Understanding Civil-Military Interaction

Lessons Learned from the Norwegian Model

Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317005100
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Technology & Engineering
• Subtopic: Military Science & Technology
• Index: Technology & Engineering

A novel examination of civil-military interaction in particular between militaries and humanitarian actors, in light of the so-called 'Norwegian model' that espouses a clear divide between political and humanitarian (or military and civilian - the model is in fact unclear) actors, while maintaining a tight coordination between them. The Norwegian government has significantly reduced their own military's capacity in the field of civil-military interaction, raising the question as to whether knowledge and skills in this field are necessary. Using a multi-actor security framework, this book examines whether or not the Norwegian government is correct in its assumptions (about both the model and civil-military knowledge amongst military personnel) and concludes that the Norwegian model is a well-meaning but inefficient and problematic model in reality. Although the case study focuses on Norway, the lessons learned are relevant to all nations engaged in civil-military operations.

PART I
Introduction, Theory, Core Concepts and Actors

Chapter 1
Introduction

Military operations are planned and conducted in ways that are unique to their specific contexts. There are also common elements that need to be accounted for in any operation, including coordination if not synchronization of effort by “governmental and non-governmental entities with military operations” (Army 2011). In a quick review of the twentieth century, one can observe and reflect upon the fact that the ways in which military operations have been conducted have evolved in accordance with the changing contexts and (to a degree) the lessons learned from previous efforts. Two World Wars were heavily dependent upon large scale deployments of troops (ground, air and sea), national army against national army; the Cold War in many respects was characterized by a heavy emphasis on technology and the weapons of nuclear arms race, while the 1990s seemed to be the age of humanitarian interventions. Debates continue about what is most effective, what is most efficient – the technology of the “shock and awe” (quick, incisive) variety, or the more direct presence of “boots on the ground”, or various combinations of both. The past two decades have been characterized by what has been perceived as expensive, personnel/troop heavy operations that have often relied upon close military contact with civilian actors (local populations as well as civilian organizations and local to national authorities). UN and NATO operations in Somalia, the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan been the source of inspiration behind the ways in which civil-military operations have developed, generating doctrinal developments in counterinsurgency (COIN) and military functions like Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept, notions like “human terrain” and more. More recently, discussions regarding military interventions look to Libya and the lessons-learned (so far) from this UN/NATO operation, some arguing that the future lies in shared (between NATO allies) burdens, rapid execution, , a combination of high technology (like air strikes or precision targeting) and special forces, and otherwise an avoidance of the political quagmire that comes with interaction between military and nonmilitary actors (Baumann et al., 4 April 2012).

If states and their militaries have become weary of the past two decades of large scale, troop heavy intervention, this might be welcome news to a number of civilian actors who have been operating simultaneously, sometimes despite of, or coordinated with, military efforts. In a recent online article for a Brussels-based organization called “Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection” (PHAP), the author Gloria Martinez relayed her frustration with militaries encroaching upon civilian activities, particularly humanitarian activities, for military purposes (Martinez, 28 March 2013). Martinez’s article is important, because despite the decades of experience that has passed and all the many lessons that allegedly have been learned, she repeats now long held concerns by the humanitarian community regarding the civil-military interface where militaries are perceived as improperly conducting “civilian” activities like humanitarian and/or development projects for military purposes. She distinguishes between UN approaches to civil-military interaction (CMCoord) that focuses on a principled approach to humanitarian action and on community needs, versus NATO’s Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) function that prioritizes the military mission in the civil-military interface, potentially increasing harm to civilian communities (ibid.). Martinez notes that kinetic military activity is addressed and controlled in international humanitarian law (IHL) and the laws of war, but non-kinetic activity is not. Martinez calls for a more focused debate that does not “ignore the difficult questions”, and which addresses the legal implications of non-kinetic activity (such as CIMIC).

