Chapter 1
Introduction
What makes people harm, injure, or kill animals?
The aim of this book is to answer that question through an evaluation of the reasons why people harm, inflict injury on, torture or kill animals and why they take them from the wild or use them in âsportsâ which ultimately result in the animalâs death. It considers the ethical and value judgements individuals and groups make about animals and the acceptability of harm caused to animals, as well as the neutralizations and justifications that are used to justify action towards animals that society generally finds unacceptable. The aim of this book is to situate animal abuse, wildlife crime, the illegal trade in wildlife and other unlawful activities directed at animals firmly within green criminology, where perspectives on species justice consider the responsibility man owes to other species as part of broader ecological concerns.
The bookâs origins are in research into wildlife crime conducted since 2000 (and which is ongoing) and which initially identified that while criminal justice policy generally treats all wildlife offenders as if they are rational actors motivated primarily by profit, the reality is that a variety of motivations and behaviours go to make up wildlife crime and various forms of animal abuse. In effect, this book attempts to outline the characteristics of the animal offender, dealing specifically with criminality and criminal behaviour involving animals. The book uses the term âanimal harmâ (defined more explicitly in Chapter 2) to cover a range of activities directed at animals but which inevitably result in some form of harm whether physical or psychological. Analysis of animal harm provides for in-depth analysis of criminality and criminal behaviour in a variety of different ways. Attitudes towards animals both on the part of the offenders who harm them and the society which punishes, or in some cases allows the harm to continue, reveal much about tolerance for different forms of violence within society, sympathy towards the suffering of others, the capacity for empathy (Beetz 2009), or an inclination towards violence or other forms of antisocial behaviour (Linzey 2009). As a result, animal harm has importance as an area of study both in its own right as a particular type of crime, and as part of mainstream criminology. However the central contention of this book is that animal harm and offending against animals is a distinct type of criminality, albeit one that has many dimensions, and needs to be seen as such by criminologists, criminal justice policymakers and legislators, although as this chapter will outline, in practice, legislation already reflects differences in types of animal harm.
This chapter provides an overview of the legal protection of animals (domestic and wildlife), discussing both core concepts in international animal/wildlife protection law and the principles behind national laws. Before considering the specific types of animal harm (and their causes) discussed elsewhere in this book, the chapter examines the nature of animal protection legislation and the ethical and policy perspectives that define animal abuse and wildlife crime as illegal activity prohibited by law. It sets out the scope of the book as dealing with animal abuse and wildlife crime as a combined topic notwithstanding the differences in criminality inherent in specific animal harm activities discussed throughout the book. Whiteâs (2008) green criminology notion of animal rights and species justice deals with animal abuse and suffering, although a distinction should be made between crimes involving and impacting on animals in the wild, and animal cruelty offences that mainly involve domesticated or farmed animals. There is considerable academic literature on animal abuse (e.g. Felthous and Kellert 1987, Conboy-Hill 2000, Henry 2004, Linzey 2009), in particular on how animal abuse can be an indicator of future offending or antisocial behaviour personality disorders. This bookâs focus is illegal animal harm, i.e. activities already prohibited by legislation whether directly or indirectly. But rather than there being cohesive animal harm legislation a range of legislation has been enacted to address multiple animal harm problems incorporating principles of conservation, animal protection, animal welfare, animal cruelty and the commercial exploitation of animals. Animal harm might be prohibited under any of these legislative categories and the distinction between companion animal abuse, which is often associated with other relationships (i.e. human ones) within the family or wider domestic environment, and the abuse or exploitation of wild animals is an important one which is explored further.
Animal Harm as Green Criminology
Although now recognized as a legitimate field of study, one potential difficulty for green criminology is in framing harms to the environment (incorporating environmental criminology and ecological justice) as a distinct area of study somehow separate from other criminological concerns. As Peelo and Soothill identify, criminology âappears as a relatively dull subject in which data and theory are used to unpick all that people of âcommon senseâ know to be obvious truths about the state of crime in Britain and America todayâ (2005: ix). Yet green criminology at its best attempts to both challenge and indeed overturn many common-sense notions of crime to reveal and challenge the reality of harms with wider social impact and negative consequences for the environment and human relations. In the specific context area of humanâanimal relationships and species justice, green criminology is uniquely placed to promote news ways of thinking about our attitudes towards and exploitation of animals as an integral part of mainstream criminal justice, albeit one worthy of dedicated study as a distinct aspect of criminality.
White contends that âthere is no green criminological theory as suchâ (2008: 14) but there is instead a green âperspectiveâ which explicitly considers environmental issues (broadly construed) as part of criminology. However, within green criminology there are a set of theories relating to humanâanimal interactions which explore different aspects of animal harm and ecological justice. When taken together these theories coherently theorize that criminality negatively impacting on animals and their environments is of importance not only because such criminality reveals much about human behaviour but also because of its wider social impact. The implication of the green perspective is that harm to animals causes harm to wider human society.
