In France, as in most other advanced capitalist countries, major political and social change occurred in the immediate postwar period. Moreover, again as in other societies, this period of major reform came to an end with the arrival of the Cold War. From this point the French version of a welfare state began to be consolidated. It was from within the institutional/political context of this âpostwar settlementâ that Franceâs postwar economic boom emerged, lasting for nearly three decades. The specifics of the sociopolitical equilibrium struck in France in its postwar settlement, in particular the relationships between French organized labor and the broader political economy, were substantially different from those of Northern Europe in particular. Since these differences created important preconditions for the later response of French trade unions to the economic crisis of the 1970s, it will be worth our time to review a brief outline of them.
The Period of Reform: 1994â7
Events surrounding the warâthe decline of the Popular Front, Munich, the Spanish Civil Warâand those of the war period itselfâthe defeat of 1940, Vichy and the Resistanceâcreated a large bloc of political and social forces committed to reform at Liberation. The size of this bloc could not conceal, however, its internal divisions around the desirable extent and nature of such change. Gaullists wanted primarily to set up new presidentialist political institutions. Christian Democrats and, to a greater degree, Socialists, wanted a number of âwelfare stateâ type changes. Communists, whose power vastly increased in the Resistance and Liberation period, wanted to forge a new United Front with the Socialists for the dual, ultimately conflicting, purposes of promoting waves of social reform (nationalization, economic planning, income redistribution) to push France towards popular democracy and of keeping France on amicable terms with the Soviet Union. At the warâs end the task of governing France fell to governments formed from this heterogeneous, reform-oriented and ultimately unstable national Resistance coalition.
Organized labor in France was an important component of this broad Resistance-Liberation bloc. The CGT, by far the most significant labor organization, had reunified during the war (PCF-oriented and more moderate âreformistâ elements having divided under the pressures of political disagreement in the late 1930s) and a massive influx of new members after 1944 brought CGT membership levels to an historic high point of 6 million in 1946. At the same time as the CGT itself gained in strength, Communist power within the Confederation grew to the point where PCF control over most parts of the organization became unassailable.1 The CGT had traditionally been a âclass orientedâ union movement in which strong efforts to shape labor market and other action to achieve broad âclassââas opposed to category and particularisticâgoals had always been made. New PCF power in the Confederation ensured that this orientation would continue, with, in addition, the PCF using its power to shape the CGTâs class goals to conform, in general ways, to PCF political objectives. In time the PCFâs shaping power over CGT class goals was bound to pose problems. The CGT had committed itself as early as the Amiens Charter in 1906 to partisan neutrality. The Confederation had always conceived of itself as a component of the French Left, but one whose positions were based on the generalized objectives of a politically pluralistic class rather than those of any specific partisan family within this class. The Catholic CFTC (ConfĂ©dĂ©ration Française des Travailleurs ChrĂ©tiens) held very different orientations, refusing class struggle perspectives in deference to the Churchâs doctrines of social harmony.2 The CFTC emerged from the war with reformist intentions and increased membership as well, but it remained a weak trade union sister in terms of mobilizational and organizational power compared to the CGT.3
Installed in power at the warâs end, the Resistance coalition promoted extensive changes in a very short time. A new social security program was legislated. Several industrial sectors were nationalized, mainly, but not exclusively, public utilities. Works councils for employee representation in the firm were set up in all companies above a certain size. New measures of statutory job security protection in the civil service were enacted. The health care and educational systems were reconstructed. An economic planning apparatus was established. Finally, after painful and difficult national debates, the new political institutions of the Fourth Republic were put into place. The period of energetic postwar reformism proved short-lived, however. Tensions between different components of the Resistance coalition proved impossible to contain once the unifying influence of the war was removed. First the Gaullists left the government, creating a new reduced governing bloc composed of Christian Democrats, Socialists and Communists. Then as a result both of the emerging Cold War and of conflicting domestic objectives in this bloc, the Communists were forced out of power in Spring 1947, leaving government in the hands of the Socialists and Christian Democrats. From this point onwards no further reforms were forthcoming. Government alliances of the Center-Left and Center-Right either had no interest in reform or could not generate the political resources for it.
Union perspectives and action during this tumultuous post-Liberation period are what interest us most. The CGT had firm goals for restructuring Franceâs economic order in these years and used its considerable organizational power to advance them. It desired to see an extended public sector both for reasons of principle and to give governments major new sources of leverage, through economic planning, over the course of capital accumulation. It advocated tripartite administration over newly nationalized firms, with unions, the government and âconsumersâ forming boards of directors. It hoped to see works committees assume a degree of decisionmaking power in all firms, its way of establishing a new union presence on the shop floor (in fact, works committees were established, but rapidly relegated to peripheral tasks, such as recreation and vacation programs, away from any role in administration). And, of course, it backed the creation of new social security and welfare bodies, preferably with strong union representation in their operations. In order to obtain such changes, the CGT acted in two major ways. Whenever and wherever possible, it intervened in the political process, either by direct organizational pressure on government or by indirect mass mobilizational efforts, to see that such changes were legislated and in the ways desired by the Confederation. Moreover, it was also willing to enter into quasi-âcorporatistâ arrangements with governments as long as reforms were forthcoming.4 It quite energetically fought what it labelled the âbattle for production,â actively prevented strikes and participated in wage control programs. The CFTC, much weaker and smaller, went along with such trade union productivism and self-control in much the same spirit.
It is important to underline here that the CGTâs goals in the immediate postwar period were informed less by any coherent desire to set up a mixed economy along the lines which did ultimately emerge than by a transformative political logic. The PCF, which by 1945 had won a dominant position within the Confederation, was attempting to use the postwar months of reconstruction and reform by a national Resistance coalition to lay the political groundwork for a new Popular Front alliance of the Left which would initiate a further period of more thorough-going change. Its goal was to set in motion processes which might again begin transforming the accumulation process, and the social relationships underlying it, away from capitalism altogether. To get to such a point it was necessary for PCF and CGT, first of all, to devote their efforts and energies to postwar reconstruction, for only through successful reconstruction could French society establish the economic independence necessary for further change.
The PCFâs general strategy failed in 1946â7 for want of willing United Front political alliesâthe Socialists chose to ally to their Right rather than to their Leftâand the Cold War. Ironically, certain of the postwar reforms enacted, in large part because of PCF and CGT insistence, provided the most important instrumentalities for the later postwar boom in France. And the CGTâs momentary corporatism, productivism and devotion to labor discipline helped to reestablish the French capitalism which the Confederation, in theory, desired to transcend.5 Perhaps more important, the unravelling of general PCFâCGT strategy occurred at great organizational cost to the CGT, and ultimately to French unionism as a whole. Conflict within the Confederation, fueled both by efforts by Communist-oriented trade unionists to consolidate their hold over the bulk of the CGT, and by simultaneous attempts by these same unionists to prod the CGT to pursue pro-PCF policies, finally led, in the early Cold War, to organizational schism. Almost all of the CGTâs industrial federations and thus most of the CGTâs membership stayed in the CGT, which PCF unionists operated as a classic Leninist âtransmission beltâ until the later 1950s. But a minority of members, plus a few federations (mainly in the public service area of the public sector) split to form the Social Democratic CGT-Force OuvriĂšre, while the very large teachersâ Federation (FEN) became autonomous.