What have we learned about civil-military interaction from past experience and what, if anything, do we need to take with us into the future? If there is at least one lesson to be learned, it is that the nature and scale of intervention, when intervention with militaries is called upon, will continue to adjust according to context, and the demands in each case will therefore be different. Another lesson learned, despite the differences between interventions, pertains to the elements of continuity throughout all of these eras or phases of warfare. When we look more deeply into the immediate and long-term needs and practices of operations over time, a constant factor is the contact and/or impacts between civilians and militaries, and since the development of laws of war, a level of responsibility of the latter (employing force) to the former. The contact between civilians and militaries might take place on a small or large scale, but it is, and has been, ever-present. What has changed however is the ways in which we think about the contact between civil and military actors, where previously (during the Cold War and before) militaries could prioritize “strictly military” objectives over the needs of civilians, as that is what engaging in conflict demanded.

The notion of a purely “military” solution is largely irrelevant now. Aside from a wholesale conquering of a nation by another militarily and politically, it is not possible to legitimately argue that future solutions to international crises will not include diplomacy, negotiation with and between regimes and humanitarian and development support, demanding therefore broadly political and humanitarian efforts. Part of that effort may or may not be military. When militaries are called upon, they are by no means the only relevant actor to the crisis or conflict situation. At the same time, today’s militaries (and their deploying governments) are being held more and more accountable for their actions and how these actions affect civilians and civilian/human security. A good example of this is the development of the UN Security Council resolutions on women and security, including the ground breaking UNSC 1325 agreed to in 2000, to the most recent UNSC 2122 agreed to in October of 2013. Militaries therefore need to be increasingly cognizant of “civil-military interaction” regardless of the nature of the operation be it air strikes, or extensive face-to-face contact between troops and local populations, knowing what to be aware of in each instance, including the effects of the military presence in the specific operational context, the presence and role of civilian actors, and how to balance politico-military goals of the troop-deploying nation with the needs of the non-combatants (civilians) they, in the end, are mandated to protect. Thus in addition to being the primary tool deployed for the purposes of national/state and international security, military actors are often also the ones responsible for human security while they complete a difficult, complex, and political mission. Civil-military interaction thus plays a role in the responsibility multiple actors have towards each other to ensure minimal negative impact on human security, but it also plays a role in the military overall strategy and operational and tactical activities. Civil-military interaction can be very influential for the success or failure of an operation where negative impacts on local communities can kickback as resistance to the military objective and to any gains made in providing a secure area of operations.

In this book I examine how national and international mandates are operationalized by deployed militaries, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and governmental/ministerial actors during civil-military operations with a particular focus on the challenges faced by the actors “on the ground” or at the tactical level. My interest is primarily with the military though I must pay considerable attention to civil actors as well. The military is one of the actors that often have the most controversial role in complex civil-military operations as they are one of the few actors sanctioned to carry and use weapons. They are often held directly responsible for, and having extensive power over, the lives and deaths of others, particularly unarmed actors (non-combatants/unarmed civilians). This responsibility does not take place in a vacuum, and is further coloured by the politics of the operation, the mandates of the troop contributing/donor countries involved in the intervention, the politics of the host nation, the mandates of civilian organizations, and the politics and activities of the people living in the area where the operations are taking place. In this book I wish to raise, discuss, and at times challenge, some of the principles and practices circulating within the civil-military interface. I will discuss some of the assumptions made by military as well as by civilian actors, and uncover some core principles and learning-moments that we can draw from as we prepare for the possibility of future engagements.

Many rules, principles, and “models” of behaviour have already been designed to attempt to address the complexities of relationships taking place during an operation, to the point where some may think enough has been done for the operational and tactical levels. On this point, I would argue that not enough has been done, and in agreement with Martinez in her March 2013 article referred to above, a number of difficult questions have not been adequately addressed. To this end, I examine the civil-military interface through the policies and experiences of the Norwegian government and military. Norway employs what can be considered a principle-based “model” of civil-military interaction that is meant to inform the practices of their military when deployed on an operation. This model reflects the principles and concerns of humanitarian practitioners not unlike Martinez cited above, and in this respect represents a national civil-military policy that lies at one end of the civil-military spectrum where humanitarian principles figure most prominently. This is a significant policy move for a NATO member to take, a state that has participated actively in an extensive civil-military operation in Afghanistan where other participating NATO members have taken decidedly different approaches to the civil-military interface. As such, reflecting on civil-military interaction from the Norwegian position is useful not just for Norway but all states engaging in, or contemplating engagement in, civil-military operations. Does the Norwegian model work best? If so, how can the Norwegian approach inform processes and policies in civil-military interaction for NATO and other operations? And if not, what can we learn from past experiences to arrive at an approach that is flexible and responds to the needs of the complexities and multiple actors in an operation?

