Targeting Peace

Understanding UN and EU Targeted Sanctions

Mikael Eriksson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317046745
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In recent years, the international community has increasingly come to abandon the use of comprehensive sanctions in favour of targeted sanctions. Unlike adopting a coercive strategy on entire states, actors like the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) have come to resort to measures that are aimed at individuals, groups and government members. Targeted sanctions involve adopting measures such as asset freezes, travel bans, commodity sanctions, as well as arms embargoes. Eriksson argues that recent changes in the practice of sanctions from comprehensive to targeted sanctions requires a new way of understanding international sanctions practice. Not only do we need to rethink our methodology to assess recent practice, but also to rethink the very theory of sanctions. This valuable new perspective provides recent thinking on targeted sanctions, trends in practice and unique case studies for evaluation. Based on substantial research, this is a must-read for students, scholars and practitioners interested in international politics.

1 Targeting Peace

DOI: 10.4324/9781315611860-1

Following the end of the Cold War, the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), as well as their respective member states in their own capacities, each shifted from comprehensive to targeted sanctions. This policy shift opened up a new area of sanctions research and invited new approaches to the analysis of this tool.¹ While multilateral sanctions practice during the Cold War was limited in scope, with only two sanctions regimes in place in the period 1945–90 (the economic sanctions on Southern Rhodesia 1965–79 and an mandatory arms embargo on South Africa 1977–94), there are currently nearly 30 EU and UN targeted sanctions regimes ongoing around the world.² Scholars have labelled the proliferation of UN sanctions regimes during the 1990s as the ‘Sanctions Decade’.³ The trend towards this new practice is also well summarised in the academic literature.⁴

¹ Elliott and Hufbauer (1999): 405. ² In addition, there have been many bilateral sanctions regimes as well as a number of non-mandatory economic embargoes in place. Charron notes, in a recent dataset, that an estimated 39 voluntary UN sanctions regimes in the period 1945–2007; see Charron (2009): 3. ³ Cortright and Lopez (2000). ⁴ Ibid., Cortright and Lopez (2002a, 2002b), Doxey (1996, 1999), Tostensen and Bull (2002), Hufbauer et al. (2007), Portela (2008), Giumelli (2009) and Charron (2010).

Targeted sanctions involve measures such as financial sanctions, travel bans, arms embargoes, trade sanctions, flight bans, admissions restrictions, diplomatic sanctions, boycotts, as well as a number of specific measures applied on rough diamonds and timber, and so on. These measures are adopted and implemented in order to deal with domestic and international crises, as well as armed conflicts.⁵ From traditionally having been state- and society-oriented (that is, ‘conventional’ or ‘comprehensive’), the use of sanctions now entails targeting, by political and economic means, those individuals (entities) and groups involved in armed conflict,⁶ terrorism,⁷ threats to peace and security,⁸ and international crimes, political violence and human rights abuses.⁹ Cameron (2008), who has written an important legal analysis of the use of this policy, suggests that targeted sanctions nowadays can achieve a number of different goals. The primary goals of targeted sanctions are to encourage democracy, stop human rights violations and suppression of internal opposition, enforce peace agreements, assist in the pursuit of individuals for prosecution before international courts, and ensure compliance with treaty obligations; the secondary goals concern the promotion of the sender's reputation domestically and internationally, and ultimately, to maintain international norms and structures.¹⁰ To these observations, one could also add other sanctions objectives such as preventing and containing armed conflict, achieving compliance with international law, countering conflicting parties’ military aggression, expressing outrage, building support for military action as a tool in negotiations, preventing the export of sensitive technologies, embarrassing the targets, restoring democratically elected governments, settling civil wars, containing conflict, compelling compliance, limiting the spread of weapons, constraining international rogue actors, and bringing suspected terrorists to justice.¹¹

⁵ Cortright and Lopez (2002b): 1–22. ⁶ According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP), there were an estimated 30 ongoing armed conflicts around the world in 2008 (for the latest update, see Harbom and Wallensteen, 2010). Several armed conflicts have been profoundly shaped by decisions taken by charismatic leaders. Examples here include Jonas Samvimbi (Angola), John Garang (Sudan), Joseph Koney (Uganda), Yassir Arafat (Palestine) and Charles Taylor (Liberia). ⁷ Since 11 September 2001, a large number of terrorist entities have been placed on UN and EU sanctions lists. The relevance of imposing targeted sanctions follows the number of independent terrorist organisations and individuals posing a threat to international peace and security. For an overview of the features and numbers of such groups, see Kreuger and Laitin (2004); Mack (2005); UCDP, <www.pcr.uu.se>; US Department of State (2008). ⁸ Over the last two decades, targeted sanctions have been imposed and concerted to bring perpetrators and former war criminals to international justice. Examples include the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, Liberia and Sierra Leone (all of which are currently subject to sanctions regimes). High-profile targets which have been previous or currently listed include: Slobodan Milošević (former Yugoslavia), Saddam Hussein (Iraq), Charles Taylor (Liberia) and the more recent establishment of the hybrid UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (1 March 2009) following the killing of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others. In addition, targeted sanctions have also been imposed to deal with more long-standing threats (for example, in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and in Iran when targeting the elite for its nuclear ambitions), as well as more short-term ones, for example to bring warring parties to peace negotiations (in Sudan/ Darfur, for instance). ⁹ Targeted sanctions have also been implemented against those engaged in organised crime and political violence. A well-known entity here is Viktor Bout, or ‘the merchant of death’, an arms dealer and alleged holder of five passports active in conflicts such Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia and Somalia. While many countries do not experience armed conflicts and terrorism per se, most countries do, however, experience organised crime and political violence; see Mack (2005): 50, and Andreas and Nadelmann (2006). Moreover, officials and government leaders inciting political violence have also been targeted with sanctions, usually for their failure to adhere to democratic and human rights practice (for example, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe). ¹⁰ See Cameron (2008). ¹¹ As noted by Gottemoeller: ‘Nevertheless, “sanctions” may feel better than nothing: they are less feeble than scolding an ambassador and less bloody than sending in the marines. They provide a frisson of moral satisfaction”’; Gottemoeller (2008): 100.

