Self-Determination and Collective Responsibility in the Secessionist Struggle

Costas Laoutides

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317057451
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The often violent emergence of new independent states following the end of the Cold War generated discussion about the normative grounds of territorial separatism. A number of opposing approaches surfaced debating whether and under which circumstances there is a right for a community to secede from its host country. Overwhelmingly, these studies placed emphasis on the right to secession and neglected the moral stance of secessionist movements as agents in international relations. In this book Costas Laoutides explores the collective moral agency involved in secessionist struggles offering a theoretical model for the collective responsibility of secessionist groups. Case-studies on the Kurds and the people of Moldova-Transdniestria illustrate the author's theoretical arguments as he seeks to establish how, although the principle of self-determination was envisaged as a means of gradually bestowing political power upon the people, it never managed to realize its full potential because it was interpreted strictly within a framework of exclusionary politics of identity.

PART I
Theory and Practise of Self-Determination and Secession

In the Introduction, I highlighted the importance of re-examining the historical circumstances in which the principle of self-determination was first formed and applied. In Chapter 1, I continue the revision of the historical circumstances that defined and shaped the principle, while in Chapter 2, I examine contemporary theories of secession which are based on a distorted understanding of the principle. Early forms of the principle of self-determination evolved as a means of minimizing religious (papal) influence over the rulers of political/territorial units in Europe, and were later employed as the vehicle for the political autonomy of populations from absolute political authority. Hence, political autonomy lacked, in its early days, elements of democratic substance, given that the subject of political autonomy was not a collectivity. Although the protection of minorities was established as one of the responsibilities in the jurisdiction of the autonomous ruler, it was still confined to religious minorities. Furthermore, due to the vicious religious wars that followed in the seventeenth century, the notion of self-determination was strongly associated with violence and political instability, thus reflecting the negative aura that always surrounded the principle at the international level. In fact, it emerges that, although rulers in the Middle Ages claimed independence from an external authority (the pope based in Rome), political autonomy was not intended as an international norm. It was always kept at bay within the borders of the medieval proto-states and was defended as such by the rulers who cared little about the situation in nearby regions. The early manifestation of the principle was, after all, quite individualistic: “cuius regio, eius religio.” The other issue, of course, that would also haunt the later principle of self-determination and its interpretations, was that this political movement, because it was never regarded as relevant at the international level, was not systematized theoretically.

Having established the importance of the influence of the Middle Ages on the shaping of the new political ideas in Europe about popular participation in government, in Chapter 1, I observe the employment of the principle of self-determination during the French Revolution and its aftermath. It is precisely in the shadow of the Revolution that many countries retreat from the liberal ideas of the principle, thus (re-)establishing monarchical regimes such as Napoleon’s in France. The discussion will point out the violent nature of the claims of self-determination and the competition between elites, who are fearful of losing their privileges, and poverty-stricken peasants. The historical events of the two world wars that took Europe by storm in the twentieth century also changed dramatically the application of the principle which now obtained a prominent national element and was transformed into a political lever for attracting allies. Although national self-determination led to the collapse of authoritative empires, such as the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, it also solicited further the use of violence internally, and the oppression of minorities that did not conform to the principle of national homogeneity. The seeds for the majority of later secessionist cases were sown at this time. In the shadows of these grave historical moments, the principle was also manipulated by Soviet ideology inasmuch as by the political revisions of Woodrow Wilson who incorporated the principle in his famous Fourteen Points. To this end, self-determination was regarded as a political principle without bearing the weight of a legal norm. When the principle was included in the UN Charter, which later became the normative vehicle for movements of decolonization, the possibility for a formal articulation of the principle at the international level arose for the first time. However, this ought to be recorded as a lost chance since good intentions were swayed by fears of internal political upheaval in many newly established nation-states. This loss not only affected the major disarray in which the principle was applied in the various former colonies, but, crucially, is still reflected in the ideology that underpins modern theories of secession.

Chapter 2 will offer a critique of the relatively recent attempts to explore secession from a theoretical/normative point of view. A number of diverse approaches will be examined highlighting the often conflicting interpretations of self-determination. Without the intention of blindly rejecting the premises of those theories, I shall focus on their shortcomings and on possible ways in which we can offer a response to the issues that remain unresolved. The following issues feature highly in my agenda: first, the international normalization of self-determination, and therefore, secession. Second, the need to shift from the national character of societies which, in practise, has already proven ineffective and unrealistic, and, third, the need to include redistribution of resources in a discussion at the international (rather than the national only) level. By the end of Part I of the volume it will become clear that we ought to restore the liberal elements of the principle of self-determination by aiming at the creation of democratic societies and progressive regimes that avoid the mistakes of the past. In this context, secession need not be a negative manifestation of political will, as long as its emancipatory potential is emphasized and guaranteed.

