Docta ignorantia: professional knowing at the core and at the margins of a practice
Silvia Gherardi
Dipartimento di Sociologia e Ricerca Sociale, University of Trento, Trento, Italy
The expression âknowing-in-practiceâ focuses on practical reasoning and organising that takes place is working practices. An empirical analysis of the practice of cardiological teleconsultation allows to illustrate the characteristics of knowing-in-practice and how organising is discursively accomplished. The article illustrates how professional knowing-in-practice has an opaque dimension which is explored in terms of docta ignorantia, that is, a mode of practical knowledge unaware of its own principles that accommodates a full range of sociomaterial resources and interactional forms according to the logic of the practice at hand. The concepts of âgenerative modelâ and âeconomy of logicâ are employed in order to analyse how professionals rely on docta ignorantia to accomplish the practice in which they are involved. The generative model of the practice of teleconsultation distinguishes between activities at the core of the practice (mobilising professional authority and jurisdiction; performing accountability on professional, legal and bureaucratic bases; enacting a diagnostic community) and activities at the margins of the same practice (learning, theorising in practice, performing of a professional self and of a community of professionals). While the former activities are oriented towards the formation of the object of practice, the latter are oriented to the reproduction of the practice itself.
Introduction
Contemporary organisational and educational literature displays growing interest in the intersection of knowledge, work and professional practices. One reason for this interest is the potential of new Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and their impact on the traditional way of working, and on the competences of professional groups.
The globalisation of the economy has induced organisations to use various forms of work organisation which presuppose groups of professionals who collaborate at a distance, creating a shared workspace. For such work at a distance, the most critical resource is knowledge and the professionalsâ ability to manage their knowledge interdependencies efficiently and effectively trough expertise coordination (Faraj and Sproull 2000; Faraj and Xiao 2006). Whence derives the renewed interest among organisation and management scholars in how organisation create, transfer and apply knowledge (Argote 1999); how the design of the information and telecommunication technologies supports practical knowledge (Orlikowski 2002); how knowing is enacted and is embedded in the material and discursive context of work (Sole and Emodson 2002; Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2005) and how professionalsâ learning and knowing change in such a context (see Fenwick, Jensen, and Nerland 2012).
This field of studies raises a number of theoretical and methodological problems which I intend to discuss and illustrate here by means of an empirical study on telemedicine, my purpose being to show how collective (professional and non-professional) knowledge is performed in distance work. To this end, I shall introduce the concept of knowing-in-practice, since this will enable me to interpret knowledge as a situated, sociomaterial activity and as a collective practical accomplishment. By examining a single practice â cardiological teleconsultation â performed by two communities of professionals â general practitioners (GPs) and cardiologists (C) â supported by a group of operators in charge of the technological infrastructure, I shall illustrate the generative model that supports knowing-in-practice. Considering two interactional patterns â at the core of the practice and at its margins â I shall illustrate how professionalsâ competence is enacted, how learning and working are entangled and how technological settings shape professional knowing.
Knowing-in-practice and the practice literature
Study of the practical organisation of knowledge, in the form of methods of talking, reasoning and acting, and the association of human and non-human elements, is one of the most important directions taken by empirical studies using the practice-based approach (Gherardi 2011). Of central importance in this regard is practical knowledge, which is analysed from a sociomaterial and organisational perspective, the unit of analysis has been situated activity, and the material and discursive practices that put competences to use.
This perspective draws mainly on sociology, anthropology and ethno-methodology, and focuses its analysis around the concept of âsituatednessâ. Rather than asking what kinds of cognitive processes and conceptual structures are involved, researchers ask what kind of social engagements and material settings provide the proper context for knowing, working, learning and innovating (Brown and Duguid 1991, 2001). For example, Jean Lave, and situated learning theory, puts forward a theory of knowledge acquisition in which âknowing is inherent in the growth and transformation of identities and it is located in relations among practitioners, their practice, the artefacts of that practice, and the social and political economy of communities of practiceâ (Lave and Wenger 1991, 122).
This study adheres to a sociomaterial perspective and it assumes that âthe starting premise is that work activities and workspaces are mutually constituted, in ways that are structured and available for detailed understandingâ (Suchman 1996, 35). This assumption prompts the question: is it possible to observe knowledge as it unfolds and describe it empirically without resorting to concepts such as the intentionality of actors, with their mental and/or linguistic representations, and without having to rely on what actors say that they think? In other words, can practical knowledge be described as a situated activity, and as an activity of joint and collaborative production between humans and non-humans, without having to attribute priority to the former, and without assuming that knowledge precedes action?