With all of the above in mind, what underpins the current use of targeted sanctions is the rationale of avoiding harm to those actors that are not responsible for the policies which the sender intends to change.¹² By introducing targeted sanctions on carefully selected individuals and commodities, instead of entire countries and societies, the sender hopes to change, steer or control the political behaviour of the target. The way this is done is by hitting the political heart of decision-making power, thereby reducing the political and economic capabilities of those targeted.¹³ Rather than inflicting collective punishment and suffering, which was embedded in the rationale of comprehensive sanctions, targeted entities – both so-called ‘natural’ entities (individuals) and legal entities (organisations and private operators) – are held accountable.¹⁴ Based on this rationale, the shift in sanctions practice reflects the determination of the sender to make the sanctions policy more ethical, legally secure and justifiable than previous comprehensive sanctions.¹⁵

¹² Biersteker and Eckert (2006). ¹³ Cortright et al. (2000a): 4. ¹⁴ One problem here is whether targets are listed as free agents under state protection or in their public capacity. Such separation is not entirely clear in international law. ¹⁵ Over the years, a number of governments have turned to targeted assassinations, the killing of political leaders for preventive purposes. For a legal discussion, see Lotrionte (2003) and Kretzmer (2005).

The shift in sanctions practice also makes it possible to differentiate between three different application areas. A distinction can be made between: (1) sanctions targeted against individuals, groups or corporate entities (such as against senior military officials in Burma/Myanmar, weapons traders such as Victor Bout, organisations like Hamas, or private companies like Iranian banks); (2) sanctions targeted against particular commodities or sectors of an economy (such as timber sanctions in Liberia, arms embargoes on former Yugoslavia, bans on rough diamonds under the Kimberly scheme, or the luxury goods ban in North Korea), and (3) sanctions targeted against certain regions of a country (such as the arms embargo against groups active in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo).¹⁶

¹⁶ Biersteker (2004): 2.

In this study, I will limit the focus to sanctions adopted against individuals. Compared to conventional sanctions that are mostly applied to entire states, individually applied sanctions present a specific research puzzle compared to comprehensive sanctions, as they are able to ‘think’, ‘act’ and ‘respond’ to the polices adopted by the sender. This brings in a number of new factors in assessing the effectiveness of sanctions which have traditionally been left out of the literature. As noted by Chesterman and Pouligny: ‘A micro sociology of local actors, of their interests and strategies, is necessary to understand their different reactions when sanctions are imposed.’¹⁷ Not only do we need to account for personal perception and political behaviour, but also how the sender and the target interact with each other. Most importantly, the focus on individuals is likely to affect the way scholars and practitioners assess the policy outcome of a sanctions regime.¹⁸

¹⁷ Chesterman and Pouligny (2003): 511. ¹⁸ Such interactions can be noted in mediation efforts, public diplomacy, political dialogues, and so on. See Conciliation Resources (2008).

This shift in focus also jibes well with a ‘humanisation’ trend in international politics and contemporary international law, where there is a clear increase in the pursuit of personal responsibility and judicial accountability of natural entities and official decision-makers. Professor Sikkink, who refers to an ongoing international ‘justice cascade’ where attention is put on individual decision-makers, has also made a similar observation.¹⁹ Interestingly, the imposition of targeted sanctions against individuals and groups also seems to form part of a longer and more established practice of holding government officials and individuals accountable for practices that are contrary to the will of the international community. In fact, the trend of individualising responsibility seems to go back at least as far as the First World War.²⁰ Since then, a number of regional and international institutions have been established to promote personal responsibility among decision-makers. Foremost, there has been the establishment of local, regional and international courts seeking to extradite, put on trial and convict individuals, both in their private and official capacities, involved in activities undermining human rights, democratic principles and/or posing a threat to peace and security.²¹

¹⁹ Sikkink (2008). ²⁰ See also Meron (2006). ²¹ Examples include the establishment of the Nuremberg trials (1945), the International Military Tribunal of the Far East/the Tokyo trials (1946), the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (1991), the Arusha Tribunal, (1994) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002), the national process against former Chilean president Pinochet (1998–2006), the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal (2002) and the Iraqi Interim Government's trial of Saddam Hussein (2003).

Returning to the shift in practice of targeted sanctions, as noted at the outset, there is still a fundamental puzzle that remains unsolved for sanctions scholars in understanding the utility of targeted sanctions. How should sanctions scholars go about evaluating this new form of sanctions practice? This and related questions make up the...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title Page
• Dedication
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Targeting Peace
• 2 Rethinking Targeted Sanctions
• 3 Refining Sanctions Assessment
• 4 Trends in Targeted UN and EU Sanctions
• 5 Decision-making, Perceptions and Complexity
• 6 UN Sanctions Decision-making
• 7 Episodes of UN Targeted Sanctions against UNITA
• 8 EU Sanctions Decision-making
• 9 Episodes of EU Targeted Sanctions against the Zimbabwe Leadership
• 10 Rethinking Targeted Sanctions
• Appendix 1: Operationalisation and Definition of Targeted Sanctions
• Appendix 2: Sanctions Regime Episodes
• Bibliography
• Index