Chapter 1

The Evolution of Self-Determination in World Politics

Introduction

This chapter continues with the examination of the history of self-determination the early proto-phase of which I outlined in the Introduction. As I pointed out, issues such as the relationship of sovereignty to self-determination, largely based on the territorial aspects that were gradually attached to sovereignty, the protection of minorities, the violent application of the principle and its lack of clear theoretical premises, all contributed to the association of self-determination with a negative political climate and instability. Unsurprisingly, secession is a product of the principle of self-determination for communities that did not have the opportunity to negotiate their statehood in certain historical periods, when most of the modern states acquired their territorial identity, also inherited the negative association of the principle with violence and political unrest. The slow approximation of statehood and territorial sovereignty was, at this early stage, exercised by the monarch. In this chapter, I examine the circumstances under which the principle was developed and exercised in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the name of the people. The chapter follows the chronological evolution of the principle of self-determination.

Despite the main shift in the identity of actors claiming self-determination, the issues surrounding the early guises of the principle did not subside, and they were, certainly, far from resolved. In the nineteenth century the emergence of the nation-state and the almost exclusive association of the principle of self-determination with national visions proved the major loop-hole that almost led to the cancellation of the liberal and emancipatory character of the principle. In fact, in many instances, it encouraged oppression of many communities that were found trapped in the national boundaries of other ethnic majorities. In the early twentieth century, the principle was employed, in an essentially illiberal fashion, on ideas that underpinned the social revolution in Russia. At the same time, self-determination was also evoked by Wilson in the aftermath of World War I. The political factors that led to the hacked and insufficient articulation of the Wilsonian version of self-determination at the Versailles Treaty will be also explored. Furthermore, the inclusion of self-determination in the UN Charter in 1945, which placed it firmly within the body of international legal norms, will be analyzed. Having covered the historical evolution of the principle, I shall, then, focus on its contemporary applications post-Cold War and criticize certain aspects of it, such as the one-off exercise of the right, the negative approach of international law to secession, and the unfulfilled potential of emancipation.

From Bastille to Sarajevo

A theory of collective self-determination could only appear in the presence of a democratic ideology which emerged in the modern sense in the second half of the eighteenth century. In Europe the concept of self-determination had two different manifestations which highlight the complexity of the issue and the role that identity formation processes play in shaping the identity and the political agenda of collectivities. In some cases, and depending on the socio-political setting, the concept of self-determination had a political/civic orientation which downplayed, to a degree, ethnic considerations, whereas in other cases the concept was strongly linked to ethnic and cultural factors.

Political and administrative power had become highly concentrated in the United Kingdom and France by the eighteenth century. This political cohesiveness had produced a sense of national identity which influenced most of the inhabitants within the boundaries of the existing state. Political debate in France and Britain in that period focused mainly on issues of political sovereignty, liberty, constitutionalism, and the notion of a society of free citizens based on laws.¹ Already, John Locke and other political philosophers of the seventeenth century, including Algernon Sidney and John Milton, had placed emphasis on civil liberty, natural rights, and popular sovereignty. The emphasis on these concepts exerted considerable influence on France where the ideas of Rousseau and other Enlightenment philosophers found expression in the French Revolution and were explicitly incorporated into the French Declaration of Rights of 1789.

The French Revolution made democracy something more than a mere representation of individuals in a parliament which exercised constitutional control over the ruler.² The people themselves became the supreme authority, the single active principle in the state. They passed from the role of subject to that of sovereign, following an emancipatory path in which the people collectively took control of their system of government. As we have already seen, the theory of popular sovereignty was not new. However, according to some authors, what made the ideas of the Enlightenment with respect to popular sovereignty different was the fact that the electoral body was extended to include literally every inhabitant of the territory (Hall 1999, pp. 142–3). The Enlightenment associated the idea of electing a ruler with the notion that elections should have some effect on how political power was actually exercised. In addition, by ridiculing aristocratic claims to ruling supremacy, the Enlightenment left no other option for the theory of sovereignty than to go down the road of a truly popularly exercised self-government. The result was the idea of the democratic republic, a polity which would be democratic in a twofold sense: it meant that the people’s will would be the basis of the republic’s legitimacy, and, also, that it would have a significant impact on the way the government of that polity would actually operate. Elections would serve both as a test of legitimacy of the system of government and as input into how that system would work in practise; in other words, the people’s wishes and desires stood to have an effect on policy (McClelland 1996, p. 293). With the influence of the new national and democratic ideas, the people took shape, increased its perception of coherence, were called the nation, were endowed with sovereignty, and identified with the territorial state. The logical consequence of the democratization of the state by the revolutionaries was the theory of national self-determination.