The contribution of the concept of âknowing-in-practiceâ in answering these questions is that not only is it possible, it is also useful to describe knowledge as a practical accomplishment which does not require investigation of what goes on in peopleâs minds and of what they say that they think.
At the theoretical level, the entry of the concept of knowing-in-practice into the literature on practices has helped displace the mind (meanings, values or truth) as the central phenomenon in human life and to prioritise practices over individual subjects.
Indeed, the concept of practice, and the literature on working practices, has recently acquired new vigour. Yet, despite the title of the book by Schatzki, Knorr Cetina, and von Savigny (2001), The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory, which baptises yet another âturnâ after the cultural, linguistic and narrative ones, a radical break with traditional programmes is not yet forthcoming, and a unified field of practice or a unified âsocial theory of practiceâ does not exist. The sociological roots of the concept of âpracticeâ can be traced back to the work by Garfinkel (1967), Giddens (1984) and Bourdieu (1990), while its philosophical roots go back to Greek philosophy, and to Aristotle in particular, whose concept of phronesis recently received a particular attention within practice theories (Eikeland 2008).
Nevertheless the return to the study of practice has common goals that, according to Schatzki (2001, 2-14), can be summarised as follows:
⢠to go beyond problematic dualisms (action/structure, human/non-human, mind/body);
⢠to see reason not as an innate mental faculty, but as a practice phenomenon;
⢠to question individual actions and their status as building blocks of the social and
⢠against idealism.
The literature on practice is rather extensive. But it is not yet widely known and a commonsense understanding of practice â as opposed to theory, or as activity or routine â is prevalent. This confusion is due to two ways of understanding practice.
With reference to scientific practices Rouse (2002, 161) argues that there are at present two fundamentally different conceptions of practices:
(1) practices identified with regularities or commonalities among the activities of social groups and
(2) practices characterised in terms of normative accountability of various performances.
According to the first conception, practices are commonly defined in terms of âarrays of activitiesâ which form patterns, nexuses or bundles. For example Schatzkiâs (2005, 471), definition is couched in terms of: âthe set of actions that compose a practice is organised by three phenomena: understanding how to do things, rules, and a teleoaffective structureâ. I disagree with this definition because the principles that organise a practice are outside the action of âpractisingâ, and they precede it. Does understanding come before doing? And do the rules that seemingly govern action, and which are used to explain and justify action, precede the act of âfollowing the rule?â And does teleoaffective structure drive action? In my view, more promising in practice-based studies are the patterns apparent in the activities that enable practitioners to recognise a practice amid many different and contextually variable ways of undertaking the âsame practiceâ. That is to say, practitioners adapt their activities to changing contexts, and it is this situated rationality that constitutes their logic of practice.
While it certainly makes sense to analyse practices in terms of patterns in the activities that constitute them, if we restrict the analysis to this level, we lose sight of what makes a practice recognisable to its practitioners, and of why practices continue to be repeated, that is, practised.
The second definition has an edge on the former because it directs attention to practices defined as âways of doing things togetherâ, and therefore to the social processes that support practices ethically, aesthetically and emotionally. For example, Rouse (2001, 190) writes: âactors share a practice if their actions are appropriately regarded as answerable to norms of correct or incorrect practiceâ. This signifies, according to my interpretation of Rouseâs definition, that within every community of practitioners, discussing and disputing practice, developing different cultures of practice yet identifying with a shared practice and making practice into terrain legitimately contestable by its practitioners are dynamics that socially sustain a practice. These dynamics construct the conditions in which the practice is reproduced. They can be conceived as the everyday work of practice reproduction, and as the dynamic work which adapts the practice to changed circumstances, so that it is once again performed âfor another first timeâ (Garfinkel 1967, 9).1
We may therefore speak of the âpractical knowledge of a practiceâ to refer to the reproduction of practices within a community of professionals. For example, when one speaks of âmedical practiceâ, the intention is to denote a body of knowledge and competences over which the community of doctors has jurisdiction and which is reproduced through institutional mechanisms like a dedicated educational system, through control over access to the profession and its exercise, and through an array of working practices situated in specific organisations, forms of work and medical technologies. Duguid (2005, 113) accordingly talks of a network of practice to denote âthe collective of all practitioners of a particular practiceâ, while reserving the term community of practice for a specific community âlocalâ in the sense that it is held together by practices routinely reproduced within hospital X or Y. Finally, we may use the term knowing-in-practice to denote the situated activity of the community of medical and non-medical professionals which, through mediation with a material and discursive world, performs a p...