Benton suggests that âit is widely recognized that members of other animal species and the rest of non-human nature urgently need to be protected from destructive human activitiesâ (1998: 149). Contemporary notions of justice must, therefore, extend beyond traditional human ideals of justice as a punitive or rehabilitative ideal, to incorporate shared concepts of reparative and restorative justice between humans and non-human animals and an obligation on human societies to minimize the harm caused to both their human and non-human residents. An effective criminal justice system arguably needs to provide justice for all âcitizensâ whether human or ânonhuman animalâ (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011) and to incorporate wider notions of citizenship in considering the impacts of criminality. In doing so the idea of justice requires expansion to consider the nature and consequences of criminal behaviour and different types of crime not just on human society, but also to the wider environment and to non-humans. However, within species justice discourse, there are different perspectives on the nature and causes of animal abuse and the importance of animal interests when compared with human interests (Singer 1975, Regan 1983, Linzey 2009). These differences are reflected both in animal protection legislation and in the criminal justice response to different aspects of animal harm.
Social theorists and theologians argue that manâs dominant position on the planet necessitates living in harmony with the environment and ânon-humanâ animals (Singer 1975, Benton 1998, Linzey 2009). Thus violence and cruelty towards animals makes society poorer because it demeans us as individuals and increases the acceptance of violence within society. Within the animal rights literature there are complex arguments about the moral imperative to respect and promote animal welfare and the consequences of cruelty to animals for society. Criminologists (e.g. Benton 1998, Beirne 1999, White 2007) have also recognized the link between environmental and animal protection laws and the development or improvement of society. Increased acceptance of environmental concerns and better animal protection and welfare standards make society better by extending social justice principles beyond human concerns. Criminological research also indicates a link between animal cruelty and violence towards humans (Linzey 2009), primarily indicating that animal abuse is a precursor to human violence but also identifying violence towards animals as indicative of antisocial characteristics within human relationships. Promoting good animal welfare and preventing cruelty towards animals thus benefits society not only by preventing possible future violence towards humans, but also in protecting and improving society by positively influencing our co-existence with animals and the environment and developing a strongly institutionalized protection of universal civil liberties based on respect for and humanity to others.
Yet the reality is that much animal harm remains legal and indeed is positively provided for in legislation. Debates in theology, criminology and the study of animal law which consider the rights of animals and the moral wrong of inflicting harm on other sentient beings are not yet truly reflected in any form of universal animal protection legislation. Instead, in law animals are protected only in certain circumstances and from certain activities (Radford 2001, Zimmerman 2003, Schaffner 2011), primarily according to human interests, or at best where animal interests happen to coincide with human ones. While the principle argument for providing animals with legal rights is utilitarianism and recognition of the fact that animals as sentient beings can suffer (see Bentham 1789, Singer 1975) and that suffering in animals often causes humans to suffer, the concept of legal rights for animals has yet to be widely accepted by legislators and policymakers (see, for example, Wise 2000, Sunstein and Nussbaum 2004, Scruton 2006, Ascione 2008) although the need for improved standards of animal welfare and anti-cruelty statutes has been largely accepted by legislators around the world and incorporated into a range of legislative measures. Drawing on Jeremy Benthamâs ideas that animals deserved equal consideration Singer, in Animal Liberation (1975), argued not that animals have rights, but that humans and animals have equal interest in avoiding suffering and so humans should apply equal consideration to animals, making moral choices that try to avoid animal suffering wherever possible. Crucially Singer does not argue that all animals should be treated equally and thus accepts that animals of different species have different interests. However, the principle of utilitarianism is that we should make our lives as free from cruelty as possible and avoid inflicting pain and suffering on animals and humans alike. For utilitarianism the benefit of animal welfare is its contribution to an ethical society which tries to minimize pain and suffering wherever and however they occur. Singerâs utilitarianism thus provides that animal welfare contributes to the improvement of society and the public good by being a core philosophy that lessens violence in society, leads to a more moral society but, crucially, it does not seek to prohibit all uses of animals where society might benefit from the use (e.g. animals used for food and arguably some forms of animal research) if appropriate welfare standards are maintained. Animal law broadly incorporates this view, providing a framework for the continued use of animals where beneficial to human interests, while prohibiting actions that either conflict with or are incompatible with acceptable use or contravene socially constructed notions of acceptable behaviour commensurate with the use of animals. Initially, then, it could be argued that animal harm is legislated against primarily where it impacts on human animal use, although as this chapter progresses this initial definition proves inadequate.
Principles of Animal Law
From the outset it should be made clear that the animal harm discussed in this book relates to illegal activity rather than any wider notion of harm caused to animals which constitutes a moral wrong. Even though some moral dimensions of animal harm are discussed throughout the text, the primary focus is on behaviour already prohibited by the law according to the legalist perspective of crime which Situ and Emmons (2000: 2) define as
The strict legalist perspective emphasizes that crime is whatever the criminal code says it is. Many works in criminology define crime as behaviour that is prohibited by the criminal code and criminals as persons who have behaved in some way prohibited by the law.
