1.2 Basic concepts of climate finance
I define âclimate financeâ as consisting of (1) the finance raised by states pursuant to their international obligations under the FCCC and its elaborations in decisions of the state parties (which finance I will refer to as âstate financeâ); and (2) finance raised through the deployment of state finance, and in particular the finance recruited to the purposes of the FCCC through the leveraging of non-state finance. I will refer to the latter as âstate-leveraged financeâ, which, being by definition non-state finance, may also be thought of as âprivateâ finance. Involvement of the FCCC state parties is essential to both concepts, with the consequence that finance that is independent of state involvement is not climate finance, under this two-part definition.
The notion of climate finance constituted of state finance and finance leveraged with state finance is neither so narrow that it fails to incorporate the main sources of climate finance, nor so broad that it makes it impossible to isolate and study the empirical aspects of the topic.4 If we are to maintain that international law creates state obligations on climate finance â as it surely does â it must be possible to distinguish climate finance, for which states are responsible, from other finance that is not their responsibility and occurs independently of them. Only then could we assess whether states are meeting their climate finance obligations. I will therefore at times also refer to climate finance (consisting of the two elements of state finance and state-leveraged finance) as âregimeâ or âtreatyâ finance, to emphasize the dependence of the concept of climate finance not only on state involvement in its production or generation, but also on the very existence of the FCCC and the international âclimate change regimeâ that has formed around it.
Thus regime or treaty finance is to be distinguished from other finance that in one way or another (and in particular through private initiative) responds to the problem of climate change without instigation by the climate change regime of the FCCC. The distinction is of course artificial, although no more artificial than other distinctions made for legal reasons. The main difficulty is with the element of state-leveraged finance and the role it plays in the compliance rhetoric of states. For while it is true that state finance can âunlockâ private finance and that some private finance would remain indefinitely âlocked upâ without state finance, it is less clear that state-leveraged finance should always be counted as new climate finance, or that a state should be allowed to claim the whole amount of leveraged private finance as its own contribution to climate finance for FCCC purposes.
In practice, when considering the amounts of climate finance contributed, it is tempting to retreat to the notion of state finance as a measure of state performance. The estimation of state finance is hardly free of methodological difficulty, but the estimation difficulties are much greater for state-leveraged finance.5
Let us consider other definitions of climate finance in circulation. Buchner et al. define âclimate-specific financeâ as âcapital flows targeting low-carbon and climate-resilient development with direct or indirect greenhouse gas mitigation or adaptation objectives/outcomesâ.6 The work in which this appears is a report of the Climate Policy Initiative. It is not a legal analysis. Nothing, therefore, prevents Buchner et al. from settling on a very broad definition. The reportâs authors do not require a link between âclimate-specific financeâ, on the one hand, and the FCCC (or another state-level source of legal responsibility), on the other. A different definition is offered in another non-legal work, by Nakhooda et al.: âClimate finance refers to the financial resources mobilised to help developing countries mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change.â7 This narrows climate finance to that which is earmarked for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. However, it does not indicate who is responsible for mobilizing the finance, so this definition, too, is formulated more broadly than my own.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has noted that climate finance under the FCCC is not well defined.8 However, it has not offered its own definition, merely observing that, as a matter of fact, âThe term âclimate financeâ is applied both to the financial resources devoted to addressing climate change globally and to financial flows to developing countries to assist them in addressing climate change.â9 This summary is too broad to serve as a definition in a legally oriented discussion.
The Paris Agreement contains an indirect definition of climate finance at article 9(7): climate finance means âsupport for developing country Parties provided and mobilized [by developed-country parties] through public interventionsâ. This becomes similar to my own definition, if we read into article 9(7) the words âpursuant to the Paris Agreementâ.
I will now proceed to consider the main concepts relevant to the law on climate finance, in the sense of regime or treaty finance. I begin with four concepts that occur together in article 4.3 of the FCCC:
The developed country Parties and other developed Parties [namely the European Union] included in Annex II shall provide new and additional financial resources ⌠including for the transfer of technology, needed by the developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs of implementing measures that are covered by [article 4.1]. The implementation of these commitments shall take into account the need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds and the importance of appropriate burden sharing among the developed country Parties.
Following a discussion on each of the four highlighted concepts, I will proceed to discuss several other relevant concepts which occur in the FCCC itself and in other texts of the international climate change regime.
1.2.1 âNew and additionalâ climate finance
The requirement that climate finance under the FCCC must be new and additional is far from straightforward. As both physical science and law, the study of climate change and the human response to it is partly about understanding the past and partly about foreseeing the future. Understanding the past is hard enough, of course. Even understanding a countryâs recent anthropogenic emissions can be a challenge, and in fact in most cases such estimates are highly uncertain, if they are available at all. (At this writing, China announced that it may have underestimated its emissions from coal combustion by as much as 1Gt CO2 per year, an error that is more than twice Australiaâs annual output of CO2 from all sectors.10) Foreseeing the future is even more difficult, because it necessitates a host of assumptions, many of which lose plausibility very quickly.
The concept of ânew and additionalâ straddles both past and future. âNewâ in this context means new amounts of money, as opposed to funding taken from another development- or environmental-aid programme and renamed âclimate financeâ. âNewâ therefore represents not only growth in a specific budget-line item but growth across the whole of the relevant budget â e.g. growth across the whole of official development assistance (ODA).11 A contrasting example would be money taken out of a subsidy programme ...