I believe it can be argued that the Norwegian policy or model is on the right track in many respects, and the research and discussions to follow in this book will provide evidence of that. The Norwegian approach to civil-military interaction employs a necessary precautionary approach that should serve as a primary lens through which military activities (primarily non-kinetic) take place. At the same time however, the Norwegian approach is inflexible and immature or not well developed, and as much as one needs to address the “difficult questions” surrounding military practices like CIMIC, one also has to acknowledge that there are difficult questions surrounding the practices and principles of humanitarianism and how they are used (and sometimes abused). The model does not account for many of the challenges that arise due to different contexts, and rather than resulting in best practices the model can be seen to result in a form of irresponsible idealism that places ideals and principles ahead of the difficult questions and realities.

Until recently with the change in government, discussions about civil-military interaction at the tactical and operational levels in Norway seemed to have reached their conclusion. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs in Norway, Espen Barth Eide, stated during a September 2011 conference on Afghanistan that coordination at that tactical (ground) level did not really need attention, and efforts should be placed on coordination at the political and strategic levels (Barth Eide 2011). Although he was right to highlight the problems of coordination amongst governments and ministries (host and international) both in terms of action and policy, the evidence I provide in this book intends to demonstrate that there are also very serious challenges at the operational and tactical levels. What happens on the ground matters as much if not more, as it is these actors who interpret and operationalize the ideals within strategy and policy. The recent election of the “Blue” government (consisting of the Conservative party and the Progress party), with the appointment of Ine Eriksen Søreide as the Minister for Defence, suggests that there might be room again to open this debate.

The Complicated World of Civil-military Interaction

The international community, a collection of states ideally represented through the UN or other international and regional organizations, has been deploying militaries under mandates to protect civilians who have no protection otherwise, or to encourage democracy, or to protect perceptions of national and international security, or more often, all of the above. It means that as an international community, we occasionally agree that we should use force to provide protection, encourage regime change and defend national security. Often the deployment of militaries is invoked as a last resort, although not always, as it has also been pre-emptive. As well, that “last resort” has appeared with some regularity (Rwanda being one of the poignant exceptions here). Under some circumstances the international community appears willing to risk lives of their military actors to protect a certain set of values (rooted in democracy, human rights, and so forth), to protect civilians, as well as to ostensibly, and some argue primarily, protect the national security and national interests of the individual participating nations. In the past two decades militaries have been deployed on large scales to different operational theatres, but once they get there, some nations (like Norway) are uncomfortable about what they indeed should be doing, particularly when the objectives are complex, and the tensions mount. Debates about “what are we doing in Afghanistan” have not been uncommon within participating NATO member states at some time during the intervention, which is slated to end in 2014. The deployment of a military means that the use of force is condoned, but to what extent, in which ways, and how can it be justified according to the norms and interests of the participating nations, as well as the “host” nation? Do so-called “peaceful” nations and those that support negotiation and diplomacy, which argue for a “political solution”, also deploy militaries? And when they do, how do they address the amount of contact civilians will have with the militaries that use force ostensibly on their behalf, as well as with the civilians who may not condone the use of force at all?