In short, the strict legalist view is that crime is whatever the criminal law defines it as being by specifying those actions prohibited under the law. For example the shooting of wild peregrine falcons (a protected species under UK wildlife law) would be a crime in the UK while the shooting of red grouse (during the âopenâ season) would not be as UK law recognizes as legitimate the shooting of birds considered to be âgameâ, allowing them to be lawfully shot subject to certain conditions. Comparable legislative provisions exist in the United States, Canada and many other countries where game shooting is a lawful activity subject to state control through public law, and a regulatory regime which seeks to control numbers of birds and animals shot primarily through licensing and permit systems. This identifies one of the problems of a purely legalistic approach towards animal harm, that of the inconsistent manner in which the law deals with different animals; defining some forms of animal harm as permissible under the law, while prohibiting others. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and animal activists often consider this approach to animal legislation to be hypocritical, revealing the central dichotomy of animal legislation to be the conflict between human and animal interests with animal interests almost always being a secondary consideration. An alternative approach to animal legislation sometimes advocated by activists is the social legal perspective which argues that some acts, especially by corporations, âmay not violate the criminal law yet are so violent in their expression or harmful in their effects to merit definition as crimesâ (Situ and Emmons 2000: 3). This approach âfocuses on the construction of crime definitions by various segments of society and the political process by which some gain ascendancy, becoming embodied in the lawâ (Situ and Emmons 2000: 3).
While the criminal justice system focuses solely on those acts that are prohibited by the criminal law, definitions of crime also need to consider how criminal acts manifest themselves and to consider those acts not yet defined as crimes but which go against the norms of society. Lynch and Stretesky, for example, explain that from an environmental justice perspective a green crime is an act that â(1) may or may not violate existing rules and environmental regulations; (2) has identifiable environmental damage outcomes; and (3) originated in human actionâ (Lynch and Stretesky 2003: 227). They explain that while some green crimes may not contravene any existing law, where they result in or possess the potential to result in environmental and human harm, they should be considered to be crimes. This is an important issue in animal harm because much campaigning activity is aimed at extending the remit of the criminal law to encompass activities that are currently legal but which NGOs, their supporters and animal activists consider should be made unlawful. Although much animal legislation is not intended as criminal law, frequently it is only through the use of the criminal law and its enforcement mechanisms that animal harm can be addressed where environmental protection measures prove inadequate. The social legal perspective provides a mechanism through which contemporary concerns about animal harm and the abuse of animals which is revealed by animal activists and others could be integrated into legislative policy.
Animal legislation serves multiple purposes and is intended to address a variety of human activities considered harmful towards animals, although arguably animal law is primarily aimed at preserving human interests. Schaffner defines animal law as âlegal doctrine in which the legal, social or biological nature of nonhuman animals is an important factorâ (2011: 5). The notion of animals as property has frequently dictated the extent to and manner in which animals receive legal protection and influences legal definitions of animal welfare (Lubinski 2004). Broom, in his foreword to Radfordâs book Animal Welfare Law in Britain (2001), compares the treatment of animals as property in most early legal systems to the treatment of slaves, servants and even wives as possessions. This view persists in a number of legal systems (including in the UKâs groundbreaking Animal Welfare Act 2006) providing the âownerâ of an animal with the means to seek redress for damage to their âpropertyâ while limiting protection of the animal to its value as property. While some animal welfare and anti-cruelty laws are designed to protect human investment in property, Broom argues that the view of domestic and other animals as sentient beings that deserve respect is a natural social progression âin the wake of a similar developing view that persons of other nations, creeds, or colours and women had such qualitiesâ (Radford 2001: Foreword). Wise (2000) also argues strongly that legal rights for animals are a natural progression of human evolution, societal development and enlightened thinking. The nature of animal law is, however, diverse and goes beyond providing animal protection or regulating ownership to consider issues of trade, contract, tort, criminal law, charity law and several other areas the legal principles of which are not covered in detail by this book. Animal law does, however, provide a clear framework for defining the illegal animal harm that is the subject of this book.
International Animal Law
International law sets out the obligations on states in respect of legal standards. The primary international law mechanisms are treaties and conventions (Schaffner 2011). Yet at present there is no binding international treaty for the protection of animals and thus no clear international legal standard on animal protection. Instead, it is down to individual states to decide the content of their animal protection laws either through public or private law mechanisms, which either consider animals to be worthy of state protection and public enforcement of animal harm (via public law) or as property subject to civil law allowing individuals rather than the state to resolve potential animal harm problems (via private law). Thus levels of animal protection vary from country to country or even on a regional basis where municipal authorities have law-making powers (e.g. state or province laws within the United States, Canada and Australia) dependent on the legislative approach taken and the extent to which cultural perspectives on animal harm are incorporated into legislation.
Quinneyâs idea of crime as a social construction identified that acts defined as crime are, for the most part, behaviours undertaken by relatively powerless social actors (Quinney 1970). But the response to these actions and the way that knowledge and understanding of them is collected, collated and disseminated by different groups determines our understanding of crime. Animal harm is thus a social construction influenced by social locations, power relations in society and the need to both promote and protect specific ideological positions on animals by legislators and policymakers. Western conceptions of animal rights and the growing perception of a need for the legal personhood of animals to be part of law are not universally shared and thus western ...