As France did not have to be liberated from foreign powers, the strictly democratic element of the revolutionary ideology was naturally emphasized internally. The principle of national self-determination, however, also received practical application during the early years of the Revolution. It appeared in the attitude that the French assembly adopted towards the proposal regarding the union of Avignon and Venaissin in 1791 with France, and of Savoy and Nice in the following year. It was argued that only the clearly expressed will of the populations concerned could justify a change in sovereignty, and before annexation, a formal expression of the will of the people to unite with France should be obtained by the holding of plebiscites. The right to self-determination was not, nevertheless, uniformly applied. Plebiscites were only valid if the vote was pro-French (Wambaugh 1920, pp. 4–10, 33–57; Zirakzadeh et al. 1992, pp. 111–50). A further flaw in the implementation of the principle was the fact that it would be applied only when relevant to changes of state borders. Colonial peoples were not deemed to have a right of self-determination and, moreover, the principle did not explicitly refer to the people’s right to choose freely their own rulers (Cassese 1995, p. 12). Nevertheless, despite the limitations and flaws of the principle, the importance of the late eighteenth century French proclamations concerning self-determination should not be underestimated.³ In addition to inspiring the French Revolution and underpinning British political thinking of the time, the concepts of individual liberty, representative government, and popular sovereignty also influenced American thinkers during the eighteenth century. The leaders of the American Revolution drew their inspiration largely from the English and French political philosophers of this period, and the ideals of individual liberty and representative government were set out in the American Declaration of Independence. Because it was based upon the aforementioned principles, self-determination in the Western European context was democratic, ongoing, and universal in character (Musgrave 1994, p. 4).

However, this idealistic frame of mind did not survive for long. The change in revolutionary policy was inaugurated by Cambon’s Report in December 1792, in which revolutionary zeal carried the day over democratic idealism. The report in effect authorized the destruction of existing authorities in the conquered countries, and the establishment of revolutionary governments by force. From this point onwards, the Revolution rapidly diverged into paths of aggression, as a result of which its own principles were turned against it and consequently led to the emergence of the Napoleonic Empire. The rise and downfall of Napoleon brought the re-establishment of the anti-democratic and non-national governments of the ancien régime. But, despite having suffered defeat in the realm of practical politics for the time being, the new principle of democratic nationalism triumphed in the realm of ideas, and this was a vital fact for subsequent history.

However, the concept of self-determination did not only develop from the notion of civic political identity but in some instances was mainly based on ethnic identity and culture. In the early nineteenth century, a number of German authors began to stress the importance of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic factors in determining identity. One of the earliest writers to express such ideas was Johann Gottfried von Herder who developed the idea of the Volk (people or nation). According to Herder, a Volk was a community bound together by blood ties and characterized by a particular language, culture, religion, and set of customs (Brubaker 1992; Hobsbawm 1992, p. 57; Macartney 1934, pp. 96–7). Like the family of which it was simply a wider extension, the nation was a “natural unit.” It followed that every nation had the right to develop its own political institutions uninfluenced by others and, thus, to express its own unique character in the political realm. Until the nineteenth century, the ethnic composition of a state had been of little or no importance. Some states were composed of diverse cultural elements, and others had a higher degree of cultural homogeneity, but the matter had never been considered of any relevance. However, the existence of an essential relationship between the two was asserted. This led to the formulation of the concept of the “nation-state,” whereby the boundaries of the state ought to coincide with those of the nation. No longer could the state be considered simply a juristic and territorial unit.

Herder’s work influenced other writers such as Johann Fichte, Ernst Arndt, Friedrich von Schlegel, and Giuseppe Mazzini. The idea that nations should be defined by ethnic and linguistic criteria, and that each such nation should govern itself in a separate nation-state, spread throughout Central and Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century. In Italy Mazzini, who was working in favor of Italian unification, believed that each nation had a particular mission to accomplish, which would further human progress. This mission could only be accomplished through the instrumentality of the nation-state. It was, therefore, of the utmost importance that nations must achieve political unity.⁴

Self-determination that emphasizes national identity could be seen in this context as exclusive and particular in nature since it attaches primary importance to the group rather than to the individual (Brubaker 1992). A dualism in the interpretation of the principle lurks at this point in history and allows its vague and variable application in practise, which still characterizes the manifestos of secessionist conflicts. In addition, it is precisely during this period that the necessity to establish a national cause (even when the reasons for secession are clearly political rather than ethnic) emerges, further soliciti...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half-Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• Part I Theory and Practise of Self-Determination and Secession
• Part II Secession as Responsible Emancipation: Processes and Collective Action
• Part III Collective Responsibility in Real Cases
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index