Civil-military interaction speaks to that untidy place where the ethics, ideals, practicalities, and realities regarding the relations between militaries and civilians meet up and often struggle with each other’s goals and mandates. Civil-military interaction¹ refers to the range and nature of contact, from coexistence to coordination, and/or cooperation between national (local) and international (foreign) civilian (ranging from government officials to NGOs both humanitarian and development, to local populations) and military actors in crisis situations. This umbrella concept includes many different concepts, doctrines and relationships, from “Comprehensive Approach” to “CIMIC” or “CMCoord”, from military commanders talking with local governors to female soldiers connecting with women local villagers (see Chapter 2). Civil-military interaction has been relevant to operations to varying degrees since the World Wars of the twentieth century, but it has played a central, and controversial, role in complex operations since the end of the Cold War. The concept is grounded upon assumptions about security (by whom, for whom), legitimacy (mandate and authority), and ethical foreign policy (balancing the need to “do something” for vulnerable populations while maintaining national security priorities). At the tactical and operational levels, civil-military interaction depends upon, at a minimum, a comprehensive-as-possible knowledge of all actors relevant to or engaged within the crisis situation, including different mandates and goals. Beyond this, and depending on the context of the crisis (humanitarian, natural disaster or conflict, peacekeeping, military operations, etc.), interaction consists of a balance of security considerations, capacity and logistics, and competence between actors. In today’s operations, civil-military interaction is extremely difficult to manage, but impossible to avoid.

Many of the actors involved in today’s operational environments, often referred to as complex emergencies (Keen 2008), struggle to find a satisfactory balance between roles and mandates while they operate in close proximity to one another. This is the case whether or not the different actors wish to acknowledge each other and their relevance to the operation, such as whether or not political or military actors reduce or increase their focus on civilian actors during an operation that is quick and incisive (an air strike, for example), or during the long term, focusing on stabilizing a situation. Many actors have a poor understanding of one another, and there is a lot of mistrust. Some typical assertions about different actors include:

1. the military cannot be trusted because they will use and abuse other actors in the pursuit of their own military objectives (including force protection and so-called “hearts-and-minds”);

2. militaries and their political counterparts avoid responsibility to civilians by framing operations as “purely military”;

3. military specialists in civil-military interaction, CIMIC officers, are particularly incompetent as “wanna-be” NGOs;

4. CIMIC is synonymous with soldiers building schools and hospitals;

5. NGOs are corrupt disaster/conflict magnets looking for ways, and funding, to maintain their existence;

6. NGOs mismanage donor funding;

7. NGOs use principles of independence and impartiality to prevent project monitoring and oversight by local governing bodies and donor nations;

8. local populations will only tell you what they think you want to hear so that they can get something out of you;

9. donor nations use NGOs for their own political goals to make themselves look good and to meet their own political goals.

Ideally, a model of civil-military interaction needs to rise above the mistrust, allow for open dialogue between actors and flexibility between contexts and mandates, and assist actors towards compromise and coexistence if not coordination or cooperation.

This book addresses a number of the challenges involved in civil-military interaction generally speaking and with NATO CIMIC in particular, using Norwegian policy, politics, and experiences in Afghanistan as a context and backdrop from which to illustrate and discuss this subject matter. The Norwegian experience in civil-military interaction in Afghanistan is particularly instructive in illustrating the difficulties surrounding the civil-military interface, particularly at the tactical and operational levels. Norwegian military and civilian actors are required, according to a so-called “Norwegian model”,² to operate in such a way that there is a clear division between their activities, largely out of respect for humanitarian principles, but are required to have tight coordination between these actors. The insights of the model regarding humanitarian work are important and continuously relevant, however the approach is not well developed, does not account for complex contexts, and has resulted in a significantly reduced civil-military capacity (in knowledge and training) for the military, while solving only a few of the challenges for the civilian actors. The Norwegian approach is embedded with a critical message to military actors to think through a principled lens, but lacks a recognition for some of the more complex demands made upon militaries and troop-contributing nations in multinational operations (particularly “peace enforcement”), and it uncritically assumes a range of mobility, capacity and legitimacy of civilian actors that is not always accurate. As such, the model’s acontextualized departure point (not recognizing different demands in operations or the important differences between actors) takes an important message and weakens it. Other countries and military organizations like NATO have practiced variations of this “model” or theme, where there has been a recognition of the difficulty some civilian actors might have in working closely with military, or for militaries to conduct what are considered to be “civilian” activities. Some countries have chosen a very different approach to Norway, where military and civilian not only work closely together, but where military engage in tasks that can ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Figures
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• PART I INTRODUCTION, THEORY, CORE CONCEPTS AND ACTORS
• PART II NORWEGIAN EXPERIENCES IN CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION
• PART III CHALLENGES, LESSONS-LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
• Appendix: Methods and Parameters
• Bibliography
• Index