capacity or a domain-specific capacity, Teresa Amabile (1983, 1996, 2013) brought together these two components of creative thought and activity in a social componential model of creativity. In this model Amabile identifies four components supporting creative thought and practice, those of: domain-relevant skills (skills and knowledge relevant to the discipline); creativity-relevant processes (including thinking styles that embrace complexity, ambiguity and focused effort); task motivation (including intrinsic and extrinsic motivators); and the social environment. This latter includes extrinsic motivators and deterrents, affordances and obstacles. As Simonton notes, investigations of the disciplinary environment (or domain) have âamply proven that creativity cannot be divorced from its disciplinary contextâ (2000, p. 155).
In short, rather than view creativity as either a domain-specific or general mental capacity, these researchers emphasize the need to develop both advanced skills and knowledge in the domain, and the general mental capacities and behaviours to support the use of these skills and knowledge. Importantly, in recognizing the intersections between the social environment, motivating factors, and domain and creativity relevant skills, the collaborative possibilities of creative thought and practice are brought to the fore.
The Defining Dimensions of Creativity
Over the last several decades considerable attention has been given to the definition and measurement of creativity. E. Paul Torrance (1962) provided one of the earliest attempts to define and measure individual creativity. His initial description emphasized novelty of the product and the unique qualities of the individual creator as the defining characteristics: âThe emergence of a novel relational product, growing out of the uniqueness of the individual on the one hand and materials, events, people and the circumstances of his life on the otherâ (p. 139).
In subsequent definitions of creativity, novelty was viewed as an insufficient criterion, and the concepts of appropriateness or social value emerged as additional characteristics of creative products. For example, Amabile and Tighe (1993) suggested that âa product or response cannot merely be different for the sake of difference; it must also be appropriate, correct, useful, valuable, or expressive of meaningâ (p. 9). Others supported this notion, with Gardner (1993a) describing a creative individual as one who âregularly solves problems, fashions products, or defines new questions in a domain in a way that is initially considered novel but that ultimately becomes accepted in a particular cultural settingâ (p. 35). This view of creativity as the generation of ânovel, socially valued productsâ (Mumford, Reiter-Palmon, & Redmond, 1994, p. 3) was largely accepted and was reinforced in ensuing definitions such as the following: âCreativity is the ability to produce work that is both novel (i.e., original, unexpected) and appropriate (i.e., useful, adaptive concerning task constraints)â (Sternberg & Lubart, 1999, p. 3).
The recognition of novelty and appropriateness â understood variously as appropriate, useful, socially valued â as defining features of creativity sat well with the development of âsystemsâ models of creativity, in particular as set out by Csikszentmihalyi (1996). For Csikszentmihalyi, creativity is evident in those products (or events) arising from the efforts of person(s) working in a specific domain of practice, which are judged to be innovative and appropriate by expert practitioners in the field. The consideration of the role of a field of domain experts in this model brought another consideration into the definition of creativity; that is, that in addition to being novel and appropriate, creative work must be recognized by others to effect significant change in a domain (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, p. 8).
These views of the defining dimensions of creativity may be troubled on a number of levels (Gruys, Munshi & Dewett, 2011). Accounts of creativity that demand significant change to a domain as a defining feature would seem to relegate creative thought and practice to the work of very few. Further, within many domains, including Western Classical Music, radical domain-changing novelty is not necessarily a goal of creative practitioners. Sternberg addresses this issue through the propulsion theory of creativity, proposing three variants of creative work, specifically:
1. paradigm preserving contributions that leave the field where it is through replication and/or re-definition;
2. paradigm preserving contributions that move the field forward in the direction it is already going through forward incrementation and/or advanced forward incrementation; and
3. paradigm-rejecting contributions that move the field in a new direction from an existing or pre-existing starting point through redirection, reconstruction/redirection, re-initiation, and/or integration. (Sternberg, 2003)
Within this model, the emphasis on appropriateness versus novelty changes in relation to the degree to which the work seeks to replicate, move the domain forward incrementally, or move the domain in a new direction. Sternberg (1999) suggests that the most common form of creative thought and activity is that of forward incrementation, occurring when a creative product or event moves a domain forward without changing its trajectory (p. 91).
More recently, others have suggested that the emphasis on novelty in definitions of creativity results in âcompulsory individualismâ, âcompulsory innovationâ and âthe compulsory valorisation of the putatively newâ (Osborne, 2003, p. 507) leading to an ineluctably individualist, modernist and teleological view of creativity (Rehn & De Cock, 2008). However, when we view creativity as a collaborative enterprise, individual ownership of ideas, practices and products, and the assignation of novelty and usefulness, becomes troubled.
The Parameters of Creative Thought and Practice
Whilst the dual characteristics of novelty and appropriateness have been viewed as key to any definition of a creative product, a number of researchers have posed the question: âNovel for whom?â This has given rise to a view of creativity as occurring across a continuum ranging from small âcâ creativity, that which is personally meaningful but not domain changing, to Big âCâ creativity, that which leads to a significant change in a domain of practice (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, 1998). Exponents of little âcâ, or everyday creativity (Richards, 2007), recognize the ways in which individuals engage in creative practice through fashioning products and events that require the exercise of imaginative capacities that transform aspects of their day-to-day existence (for example, undertaking home renovations, or cooking elaborate meals) but have no effect on the larger domain of practice. Margaret Boden (2004) describes such creative activity and the products that arise from this, as âPâ or âPsychologicalâ creativity; that is, creative thought and practice that is significant to the individual only. Boden contrasts this with âHâ or âHistoricalâ creativity, that creative thought and practice that effects significant change and endures over time. More recently, Kaufman and Beghetto (2009) have proposed intermediary levels of creative thought and practice including: mini-c, little-c, Pro-C, and Big-C creativity describing the differentiation between these levels as follows:
⢠mini-c ânovel and personally meaningful interpretations of experiences, actions and eventsâ (2009, p. 3);
⢠little-c âeveryday innovationâ (2009, p. 2);
⢠Pro-C âthe developmental and effortful progression beyond little-câ (2009, p. 5); and
⢠Big-C significant contribution to a domain leading to change.
These researchers suggest that creativity occurs across a continuum that ranges from personally meaningful but socially insignificant thought and practice to domain-changing and socially significant thought and practice. This account admits the possibility of young children undertaking creative thought and practice (mini-c) through engaging their âbeginnerâs mindâ aspects of creativity (e.g. âopenness to new experiences, active observation, and willingness to be surprised and explore the unknownâ (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009, p. 4). As domain knowledge and skills are acquired and consolidated (little-c), movement from little-c to Pro-C activity is characterized by informal and formal apprenticeships in which individuals âwork with an older, more experienced colleague or mentorâ (2009, p. 7). An example of this latter is evidenced in the relationships that hold between advanced student-composers and composer-teachers working in a tertiary setting. Findings from a case-study investigation of the teaching and learning processes in this setting (Barrett & Gromko, 2007) suggest that collaborative processes support and sustain the development of the studentsâ work in what might be viewed as a form of collaborative creativity. Further examples of Pro-C activity might include those professionals contributing to the domain through paradigm-preserving (Sternberg, 2003) contributions rather than paradigm-rejecting contributions that move the field in a new direction. These latter might be viewed as examples of Big-C creativity.
Individual versus Social Views of Creativity
In the seminal text Creativity: Flow and the psychology of discovery and invention (1996), psychologist Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi posed the question âwhere is creativityâ rather than âwhoâ or âwhatâ is creative. In doing so, Csikszentmihalyi reminded us that creative thought and practice does not rest solely in the individual as an attribute of mind and/or personality. Rather, for a product or event to be judged to be creative there must be recognition and agreement by knowledgeable others (the social field, comprised of other expert practitioners, critics, teachers, and institutional gate-keepers) that the contribution to the cultural domain ...